German Bomber design rational

There was plenty of similarities in British and German approach to the designing of bombers, with important exception that LW have had Ju-87 for pin-point attacks on mostly the frontline targets, while RAF was trying to bulk up the numbers with single engined strategic bomber, the Fairey Battle. The bulk of German bomber force was represented in the He 111, a strategic bomber indeed by late 1930s/early 1940s standard.

stona said:

I'm glad you said 'near myth'. Wever, responsible for the development of Luftwaffe doctrine, was certainly not an out an out follower of the doctrines developed on the similar theories of Douhet, Mitchell or Trenchard.

Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung (Luftwaffe Service Regulation l6: Conduct of the Air War) on which Luftwaffe doctrine up to WW2 was based laid down three points:

1) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority.

2) support of the army and navy (neither of which operated any aircraft independently).

3) attack against the enemy industry.

And in that order. Practically the 'subjugation of the enemy air force' was best achieved whilst it was on the ground. The second point already concedes a certain degree of subordination to the Army. The third point did not imply a huge strategic campaign of the type launched in 1943 by the Allies. It was closer to that launched by the Luftwaffe against, for example, British ports in 1940/41 or that launched less successfully by the British at the same time against oil and industrial targets in the Ruhr.
It is not true that no thought was given to a strategic capability, but the Luftwaffe was developed primarily as a tactical air force.
A very important difference to British doctrine was that the defence of the Homeland was primarily the task of the Flak arm, also controlled by the Luftwaffe, not the Army, with cooperation from the Luftwaffe.

As far as the adoption of, in Anglo-Americam terms, medium bombers, one should look at the lessons learned by the Luftwaffe in Spain, where the performance of the He 111 exceeded expectation and certainly influenced later planning. This was confused with competing requirements, but the Ju 88 was probably the outstanding result.

Cheers

Steve

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The Luftwaffe certainly managed to hit quite a number of 'strategic targets' quite aside from attacking the ports, however 'hitting' a strategic target is quite different than 'destroying' it. Luftwaffe wasn't very good at follow up damage assessment (Hmmm, where have we seen that before How many British aircraft plants suffered bomb damage even if not destroyed in 1940?
French had very few "heavy bombers" and the ones they had in numbers (around 80) were just about obsolete when built.

a variant was the first allied bomber to bomb Berlin. Single plane raid.

Italians had what for strategic bombers in 1940? a few prototypes and tooling up for the Piaggo 108?
Japanese bombed cities using single engine and twin engine bombers, sometimes at considerable distances considering the time (late 30s). Strategic bombing?

Germany's resources were not unlimited and given the limits of aircraft of the time (and actual knowledge of target effect and so on) the German decisions to build what they did build in the mid and late 30s (things got crazier later) seems sound. The main bomber, the He 111, had a range and payload comparable to most of it's contemporaries and as shown previously, the range to attack a very large percentage of likely targets. Building specialized aircraft to attack the small percentage of remaining targets at the cost it would have entailed (many fewer bombers) doesn't seem like a good trade-off.

Primary factors effecting British bomber designs in the early '30s, prior to the emergence of Germany as a threat were:

1) Distance to Paris as criterion for range of day bombers which would comprise the main striking force. Bombing a potential enemy's capital is clearly in line with Douhet/Trenchardian orthodoxy and not the same as the doctrine that would influence German designs. The development of these British aircraft was heavily influenced by the discussions at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the outcome of which was deemed likely to influence the size of future bombers. No replacement heavy night bomber was planned for this reason.

2) Subsequently Japanese aggression in Far East and then 1936 Abyssinian Crisis introduced requirements for ferry range to reinforce Middle and far East.

3) Emergence of Germany as European threat led to demands for increased operational range, speed and armament. It was these factors that led to the development of much larger bombers than had previously been sought by the RAF.

The He 111 was designed in accordance with the principles laid out in L.Dv. 16 and I think it a stretch to describe it as a strategic bomber. The Germans envisaged conflict with near continental neighbors, literally on their borders. They did not have the Imperial commitments of the United Kingdom.

