Game changers!

[Shortround6]

Sorry shortround6, still not convinced; your post just tells me that the C-47 did what the Ju 52 had done, but just a bit better; not really a 'game changer' in the strictest sense of the term. My reference to the Ju 52 was specifically to the Lufthansa examples expressly sent from Germany for airlifting Franco's army into Spain from North Africa, not to their use as a bomber/transport. Lufthansa is Germany's national airline. The bomber/transport was not the best in an actual combat arena, because it did both jobs rather poorly compared to a dedicated type. Clearly not a game changer.

Well, the C-47 could carry about 50% more troops/cargo almost 50% faster over 100% more range?

And while the bomber transport wasn't the best idea going the fact that the British had been building them or using air transports for military purposes since the early 20s Vickers Victoria - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Means the idea itself wasn't confined to visionaries or sci-fi writers before the Spanish civil war. The Requirement that led to the Handley Page H.P.54 Harrow, The Bristol Bombay and the unsuccessful Armstrong Whitworth AW.23 also show that the British were pursuing the idea of the military transport even if their execution may have lacked something.

 

[davebender]

Many military aviation ideas date back to WWI.

Air transport.
CAS.
Torpedo bombing.
Aerial mine laying.
Photo recon.
Strategic bombing.
etc.
IMO none of these were "Game Changers" during WWI as aircraft payload and aircraft numbers were too small.

April 1940 aerial transport was on an entirely different scale. Large portions of Norway were seized or supplied using only aerial transport.

One could argue the 1932 Chaco War was the first conflict where transport aircraft made a serious military difference. The Ju-52 was the star performer of those air transport operations. A great advertisement which helped make the Ju-52 very popular for both civil and military use during the 1930s.
Aerial operations in the Chaco War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

During the war, the JU 52 alone transported more than 4,400 tons of cargo to the front

 

[parsifal]

Their entire right hook through the trackless roadless Desert could not be supported by wheeled transport. The Japanese were totally surprised by this manouvre, and it caused the total collapse of their Manchurian army. The Soviet centre and left hooks were essentially pinning manouvres, which the Japanese had anticipated, and were managing rather well.

Because the offensive through the desert was thought impossible for large bodies of men and machines, it acted as a 'game changer". moreover this late war offensive probably did more to change the face of the post war Asia than any other single event. In my opinion the rapid conquest of Japanese occupied China by the Soviets led to the comm,unists in China in gaining the upper hand and gain crucial material advantages over the KMT. We are still living with its consequences.

All made possible by the unique availability and capability of the C-47

 

[parsifal]

This is an extract from Glantz's book which you can read in full under this link Leavenworth Papers No. 7 (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria)

Progress of the 6th Guards Tank Army continued to be spectacular, although the task of resupplying the numerous armored vehicles was becoming a problem. After the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps had secured Tuchuan and the 5th Guards Tank Corps had taken Lupei, both urits experienced severe fuel shortages. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps had only half of its fuel supply, while the 5th Guards Tank Corps had only fourtenths of its fuel supply. Because the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps was short of fuel even before it crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains, it had no fuel when it arrived at Lupei.18 The transportation network, which reached 700 kilometers to the rear, was badly overextended. When the campaign began, the 6th Guards Tank Army itself had 6,489 serviceable vehicles out of the 9,491 authorized by TO&E. Army automobile battalions had only 50 to 60 percent of their assigned vehicles; thus, they were capable of carrying only 500 tons of supplies. This vehicle attrition was primarily the result of the harsh march from distant assembly areas. In order to augment the truck transportation assets of 6th Guards Tank Army, the Trans-Baikal Front attached to 6th Guards Tank Army the 47th Automobile Regiment of six battalions comprising more than 1,000 trucks. In order to transport critical supplies of fuel, the front attached to the army the 453d Aviation Battalion with 400 aircraft. 19 The tank army's rapid advance strained these resources to a breaking point. In order to increase fuel supplies to a level sufficient to maintain offensive momentum, the 6th Guards Tank Army began airlifting fuel to the two advanced corps on 11 August. While resorting to this expedient, the 6th Guards Tank Army commander halted his units for a two-day period (12-13 August).

