Gen. MacArthur in ww2
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Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
I wish I could make an educated comment here- but all I can say is that FDR must have valued his leadership, as he ordered him to leave the Phillipines before the Japanese had captured it-- and he was a man of his word: "I shall return"..
The only American General I feel comfortable discussing is Gen. George Smith Patton Jr.- as I have several books detailing his life-story- VMI, West Point, Mexican campaign under Pershing's command, ditto WW1, later WW2. In Carlo D'Este's book: "Patton- A Genius For War" the author details the possible scenario of Patton being transferred to the PTO-after Germany surrendered in May 1945- and having to take orders from MacArthur, instead of from Dwight Eisenhower. The rest is, of course, history.
I do know that MacArthur had a great record in combat in WW1, and I believe that TO was where he received the Medal of Honor. If I am wrong on this, please advise- Hansie
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
I think one issue is that, pre-WW2, the US Army was considerably smaller than it was post-war; it was below 190,000 from 1922 to 1938, and had never exceeded 150,000 except in wartime before that time. Since generals are, typically, going to be in their late 40s to mid 50s, many of them would come from the pre-WW1 army. There simply weren't that many officers who had been in the army the 25 years that would be fairly typical of generals.
He was also, from what some people have written, very much a self-promoter and not exactly a strong believer in democracy.
He was also, from what some people have written, very much a self-promoter and not exactly a strong believer in democracy.
mikewint
Captain
It's not unusual to hear people rank Douglas MacArthur among America's worst generals—alongside Benedict Arnold and William Westmoreland. His critics say he was insubordinate and arrogant, callous in dealing with dissent, his Korean War command studded with mistakes. "MacArthur could never see another sun, or even a moon for that matter, in the heavens, as long as he was the sun," once said President Eisenhower, who had served under MacArthur in the Pacific. However there is no doubt about his near flawless command during World War II, his understanding of modern warfare, and his developing some of the best commanders this country has ever seen.
In a sense, MacArthur is the victim of his own success. If he had been content to receive the Japanese surrender on Sept. 2, 1945, and retire instead of continuing his career, he would be considered the greatest commander of World War II—and perhaps the greatest military commander in American history.
Instead, after serving as America's "shogun" in Japan, where he laid the groundwork for Japan's emergence as a democracy, he led U.S. forces in the Korean War. While MacArthur did author the assault that staved off an early defeat of U.S. forces on the peninsula, he consistently mishandled the Korea fight, underestimating China's commitment to its North Korean ally and then purposely flouting Washington's directives to limit the conflict. He fought bitterly over Korea policy with President Harry Truman and was eventually relieved of his command.
He returned to the United States to great acclaim, the largest ticker-tape ever seen in New York. But his fight with Truman overshadowed what he had accomplished in both of the world wars. He defended his actions in Korea in a series of public congressional hearings, but his testimony was self-referencing, uncertain and ultimately unconvincing. He dabbled in politics (without success) and, after failing to win the 1952 Republican nomination for president, moved with his second wife Jean and their son Arthur—Arthur MacArthur—to New York City, where the family lived in a set of suites at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
I've seen/heard/read a number of false historys about Mac. A popular nonfiction television series on the war has Marines on Peleliu, where the Allies and the Japanese fought for more than two months over a single airstrip, cursing MacArthur for expending their lives needlessly. In fact, he had nothing to do with the battle.
I've heard/read hundreds of times that MacArthur rehearsed his landing at Leyte, in the Philippines, where he dramatically waded onto the invasion beach through the Pacific's rolling surf, reboarding his landing craft until the cameras got it just right. That would be Patton—on Sicily.
I've heard/read the story that his son Arthur renounced him and changed his name out of embarrassment. There's not a shred of evidence to prove it.
Foe me the most negative thing about Mac were his actions during the Bonus March, where he commanded troops that gassed and trampled World War I veterans peacefully protesting in Washington, D.C, during the Great Depression. WWI veterans that had been promised a bonus and then the government reneged. Many of the men he gassed and trampled (two were bayoneted and died) were men he had commanded .
Secondly, is his evacuation from Corregidor Island, in Manila Bay, which he had fled during the darkest days of the Pacific War. The nickname "Dugout Doug," referring to his time spent bottled up on Corregidor before the evacuation, has followed him through six decades.
In a sense, MacArthur is the victim of his own success. If he had been content to receive the Japanese surrender on Sept. 2, 1945, and retire instead of continuing his career, he would be considered the greatest commander of World War II—and perhaps the greatest military commander in American history.