The emergence of the single engine bomber in the RAF has a rather convoluted history. In the 1920s there were two classes of RAF day bombers, high and medium performance. Through much of the 1930s the Hawker Hart and its derivatives best represented the high performance day bomber class. It filled twenty five squadrons. Until 1935 the squadron of twin engined Sidestrands, formed in 1929, was the only representative of the medium performance class.
In October 1930 the department of the Air Member for Supply and Research (AMSR, that man Dowding again) put forward a project for a 'High Speed 1000lb Bomber' which was to have 'Twin F or H engines ....to carry twice bomb load of present types and great speed or defence'. The Flying Operations 1 (FO1, Maund) advised the Air Staff that if this was an intended replacement for the Hart it was neither asked for, nor required. If on the other hand the AMSR was seeking to perpetuate the Sidestrand class, despite what Dowding admitted were 'its admitted disabilities of strategic mobility', then Maund thought that the proposed aircraft was too large. "2H engines to drop 1000lb of bombs is rather like giving a battle cruiser 4" guns as primary armament' was his comment.
It was the AMSR (Dowding) who then suggested that such an aircraft might be powered by a single engine, he had in mind the Griffon.
It was as a consequence of this exchange that the genuinely important (vital?) issue of evasion versus defence, or high versus medium performance, became obscured in argument about the relative merits of twin or single engine bombers.
The consequences would be felt by those Battle crews, dispatched to support the BEF in 1939/40.

Cheers

Steve

Shortround6 said:

How many British aircraft plants suffered bomb damage even if not destroyed in 1940?

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Aircraft plants were expressly part of point 1 in L.Dv. 16. By attacking these the Luftwaffe was simply carrying out its primary objective, subjugation of the enemy air force.

Cheers

Steve

tomo pauk said:

There was plenty of similarities in British and German approach to the designing of bombers, with important exception that LW have had Ju-87 for pin-point attacks on mostly the frontline targets,.

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This is actually a dissimilarity.

Dive bombing was acknowledged to be more accurate. The Germans demanded a dive bombing capability in their bombers precisely because they were expected to engage precise targets, often in support of the army.

The Japanese and Americans adopted dive bombing in their naval aviation to sink ships.

The British never developed a dive bomber of their own (excluding late war fighter bombers) and only used some imports in limited numbers in the Far East. They considered torpedoes the best way of sinking ships (by the simple expedient of letting water in) the Swordfish was not a dive bomber. Their bombers were never intended as precision bombers, this dates back to WWI. They were developing a strategic force. Using some of those 'medium', if single engine, bombers in support of the army in the early stages of the war proved disastrous.

Cheers

Steve

Both Britain and Germany had bombed each other in WW I and, had the war gone on longer, would have used more bombers and more powerful ones (larger was a bit hard to do, HP V/1500 and German giants being close to maximum practical size.)
Apparently some of the lessons were forgotten between the wars.

We may also be arguing a bit about the exact meaning of "strategic bombing" and we might get in a loop.
Yes bombing aircraft factories may be considered part of subjugating an enemy air force but at what level? tactical? grand tactical? strategic? and if you subjugate the enemy air force then you are free to attack enemy industry/s that are NOT air power related.

Was bombing the German fuel industry a way to subjugate the German air force? granted the land forces used considerable amounts of fuel but I hope you get the meaning. The crossover from strategic to tactical, tactical in sense of limiting an enemies ability to wage a certain type of warfare vs affecting land/sea battles while they are going on, can get very blurry. For instance in Europe a railroad bridge can be used to bring trainloads of troops/supplies to the front, depending on were the front is. It can hold trains carrying coal or iron ore to steel mills. Is it a tactical target or a strategic target?

One might well compare the He111 to the Wellington or Hampden. And limit the Wellington to the non Hercules versions. Were the .Wellington or Hampden tactical or strategic bombers? The fact that they weren't real good at it goes back to available engines, knowledge of structures and budgets. How many planes for how much money.

We can also look at the Knickebein beam system which had aerials going up in 1939 to show that the Germans were at least giving some thought to long range bombing operations (comparatively speaking) and navigation and not using He 111s and Do 17s to bomb enemy armies in front of their own armies which is the impression some authors seem to be giving. Not you.

"The He 111 was designed in accordance with the principles laid out in L.Dv. 16 and I think it a stretch to describe it as a strategic bomber. The Germans envisaged conflict with near continental neighbors, literally on their borders. They did not have the Imperial commitments of the United Kingdom."