On 13 August this army resumed the offensive by pushing reconnaissance units towards Tungliao and Taonan. A reinforced tank or mechanized brigade from each corps followed the reconnaissance units as each corps's forward detachment. All available fuel in each corps was put at the disposal of these forward detachments. Other units remained in static positions awaiting fuel. At nightfall on the fourteenth, after a march hindered by wet weather and by Japanese kamikaze attacks, the forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan, while that of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps continued to drive southeastward toward Tungliao and Kailu

 

[parsifal]

I largely agree with your post, parsifal, but I have to say, I honestly don't think the C-47 itself was a game changer. It most certainly deserves to be in the list you posted above - and I agree with the list, but these were aircraft that played critical roles in the course of the war, historic because they were good at what they did. To this list you could add the likes of the de Havilland Tiger Moth, the Airspeed Oxford, the Stearman Kaydet etc for the same reason.

In my opinion, a 'game changer', as Kryten put it, changed the tactics of the enemy and forced new designs through to counter the new threat, i.e. changed the face of the war, technology etc. For example, the entire DC-3 family would be more appropriate, rather than just the C-47; the DC-3 was a game changer because after it entered airline service, airlines could be categorised in either one of two ways; those that operated DC-3s or those that didn't. Those without DC-3s would end up in one of two situations, they would either: go out of business, or buy DC-3s. To me that's a game changer.

Sure, the C-47 delivered vast numbers of Allied toops to the different battlefields, but that was its job and the enemy were expecting that; the 'game changer' with regards to a battlefield scenario that's discussed in the posts was the difference having those troops there to fight made to the outcome of the battle, not really how they were transported to the battlefield. If this was the case, then the humble bicycle, a random horse encountered along the way to ease walking if the drop zone was missed, the landing craft for seaborne invasions, even the humble boot then becomes a game changer.

All these things aided the troops to get to the fight, as you would expect them to do so in a warzone. That doesn't make them game changers in the strictest sense of the term. Their impact on the enemy's tactics was minimal as individual items (although it would be pretty rotten to go to war in flip flops instead of boots!), but the fact the troops were there fighting certainly tipped the balance in their favour.

An interesting thing about the Ju 52/3m; during the Spanish Civil War, without it, Franco's army would have been stranded at their training camp in North Africa and the war might not have gone the way the fascists wanted it to. What's more, the transports were Lufthansa examples!

hi Nuumann

I havent followed krytens definition of what is a gamechanger, because i think the basic proposition is faulty. The assumption here is that technology equates to major changes to warfare or major changes to outcomes. whilst it is generally the case, often it is the way that resources are used that lead to major changes.

In the case of the transport aircraft, the way they were used , their availability, and the capabilities of the aircraft characteristics themselves served to fundamentally alter the outcomes of major campaigns.

If we look at the C-47 (and C-46), in the pacific they helped to sustain China in the war for the duration. Whilst China did not deliver a single offensive option for the whole war the mere fact that it remained in the war, tied down over 40 Divisions of the Japanese, and at least 40% of its Army air force strength. It was a constant and significant drain on limited supplies for the Japanese, to the extent that they could not garrison or fortify their island chains, or Burma properly. This had far reaching implications. The shortage of troops proabably saved australia and india from invasion, which in turn can reasonably be argued that middle eastern oil was also saved, since it was Indian and australi troops in the middle east that stopped the Germans and italians, for the most part 9certainly without them it would have been much harder to hold Egypt).

