Game changers! (2 Viewers)

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I think any ac that could operate within those envelopes would have had relatively the same success with the same pilots or those of equal training.

That's essentially my point when I mentioned the Blackburn Shark - the very fact that another aircraft could do exactly what the Swordfish could meant that it wasn't a game changer. Sinking ships with air launched torpedoes was a given to the RN and it had practiced for this scenario since during the Great War; there was no change to the strategic situation after the Bismarck or Taranto; Taranto was reinforcing the existing strategic situation - that the RN was top dog in the Med. It was aircraft that brought about a change in that however, but land based, not sea based, which steers the discussion away from the original premise.

But we can say that airpower as a means of changing a strategic situation was a game changer, but again, we can go back to the Great War and many earlier prophets warning/advocating its use in this fashion.

As I stated earlier, the locomotive torpedo was a game changer; naval; warfare was never the same once it was introduced - air launched torpedoes were another dimension to that situation; The game had already changed by the time the Bismarck was sunk and Taranto happened.
 
There is sufficient unique characteristics in the swordfish relative to its predecessors to state that it (the swordfish) could undertake operations that its predecessors could not.

The nearest equivalent to the swordfish in the RN inventory was the Blackburn shark. the Shark was developed in 1933, about a year before the swordfish. 269 were built. in many ways it was strikingly similar to the Fairey aircraft, but it did have some shortcomings compared to the swordfish. I wouldn't classify them as sufficient as to claim the Swordfish was a game changer, the swordfish was a gane changer because it allowed a convergence of all the things that are now being excluded from the equation.

why would i say the Shark could not replace the Swordfish in 1940-41. It was slightly slower, but had an engine almost 100hp more powerful. It was a fuel guzzler comparatively speaking, with an endurance only about 2/3 that of the Swordfish 9neither type were outstanding in terms of endurance, but the swordfish had an endurance approaching 7hrs, compared to less than 5 in the Shark) . It was unable, or at least not used , to deliver torpedoes in quite the same way as the Swordfish did. Sharks needed long slow straight delivery paths of at least 5000 feet, whereas the swordfish was able to pull out of a dive and make runs of less than 3000 feet to drop torpedoes at nearly point blank range. It may be that the shark could be used in that way, but the point is, it wasn't, and the swordfish was.

Which brings up the other major difference inherent to the design, the inherent ruggedness of the type. Aircrew flying the type are on record as saying they could undertake operations in conditions that no other aircraft they flew could possibly emulate . Presumably these guys had flown aircraft like the shark prewar, so first testimony is there that to proves the swordfish could do stuff that no other aircraft was capable of. if the comments about toughness are at all correct, no other aircraft could possibly have undertaken the airstrike against the Bismarck
 
I applaud the mention of the SBD - but it was the USN pilots flying an obsolete dive bomber taking complete advantage of Zeros drawn to the deck by the Torp bombers.

drgondog, that is the most oft-told and venerable story of the battle of Midway, and I suggest, it is, at least to some extent, an unfounded myth. The contribution of the TBDs was substantial and went beyond merely clearing the sky of defenders over the IJN carriers. However, I suggest that the success of the SBDs was not dependent on the sacrifice of the TBDs.

I believe I have made this point in the past in the forum, but I'll repeat it here. The IJN's greatest weakness was its inability to effectively deal with a high altitude aerial threat to its carriers. To mount an effective defense with any fighter system including the legendary Zero-sen, the IJN needed both EW RADAR and a reasonably sophisticated (aka 'British') fighter direction system . It had neither. It possessed EW RADAR during the battle of Santa Cruz and the obsolescent (not obsolete) SBDs were able to penetrate the fighter screen and do considerable damage to the Shokaku without serious loss to the attackers. I submit that even had the Zeros at Midway managed to detect the incoming SBD raid, it would have been difficult to forestall it. The SBD raid by three squadrons was approaching from two widely different points of the compass, diluting the numbers of defenders that could be arrayed against any one to something like the Santa Cruz situation. SBDs virtually always penetrated the IJN CAP. VALs when encountering a fighter directed CAP defense even when mounted by the obsolescent F4F, were most often (but not always) slaughtered. In this case, the early and undoubted effectiveness of the VAL against USN CVs owes much to the considerable skill and dedication of the pilots. When the PPI Scope and F6F were introduced, USN CAP defense became nearly impermeable until the advent of the Kamikaze.
 