This is mostly true but it also points out that a German Strategic bomber didn't need the range of a British Strategic bomber. The Germans didn't have the long distance commitments and it would have been foolish to build a fleet of bombers that had much more range than needed. AS noted before a 400 mile operational radius would cover quite a number of potential targets.
I got the 400 mile radius as an offshoot of another thread in which it was stated that the British often figured the operational radius as the range minus one hour at cruising speed then divided by two. Fairey Battle, early Blenheims having an operation radius of about 400 miles, (1000 miles minus 1 hour act cruise/2) Wellingtons and Hampdens with full bomb loads could do a bit more.

Germans did have heavy bombers such as the He177
Germany did not produce many heavy bombers for a very simple reason. Heavy bombers are very expensive to produce and operate. Not producing heavy bombers allowed them to maximize production of fighter aircraft and Ju-88 light bombers.

stona said:

The British never developed a dive bomber of their own (excluding late war fighter bombers) and only used some imports in limited numbers in the Far East. They considered torpedoes the best way of sinking ships (by the simple expedient of letting water in) the Swordfish was not a dive bomber. Their bombers were never intended as precision bombers, this dates back to WWI. They were developing a strategic force. Using some of those 'medium', if single engine, bombers in support of the army in the early stages of the war proved disastrous.

Cheers

Steve

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Well you had the Blackburn Skua. You had the Hawker Henley. Ordered and built to the tune of 200 airplanes but never fitted with dive bombing sights, dive brakes or bomb crutch. Shuffled off to target tow land with almost indecent haste before somebody got the idea that the RAF should support the army. The Fairey Barracuda was supposed to dive bomb, at least that's what those weird youngman flaps were supposed to help with.

davebender said:

Germans did have heavy bombers such as the He177
Germany did not produce many heavy bombers for a very simple reason. Heavy bombers are very expensive to produce and operate. Not producing heavy bombers allowed them to maximize production of fighter aircraft and Ju-88 light bombers.

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And how many Ju88s did it take to match a single Greif?
Factor in men, materials, engines, tires, defensive MGs, fuel and so on.

Shortround6 said:

The Fairey Barracuda was supposed to dive bomb, at least that's what those weird youngman flaps were supposed to help with.

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Naval aviation again, my fault as I wasn't specific. Dive bombing was acknowledged to give the best chance of hitting a ship sized target. I forget how many bombs the RAF (and later USAAF) dropped on ships at Wilhelmshaven to minimal effect, but it was a lot

I was also thinking of aircraft developed in that early-mid 1930s period which were in service at the beginning of the war rather than two or three years in. The British did an investigation of bombing against its ships ('Tactical Summary of Bombing Attacks by German Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping, September 1939 to February 1941', where did they get the concise titles from?) which clearly showed that dive bombers carried out the most successful attacks against all classes of ships, but particularly trawlers/auxiliaries and destroyers and escorts. In the case of aircraft carriers and capital ships dive bombing (specifically by the Ju 87) was the only method to have any success at all. The British were well aware that dive bombing was an effective way of damaging, if not sinking, shipping.

Cheers

Steve

The Germans had a plan for strategic bombing called the Ural Bomber, the link provides a lot of interesting stuff I was not aware of until today.

Ural bomber - Wikipedia



Strategic bombing was undertaken by countries separated by water from their adversaries. It is a luxury in war time, If you have a front to fight on then Strategic bombing is symbolic and for propaganda, either in attack or defence there are always targets on the front or just behind that are more important than houses or factories in your opponents capital city.. Between 22 June and 02 December 1941 Germany advanced to within 15 miles of the Kremlin. The Russians toyed with bombing Germany but the game was not worth the candle.


The B24 was one of the best strategic bombers in WW2, what did the British do with it? The very first B24s were converted to carry people (and I suspect documents) contracts needed to be signed drawings needed to be exchanged discussions needed to be held, it was Churchill's favourite mode of transport. The next use was in the Battle of the Atlantic which had to be won before any thought of bombing Germany.


For the RAFs first 1000 bomber raid Coastal command refused to take part, the shortfall was made up by training units of Bomber command. If strategic bombing was considered vital Coastal command would have handed the planes over.


Despite all the bombing of Berlin by US and UK heavy bombers the Russians were able to drop more explosives on the city in a matter of weeks using artillery and rockets.


from wiki
Bombing of Cologne in World War II - Wikipedia
The first British Liberators had been ordered by the Anglo-French Purchasing Board in 1940. After the Fall of France the French orders were in most cases transferred to Britain.