This was not their only contribution. It was the Australians in NG that worked out how to defeat the Japanese Hook tactics, and defeat them in terrain that previously the Japanese had never been defeated....how did they do this. Hook tactics worked because they were a direct threat to traditional logistics. it forced the defeat of the british in Malaya, the east indies and Burma in quick succession, and the brits at least were still vulnerable to it as late as the Arakan offensives. The Americans were not all that intersted in developing a successful land strategy to defeat the japanese, and given time, they had the resources to follow that path....their island hopping strategy however was dependant upon gaining complete control of the oceans and the skies, and taking objectives at a tolerable cost in lives (something that would have been denied them if the Chinese were not in the war). The Australians worked out the tactics and strategy to defeat hooking tactics, and it required re-supply by air, in terrain that no other aircraft at that time other than the DC-3 could provide. There was no other aircraft that could operate in the NG jungles and mountains to the same extent as the DC-3 (not until the introduction of the caribou was their an aircraft that could undertake jungle supply operations better....not even the hercs). It enabled Australian formations threatened with encirclement to not worry about their lines of supply. they dug in, hedgehogged, and outlasted the outflanking Japanese. Battles were fought and won using this method, completely dependant on the capabilities of the c-47 that changed the entire outcome of the war. Without thye victories in New Guinea, and the avoidance of defeat in China, the Americans could not have done what they did later in the war.

And then, of course there were the operations of the Chindits, without which, the Japanese may well have been able to achieve a different result with their 1944 offensives into India.

I fauil to see how the capabilities, numbers and usage of the c-47 cannot be seen as a game changing aircraft.

 

[michaelmaltby]

..... I fail to see how the capabilities, numbers and usage of the c-47 cannot be seen as a game changing aircraft."

usage is the game changer -- but the plane is/was damn good.

MM

 

[nuuumannn]

I havent followed krytens definition of what is a gamechanger, because i think the basic proposition is faulty. The assumption here is that technology equates to major changes to warfare or major changes to outcomes. whilst it is generally the case, often it is the way that resources are used that lead to major changes.

Based on the fact that you haven't followed Kryten's definition of what is a game changer alters everything. Your examples of where the C-47 played a role in combat certainly prove that indeed it altered the course of that particular conflict. In that context, then, yes, it is a game changer, based on that definition. For you to state that an assumption that technology could equate to a major change to warfare or a major change to an outcome is a faulty proposition is quite ignorant of the actual definition of "Game Changer".

In business, a game changer is defined as something (or someone) that transforms the rules and business strategy or redifines the sector in which it competes. My example of the DC-3 as an airliner changed the industry for ever in the USA and forced its competitors to buy DC-3s or go out of business. The example of the B-29s landing in Russia, which then resulted in its copying by the Soviets changed the entire Soviet aircraft industry, resulting in the knock on effect of how US foreign policy changed to meet the threat.

The Me 262, being a jet meant that fighter technology and application would never be the same because of the advantages that jets offer over piston engined fighters. The Atom bomb; possession of the Atom bomb alone, without its application brought about nuclear stalemate, which continues to this day. These are examples of what I take Kryten to mean in his 'game changer' thread. These examples are closer to the true definition of the term. I don't understand how you can claim that this proposition is faulty.

The definition of a game changer in reference to an individual is a visionary, or a person who is given to audacious or highly speculative, or impractical ideas or schemes. The application of the C-47 in the contexts you mention were dictated by the course of and the tactical needs of the battle. This does not fit the definition.

I agree with your thoughts regarding the application of the resources, which leads to changes in a tactical situation on the battlefield, because yes, the C-47 did do this, as you have pointed out in your posts. All you are doing, however is reinforcing what I stated in my post, that indeed the C-47 belongs in your list of significant types that played a critical role in the course of the war. But the use of the C-47 did not bring about a change in the way we carry out offensive air warfare, that element was already there and had been since the end of the First World War.

Kryten stated at the beginning of this thread that he did not believe that the Spitfire or the Bf 109 were game changers, this then, reinforces my point, because if we take your definition of the term, then both the Bf 109 and the Spitfire most certainly were game changers.

In the true definition of the term, a game changer is not just an aircraft that played a significant part in a battle or an attack (like the C-47, Ju 87, Il-2 etc), which might have changed its outcome, but something that causes the application of that technology or philosophy to bring about a paradigm shift in contemporary thought on how the conflict is waged. There is a big difference between what he means and what you mean.

