Game changers!

".... operational usage was the main game changer, not technology".

That is usually the case. Pointed stakes and pits dug in the ground aren't high "tech" but can sure be a game-changer against armoured cavalry. There is only so much "break through" technology -- but there is almost unlimited human imagination to determine operations and usage.

MM

parsifal said:

You know something is really wrong when they take one of the most brilliant bankers of the century, Herr Schacht and sack himn because they dont like what he tells them........

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That happened to a lot of people "who knew what they were doing". It really is telling of what was going on in the country at the time. Pretty much the same thing that happens in most military dictatorships.

"... That happened to a lot of people "who knew what they were doing". It really is telling of what was going on in the country at the time".

So true. Immigration is another very telling factor.

MM

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:

That happened to a lot of people "who knew what they were doing". It really is telling of what was going on in the country at the time. Pretty much the same thing that happens in most military dictatorships.

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Hitler is often credited with pulling Germany out of the depression. I dont agree. It was this man Schacht (or Schlacht....I forget) that turned the German economy around, stbilzed her finaces, and made possible German re-armament. But he fell out with hitler because he could see that the fragile economy was being somewhat overheated. He wanted to return German industry to a consumer based economy, to cement the newly acquired economic position the Germans had carved for themselves in Eastern Europe. He felt that about a further 10 years or so were needed for the German economy to be strong enough for a war. not that he wanted war, he was against it.

It was a miscariage of justice after the war that he was placed on trial for war crimes. He was about as innocent of that as was possible. He was one of the few acquitted, and rightly so.

I actually think that war time production planning went well in some areas.

Firstly the notion that the Germans hadn't gone to a war time economy till 1942 is dispelled by Adam Tooze. Basically the the Germans were working hard and investing hard but the labour and money was going into investing in plant and equipment. In 1942 the labour/investment that was going into building plant switched to actually producing the weapons those plants (and improved designs) that were made for them. In fact they were investing so hard they imperilled their own economy and food supply.


In 1940 there were Me 109E7s, there were even Me 109F's there were no P-47, P-38s until when? 1942?

One need only look at French efforts at aviation production which resulted in a plethora of either aged under-performing types or highly promising types that were either not produced in numbers in their piecemeal factories or lacking a competitive engine; the Hispano-Suiza HS12Y never reached its high potential and was way behind the DB601. Did anything apart from the Spitfire really match the Me 109 till 1942?

Of-course 1942 was a watershed year: new allied weapons came in such as the Lancaster, B-17E, P-47 etc while the Germans stumbled in their ambitious Me 210, He 177, Ju 288; these were really 1943/44 weapons that were removed from mass production because they missed the boat by 1 year.

The Germans gambled on short wars as they had immediate situations on or close to their borders that were more imperative than long term strategic goals hence some important weapon categories were missing such as long range maritime bombers.

They also started to sharply focus their R+D efforts; abandoning microwave radar research to a low level even abandoning a promising 25cm radar from Lorentz when it was 80% complete.. There was in some ways a lack of diversity insurance. It was at this time that decisions of 1939/1940 when the Battle of France was raging around suspending work on projects that could not be completed in 6 months impacted areas such as radar and aircraft such a the Ar 240, a backup for the Me 210/410

"... Firstly the notion that the Germans hadn't gone to a war time economy till 1942 is dispelled by Adam Tooze. "

That's not the conclusion I draw from the aforementioned author.

Mass production balls-to-the-wall production did not begin until after Barbarossa. The German AIRCRAFT industry was in war production mode - Ju 88's, Me-109's, Fw-190's etc.,
but commodities such as AMMUNITION were ongoing production priority issues. 1942-levels of production are introduced with "labour" programs ... and we know what that means.

I am not critiquing German war efforts ... I am constantly amazed ... but the country was not on the all-out effort until after Barbarossa ... and that is the message I take/took from Tooze.

MM

I kinda agree, but there are fundamental areas that I have to take issue. I admit that i dont use Tooze as much as perhaps i should, but I do have a copy of Overys analysis of the wartime and prewar economy, and I have read some accounts by others as well. I dont think Tooze dispels their positions completely. One good source i can recommend is Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945 ; Mark Harrison, Department of Economics, University of Warwick.