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drgondog, that is the most oft-told and venerable story of the battle of Midway, and I suggest, it is, at least to some extent, an unfounded myth. The contribution of the TBDs was substantial and went beyond merely clearing the sky of defenders over the IJN carriers. However, I suggest that the success of the SBDs was not dependent on the sacrifice of the TBDs.

I believe I have made this point in the past in the forum, but I'll repeat it here. The IJN's greatest weakness was its inability to effectively deal with a high altitude aerial threat to its carriers. To mount an effective defense with any fighter system including the legendary Zero-sen, the IJN needed both EW RADAR and a reasonably sophisticated (aka 'British') fighter direction system . It had neither. It possessed EW RADAR during the battle of Santa Cruz and the obsolescent (not obsolete) SBDs were able to penetrate the fighter screen and do considerable damage to the Shokaku without serious loss to the attackers. I submit that even had the Zeros at Midway managed to detect the incoming SBD raid, it would have been difficult to forestall it. The SBD raid by three squadrons was approaching from two widely different points of the compass, diluting the numbers of defenders that could be arrayed against any one to something like the Santa Cruz situation. SBDs virtually always penetrated the IJN CAP. VALs when encountering a fighter directed CAP defense even when mounted by the obsolescent F4F, were most often (but not always) slaughtered. In this case, the early and undoubted effectiveness of the VAL against USN CVs owes much to the considerable skill and dedication of the pilots. When the PPI Scope and F6F were introduced, USN CAP defense became nearly impermeable until the advent of the Kamikaze.

Respectfully, the SBD's at Midway had no opposition during that game changing attack. The reason the A6m's weren't flying in CAP at the right altitude is because the myth was true - they were hunting Torpedo bombers. You may be correct that SBDs would have gotten through to make an attack, but you would be hard pressed to predict an outcome anywhere near the loss of 4 carriers arising from almost 'target practice' conditions for the SBD force.
 
There is no doubt that the purported facts do appear to lend credence to the story. But, based on examples from prior and subsequent instances, is more likely to be a circumstantial association and one that is created in the telling not in the facts. Enemy fighters overwhelm and annihilate the TBDs, while no IJN fighters confront SBDs, there must be a connection between the tragedy of the former and the success of the latter. The story also appears to justify the sacrifice of the USN aircrews. But some facts suggest it is a false narrative or at least a poorly-correlated association.

First, the example of orbiting and observed VF-6 escorts.

At about the time the TBDs arrived (0915), VF-6 squadron commander Gray arrived over head the IJN fleet leading 10 'level-bombers", clearly observed by the crews of the ships below and quite likely by the returning Tone scout plane as early as 0855. No attempt was made to intercept the F4Fs until about 1000 and no attempt was made to intercept the B-17 formation that arrived earlier. at about the same altitude.

USN tactical doctrine allocated one VSB squadron for each major CV combatant. There were three squadrons of SBDs and three carriers hit. At Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons & Santa Cruz, with IJN CAP defense permeable, in cases where a single SBD squadron approached a defended carrier, in a variety of circumstances with and without TBD sacrificial lambs, the Japanese carriers were hit and seriously damaged either sinking them or putting them out of action. At Santa Cruz, two opportunistic SBD Pilots attacked the Zuiho in the face of significant but out-of-position A6M defense and delivered debilitating blows that ruined her flight deck.

Perhaps most telling is the timing. The attack of VT-8 was made at just after 0915 AM and was over before 0930. The attack of VT-6 was begun at about 0938 and was done by about 10:10. There was time for the CAP to reorganize and disperse to assigned altitudes Coincidently, the IJN CAP pursuing the survivors of the VT-6 attack were in good position to disengage their pursuit and engage the incoming Yorktown strike with whatever ammo remained. The air battle waged by Yorktown's Thach and Massey occurred at the time of SBD assault and was most likely solely responsible for the lack of a high altitude IJN CAP defense. So to that extent and that alone, does the myth hold some water but credit should be shared equally between the TBD and its VF escort.