The RAF, like the US, found global war increased the need for air transports and early type bombers and seaplanes were converted or completed as cargo carriers and transports. LB-30As were assigned to transatlantic flights by RAF Ferry Command, between Canada and Prestwick, Scotland. The first Liberators in British service were ex-USAAF YB-24s converted to Liberator GR Is (USAAF designation: LB-30A). The aircraft were all modified for logistic use in Montreal. Changes included the removal of all armament, provision for passenger seating, a revised cabin oxygen and heating system. Ferry Command's Atlantic Return Ferry Service flew civilian ferry pilots, who had delivered aircraft to the UK, back to North America.[citation needed]

The most important role, however, for the first batch of the Liberator GR Is was in service with RAF Coastal Command on anti-submarine patrols in the Battle of the Atlantic.[20]

Also
Bombing of Cologne in World War II - Wikipedia
At this stage of the war Bomber Command only had a regular front line strength of around 400 aircraft, and were in the process of transitioning from the twin engined medium bombers of the pre-war years to the newer more effective four-engined heavy bombers such as the Handley Page Halifax and Avro Lancaster. By using bombers and men from Operational Training Units (OTUs), 250 from RAF Coastal Command and from Flying Training Command, Harris could easily make up the 1,000 aircraft. However, just before the raid took place, the Royal Navy refused to allow the Coastal Command aircraft to take part in the raid.[5] The Admiralty perceived the propaganda justifications too weak an argument against the real and pressing threat of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Harris scrambled around and, by crewing 49 more aircraft with pupil pilots and instructors, 1,047 bombers eventually took part in the raid, two and a half times more than any previous raid by the RAF. In addition to the bombers attacking Cologne, 113 other aircraft on "Intruder" raids harassed German night-fighter airfields.

A few points.
1. it is about 930 miles from Moscow to Tankograd. or slightly longer than the distance from London to Warsaw.
The Ural bomber was pretty much a pipe dream for the 1930s and most of WW II. Getting a plane to fly that distance with even a token bomb-load was hard enough. A Halifax II could do it carrying about 1500lbs or less using Merlin XX engines. Actually flying for that long in defended airspace would have been a near miracle. Halifax II cruised at 205mph true. Only over water zones are lakes or rivers.
given the amount of empty space in Russia it didn't take rocket scientists to figure out what the likely target/s were after the first few hours of flight.
2.Germans had crap for defensive armament for a good part of the war, Sorry but a 7.9mm MG with a 75 round drum is NOT first class. Turrets on the first "Ural" bombers held a single 20mm cannon but it was a MG/FF and the turret/s were "powered" by two men. One controlled the traverse and the other the elevation. both using hand cranks. Granted better mounts might have showed up on later aircraft but the turret on the Do 217 and late He 111Hs wasn't all that special. It appears to have been powered in traverse only and even at that had a small range of manual traverse???????
3. Long range navigation over most of Russia was going to be a real problem. Maps, in all likelyhood, were not as good as the rest of Europe. The German Knickebein system wasn't going to work at the distances needed. And even trying to "Bradshaw" (follow rail lines) was going have problems. Not that many rail lines and once the Russians figure out what is going on the possibility of ambushes goes way up.

4. The B-24 use by the British doesn't prove much one way or the other as the Versions the British got first did not have turbos and had a rather different performance envelope than the versions used by the USAAF. In fact it may show the lack of actual combat capability of early 4 engine bombers using low altitude and/or low powered engines. Using non-turbo B-24s as long range low altitude maritime patrol planes actually made a great deal of sense.

pbehn said:

The Russians toyed with bombing Germany but the game was not worth the candle.

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The Russians bombed Berlin as early as 7 August 1941 and continued to bomb Germany (and other targets in Germany) for the duration of the war. Their primary bomber in these missions was the Petlyakov Pe-8.

While it may have accounted for a small percentage of all Allied tonnage delivered to German targets, the fact remains that they were there.

Shortround6 said:

The fact that they weren't real good at it goes back to available engines, knowledge of structures and budgets.

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Weren't very good compared to what? It's a little unfair to compare these pre-war designs to more advanced types that entered service during the war. Available engines, maybe, but doctrine is more likely a restricting factor to the capability of pre-war aircraft. The urgency that a state of war introduces puts R&D into overdrive, which accelerates technology development. Had there been no WW2, aircraft like the Wellington and Do 17, He 111 would have remained in service in their early incarnations a lot longer than they did.