 

[nuuumannn]

To reinforce my point. Let's take the Nomonhan Incident as an example, as you refer to in your post. The presence of the Japanese in Manchuria has caused the Russians to develop a nuclear weapon, which they then threaten to drop on Tokyo if the Japanese don't pull out of Manchuria. What do the Japanese do? Pull out of Manchuria, of course.

Obviously, the Russians possessing a nuclear weapon in the Thirties would have dramatically altered world events. This would have been a game changer in the truest sense of the definition.

 

[parsifal]

hi neumann

you mentioned two examples of technology that act as game changers. for clarity i quote:

"The Me 262, being a jet meant that fighter technology and application would never be the same because of the advantages that jets offer over piston engined fighters. The Atom bomb; possession of the Atom bomb alone, without its application brought about nuclear stalemate, which continues to this day. These are examples of what I take Kryten to mean in his 'game changer' thread. These examples are closer to the true definition of the term. I don't understand how you can claim that this proposition is faulty.

In the case of the me 262, it changed the design of aircraft, ushering in (along with the Meteor) the jet age. And yet, in the context of WWII what did either the meteor or the 262 actually achieve in terms of combat operations that actually affected or changed the nature of the war. The 262 never got the chance to prove its potential, and neither did the meteor. If you view the technology in the context of the war, and the results they achieved 9per your business model) they achieved nothing really....

In the context of the Atomic bomb in the war, it was certainly a game changer, in every sense. It represented a technological revolution that still affects us and the way we fight wars. I doubt there will ever be a "Total War" of national survival ever again, because of the principal of MAD.

In the context of the war itself, the bomb had a profound influence on Jaspanese resolve and led directly to their surrender. many have argued that this would have happened anyway, but at the very least, the bomb saved millions of lives by avoiding the scenario of national hari kari that the japanese had set themselves in 1945. Perhaps some could be accused of overstating the effect of the bomb, but no-one can legitmately argue that it didnt change many things....not least the balance of power.

 

[nuuumannn]

hi neumann

you mentioned two examples of technology that act as game changers. for clarity i quote:

"The Me 262, being a jet meant that fighter technology and application would never be the same because of the advantages that jets offer over piston engined fighters. The Atom bomb; possession of the Atom bomb alone, without its application brought about nuclear stalemate, which continues to this day. These are examples of what I take Kryten to mean in his 'game changer' thread. These examples are closer to the true definition of the term. I don't understand how you can claim that this proposition is faulty.

In the case of the me 262, it changed the design of aircraft, ushering in (along with the Meteor) the jet age. And yet, in the context of WWII what did either the meteor or the 262 actually achieve in terms of combat operations that actually affected or changed the nature of the war. The 262 never got the chance to prove its potential, and neither did the meteor. If you view the technology in the context of the war, and the results they achieved 9per your business model) they achieved nothing really....

In the context of the Atomic bomb in the war, it was certainly a game changer, in every sense. It represented a technological revolution that still affects us and the way we fight wars. I doubt there will ever be a "Total War" of national survival ever again, because of the principal of MAD.

In the context of the war itself, the bomb had a profound influence on Jaspanese resolve and led directly to their surrender. many have argued that this would have happened anyway, but at the very least, the bomb saved millions of lives by avoiding the scenario of national hari kari that the japanese had set themselves in 1945. Perhaps some could be accused of overstating the effect of the bomb, but no-one can legitmately argue that it didnt change many things....not least the balance of power.

So, Parcifal, based on your response then, you agree in principal what I'm arguing? Good. As far as the Me 262 and Meteor is concerned, yes, you are right, they did achieve little in WW2, but they ushered in a whole new era in aviation - that, I think is the original reason why the Me 262 was offered as a game changer. Glad you see the point now.

 

[Jabberwocky]

The 1940 German invasion of Norway would have been impossible without it. So would the 1941 invasion of Crete. Without the Ju-52 transport the 1942 Demyansk Pocket becomes a German defeat instead of a German victory. Probably quite a few other encirclement battles also. Ju-52 transports were crucial in allowing Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units to rapidly relocate to other airfields, allowing CAS to keep pace with Heer units on the move.

