German logistics, purchase programs and war booty, reality and alternatives 1935-43

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Taking them apart, transporting them, reworking them was labor intensive.
The 25mm Hotchkiss AA gun was not very good anyway. Park them in France, give them away, don't spend any more German resources on them.
Time/money spent on modifying 25mm ATG barrels to fit 25mm AA guns is time/money not spent of new barrels/guns for 2cm Flak 38s or 3.7cm Flak 37s

The 25mm AA gun fired the twice as heavy shell than the 2cm Flak did, at the same velocity. Means it will ought to outrage the light Flak that Germans had in scores (= 1-barreled 2cm), and that seems to be so, 3000m vs. 2000m for the 2cm (terms and conditions apply). It will also have a better ceiling.
Turning the 25mm ATG barrels into the parts of the 25mm AA gun can be done in France (and Romania, where for exmple a lot of the captured 75mm Polish guns were sold), and it will take mo more time and resources than a 2cm Flak to manufacture. See whether it can fit on the 2cm Flak tripod, like the MK 103 later did so.

For the 37mm AA gun to become a widely-produced gun, it will take Germany to realize that they need to take that weapon seriously ASAP and devote the resources for production of it. As-is, it was being produced just by one production line at Rheinmetall, and, boy, have they had their plate full.
 
The 25mm AA gun fired the twice as heavy shell than the 2cm Flak did, at the same velocity.
It was trade off, the French 25mm fired about 2/3 the number of shells per minute. and that is counting magazine changes.
Means it will ought to outrage the light Flak that Germans had in scores (= 1-barreled 2cm), and that seems to be so, 3000m vs. 2000m for the 2cm (terms and conditions apply). It will also have a better ceiling.
An awful lot depends on sights and mounting. I am rather suspicious of a lot of these light AA ranges. For a 3000m range for a gun with a 900m/s velocity that means a flight time of 3.3 seconds, not counting air resistance. Now how many of these light AA guns had sights that allowed for aiming even 3 seconds ahead of an aircraft? even a biplane flying 180kph moves 50 meters in one second. A 300kph plane moves 83meters per second.

The story of the Hotchkiss 25mm seems to be a little confusing in non-Japanese hands.
Wiki says that the Romanians ordered 300 guns but only got 72 before the war started. Most of the rest went to the French forces.
NavWeap's says the Romanian's didn't get any before the war but got most of the guns after France fell.
Anthony Williams says fewer than 250 guns (for everybody) were delivered by the summer of 1940.

The French navy didn't get any until after the war started, if not later.
The French Army got around 200. Impounded Romanian guns or their own orders?
There were 2 or 3 different rates of fire depending on year of the gun. There were several different mounts, including twins.

Considering the rather dismal performance of the 25mm gun in Japanese service (unknown in 1940) it would seem that devoting any energy/money to any program involving the 25mm Hotchkiss AA gun would only benefit the Allies.

The Romanian time line is also skewed a little. Romania doesn't join the Axis until Nov 23 1940, at which point the Germans had moved around 500,000 troops into Romania in the last 6 weeks. Romanian relations with both Germany and Russia are somewhat twisted. Germany agreed for the Soviets to take back large areas of Romania when the Soviets 'occupied' eastern Poland. Then got Romania to help Germany in return for German help in regaining the lost territory. Germany isn't shipping much of anything to Romania until Dec of 1940?
 
Speaking of licensing (DC-3), I would ground the story.
We've talked about steam trucks a couple of times already. Yes - they are more expensive to use than petrol/diesel trucks, they needed both a stoker and a driver, they would burden the coal mines ... but they would not use petrol and/or diesel, and they are definitely better than horses.

Now there were a couple of manufacturers in Germany itself, but in those early 1930s, the British oil industry (and the government because of the railways) decided to get rid of steam trucks. So I'm sure that Sentinel (and Foden) would be happy not only to sell the license but also the entire production.
And if the army had embraced steam trucks at the beginning of the 1930s, I'm sure they would have expanded into civilian use as well.
The only detail that I see as problematic is their use in North Africa 😉.
Admittedly, this could also be solved if coolers and drippers and a water-steam-water circular flow were installed.
 
It was trade off, the French 25mm fired about 2/3 the number of shells per minute. and that is counting magazine changes.

That is when compared with the Flak 38.
Compared with Flak 30, that was in thousands in the German service well into 1941/42 (production of the Flak 38 started in Spring of 1940), difference in the RoF was negligible.