The widely held assumption that the full weight of the A6M CAP would have been applied and able to prevent the SBDs from doing their deadly work may be based upon a land-based perspective. The battle field area over Kido Butai was dynamic. It moved with the ships at about 35 mph and was quite large, not the extent of one point airfield or even four closely positioned targets but over the area of a fair sized county (see the telling photo 14-6 on page 263 of Shattered Sword). Marshaling an effective defense over that large an area with limited resources with potential and real threats appearing from different directions and at different altitudes is subject to the limitations of the fighters and systems making it possible to direct them (RADAR, Radio and IFF). In the IJN case the limited range of the human eyeball, poorly functioning radios and the bustering speed of an A6M of about 4 to 5 miles per minute and its climb rate of about 3,000 fpm. Yes, maybe if all 41 or so CAP A6Ms could have been ideally positioned, they might have prevented a total destruction of the three IJN carriers. But that is a reality that is extremely unlikely (and maybe impossible) to have materialized. A very good account of this can be found in Shattered Sword pages 226 to 227. The IJN Cap was in the process of being overwhelmed by the multiple attacks staged from very different directions. The USN's extraordinary luck of that day was that it couldn't have planned the accidental timing of its nearly simultaneous high altitude attacks to have happened more advantageously. That stroke of luck was in stark contrast to frequently mediocre tactical planning and execution (with the exception of the Yorktown).
 
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I should have added that the destruction of the Hiryu was a classic counter-case to discredit the myth. there were no low-level TBDs during the attack by the SBDs that destroyed her flight deck and air wing. The airborne IJN CAP was formidable, undistracted and able to ascend to, or already at, a suitable intercept altitude. Over a dozen A6Ms actually engaged the 24 SBDs to no significant effect beyond downing three of their number.
 
The primary aim of CAP is not, and was not the total destruction of the attacking force. The aim was to interfere with the attacking forces to throw them off their aim, break up attacks thereby degrading the effectiveness of the attack. This was certainly the case for the RN where the presence of even a single fighter over the fleet could make all the difference. Conversely, all the resources in the world can amount to very little. again the salient lesson can be learnt from the RN, 10 January 1941. The four a/c on CAP were out of position preventing them from disrupting the stukas' form up and dives. by the time the fulmars were able to get into the battle the damage had been done.

That seems to me to be the case for the IJN at midway. I think they had plenty of fighter resources to disrupt the attack, and it could even be claimed that they had some measure of success in the way they so completely decimated the TBDs sent in against thgem. But they lacked the technology and doctrine to provide such effective defence on anything but the simplest of tasks. I doubt they could have completely stopped the SBD attack completely because of those constraints

If the Zekes had not been drawn down to deal with the TBD threat, maybe they could have broken up the SBD attack, but doubtful it would totally effective. Successful CAP defence was not something you threw together at the last minute and could hope for a perfect score. it was a hard thing to do. Even for navies that practiced it and made it the focus of their available resources.
 
Good points Pars, and as dd suggested, serious opposition might have diminished the scale of the damage inflicted on the IJN flat tops. Yet the history suggests that every time a squadron (or less) of SBDs attacked a CAP defended IJN carrier, they drew sufficient blood to put the target out of action. Considering the status of the IJN carriers loaded with fueled and armed aircraft, even a single hit would have likely been sufficient to write their end. Irving and Strong's single hit fired the Zuiho's cleared flight deck at Santa Cruz and put her out of action. Of course, at Midway, the damage that lead to scuttling four CVs was due to the readied nature of their embarked air groups. Akagi suffered only one bomb hit and two near misses. If CAP interference had prevented that one bomb from hitting that one CV, and had added its air group to the Hiryu's. The battle might very well have had a less lopsided outcome. The USN order of battle for the afternoon battle would then have been portions of 2.5 squadrons of VF (about 20 arrayed against the initial IJN attack by 2 squadrons of VB and another 21 airborne (depending on the outcome of the first attack) to defend against an attack by 1.5 squadrons of VT. It's hard to say how that battle would have played out considering the vulnerability of the Val and Kate and their demonstrate efficiency in inflicting serious damage. if the two battles followed the pattern of subsequent CV Battles in 1942, the IJN's losses would have been severe while inflicting serious damage on the USN counterparts, regardless of the effectiveness of the USN CAP. With all or parts of 4 IJN squadrons attacking three USN CVs, would two or all three American CVs been put out of action?