Instead, after serving as America's "shogun" in Japan, where he laid the groundwork for Japan's emergence as a democracy, he led U.S. forces in the Korean War. While MacArthur did author the assault that staved off an early defeat of U.S. forces on the peninsula, he consistently mishandled the Korea fight, underestimating China's commitment to its North Korean ally and then purposely flouting Washington's directives to limit the conflict. He fought bitterly over Korea policy with President Harry Truman and was eventually relieved of his command.
He returned to the United States to great acclaim, the largest ticker-tape ever seen in New York. But his fight with Truman overshadowed what he had accomplished in both of the world wars. He defended his actions in Korea in a series of public congressional hearings, but his testimony was self-referencing, uncertain and ultimately unconvincing. He dabbled in politics (without success) and, after failing to win the 1952 Republican nomination for president, moved with his second wife Jean and their son Arthur—Arthur MacArthur—to New York City, where the family lived in a set of suites at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
I've seen/heard/read a number of false historys about Mac. A popular nonfiction television series on the war has Marines on Peleliu, where the Allies and the Japanese fought for more than two months over a single airstrip, cursing MacArthur for expending their lives needlessly. In fact, he had nothing to do with the battle.
I've heard/read hundreds of times that MacArthur rehearsed his landing at Leyte, in the Philippines, where he dramatically waded onto the invasion beach through the Pacific's rolling surf, reboarding his landing craft until the cameras got it just right. That would be Patton—on Sicily.
I've heard/read the story that his son Arthur renounced him and changed his name out of embarrassment. There's not a shred of evidence to prove it.
Foe me the most negative thing about Mac were his actions during the Bonus March, where he commanded troops that gassed and trampled World War I veterans peacefully protesting in Washington, D.C, during the Great Depression. WWI veterans that had been promised a bonus and then the government reneged. Many of the men he gassed and trampled (two were bayoneted and died) were men he had commanded .
Secondly, is his evacuation from Corregidor Island, in Manila Bay, which he had fled during the darkest days of the Pacific War. The nickname "Dugout Doug," referring to his time spent bottled up on Corregidor before the evacuation, has followed him through six decades.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Indeed, a sad time in America's history- the great Depression- Was Hoover the C-in-C that ordered Mac to disperse the WW1 veterans from their encampment in D.C.?? If so, that has to be one of the blackest days in our entire history, from 1900 through 1960 at least. American troops armed and attacking unarmed discharged Veterans that served in Europe 1917-1918. I have some "second-hand" insight in General John Pershing, from my studies of George Patton's career- I can only guess what remarks Pershing would have made to that educated engineer from Iowa about doing that--
I don't understand how Mac could have been so "politically connected" to any party or government group after that sordid act. Makes me want to lose my dinner--the last time in our History we had a similar set of events was the Civil War-and nothing "civil" about that either. Hansie
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
"Arthur Mac Arthur"-- kinda like "Ralph Malph" from Happy Days.
buffnut453
Captain
Can't comment on the latter half of the sentence but I must take issue with the first part. Flawless? Allowing his air forces to be surprised on the ground even though he knew Pearl Harbor had been attacked? That doesn't count as flawless in my book. Indeed, I find it amazing at the vitriol heaped on Kimmel and Short while McArthur somehow managed to avoid any criticism of his actions in the Philippines on 8-9 Dec 1941.
Hoosier Hot Shot
Airman
- 17
- Apr 20, 2012
As a Vet of the Pacific War, I disagree. Two specific instances of his gross misconduct; the return to the Philippines cost many lives and was not important to the war. The invasion of Okinawa was the same tragic error.
I think history will show that he argued that for him to be captured in Manila would give the Japanese a huge trophy for display in Tokyo.
Thus he abandoned his troops and left to die.
Dugout Doug was a coward.
mikewint
Captain
I would agree with you almost totally. MacArthur's inaction like Kimmel's and Short's and the US in general had its roots in racial stereotypes. Big, strong, manly, cowboy-tough, Americans vs. the little, yellow, buck-toothed, bandy-legged Japs...NO contest.
By 6 December 1941 (Hawaii time), the Japanese had assembled about five hundred fighters and bombers at airbases on Formosa for their assault on the Philippines. The task of this fleet was to support a seaborne invasion by destroying the United States Far East Air Force, and seizing control of the skies over the Philippines for Japan.