I agree that German wartime economy was reasonably managed....i draw the line that it was well managed....there was too much wastage on useless prototypes and theoretical research, and component deliveries too haphazard to ever say that. Financial management was also incredibly bad. Nazi interference prevented Speer from implementing the full program that he wanted, and this had a major effect on delivery of some items. There was too much emphasis on size and technology, and not enough emphasis on numbers....aka Tiger tanks which actually weakened the effectiveness of formations as a whole whilst providing merit on an individual basis.

Moreover, whilst german industry was working to capacity in terms of factory floorspace, in terms of availabloe manpower (and woman power) it was anything but. The basic problem gets back to this Schacht issue. He wanted, among other things, in the prewar situation, to return German industry for a while to a consumer based economy, so that cash flows could be restored, so that more percentages of industries could be readied for war production. He was overuled and eventually sacked. Hitler wanted the machines of war now, not the sinews for a long war. whereas in places like britain, great efforts were made to prepare industry for a long war, the germans prewar wanted the machines. The result was that when war actually came, the Germans were left with a relatively limited portion of their economy that they could direct to war production, whilst the Brits, and others, could power on. it was a fundamental, and fatal error, because in the critical years 1939-42, the germans could not compete in military outputs despite having the second most powerful ecoomies overall in the world at that time.

Moreover, there is strong argument that the german economy was mobilized after 1942, primarily on the back of loot it took from the economies of occupied nations and nations allied to it (loot by various means). all gold reserves were immediately appropriated from these occuiped territories, all these nations were forced to pegging of the RM at rates highly favourable to the germans, all these nations were forced to sell raw materials to germany at below cost. All these nations were forced to pay massive reparations to the germans, provide free labour and pay for the occupying forces. And of course they were forced to hand over all stocks of military equipment they possessed.

All this looting and pillaging allowed the germans to mobilise their own industries, but at the cost of wrecking the economies of the nations they occupied. unlike the economies of Czechoslovakia and Austria, which under Schacht had been carefully integrated into the overall German economy and provided a great deal of help materially to the Germans during the war, the economies of the occupied nations were completely trashed and mismanaged. Germany could have benefitted directly from industrial potential of france, for example, but in the end received only a limited amount of help, because it was not worth French industry the effort to do anything. Stripping iout the European economies as they did, gave the germans a short term gain, but long term made their occupation of euro[pe a financial liability

ok...here's my choices for game changers. i know there is an strong argument about cargo ac....its which came first the chicken or the egg deal. cargo ac are no good if you arent winning at the front....and you cant win at the front with out supplies. but still you must first be able to produce a victory to then have to supply. to out run your supply lines is a logistical matter to be managed

You are going to laugh but...the Curtis MB 2 bomber. Not because of that particular plane but because of the chance it was given and the outcome that was the result. in 1921 Billy Mitchell picked it to participate in the naval testing he was involved in. the MB2 dropped bombs which sunk the German dreadnought Ostfrieslan ( thought to be unsinkable) . these tests were blown off by the US high command but not by a Japanese General named Yamamoto. Impressed by this test he adopted a theory of naval warfare based on aircraft. the Val and Kate carrier born ac were direct results of this theory and bitter lesson learned by the US at Pearl harbor. That early "experiment" with that relic ended up changing the face of naval warfare from that point on.

the Me 109. cutting its teeth in the spanish civil war it outclassed fighter aircraft of the day and brought that standard to new heights. it dominated the skies in Germany's early eastern wars ( Poland, etc..) and even the early years of the russian war. in the western war it proved itself over belgium and france. during the battle of britian the german high commands decision to change tactics ( and later strategy ) seriously hindered it from completing it task of winning air superiority which it was able to do. it also was instrumental in gaining air superiority over europe by inflicting serious and unacceptable loses to the US bomber forces in 43...enough so for them to halt daylight bombing. this had extreme and far reaching results....