The USA took these lessons to heart, producing a massive C-47 fleet to support both themselves and Britain. But it was the Ju-52 that got there first.

The Ju-52 wasn't game changing.

A trimotor civilian transport with fixed landing gear that could be used for light bombing was hardly revolutionary when the aircraft was (re)designed from a single to a three engine configuration in the early 1930s. It was just a continuation of the G24/G31 line that Junkers had successfully manufactured for years and followed the well worn pattern laid down by the Ford Trimotor, Fokker VII and various other types across the world.

The DC-2/DC-3/C-47 line really was much more of a revolution than the Ju 52/3. It was of more modern design and construction and could fly notably faster and notably further with much more inside.

The Ju 52/3 was manufactured in such large numbers because it was there and the Luftwaffe had little choice of anything else. The C-47 was manufactured in such large numbers because it was the best design trade off in terms of capabilities vs cost, despite all the options that the Allies had (C-46, C-54, C-56 ect).

 

[Siegfried]

This information is from "Hitler's Pre-Emptive War" by Henrik Lunde.

Largest air transport operation in military history up to that time.
582 transport aircraft (mostly Ju-52s) flew 13,018 sorties.
29,280 troops delivered. 21% of total troops delivered.
2,376 tons of supplies delivered.
QUOTE]

There has to be something wrong with these figures. This works out as each Ju 52 sortie delivering 2.3 troops plus 180kg of cargo. (Total weight about 410kg)

Even if a return flight is counted as a second sortie it still comes in as 4.6 troops delivered and 360kg of cargo.
(total weight about 820kg)

The distance from Hamburg to Oslo is about 800km.

I can only think that some of the Ju 52's were delivering fuel, for their own return missions, and that this figure is for 'net' cargo delivered, some accounting error or a misprint.

 

[Siegfried]

Well, the C-47 could carry about 50% more troops/cargo almost 50% faster over 100% more range?

And while the bomber transport wasn't the best idea going the fact that the British had been building them or using air transports for military purposes since the early 20s Vickers Victoria - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Means the idea itself wasn't confined to visionaries or sci-fi writers before the Spanish civil war. The Requirement that led to the Handley Page H.P.54 Harrow, The Bristol Bombay and the unsuccessful Armstrong Whitworth AW.23 also show that the British were pursuing the idea of the military transport even if their execution may have lacked something.

The Ju 52/3m started out as the Ju 52/1m (with one motor instead of 3). It was purely a passenger or transport liner, like the DC-3, built on the aluminum technology Junkers had pioneered such as the Junkers W.24 trimotor. The Ju 52/3m was really the last of that fairly long type of construction and Junkers was moving on to flat sheet. A good aircraft that could be easily built, maintained and with STOL like abilities. The Germans set up production in France.

The reason the Ju 52 was popular is the same reason the DC3/C47 was popular: large numbers were already being built for civilian customers and so a good tooling and manufacturing infrastructure was set up. The Luftwaffe surely would have preferred something else but the Ju 252 and Ar 232 just came too late since no one was going to cut into fighter and bomber production to set up a factory to get a better cargo aircraft. This is essentially what happened to the Ju 252; had it been in even low production for Lufthansa it might have been ramped up to large scale production as it was it just missed out and only a score or so were made.

It's hard to get exact range-load charts but this looks like what a Ju 52/3m7ge might be able to do (all figures rounded)
Empty Weight 6500kg
Max Takeoff Weight 11000kg
Internal fuel 2470L (about 1800kg or 4000lbs) Auxiliary fuel can raise this to 3164L (about 2400kg or 4000lbs)
Range is given as 870km/540 miles.

This is clear the range at full load which would be 2700kg, in reality 2500kg given the weight of the flight crew.
With Auxiliary fuel the range was probably around 1160km/740 miles with 600kg less cargo: ie about 1.9 tons)
(The 3ge version is given as 1300km or 808 miles range so I'm just taking 10% of to get the range of the heavier more power 7ge version)

So in effect the Ju 523m7ge had an radius of action of around 270 miles or up to 370 miles with auxiliary tanks.