Now the Japanese were not expecting to be able to employ the same swift surprise attack for their invasion of the Philippines as they had at Pearl. Recall that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would take place at 8.00 a.m. on 7 December 1941 (Hawaii time). However, because of the difference in time zones, and the separation of Hawaii and the Philippines by the International Date Line, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor it would be 2.30 a.m. on 8 December 1941 in Manila. The Japanese had planned for their bombers and fighters to begin taking off from Formosan airbases at 2.30 am on 8 December. This timing would enable the Japanese aircraft to reach the Philippines by daybreak on that same day. By that time, the Japanese expected that the commander of American air forces on the Philippines (MacArthur) would have responded to their attack on Pearl Harbor by placing his air defenses on full war alert. Therefore the Japanese expected that their fighters and bombers would meet stiff opposition from American fighters when they arrived over the Philippines.
The Japanese plan was meeting with its own problems, before Japanese aircraft could take off from Formosa at 2.30 a.m. on 8 December, thick fog began to envelop the airbases. As hours passed with no sign of the fog lifting, senior Japanese commanders and their staff became increasingly concerned that the Americans might strike first at the Formosan airbases which were crowded with aircraft, fully armed, fuelled, and waiting to take off. So, YES, had MacArthur acted decisively it would have been Pearl in reverse.
Now let's consider the American side: Within minutes of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred at about 2.30 a.m. on 8 December 1941 (Manila time), the news was received at the headquarters of the United States Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines. Admiral Hart was informed at about 3.00 a.m. The news was not passed on to the army. General MacArthur first heard of the Japanese attack from his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland. By sheer happenstance, an army signalman had picked up the news while listening to a Californian radio station. At 3.40 a.m. official word finally came when Brigadier Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the Army's War Plans Division, telephoned MacArthur from Washington to confirm that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. He told MacArthur that he "wouldn't be surprised if you get an attack there in the near future".
At 5.30 a.m. MacArthur received a cable from Washington directing him to execute the Rainbow -5 war plan at once. This plan included orders for the planes of the Far East Air Force stationed in the Philippines to attack any Japanese forces and installations within range at the outbreak of hostilities. The Japanese airbases and harbor installations on Formosa were within range of MacArthur's B-17s. MacArthur failed to obey these orders AND even failed to confer with the commander of his air force. MacArthur took no significant action between 3.00 a.m. and 12.20 p.m. to bring his command to a proper state of readiness to resist an attack and to preserve his air force.
The commander of MacArthur's Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis Brereton, heard the news about Pearl Harbor from Brigadier General Sutherland shortly before 4.00 a.m. Brereton immediately placed his air forces on war alert. Many of his fliers had only just returned to their airbases from the lavish party at MacArthur's hotel. From 5.00 a.m. on the morning of 8 December 1941, Major General Brereton tried to speak to MacArthur about a Far East Air Force response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but he was repeatedly denied access to MacArthur by Brigadier General Sutherland. Brereton was aware of the Japanese propensity to launch surprise attacks at dawn, and he wanted to persuade MacArthur to mount a bombing attack on the Japanese airbases on Formosa. While waiting to see MacArthur on this morning, Brereton was informed by Admiral Hart that Japanese carrier aircraft had bombed the American seaplane tender William B. Preston in Davao Bay on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. This was clearly a hostile "first overt act" by Japan of the kind referred to in General Marshall's war warning of 27 November 1941. In response to this direct hostile act against an American warship in Philippine waters, Brereton again asked Sutherland to permit him to see MacArthur or approve bombing of the Japanese airbases on Formosa himself. Sutherland refused both requests.
Fearing that his aircraft would be caught on the ground by the Japanese and destroyed, Brereton finally ordered them aloft to circle their airfields. Shortly after 9.00 a.m., Brereton was told that Japanese aircraft had attacked southern Luzon, and he pressed Sutherland again for permission to attack the Japanese airbases on Formosa. Again Sutherland refused. It was not until 11.00 a.m. that MacArthur finally approved a bombing attack on the Japanese airbases. Brereton ordered all of his aircraft to land so that they could be refueled and the bombers armed. Unfortunately history records that the Japanese launched their devastating attacks on MacArthur's airbases at about 12.20 p.m. on 8 December 1941. Therefore most of Brereton's aircraft were sitting on their airstrips when Japanese bombers and fighters arrived overhead and took them by surprise. At the Clark Field airbase, located about 50 miles (80 km) north of Manila, the American bombers and fighters were caught on the ground and most were destroyed. Other Japanese aircraft attacked the American fighter airbase at Iba on the west coast of the main northern island of Luzon and destroyed all but two of the American P-40 fighters based there. Half of the aircraft of MacArthur's Far East Air Force were destroyed on the ground on the first day of the Japanese attack.