We know that the bulk of the Yorktown's air group had taken refuge on the Enterprise and Hornet when their home plate was attacked by Hiryu aircraft. If Enterprise was attacked before that occurred, would Yorktown's SBD's probably had the fuel to successfully divert to the Hornet a short distance away. But then their refuge might have been put out of action in the first or second IJN wave. In that event, all SBDs on board would be stranded and unusable. If one USN flight deck remained operational it would have probably been able to collect approximately 20 SBDs (11 from Hornet on Midway and 10 from Yorktown on a morning search) and whatever else might be already on board. Enterprise might have 25 SBDs (7 VS-6, 4 from VB-6, and 14 from VB-3), while Hornet had, including the previously counted 11 from Midway, about 30 SBDs. The aircraft available for a counterstrike on Akagi and Hiryu would therefore have been at least two and possibly 3 squadrons of SBDs At least 45 and up to 50+ SBDs). Enough to put both out of action if they could be hit. In contrast, the survivors of the first two-wave IJN attack on the USN carriers might have been too few to put an end to a surviving USN carrier, defended by more than 20 F4F on CAP. Nevertheless, there are so many variable in this 'what if' scenario that it is virtually impossible to predict an outcome. All that can be said is that two IJN CVs (Kaga and Soryu) would have almost certainly been scuttled. Likely two or more USN CVs at least damaged. If just one USN flight deck was operational after the IJN's two attacks, I would guess that at least one of the two surviving IJN CVs would be put out of action, but not scuttled. Survivors (un-sunk and un-scuttled) would have presumably limped away to fight another day with far reaching consequences for prosecution and duration of the Pacific war. Absent Kido Butai on the scene, Midway would most probably have remained in US hands.
 
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The SBD is one of those legendary aircraft, like the Swordfish. It was the right aircraft at the right time at the right place. I hesitate to call it a game changer.

The start of the thread defined a game changer as a plane that changed the way the war was fought. In the Pacific, I still point to the B-29. The introduction of B-29 fire bomb raids, and the execution of Operation Starvation in my opinion changed the way the war was fought.
 
There is sufficient unique characteristics in the swordfish relative to its predecessors to state that it (the swordfish) could undertake operations that its predecessors could not.

Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)

Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service. Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so.
 
If the Swordfish legends are to believed, on the Bismarck attack run the observer hung over the side to best-time the drop between wave peaks and crests.
Try doing that out of an Avenger :).
 
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Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)

Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service. Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so.

Why dont you think TBFs could have flown the Taranto or Bismarck strikes? They did a fair job against Musashi and Yamoto, and Truk Atoll. Kate's had their day at Pearl, similar to Toranto.
 
Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)

I think we do agree that there is not enough difference between the Shark and the swordfish to claim that the Swordfish was a game changer relative to that aircraft. The shark was introduced in 1932-ish and the Swordfish 1935-ish. we don't have any definitive information to say the swordfish was markedly superior, but it did replace the shark at a time when the FAA was critically short of any carrier capable aircraft, moreover pilots that flew the Swordfish (and presumably also the slightly earlier Shark) say that no other aircraft they had flown had the rough weather handling the swordfish possessed. I have to assume they included the Shark in that back room assessment.

as far as range is concerned, well, there are lies, damned lies and then range values. I was sheepish to make those claims, but they were on the basis of what little information I had on the shark. What would be needed is operational data....how long the shark could stay aloft with weapons aboard in a fighting trim, compared to a swordfish in the same situation. I know the swordfish situation, its about 7 hours, but I don't know the shark statistics.

Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service.

I agree that we have no data with regard to the shark. that cuts both ways however, we don't know if it could, or could not undertake such a mission.

Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so
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If the RN had avengers in 1940, they would not have been able to attack at night into a constricted like Taranto (and repeated many time subsequently by 830sqn operating out of malta) waterway at night. Taranto is a port ringed by a ridge a shallow depth of water under the keels of the ships in the harbour and a short run in to get the altitude right, the speed right, the bearings right. too much speed or height and your fish will not be able to stay between the bottom of the torpedo netting and the harbour bottom. speeds had to be kept to below 80 knots airspeed, and altitudes under 60 feet (i think it was 60 feet, i would need to check, but the point is the height was very limited). no other aircraft at that time could undertake a mission of that type with such narrow parameters to work with. add to that that the mission needed to be undertaken at night and the issue is not in doubt, no other aircraft in 1940 could undertake the mission, and that made the swordfish a game changer.

The nearest equivalent to Taranto occurred at Pearl harbour the following year, but that was a day operation, with an extra 20 feet (approximately) of depth to play with and torpedoes specially modified to not hit the bottom at the design launch speed of 200 kts. with regard to the avenger, I know of no strategically significant operations this aircraft undertook under similar conditions in its time frame. bear in mind that the Avenger was an aircraft 7 years newer than the swordfish.