the P 51 Mustang. with its ability to escort bombers to the furthest parts of german occupied areas the US was again able to resume daylight bombing campaigns. the implication of this was the resumption of the D-day invasion and thus relief to the eastern front. the ability of long range bombers to continue over operations central germany was paramont to the the success of invasion...which was important to the war in eastern europe ( western russia). ground troops and LW ac that could have been repositioned to both corridors were now "fixed" in defense of the homeland and out of range of both fronts. at this point the LW no further enjoyed battle free zones where they could rest. repair and recover in peace. allied bomber losses dropped to "acceptable " levels. when Jimmy Doolittle took over command of the 8th Af the standing rule of staying with the bombers and disengaging if the enemy dove beneath 18k feet was no longer in effect. p 51s were free to roam and destroy the Lw where ever they found them...in the air..or on the ground. the range of the p 51 removed the unmolested sanctuary of all LW ac. while LW factories were being bombed US factories were unencumbered and able to mass produce hundreds of ac daily. where the allies could roam every inch of nazi controlled area germany could only transgress into less than 5% of the allied territory. it became a war of attrition but at a break necks pace..... if the allies had not come up with a long range escort...p51 or some other ac....much of what we read would not have happened...or at least as soon as they did.

Hi Bobbysocks, your reference to the Martin MB-2 bomber (not Curtiss) and mention of the attack on Pearl Harbor as influenced by Billy Mitchell is interesting, but I don't know if you are aware that it was the British who trained the Japanese in the art of sinking warships using aircraft.

In 1921 the British sent a naval mission to Japan led by Col. The Master of Sempill, which comprised 30 instructors and several examples of recent British naval aircraft, including Avro 504L floatplanes, Nieuport Nighthawks and two different torpedoplane designs; three Blackburn Swifts and six Sopwith Cuckoos. The latter were of significance because the Sopwith T.1 was the very first aircraft carrier based torpedoplane. During WW1 the British Admiralty adopted a plan to sink the German High Seas Fleet in its own anchorage on the Jade River at Wilhelmshaven. Before the end of the war, training had begun using Cuckoos for this raid, but little priority was placed on it due to the U-boat threat taking up resources.

Nevertheless, the Cuckoo crews carried out pioneering training on the type, torpedoeing destroyers and motor boats with the depth setting mechanisms set to run under the vessels off the coast of Scotland. In October 1918 the very first aircraft carrier based torpedo squadron was formed at East Fortune; this was 185 Sqn, RAF. At that stage the very first flat top carrier, HMS Argus had completed trials and was in Royal Navy service and 185 Sqn was assigned to that ship lter that month.

At the time of the British Naval Mission to Japan, the Cuckoos and Swifts operated from the first Japanese carrier Hosho; Torpedo drops were carried out in Tokyo Bay by both types.





I'm sure that Mitchell's efforts were examined by the Japanese, as they would have been by most major powers at the time, but the seed had already been sown in the minds of the Japanese to use aircraft for this purpose.

You might also be interested to learn that the Japanese carried out the first sinking of an enemy warship using torpedoes during the battle of Port Arthur on the night of 8/9 February 1904. Japanese destroyers snuck into Port Arthur and carried out a surprise attack on the ships at anchor. The Russian cruiser Pallada was sunk and two Russian battleships were holed, but were later repaired.

The British referred to such an attack as to 'Copenhagen' an enemy fleet after Admiral Horatio Nelson's singular burst of initiative against the Danish fleet in 1801. In Admiralty paper work concerning the plans to torpedo the German fleet in WW1, this term 'Copenhagen' is used to describe the attack.

It is also documented that Yamamoto was highly impressed with the Royal Navy's attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto on the night of 11 November 1940 using Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers flying from the carrier HMS Illustrious.

I hope this is helpful. By the way, this by no means suggests that anything I have mentioned here constitutes game changers. Back to the game changing posts... sorry.

I have written articles on the subject of these pioneering torpedo trials, which I will post a thread in another section of the forum...

Thanks Nuuumannn.

Jerry

No worries Jerry, that second post was a double, but I modified it - I'm using my wife's laptop, so things are a bit slower. I didn't mean to hijack the post, by the way.

nuuumannn, a lot of great info there. at 3:30 in the morning and half a snoot full of rum a lot of the details in that part of the post were turned askew...go figure. mitchell was lobbying for an airforce...basically claming that they could produce a fleet of bombers for the price of one dreadnaught. he was basing more of the defense of a nation on a strong presence in the air. but as much as he was for aerial bombardment he didnt see the virtue in aircraft carriers. in his mind they were foolish and just bigger targets for a bomber. the upper command of course didnt tumble to his advice right away but the navy finally did see come around. The concept in the beginning seemed lost the the US where others were studing it with an open mind as a viable tactic/stragegy. anytime you go against the established hierarchy way of doing things...its usually met with a stone wall and negativity. as was in this case and with claire chennaults strategy for fighter ac to bring down bombers. anyways...since you seem to have studied this in great depth...when was the first time in other nations bombs were dropped on ships? i only came across mitchell's experiment because i was looking for something else. but i would be interested to know who used them and the details surrounding the indicents.