MacArthur's failure to respond appropriately to the emergency was almost certainly influenced by Philippine politics. The President of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, had been a friend of MacArthur for many years. Despite the Philippines already having been included, without its consent, in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Quezon naively believed that his country was neither militarily or economically important to Japan. Thusly Quezon hoped to steer the Philippines to a course of neutrality in the event of war between the United States and Japan. When Quezon received news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he contacted MacArthur immediately to urge him to avoid action that might provoke a Japanese attack on the Philippines. Quezon's pressure for neutrality was reflected in the orders issued by MacArthur immediately following the news of Pearl Harbor. Although ordering his army and air forces to battle stations, MacArthur directed that the American Army and Air Force in the Philippines was not to initiate offensive action against Japan. The American Far East Air Force was permitted by MacArthur to retaliate only if directly attacked by the Japanese.
So it appears that Quezon's pressure for neutrality infected the decision-making process at MacArthur's headquarters in Manila during the critical hours immediately following Pearl Harbor.
MacArthur's subsequent escape to Australia with only his closest staff officers and family enabled him to escape scrutiny of his behavior at that time. Brereton was posted to duty elsewhere. Senior officers who might have testified to MacArthur's neglect of duty and incompetence as a commander remained in the Philippines, and either died or suffered lengthy imprisonment in Japanese prison camps. Even after the truth became known at the end of World War II, MacArthur had established himself as an heroic figure and was never brought to account for his lack of action following Pearl. Questioned after the war, MacArthur relied on the words "..the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" in General Marshall's war warning of 27 November 1941, and said, "my orders were explicit not to initiate hostilities against the Japanese".
This is nonsensical as it ignores the obvious facts that Pearl Harbor and the bombing of the William B. Preston in Philippine waters were each a hostile "first overt act". MacArthur also blamed Major General Brereton for the loss of half of the Far East Air Force on the ground and to a degree I agree. Even allowing for MacArthur's fatal inaction during the crucial nine hours that elapsed after news of Pearl Harbor, Brereton should have responded to the danger created by MacArthur's inaction by taking sensible precautions to avoid all of his aircraft being caught on the ground by the Japanese. Those sensible precautions could have included maintaining combat fighter patrols over the main airbases while other fighters were being refueled, dispersing some of his fighters to secondary airfields, and withdrawing all of his B-17s to Mindaneo while MacArthur was paralyzed by indecision.
Such indecision seems to have been endemic with the American commanders at the time. Within hours of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese aircraft bombed Guam and Wake. On 10 December 1941, 5,000 troops of Japan's elite South Seas Detachment stormed ashore on Guam and quickly overran the small garrison of 300 US Marines. Their fate was sealed and nothing could have been done, however, on 11 December 1941, a Japanese amphibious invasion force approached Wake Island and here the Japanese received a surprise. The Marine garrison had received twelve Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters and 5 inch coastal guns had been installed. As the Japanese warships approached Wake, they were subjected to heavy bombardment and were forced to withdraw with the loss of two destroyers and damage to several cruisers, destroyers and transports. The Japanese mounted daily air attacks on the small Wake Island garrison, and after all of their aircraft had been destroyed, a second much more powerful invasion force attacked the island successfully on 22 December 1941. This second invasion force included two of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's powerful fleet aircraft carriers, Hiryu and Soryu.
While the US Pacific Fleet had received a severe blow at Pearl, there were still three aircraft carriers fully functional. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, could have reinforced the defenders of Wake Island from Hawaii, and forced the Japanese into a drawn-out war of attrition in the central Pacific which would have hampered their aggression in the Philippines and the South-West Pacific. Unfortunately, Kimmel was not a bold commander. He passed up the opportunity and allowed Wake Island to fall to the Japanese.
mikewint
Captain
Let's look at the historical record:
In a message to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Washington, D.C., on 11 February 1941, MacArthur announced that he and his family intended to "share the fate of the garrison". This meant surrender at best or death from artillery fire or an air raid. Three days later, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, George C. Marshall, urged MacArthur to send his family away, but MacArthur ignored this. Singapore, fell on 15 February, and in Washington, the possibility that Corregidor would also fall and MacArthur would be taken prisoner was considered. At the time, MacArthur was America's most experienced general and would be of little use in a prisoner of war camp. Moreover, he had become a living symbol of Allied resistance to the Japanese. The defense of Bataan had captured the imagination of the American public, who saw MacArthur as the only Allied general who knew how to fight the Japanese.