Roughly it can deliver 2500kg, 540 miles(870km) for 1800kg of fuel.

Scaling that 1000kg of cargo can be transported 1000km using 827kg of fuel.

With With Auxiliary tanks 1900kg, 740 miles(1200km), for 2400kg fuel
Scaling that 1000kg of cargo can be transported 1000km for 1052kg fuel
(showing the deterioration that happens)



For the C-47 the data seems to be
Wing Span: 95 ft (29 m)
Length: 64 ft 5 1/2 in (20 m)
Height: 17 ft (5.2 m)
Weight Empty: 18,500 lbs (8,390 kg)
Cabin Payload: Up to 6,000 lbs (2,720 kg)
Max Take-Off Weight: 29,000 lbs (13,150 kg)
Max Overload: 31,000 lbs (14,060 kg)
Fuel Capacity (Normal): 670 Imp Gals (3,046 L) (about 2250kg fuel)
Oil Capacity: 48 Imp Gals (218 L)

With a range of 1000 miles (wiki)

Which gives

2500kg cargo for 1600km for 2250kg fuel
Which scales to:

1000kg cargo for 1000km for 562kg fuel

This compares to the Ju 52 requirement for over 827kg fuel for the same distance.

The C-47B which was powered by R-1830-90 engines with superchargers and extra fuel capacity to cover the China-Burma-India routes, 3,364 built
actually does better. I haven't used the overload figures which would suggest greater loads if a long sealed runway is available)

Of course the Ju 52 had STOL and rough field performance better than even that of the DCC/C47 and was carrying dorsal and waist guns. In its normal role of carrying 12 passengers up to 400 miles it was perfectly adequate.

When used in Stalingrad its bases were sited so close to the front they were over run by tanks and subject to air attack and of course suffered congestion.

 

[Shortround6]

Those capabilities for the C-47 seem a bit low?

One source claims that a commercial DC-3 could carry 1780kg of payload at 205mph (.75 power) at 5,000ft . Take off weight of 25,200lbs. Empty weight was 16,865lbs Fuel burn was 105 US gallons an hour. Tanks held 600 gallons. Useful load was 8335lbs. Range is over 1000miles (1600km). That 1780KG payload already has the 3 man crew and the engine oil factored out.

Full tanks did hold 804 US gallons and with a smaller pay load (or over load) could give a range of 1500miles (perhaps a a lower power setting? like 185mph?)

A different source (1946 Jane's) gives weights of 16,970lbs for a C-47 and a 26,000lb loaded weight.
At 24,800lbs the take-off run was supposed to be 1000ft. Depending on exact model and load the stalling speed for the two planes was within a few mph of each other. The 1946 Jane's also claims a max range of 2125miles (3,400km) for the commercial DC-3 withe the maximum fuel and most economical cruising speed. Payload and speed not given.

While The Ju-52 certainly did good work and was used for the first large scale airlift, it did NOT introduce the IDEA or concept of the airlift and it proved (more due to it's age) to be unable to sustain the airlifts the Germans needed.

 

[vanir]

The economic situation, particularly in Europe was very bad in the 1920-30s. A lot of what would become major military aircraft were actually funded and requested as private civilian ventures. The Bf-108 (the airframe base used for the 109), the Blenheim was paid for by some British Lord who wanted a private business aircraft, the original Ju52 was fairly typical of period mail planes (ie. multipurpose medium, single engine passenger and cargo liners). Even aero engine manufacture was in debt to civilian flag and endurance racing, neither the Merlin/Griffon nor the Daimlers probably would've existed but for it (they still would've been produced but would've been underpowered and not as developed, more along Curtiss D-motor lines with ~950hp max potential double blown and overboosted).

Given that, the Ju52/3m is a really awesome plane for its longevity, adaptability and simple robust qualities. You didn't see Ford Trimotors, which were copied from it, in use by the Allies in the war.
I'd give it a medal for accomplishment, it deserves its place in history right up near the top, but I wouldn't go comparing it with something like a DC3 in all fairness. We used those in New Guinea and no way the Ju52 would've done the same job as good, no way.

some of those Dornier flying boats though, RAAF had at least one of those it operated throughout the war and gave it rave reviews, among best in class easily, I read of it and that was in comparison to Catalinas.