Shortround6 said:

We can also look at the Knickebein beam system which had aerials going up in 1939 to show that the Germans were at least giving some thought to long range bombing operations (comparatively speaking) and navigation

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Yep, I agree; the use of this technology gave the Luftwaffe the most accurate bombing force in the world at the outbreak of war. It wouldn't be for another couple of years before the RAF and USAAF got anywhere near the accuracy of navigation and target location that Knickebein and X and Y Gerat offered.

Regarding 'strategic bombing', the German bombing force was as 'strategic' in its intentions as any elsewhere. The distances offered by the aircraft available were perhaps not as great as those required by, say, the RAF's or the IJN's needs, but strategic bombing isn't defined by distance, as much as the choice of target. In the simplest terms possible, attacking fuel plants and aircraft factories behind the front lines is 'strategic' bombing, attacking a line of enemy tanks hiding in wait to attack advancing friendlies is 'tactical' bombing.

Strategic? Of course there was a capability, but, look at the task for the Luftwaffe given in Hitler's 16th July Directive for Sealion. .

"The English air force must be beaten down to such an extent morally and in actual fact that it can no longer muster any power of attack worth mentioning against the German crossing."

Not that different from what it had already done in Poland and the Low Countries and France, there was just the small matter of 22 miles of water, which at this time seems to have been regarded as no more than a wide river.

This fits very well with the two primary doctrinal objectives of the air force in L.Dv. 16,

"1) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority.

2) support of the army and navy."

And more specific objectives, set out in paragraph ten of the same document.

"The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals by commanding the war in the air within the framework of combined operations. By battling the enemy air force, the enemy armed forces are weakened and, at the same time, our own armed forces, our people, and our homeland are protected."

Compare this with the pre-war plans for Bomber Command . I have to be somewhat selective because this is a forum reply, not a thesis, and I can't reproduce all of them, even those pertaining to Germany rather than other potential enemies..
There were plans for attacking the 'German Air Striking Force and its maintenance organisation (including aircraft industry)' As a pre-emptive effort to minimise bombing of Britain. Relevant here are the points made about the perceived consequences of bombing made by someone else above. Attacking the enemy air force and its infrastructure was one of the aims of the Luftwaffe too, and is debatably strategic. The Luftwaffe attempted it in support of an invasion plan, the British just wanted to prevent themselves being bombed.
All the other plans are unequivocally strategic in nature, from cooperation with the Navy to protect maritime trade to

"WA.4 Plans for the attack of German military rail, canal and road communications...."

"WA.5(a) The attack of German war industry."

"WA.5(b) The attack of the RUHR and its effect on the military lines of communication in western Germany."

"WA.5(c) Attack on Germany's war resources of oil."

And this is the point, RAF Bomber Command was established as a strategic striking force and the Luftwaffe's bomber arm was not. Both had some capability to perform tasks for which they had not been designed, the Luftwaffe could bomb Coventry and Fairey Battles could perform tactical tasks behind the Anglo/French front in the Battle of France, but this was not a reflection of the doctrine on which they were founded.
The original question was about the rationale for German bomber design, and that is a reflection of the doctrine, everything from range, bomb load, performance and intrinsic dive bombing capability.

Cheers

Steve

GrauGeist said:

The Russians bombed Berlin as early as 7 August 1941 and continued to bomb Germany (and other targets in Germany) for the duration of the war. Their primary bomber in these missions was the Petlyakov Pe-8.

While it may have accounted for a small percentage of all Allied tonnage delivered to German targets, the fact remains that they were there.

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Below is from the Pe 8 article in wiki, Its strategic raid on Berlin 4 reached Berlin and only two returned, this was a symbolic gesture which almost certainly cost more in terms of Russian men and machines than German. Only 93 Pe 8s were built and front line strength was rarely above 20 from what I can see.