The President considered sending MacArthur to Mindanao to coordinate the defense of the Philippines from there, but another consideration arose. The fall of Singapore sealed the fate of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDA), of which MacArthur's command was nominally a part. Discussions were held with the British about future command arrangements. A broad agreement was reached that the United States would assume responsibility for the Southwest Pacific. A senior American officer was required, and MacArthur was the obvious choice. On 23 February, MacArthur received a message that had been drafted by the President, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Marshall. It read:
The President directs that you make arrangements to leave and proceed to Mindanao. You are directed to make this change as quickly as possible … From Mindanao you will proceed to Australia where you will assume command of all United States troops … Instructions will be given from here at your request for the movement of submarine or plane or both to enable you to carry out the foregoing instructions. You are authorized to take your chief of staff General Sutherland.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
I suspect that the politicians at the time -- this was the third year of the Great Depression -- felt the Bonus Army was inspired by communists or anarchists or something, on the basis that Real Americans never protest actions by the government.
The action, though, is very much in line with Hoover's response towards black victims of the great Mississippi floods of 1927: callous and deliberate.
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
Also FDR and the Matacumbe Key in 1935, when a huge hurricane hit the Keys, wiping out the railroad tracks and trains thereon, and the shacks the "conch" laborers inhabited. Most of those "conches" were also part of the WW1 Veterans who got shafted out of their bonus pay by the POTUS, who, like his vacuum cleaner namesake, sucked!!
Details of how the WW1 Vets working in the Keys when the hurricane hit are found in "Hemingway- the 1930's by Michael Reynolds- chapter Eight- 1935- Key West, Bimini, and Matacumbe. Hansie
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As a citizen of an Allied Country, Australia, and a man whose entire family served in WW2, there has never been a more despised General (home grown OR Visitor) on the shores. A Battalion of teenage kids (our equivalent of the National Guard) on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea, and several AIF Battalions at Milne Bay bled the Japanese white in a fighting withdrawal across the Owen Stanleys, and when the AIF arrived home from the Middle East, the enemy were slaughtered at Mission Ridge.....and yet Macarthur sent a report to FDR saying Australians could not, and would not, fight! He made scathing comments about our Spitfire Wing in Darwin , until a series of air battles over several weeks saw them knock down Japanese Bombers in almost BofB numbers...he sent a congratulatory telegram to them which was stamped and returned (Not accepted by recipient)...must have hurt his huge ego somewhat? A song here went, "Have you heard about Macarthur, the Hero of Bataan? He's come Down Under to Save Us from Japan! He sits inside a Brisbane pub with lots and lots of grog, while the poor old Aussie soldier he treats like a bloody dog!" His "I shall return" speech was made 20km from here on the platform of Terowie railway station where he gave his first Press Conference (photo of monument by Peterdownunder)
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mikewint
Captain
I was only partially aware of MacArthur's actions in Australia and I do not excuse them in any way, shape, or form. However, I think that you also need to look at the conduct of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey and the Curtin government's failure to protest to Washington.
On 17 March 1942, MacArthur's B-17 touched down at the RAAF Batchelor Field which was located 72 kilometres (45 miles) south of Darwin. He was accompanied by his wife, his child, the child's nurse, and thirteen of MacArthur's senior staff officers. The presence on the flight of thirteen of MacArthur's staff officers, known as "The Bataan Gang" , defied General Marshall's order that only Major General Sutherland were to accompany MacArthur and his family to Australia.
MacArthur arrived in Melbourne on 21 March 1942, and he immediately installed himself in the best suite in the Menzies Hotel. The Curtin government was greatly relieved by General MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area and the location of his headquarters in Australia and as such he was greeted with adulation by Australian politicians, public and media. In a press conference he told the press that his aircraft had been closely pursued by Japanese fighter planes and had narrowly escaped Japanese bombers as it was landing at Batchelor Field. This story captured the public imagination but it was all a lie. Master Sergeant Dick Graf, who was the wireless operator on MacArthur's flight from the Philippines, later exposed MacArthur's story as a figment of his imagination. According to Graf, the flight to Australia was uneventful. MacArthur's aircraft was never under threat from the Japanese.
As a result of MacArthur's presence the first American troops were sent to Australia from the United States.
On 23 March 1942, the Australian government recalled Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey from the Middle East to be Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces. Blamey was appointed Land Forces Commander under MacArthur.