An awful lot depends on sights and mounting. I am rather suspicious of a lot of these light AA ranges. For a 3000m range for a gun with a 900m/s velocity that means a flight time of 3.3 seconds, not counting air resistance. Now how many of these light AA guns had sights that allowed for aiming even 3 seconds ahead of an aircraft? even a biplane flying 180kph moves 50 meters in one second. A 300kph plane moves 83meters per second.

We can count on the 25mm AA gun having the appropriate sights to take advantage of it's ballistic properties.

Considering the rather dismal performance of the 25mm gun in Japanese service (unknown in 1940) it would seem that devoting any energy/money to any program involving the 25mm Hotchkiss AA gun would only benefit the Allies.

Stick the 20mm guns on the Japanese ships instead of the 25mm guns and see how well you fare.

The Romanian time line is also skewed a little. Romania doesn't join the Axis until Nov 23 1940, at which point the Germans had moved around 500,000 troops into Romania in the last 6 weeks. Romanian relations with both Germany and Russia are somewhat twisted. Germany agreed for the Soviets to take back large areas of Romania when the Soviets 'occupied' eastern Poland. Then got Romania to help Germany in return for German help in regaining the lost territory. Germany isn't shipping much of anything to Romania until Dec of 1940?
Romanians were buying German stuff, like the He 112, already in 1939, and were pushed even more towards Germany by the Summer of 1940.

FWIW, the production of different French stuff for Germany, 1943. The agreed upon production of the 25mm barrels (2.5cm Hotchkissrohre) was 1200, and the monthly delivery of the barrels was close about 100 in the best months.
Also see the ammo production in France for the German needs, the agreed upon quantity went from 3.15 millions to 3.7 millions by 1944, with monthly production of averaging at about 120 thousands.
My point - Germans certainly saw the merit of the 25mm AA gun in it's original role, even if that dawned too late for them.

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in those early 1930s, the British oil industry (and the government because of the railways) decided to get rid of steam trucks.
Am I missing something piece of history? The British oil industry never had steam trucks and the railways were in private ownership. I am guessing that English is not your first language? The British steam lorries fell out of use in the 1930s because people were not buying them. Economics not government policy.

When one thinks of coal as a widely available resource for both Britain and Germany one has to consider manpower. Men fit to be miners are ideal soldier material. Germany used POWs and forced foreign labour to keep their mines going and still could not meet demand even with mines in conquered countries. The British were forced to send 10% of their conscripts into the mines instead of the armed forces and still fell short of demand. They maintained this even when desperately short of infantry in 1944/5. The extra manpower and supply of extra (good) coal for a German army relying upon steam powered lorries might simply not have been available. Also the greater bulk of coal for the same energy as liquid fuel places extra pressure upon the already overloaded rail and road system. Any transshipment breaks with coal needs more labour than liquid fuels too.

The subject has to be assessed at a system level not just a technical level. Much as animal power carries burdens of breeding, veterinary care, arable land given over to feeding horses not people and more labour than liquid powered lorries.

Hence it all reinforces the traditional German need to win the battle not the war and get in a peace settlement quickly after the fighting stops. In any 20th century war Germany cannot win a long war. It worked in 1866 and 1871 and might have worked in 1914. Just possibly an intelligently run Germany might have forced a white peace in 1941.

Steam lorries might be a useful supplement to German transport at home and at war but the solution is more railways using coal not lorries. We can see this in practice with the Allied campaign in NW Europe. There the limits of movement of the Allied armies was restricted by the necessary reliance upon road transport as they had crippled the rail system themselves. A necessary destruction but a fully working coal powered French and Belgian railway would have made a vast difference with individual armies not having to compete for supplies and halt when not having the first priority for them. Had the Germans managed to build extra eastern railways across Poland and Russia, by some miracle, in 1941 things would have been far easier for them and not weather dependent either. Fleets of steam lorries will still come to a halt in the wet or freezing winter weather just as much as liquid fuelled ones did in OTL.

My conclusion on the steam lorry question is that they would be better than horses. A useful supplement to liquid fuelled ones lorries but in the period rail was still king and the best place to spend your coal. The caveat is that it needs a huge investment in preparing for the necessary massive civil engineering program to be able to do it across Russia at a speed to meet the need. It would eat up all the army bunker building concrete and naval steel production of to mention forestry for a start.
 