The swordfish had some unique capabilities, that the RN used to maximum possible advantage. I would not however call those abilities, viewed in isolation, as game changers. what made the aircraft a game changer was the combination of those rather unique capabilities in conjunction with the torpedo capabilities you and I have both talked about at various times as well as the timing of the whole package. before the swordfish, the continental navies opposed to the RN were full of confidence and expected their super battleships, ships that the RN had no answer to at the time, to gain dominance in the seas around europe. though the airpower supporters had challenged that notion prewar, there was no conviction in naval circles to support the claims. the swordfish (and the ordinance that they carried, and the fast carrier that conveyed them) in 1940 turned that whole situation around and saved britain from one of the major challenges threatening it at the time.
 
with regard to the avenger, I know of no strategically significant operations this aircraft undertook under similar conditions in its time frame.
Abut the only event that may be close in comparison would be the attack on Truk Lagoon during Operation Hailstone - starting on 17 February 1944.

The lagoon is not very deep where the primary anchorages were, many of the Japanese ships were in about 50 feet (15m) when stricken and of course, further out, the depth increases where other ships were hit, too.
 
Why dont you think TBFs could have flown the Taranto or Bismarck strikes? They did a fair job against Musashi and Yamoto, and Truk Atoll. Kate's had their day at Pearl, similar to Toranto.

You need to look at the date, 1940. Then you need look at the specifics of Taranto. Attacks at night, shallow harbour, difficult approach route, slow drop speed.

The torpedo that equipped the USN torpedo bombers was not a great piece of kit. In mid-1943 an analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots showed clearly why aviators distrusted the Mark 13: 36 percent ran cold, 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface, and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total in excess of 100 percent proved that many torpedoes were subject to more than one of the defects, just as the bulk of the problems were still due to the effects of poor air stabilization on water behavior. Better performance at reduced aircraft speeds was small comfort since aviators could not be held down by paper restrictions that imposed serious and dangerous handicaps in combat

In 1940 there was zero chance that the US could have pulled off Taranto given these limitations

Musashi was lost after 19 torpedo hits and 17 bombs had hit her, broad daylight and ideal attack conditions. She had been subjected to attack by more than 170 aircraft. To sink or disable the three Italian battleships, the RN had just 21 swordfish. most observers believe that Musashi would probably have survived if her DC had been up to scratch.

Over truk, the USN committed over 550 aircraft over a two day period of frenetic strikes. There is no denying the damage was massive, but also the resources available were not comparable to the 1940 situation, and I don't believe these strikes were at night There wasn't an extensive use of torpedoes in these strikes that I am aware of. At no stage at any time in the war did Britain have access to 550 carrier borne aircraft, let alone Swordfish in 1940.
 
The Dauntless and Avenger worked the shipping over pretty hard, fighters strafed anything that even resembled a target...and any ship that tried to escape faced surface ships and submarines. And then there were the Japanese ships that had the misfortune to be within range of the U.S. Cruisers or Battleships.

I'm aware that the timeframe is off, but Operation Hailstone is about the only action that U.S. torpedo bombers conducted that would be even remotely close to Taranto or Pearl Harbor in the way of conditions regarding the depth of the anchorage and the lack of enemy shipping mobility.
 
The Avenger wouldn't have worked at Taranto because it didn't exist. First flight was Aug of 1941.

The MK 13 Torpedo was a horrible piece of equipment in 1940-41, Max drop speed being about 110 knots even in 1942 and max drop height was 50 feet. Since the Avenger was supposed to land back aboard the carrier at 77mph while carrying the torpedo and 1/2 fuel so flying at less than 110kts should not have been a problem.

Of course the Avenger could NOT carry the long skinny British torpedo either. :)

What the Avenger could do in 1944 with much modified MK 13 Torpedoes doesn't have a whole lot of bearing on the abilities in 1940/41.

The Shark had a lot less wing area than the Swordfish and used the AS Tiger engine instead of the Bristol Pegasus. If they wanted to they probably could have swapped engines.
Intangibles are control response at low speeds and climb out. Albacore was supposed to be heavy on the controls which would not inspire confidence at low speeds/altitudes even if measured performance was the same.
Swordfish got some the long endurance (over 5 1/2 hours or so) from either a fuel tank taking the place of one of the crewmen or an external drop tank. The Shark may never have gotten the option of the internal tank and reduced crew.
For some reason the RN went with Swordfish in 1937 and I doubt it had anything to do with radar being installed in the plane. It may have been better handling or flying qualities that don't show up in a quick performance chart. It may have been disenchantment with the AS Tiger engine although the 700-800hp versions may not have had the troubles the 800-900hp ones had.