On 3 April 1942, MacArthur received from the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff in Washington a directive concerning the conduct of the war in the South-West Pacific. MacArthur was specifically directed to include on his staff senior Australian military officers. He defied the direction by appointing only Americans as his staff officers. By defying the order from his superiors, he deprived himself of advice from Australian generals with actual experience in the conduct of war. In the subsequent bloody fighting on the island of New Guinea, the absence of experienced Australian military advisers on MacArthur's staff would be reflected in poor planning and intelligence gathering, near panic-stricken responses to surprise moves by the Japanese, and unrealistic demands by MacArthur and his staff on field commanders.
Curtin was aware that MacArthur had defied his own superiors by excluding Australians from his staff, but he made no protest to Washington. It appears likely that Curtin's acquiescence was prompted by his overwhelming relief that the United States had come to Australia's aid, and a desire not to appear ungrateful.
On 18 April 1942, General MacArthur formally assumed command of the Australian armed forces. At this time, MacArthur commanded 100,000 members of the 2nd AIF, 265,000 Australian Militia, and 38,000 Americans.
On 25 April, MacArthur issued his first directive as Supreme Commander in Australia: Allied Land Forces were to prevent any Japanese landing on the north-east coast of Australia or on the south coast of the island of New Guinea. Although the directive appeared to recognize the strategic importance of Port Moresby and the vulnerability of northern Australia to increased aerial bombardment and invasion if it were to be captured by the Japanese, MacArthur and Blamey took no immediate steps to fortify Port Moresby or reinforce with battle-toughened AIF troops the poorly armed and inadequately trained militia garrisons in New Guinea. This inexcusable neglect of the defense of Port Moresby by MacArthur and Blamey becomes even more difficult to understand in the light of evidence that the Japanese and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, were well aware of the strategic importance of Port Moresby.
At Port Moresby, Major General Basil Morris was in command of the 30th Australian Infantry Brigade, a militia formation comprising the 39th, 49th and 53rd Australian Infantry Battalions. With the exception of the 53rd Battalion, the militia were led by experienced AIF officers and NCOs, but they were only raw recruits with an average age of eighteen. In addition to the Australian militia units, General Morris also had troops of the local Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) and the local New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR). The troops of the NGVR, all European and numbering about 450, were spread thinly across areas of the Australian Territory of New Guinea not occupied by the Japanese. The fortifications of Port Moresby in April 1942 comprised two ancient naval guns, a field artillery regiment, a heavy anti-aircraft battery, and a few mobile anti-aircraft guns.
Having finally been made aware of the seriousness of the Japanese threat to Port Moresby by the Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May 1942), MacArthur requested additional Australian troops to bolster the weak defenses of Port Moresby.
On 15 May 1942, Blamey assigned another militia formation, the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade. The failure of the two senior commanders to send seasoned AIF troops to New Guinea at the earliest opportunity could have had disastrous consequences for Australia when elite, battle-hardened Japanese troops began their determined drive along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby in August 1942. It was only then that MacArthur and Blamey appear to have appreciated the danger to which their neglect had exposed Australia, and they rushed seasoned AIF troops of the 7th Division to New Guinea.
When the heavily outnumbered and poorly supplied Australian AIF and militia troops could not initially stem the determined Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby, MacArthur and Blamey were severely criticized for their neglect to provide adequate defenses for Port Moresby and the heavy loss of Australian lives on the Kokoda Track which resulted from that neglect.
It was at this point that MacArthur quickly shifted the blame for his mistakes to troops under his command, and he announced his view that the Australian troops on the Kokoda Track were poor fighters who were retreating from a smaller number of Japanese troops. In fact the Australian troops were outnumbered by at least five to one by elite Japanese troops, and MacArthur and Blamey had sent them into action without adequate arms or supplies. General Blamey supported MacArthur's lie to excuse his own neglect of Australia's northern defenses and her soldiers. He ignored the overwhelming strength of the Japanese invasion force and the grave supply problems faced by Australian troops on the Kokoda Track. To his everlasting discredit, he blamed the fighting qualities of the Australian troops and their field commanders for their failure initially to stem the Japanese drive towards Port Moresby.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that Australia did receive a real benefit from MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area, with his headquarters in Australia. MacArthur's obsession with recovering the Philippines from the Japanese worked to Australia's great advantage because it was necessary first to oust the Japanese from the island of New Guinea, and MacArthur was a powerful advocate in Washington for his command in Australia to receive the military resources necessary to achieve both tasks.