 

[parsifal]

The main problem for the Ju52 was its relatively short range, and somewhat limited payload. According to Haward ("Stopped At Stalingrad - Defeat Of the LW") the Ju52 fleet, relative to more modern types suffered quite badly from icing in the winter weather.

In any event there not enough of them. Early in the east fromnt they had been used to keep the forward panzer elements supplied, but really, the limits for German re-supply were about a Corps, no more. And in poor weather they had difficulty even then. Demyansk was probably the best success for the germans, stalingrad was their most abject failure

 

[vanir]

just being facetious but it's almost like a corporal was in charge of their military

 

[Siegfried]

The DC3 and C47 range payload issue is complicated by the fact that as engine power grew so does Maxium Takeoff weight: this means more cargo can be lifted without sacrificing fuel.
In additon C47B carried more than the 3046Litres and some variants had an extended wing span. Moreover the C-47 had access to 100/130 octane which increased takeoff power
enormously and therefore payload. The fuel issue (B4/87 octane for the Ju 52 and 100/130 octane for the C-47 explains some of the differences in performance)

My understanding is that range calculations are given at full internal normal fuel load with maximum cargo permissable at that MTOW at cruise speed.
Greater range is possible at reduced load or reduced speed. Reduced speed gets you nowhere in a head wind and irritates passengers as well as wasting aircraft time.

In the C-47's case an overload was possible: this I suspect required 100/130 fuel, a long sealed runway, no obstacles at the end of the runway and probably accepted increased risk of a crash landing if there was an engine failure immeidatly after takeoff. The Ju 52/3m range figures are clearly given at Max Fuel with Max Payload at that Max Takeoff Weight
at maximum cruise. The Ju 52/3mge3 could econ cruise at 117L/100km which would give a range of 2400km at a mind numbing slow speed with little cargo.

Roughly it looks like the basic 1940 DC3 with 20% more fuel than the Ju 52/3m (circa 3000L instead of 2500L) carried the same cargo as the Ju 52/3mge3 some 66% further ie 1000 miles instead of 600 miles.

Assuming a 15% reserve one could argue that a DC3 could supply 2.5 tons of cargo to a base 425 miles away while the Ju 52/3m only 260 miles. This is a huge difference as it
gets the takeoff point well away from enemy fighter attack. The C-47B and better fuel improved these figures. The Ju 52 proably had better short field performance.

Vanir, Ju 52 continued to opperate in New Guinea till 1970. In some situations over short ranges with rough landing fields rugged simplicity, bush mechnic level may be the key factor.

Its worth looking at the Ju 252 parameters:
Crew: 3-4
Length: 25.11 m (82 ft 4¼ in)
Wingspan: 34.10 m (111 ft 10⅛ in)
Height: 5.75 m (18 ft 10⅓ in)
Wing area: 122.6 m² (1,320 ft²)
Empty weight: 13,127 kg (28,880 lb)
Loaded weight: 22,257 kg (49,560)
Max takeoff weight: 24,050 kg (52,911 lb) (overload)
Powerplant: 3 × Junkers Jumo 211F liquid-cooled inverted V12 engines, 1,007 kW (1,350 hp) each
Performance

Maximum speed: 438 km/h (237 knots, 272 mph) at 5,800 m (19,030 ft)
Cruise speed: 335 km/h (181 knots, 208 mph) (econ cruise)
Range: 3,981 km (2,150 nmi, 2,473 mi) with maximum payload, 6,600 km (3,565 nmi, 4,100 mi) with 2,000 kg (4,400 lb ) payload
Service ceiling: 6,300 m (20,670 ft)
Rate of climb: 12.5 m/s (748 ft/min)

http://www.pilotfriend.com/photo_al... Ju 252.htmcraftwwii.com/blog/archive-201108/