The Swordfish was lucky in that it was the right plane at the right time in the right missions. WW II might have been much harder for the British without it but it didn't really change tactics or strategy. It may have pushed the envelope on occasion, anti sub air-cover in bad weather for example, but that is hardly a game changer if some navies are flying anti-sub missions (even if recon) up to the limits of their carriers and planes in a particular weather condition.

When dealing with carrier planes, especially torpedo planes, you have a 3 prong situation. The weapon itself, the torpedo, all torpedos were certainly not equal. The planes, much discussed, and the Carriers themselves. Flight deck length, catapults (if used) flight deck width (deck storage) and ship length and flight deck height above water affect what conditions flight is possible with certain aircraft.
What combination worked for one Navy might not work for another or even been desirable.

The US Navy got very lucky indeed when the Avenger was able to operate from short, slow carriers even though at reduced weights at times when that had not really been part of it's design specification. Smallest carriers the US was contemplating during the Avenger initial design were the Ranger and Wasp.
 
The Shark had a lot less wing area than the Swordfish and used the AS Tiger engine instead of the Bristol Pegasus. If they wanted to they probably could have swapped engines.

Sharks built by Boeing Canada had Pegasus engines. The only thing I have read that compared the Swordfish and the Shark said landing wasnt as nice in the Shark in poor visibility because of a long nose and a sharp stall.
 
You need to look at the date, 1940. Then you need look at the specifics of Taranto. Attacks at night, shallow harbour, difficult approach route, slow drop speed.

The torpedo that equipped the USN torpedo bombers was not a great piece of kit. In mid-1943 an analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots showed clearly why aviators distrusted the Mark 13: 36 percent ran cold, 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface, and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total in excess of 100 percent proved that many torpedoes were subject to more than one of the defects, just as the bulk of the problems were still due to the effects of poor air stabilization on water behavior. Better performance at reduced aircraft speeds was small comfort since aviators could not be held down by paper restrictions that imposed serious and dangerous handicaps in combat

In 1940 there was zero chance that the US could have pulled off Taranto given these limitations.

Musashi was lost after 19 torpedo hits and 17 bombs had hit her, broad daylight and ideal attack conditions. She had been subjected to attack by more than 170 aircraft. To sink or disable the three Italian battleships, the RN had just 21 swordfish. most observers believe that Musashi would probably have survived if her DC had been up to scratch.

Over truk, the USN committed over 550 aircraft over a two day period of frenetic strikes. There is no denying the damage was massive, but also the resources available were not comparable to the 1940 situation, and I don't believe these strikes were at night There wasn't an extensive use of torpedoes in these strikes that I am aware of. At no stage at any time in the war did Britain have access to 550 carrier borne aircraft, let alone Swordfish in 1940.

I don't disagree with anything you've said here except for the emboldened statement above which is presumably based in equal part upon the quoted 1943 report and the bulk of the early 1942 experience with the TBD-Mk 13 combination. Pretty solid evidence, but anecdotally, there is an apparently anomalous moment in the record of the Devastator-Mk 13 combo that some might call its one moment of glory and might weigh somewhat against your statement I am referring to the attack on the IJN light carrier Shoho on the first day of the Coral Sea Battle. During this attack, flown against a defended (if lightly) carrier the 12 TBDs of VT-2 scored 5 of 12 times while executing a successful anvil attack against the maneuvering ship before it was debilitated by multiple bombs dropped by SBDs from VB-2 and VS-5 and escaped to tell the tale. This performance was not isolated on that occasion. The 10 TBDs of VT-5 also scored multiple times (surely more easily) against an essentially immobile target. Also, on the previous March 10 raid on Lae and Salamaua, TBDs scored on an apparently anchored Transport. Before that, during the early USN Pacific island raids, the TBD was typically armed with bombs rather than torpedoes so the Midway and subsequent experience with the Mk 13 may have come as something of a surprise. I've read, can't recall the source, that the early batch of Mk-13s had better performance than later production runs. If true, that information may be based solely upon the early experience or possibly some sort of pre-delivery testing. In 1940, if TBD's were using early run Mk-13s, perhaps they could have pulled off a Taranto style attack. Although the Swordfish had better performance in most categories, it seems as though the range to the target and circumstance may have been barely within the capability of the TBD-Mk 13 combination. If the Mk-13 did not run too deep for the harbor, perhaps....? At Lae and Salmaua, the harbor depth was apparently a factor preventing more USN-favorable results.
 
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