On 17 March 1942, MacArthur's B-17 touched down at the RAAF Batchelor Field which was located 72 kilometres (45 miles) south of Darwin. He was accompanied by his wife, his child, the child's nurse, and thirteen of MacArthur's senior staff officers. The presence on the flight of thirteen of MacArthur's staff officers, known as "The Bataan Gang" , defied General Marshall's order that only Major General Sutherland were to accompany MacArthur and his family to Australia.
MacArthur arrived in Melbourne on 21 March 1942, and he immediately installed himself in the best suite in the Menzies Hotel. The Curtin government was greatly relieved by General MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area and the location of his headquarters in Australia and as such he was greeted with adulation by Australian politicians, public and media. In a press conference he told the press that his aircraft had been closely pursued by Japanese fighter planes and had narrowly escaped Japanese bombers as it was landing at Batchelor Field. This story captured the public imagination but it was all a lie. Master Sergeant Dick Graf, who was the wireless operator on MacArthur's flight from the Philippines, later exposed MacArthur's story as a figment of his imagination. According to Graf, the flight to Australia was uneventful. MacArthur's aircraft was never under threat from the Japanese.
As a result of MacArthur's presence the first American troops were sent to Australia from the United States.
On 23 March 1942, the Australian government recalled Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey from the Middle East to be Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces. Blamey was appointed Land Forces Commander under MacArthur.
On 3 April 1942, MacArthur received from the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff in Washington a directive concerning the conduct of the war in the South-West Pacific. MacArthur was specifically directed to include on his staff senior Australian military officers. He defied the direction by appointing only Americans as his staff officers. By defying the order from his superiors, he deprived himself of advice from Australian generals with actual experience in the conduct of war. In the subsequent bloody fighting on the island of New Guinea, the absence of experienced Australian military advisers on MacArthur's staff would be reflected in poor planning and intelligence gathering, near panic-stricken responses to surprise moves by the Japanese, and unrealistic demands by MacArthur and his staff on field commanders.
Curtin was aware that MacArthur had defied his own superiors by excluding Australians from his staff, but he made no protest to Washington. It appears likely that Curtin's acquiescence was prompted by his overwhelming relief that the United States had come to Australia's aid, and a desire not to appear ungrateful.
On 18 April 1942, General MacArthur formally assumed command of the Australian armed forces. At this time, MacArthur commanded 100,000 members of the 2nd AIF, 265,000 Australian Militia, and 38,000 Americans.
On 25 April, MacArthur issued his first directive as Supreme Commander in Australia: Allied Land Forces were to prevent any Japanese landing on the north-east coast of Australia or on the south coast of the island of New Guinea. Although the directive appeared to recognize the strategic importance of Port Moresby and the vulnerability of northern Australia to increased aerial bombardment and invasion if it were to be captured by the Japanese, MacArthur and Blamey took no immediate steps to fortify Port Moresby or reinforce with battle-toughened AIF troops the poorly armed and inadequately trained militia garrisons in New Guinea. This inexcusable neglect of the defense of Port Moresby by MacArthur and Blamey becomes even more difficult to understand in the light of evidence that the Japanese and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, were well aware of the strategic importance of Port Moresby.
At Port Moresby, Major General Basil Morris was in command of the 30th Australian Infantry Brigade, a militia formation comprising the 39th, 49th and 53rd Australian Infantry Battalions. With the exception of the 53rd Battalion, the militia were led by experienced AIF officers and NCOs, but they were only raw recruits with an average age of eighteen. In addition to the Australian militia units, General Morris also had troops of the local Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) and the local New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR). The troops of the NGVR, all European and numbering about 450, were spread thinly across areas of the Australian Territory of New Guinea not occupied by the Japanese. The fortifications of Port Moresby in April 1942 comprised two ancient naval guns, a field artillery regiment, a heavy anti-aircraft battery, and a few mobile anti-aircraft guns.
Having finally been made aware of the seriousness of the Japanese threat to Port Moresby by the Battle of the Coral Sea (7-8 May 1942), MacArthur requested additional Australian troops to bolster the weak defenses of Port Moresby.
On 15 May 1942, Blamey assigned another militia formation, the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade. The failure of the two senior commanders to send seasoned AIF troops to New Guinea at the earliest opportunity could have had disastrous consequences for Australia when elite, battle-hardened Japanese troops began their determined drive along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby in August 1942. It was only then that MacArthur and Blamey appear to have appreciated the danger to which their neglect had exposed Australia, and they rushed seasoned AIF troops of the 7th Division to New Guinea.