Hi Bobbysocks,

I'm no expert on this sort of thing, but torpedo aircraft of that period are of interest to me. The first unofficial record of a ship being attacked by aircraft is again by our erstwhile Far Eastern friends (in WW1 at least) the Japanese during the siege of Tsingtao, a German held colony in China. At the outbreak of WW1 the Japanese sent a naval task force that included the seaplane tender Wakamiya equipped with four Maurice Farman floatplanes. These carried out a number of notable aviation firsts against German targets, although some of these are disputed. On 5th September 1914 one of the Japanese Farmans dropped what were essentially naval artillery shells on a German mine layer, which is often referred to as a torpedo boat, and caused damage to it; some accounts claimed this vessel was sunk, but this is not recorded in German shipping losses around that time.

Also during the Wakamiya's aircraft's ventures, German ground positions were attacked. These operations are often claimed by many sources, notably on the internet, to be the first successful aircraft carrier air strikes in history. This is somewhat over stating their significance since the Wakamiya could not launch her aeroplanes, they had to be lowered into the sea; she was a seaplane tender. Another claim of the Japanese Farman seaplanes at Tsingtao is that they made the first night attacks against enemy positions, but there is debate about this and whether if it at all took place, how successful such an attack was. Nevertheless, these actions illustrated the resolve of the Japanese to use any weapons at their disposal to achieve their aims before many European and US military organsations were prepared to realise the potential of military aviation.

Unless I can be proven wrong, the first bombing attack on a capital warship by an aeroplane was by Royal Navy Short 184 seaplanes against the German battlecruiser Goeben sailing under the Turkish flag as the Yavuz Sultan Selim. On 20 January 1918, the seaplane tender HMS Empress launched a night attack against the ship, which had run aground off Nagara Point off the Dardanelles; one bomb struck the ship but caused little damage. Over the next few days more Short seaplanes dropped bombs on the ship, causing small amounts of damage, but none of the small sized (230 lb) weapons were able to penetrate the Goeben's deck armour and it was towed off the reef by a Turkish warship.

One of the unsung aircraft of WW1, the ubiquitous Short 184 has a distinguished naval history; during the Dardanelles campaign in 1915, Short seaplanes sank Turkish vessels using torpedoes on more than one occasion, although one of the vessels had been disabled by a submarine prior to being shot at by the aeroplane. For more, read my article posted under the World War One heading on this forum called Laying Eggs in Someone Else's Basket.

One again, I've hijacked a thread! Mind you, you could argue it was in order to establish a potential game changer!

no, not at all....very intersting material Nuuumannn

thanks for the info nuuumannn, any time you think outside the box and experiment like in the examples you illustrated above...that is the potential for...or the "seeds" of game changers. good stuff.

The B24 aside from closing the mid Atlantic gap which no other aircraft was capable was also used as a transport , in 42 prior to El Alamein there was shortage of anti tank ammunition in the middle east the B24 on its ferry flights was tasked with carrying the ammo from the US to the front , also the B24 used to carry the armour and other equipment removed from B17 on the trans Atlantic ferry allowing B17 to carry enough fuel reserves for the crossing . The B24 ferry flights were always loaded with high priority supplies or passengers

B-24's with bomb bay fuel bladders were used to ferry fuel to General George Patton's hard-driving armoured columns in west France IIRC.



MM

The C.202 was definitely a game changer for the Italians. with one fell swoop the italians possessed a aircraft in sufficient numbers to rival and sometimes outdo the p-40s and hurricanes that were devastating the C.200s and Fiat G.50s

michaelmaltby said:

B-24's with bomb bay fuel bladders were used to ferry fuel to General George Patton's hard-driving armoured columns in west France IIRC.



MM

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and grass seed for Malta which was needed to prevent erosion post bombing attack by LW