Maximum speed was 272 mph (438 km/h) with a maximum cruising speed of 242 mph (390 km/h). The service ceiling was 20,670 ft (6300 m). Range of 2,473 miles (3980 km) with maximum payload. With only 4,410 lbs (2000 kg) of payload range increased to 4,100 miles (6600 km). Empty the aircraft weighed 28,880 lbs (13100 kg), with a normal loadout it weighed 49,560 lbs (22480 kg) and with maximum overload it weighed 52,910 lbs (24000 kg). It had a span of 111 ft 10 in (34.09 m); length 82 ft 4 in (25.10 m); height 18 ft 10 1/4 in (5.75 m) and a wing area of 1,320 sq ft (122.3 sq m).


My reading of this is that at normal (non overload) the aircraft confifuration was
1 Empty weight 13100kg
2 MTOW (normal) 22480kg
3 Cargo 2000kg
4 Therefore assuming MTOW the fuel capacity might be be 22480kg-2000kg-13100kg = 7380kg = about 10000L

Thus carrying 2000kg cargo , 6600km, 7380kg fuel leads to:
1000kg being carried 1000km for 560kg fuel.

As good as the DC3 but over twice the range.

Assuming that when opperating at 2400 miles instead of 4100 miles the fuel load is reduced pro rata to 59%and 10% added; leaving only 5000kg fuel and 2500kg crago added to make up the weight we have
4500kg, 4000km, for 5000kg fuel
1000kg, 1000km, for 312kg fuel.

Much better than the DC3. This is probably produced by a more modern high aspect ratio wing and the good fuel efficiency of the Jumo 213F.

The Ju 252 design was halted to militarise it for a rear loading ramp (it was alwasy duel Lufthansa/Luftwaffe) and then paused to concentrate on more important armaments work.

The delay in producing the Ju 252 may just have cost the Germans a loss at Stalingrad and hastened the Afrika corps demise in Nth Africa. Not only could the Ju 252 have supplied cargo great distances it could do so efficiently (half the fuel of the Ju 52) and it could avoid vulnerable and congested staging fields and the double handling of transhipping from forward train depots to forward airfields.

If you think about it it was a false economy: the Ju 252 could have carried over 2.5 times cargo 4 times as far as the Ju 52 and done so with half the fuel burn per unit of cargo.
In extreme situations it could fly the same weight of cargo 6.5 times the distance for 70% the fuel burn per km.

I would add that burned out engines of Ju 52 at Stalingrad from lack of maintenance and heavy use meant they were restricted from using max takeoff power and this limited loads to as little as 0.5 tons at times. A pitfull waste of human life when one considers the risk to only deliver a small cargo. Again, if one has an adaquet aricraft does one need to overuse it?

 

[vanir]

You're way more read up than me on this, I might mention I've found problems with things like comparing range quotes internationally, as they vary by convention and pilot training. US uses unique NACA developed cruise settings designed to increase range, no other country uses three different typical cruise settings and divides climb/military power and normal takeoff, WER, etc., Europeans have two and one 30-min setting plus emergency or overboost and engine idle, but have shorter quoted ranges on average in the same class.

What I've found with bomber and transport ranges though is the US tends to quote range with "normal payload" or in otherwords in a typical configuration, not maximums unless specified. Europeans tend to be a little more specific, and give ranges at maximum payload unless specified. Eg, the Lanc compared to the B-17, actual loadbearing capacity is within hundreds of kg between them. But quoted figures for the B-17 always use the typical load employed by the 8th for long ranging missions off english aerodromes, a third its capacity. That's also the load for which range is often quoted.

When McDouglas threatened to bomb Tokyo with his B-17s in early 41 the Japanese took it seriously because with a light bomb load they can make it, but they should've gotten out their calculators because it's a very light load.
Conversely, unless otherwise specified in the source, I'd always assume any quoted range for an American transport or bomber to be at typical loads, about a third of maximum.

 

[davebender]

First cargo aircraft to provide effective CAS.

Personally I question the sanity of employing a large, slow cargo aircraft for CAS. But a crazy idea that works is often referred to as genius.