When the heavily outnumbered and poorly supplied Australian AIF and militia troops could not initially stem the determined Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track towards Port Moresby, MacArthur and Blamey were severely criticized for their neglect to provide adequate defenses for Port Moresby and the heavy loss of Australian lives on the Kokoda Track which resulted from that neglect.
It was at this point that MacArthur quickly shifted the blame for his mistakes to troops under his command, and he announced his view that the Australian troops on the Kokoda Track were poor fighters who were retreating from a smaller number of Japanese troops. In fact the Australian troops were outnumbered by at least five to one by elite Japanese troops, and MacArthur and Blamey had sent them into action without adequate arms or supplies. General Blamey supported MacArthur's lie to excuse his own neglect of Australia's northern defenses and her soldiers. He ignored the overwhelming strength of the Japanese invasion force and the grave supply problems faced by Australian troops on the Kokoda Track. To his everlasting discredit, he blamed the fighting qualities of the Australian troops and their field commanders for their failure initially to stem the Japanese drive towards Port Moresby.
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that Australia did receive a real benefit from MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area, with his headquarters in Australia. MacArthur's obsession with recovering the Philippines from the Japanese worked to Australia's great advantage because it was necessary first to oust the Japanese from the island of New Guinea, and MacArthur was a powerful advocate in Washington for his command in Australia to receive the military resources necessary to achieve both tasks.
Barrett
Senior Airman
Many years ago Naval Institute Proceedings published an article comparing MacArthur's casualty stats with the Marine Corps'. IIRC the article was spurred by unfavorable comparisons, "showing" that the Marines were less efficient and/or were poorly led compared to Big Army. The obvious difference (at least to those who knew Pacific geography) was the vast disconnect in terrain: New Guinea v. Tarawa; Philippines v. Peleliu, etc. Marines had far less room for maneuver, requiring head-butting rather than flanking, etc. Having said that, Mac seemed to appreciate USMC far-far more than most of his army contemporaries (most notably Marshall) who were still really cranky over the Devil Dogs' splashy publicity in the Great War.
Sidebar:
I used to be acquainted with Adm. Tom Moorer, CNO and later JCS chairman in the 70s. As a Cdr. he gave a briefing in the Pentagonal Palace c. June 44, advancing the notion of putting USMC Corsairs on escort carriers in the Channel/North Sea armed with then-new Tiny Tim rockets to destroy V-1 sites. Marshall listened for a minute or so, then stood up. "As long as I'm chief of staff there'll never be a marine in Europe." Then he walked out. As things developed, the launch sites were over-run soon thereafter but it's instructive that the US Army preferred seeing V-1 attacks continue rather than stopping the attacks. (Sites were concealed and small, largely immune to conventional bombing. Why AAF/RAF fighter-bombers didn't do more remains mysterious.)
Sidebar:
I used to be acquainted with Adm. Tom Moorer, CNO and later JCS chairman in the 70s. As a Cdr. he gave a briefing in the Pentagonal Palace c. June 44, advancing the notion of putting USMC Corsairs on escort carriers in the Channel/North Sea armed with then-new Tiny Tim rockets to destroy V-1 sites. Marshall listened for a minute or so, then stood up. "As long as I'm chief of staff there'll never be a marine in Europe." Then he walked out. As things developed, the launch sites were over-run soon thereafter but it's instructive that the US Army preferred seeing V-1 attacks continue rather than stopping the attacks. (Sites were concealed and small, largely immune to conventional bombing. Why AAF/RAF fighter-bombers didn't do more remains mysterious.)
Hansie Bloeckmann
Senior Airman
I am curious as to why General Marshall had such a thing about the Marines serving in the ETO-can anyone elaborate on this- It is my understanding that the Marines had a larger trained force when Woodrow Wilson got us into WW1- and it took the Army led by Pershing longer to get up to the strength needed to bring the Allied Forces a victory-- The USMC and Bellau Wood are part of the lore and legend of the USMC- as later- Tarawa, Guadacanal and Iwo Jima became. Inter-service rivalry has no part in a coordinated victory involving all combat forces, united in effort and leadership.
Glider
Captain
I admit to thinking that this is one of the worst ideas I have heard for some time, for a number of reasons.
a) Putting Corsairs on escort carriers is asking for trouble, the accident rate would have been huge
b) To imply that the USAAF and the RAF couldn't do more is simply wrong. At the start practically everything we had was thrown at the V1 threat only Overlord had a higher priority
c) To assume that the Corsairs would have had acceptable losses is interesting, the sites were very well defended