On the evening of 10 August, eight M-40-engined Pe-8s of the 432nd TBAP, accompanied by Yermolaev Yer-2s of the 420th Long-Range Bomber Aviation Regiment (DBAP), attempted to bomb Berlin from Pushkino Airfield near Leningrad. One heavily loaded Pe-8 crashed immediately upon take off, after it lost an engine. Only four managed to reach Berlin, or its outskirts, and of those, only two returned to their base. The others landed elsewhere or crash-landed in Finland and Estonia. The aircraft of the commander of the 81st Long-Range Bomber Division, Combrig Mikhail Vodopianov, to which both regiments belonged, was attacked mistakenly by Polikarpov I-16s from Soviet Naval Aviation over the Baltic Sea and lost an engine; later, before he could reach Berlin, German flak punctured a fuel tank. He crash-landed his aircraft in southern Estonia.[20] Five more Pe-8s were lost during the operation, largely due to the unreliability of the M-40s.[21] Seven Pe-8s were lost during the month of August alone, rendering the regiment ineffective.

pbehn said:

For the RAFs first 1000 bomber raid Coastal command refused to take part, the shortfall was made up by training units of Bomber command. If strategic bombing was considered vital Coastal command would have handed the planes over..

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I just noticed this and have to correct you.
First this shows a lack of understanding of the structure of the RAF and the roles of the commands within it.

Bomber Command was established as a strategic bombing force. It was the only reason for its existence.

Coastal Command had an entirely different job to do, as specified in various pre-war plans. It was not and never was intended as a strategic bombing force.

You also gave a rather over simplified account of the efforts made by Harris to assemble the aircraft and the contribution of other commands.
When 'the new sheriff in town' Arthur Harris decided to attempt a 1,000 bomber raid, to capitalise on the successes he had achieved against Lubeck and Rostock, he first approached Portal and Churchill seeking authorisation for such a raid, which he knew would involve aircraft from other commands. Harris asked for help from the commanders in chief of both Coastal Command and Flying Training Command. Sir Philip Joubert of Coastal Command immediately offered 250 aircraft, many of them from ex Bomber Command squadrons. He was keen to get his command involved. Training Command offered 50 aircraft, but they were poorly equipped and, eventually, just 4 Wellingtons came from this command.
It was only later that the Admiralty refused to allow Coastal Command to take part in the operation. Anyone aware of the ongoing battle between the RAF and RN for control of maritime air power will understand why this happened. It would not have been lost on the Admiralty that if Harris' grandiose plan was a success it would do little to help the Admiralty's prospects of building up a force of long range, modern aircraft for the prosecution of the war against the U-boats. They were prescient...it didn't.

Wikipedia never let's the facts get in the way of a good story

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Wikipedia never let's the facts get in the way of a good story

Cheers

Steve

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I know but I cannot cut and paste from books on the Battle of the Atlantic, in 1942 there were 8 million tons of shipping sunk. The Battle of the Atlantic was of far greater significance to the UK than strategic bombing. As I said the Liberator was a strategic bomber but instead of using it to bomb Germany we fitted it with RADAR and Leigh lights because it had the range to close the mid Atlantic gap.

Coastal Command was always competing with Bomber Command for aircraft. It had started the war in an even more woeful state than Bomber Command.

It is also important to remember that the Deputy Director of the Plans Division in the Air Ministry, through much of the expansion period during which Coastal Command might have hoped for some reinforcement was a certain Group Captain Arthur Harris. In December 1936 Harris wrote.

"It would be an unnecessary, a serious and perhaps even fatal subtraction from our total offensive strength to keep any ponderable number of aircraft either employed on, or standing by for, reconnaissance operations in connection with a trade defence war that might not happen."

Harris argued that it was more cost effective to "nip in the bud" an enemy's war waging potential by attacking his war industries. He was concerned, in his words, with "sources" rather than "fringes". The best place to attack a U-boat was in its factory or dockyard where you knew where it was, not to go gallivanting around the North Atlantic in the hope of finding one. This is the raison d'etre of any strategic bombing force. He was right at the time, before the advent of workable radar. The 'Channel dash' was a salutary lesson to the RAF, including Coastal Command.
His argument was supported by many at the Air Ministry (hardly surprising as the Admiralty was still trying to seize control of Coastal Command) as well as Churchill and essentially prevailed. Bomber Command received a preferential supply of aircraft.

The Battle of the Atlantic was never as close as has sometimes been claimed in any case.



Cheers

Steve

You should also remember Milch's quotation of Goering; "The Fuhrer will only ever ask me how many bombers do you have. He will never ask how big they are. For one four engined job I can build two and a half medium bombers"
Ref: Devils Disciples page 416.

Bear in mind that in this time frame (late 30's) Germany was running short of a lot of raw materials including aluminium.