When one thinks of coal as a widely available resource for both Britain and Germany one has to consider manpower. Men fit to be miners are ideal soldier material. Germany used POWs and forced foreign labour to keep their mines going and still could not meet demand even with mines in conquered countries. The British were forced to send 10% of their conscripts into the mines instead of the armed forces and still fell short of demand. They maintained this even when desperately short of infantry in 1944/5. The extra manpower and supply of extra (good) coal for a German army relying upon steam powered lorries might simply not have been available. Also the greater bulk of coal for the same energy as liquid fuel places extra pressure upon the already overloaded rail and road system. Any transshipment breaks with coal needs more labour than liquid fuels too.
A French, Belgian, Czech, Polish, Yugoslav and Ukrainian man will much more likely be working in the mines than it will be serving as a soldier fighting for the German cause.
Shipping of oil will require shipping it from Germany proper. Shipping of the coal is moire or less a local matter. Rail transport is great when there is the bulk cargo to be shipped across, well, railroads. Where there are no railroads (either as-is, or due the enemy action), but there is still coal, the coal-powered lorries can do the trick. One accurate and powerful attack (whether a diversion or an air attack) can render the railroads unusable. Enemy making a counter-attack can also sever the raillines, while the steam-powered trucks have no such weakness.
 
One could argue that with lower octane gas than the Allies (C3 was what, roughly equivalent to 100/130, whereas late in the war R-2800 ran on 115/145?), and poorer valves, bearings etc., the Germans could get away with slightly more volume per cylinder before running into cooling limits due to the surface area vs volume issues you described.
Very little 115/145 was produced during the war. See my previous post
 
Very little 115/145 was produced during the war.
Not disputing that. Just saying that having less volume per cylinder could have been an advantage for the USAAF while remaining irrelevant for the LW due to the fuel situation. Now whether that was foreseen back when the engines were designed is another matter entirely.
 
I am guessing that English is not your first language?
No it's not.
What I (tried) to write in perhaps too few words is that a special tax on the weight per axle of a vehicle was passed.
So the price of using steam (witch required heavier construction of trucks ) itself automatically became significantly more expensive than using gasoline.
That's why, for example Sentinel made first worlds four axle truck (wagon).

The aim was to reduce the number of steam trucks (because their carrying capacity was significantly greater than gasoline trucks and they also began to compete with railway traffic).

A similar thing happened about 30 years earlier with electric cars.
Yes, I should have written "interest groups" 😉.

And besides, you don't have to stuff coal, wood also burn and everything else that burns you can put into the boiler - perhaps less efficiently and needs more cleaning, but ...
 
When one thinks of coal as a widely available resource for both Britain and Germany one has to consider manpower. Men fit to be miners are ideal soldier material. Germany used POWs and forced foreign labour to keep their mines going and still could not meet demand even with mines in conquered countries.

Yes, Germany had a coal problem, as in not being able to dig it up fast enough for all potential users. But at the same time, allocating more resources to coal extraction could very well have been the best choice they had in terms of gaining access to extra energy with the least effort. Compared to, say, gathering and transporting wood from forests, which is fairly labor intensive, arguably more so than coal extraction at industrial scale. And having lost the geological petrochemical lottery, Germany didn't have the option of sticking a straw into the ground and having liquid fuel gush out, either (in significant quantities, at least).

The subject has to be assessed at a system level not just a technical level.

My conclusion on the steam lorry question is that they would be better than horses. A useful supplement to liquid fuelled ones lorries but in the period rail was still king and the best place to spend your coal. The caveat is that it needs a huge investment in preparing for the necessary massive civil engineering program to be able to do it across Russia at a speed to meet the need. It would eat up all the army bunker building concrete and naval steel production of to mention forestry for a start.

You might very well be correct in that higher investment into railways would have paid off handsomely. And also coal-powered canal shipping, which was AFAIU widely utilized in mid-century Europe. Of course, just as the Allied targeted rail infrastructure, they also had a nasty habit of dropping aerial mines into major waterways.

But I'd see lorries not so much as an alternative to railways and barges, but rather as an alternative to horse and cart. And lets not forget farming; agricultural mechanization, even with steam tractors, could have meant more area available for human food instead of horse feed, as well as liberated a huge workforce to work in factories, and yes, coal mines to power those steam tractors and lorries.
 
A tidbit about how the 75mm of the French origin, that were captured in France, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia (??) were to be delivered to the different end users. Note the "Beute t, p, b und f" in the title, denoting were the guns were captured, or, better, from whose military.
Of the ex-Polish and ex-CZ pieces, that about 860 were captured, 120 were supposed to be shipped to Romania, only 80 were actually shipped, with Germans eventually deciding that they need them. 410 were issued to the navy (Marine), 221 were issued to the LW (Luft), another 150 (located in the Generalgovernment, ie. the German-held part of Poland) was further earmarked for the LW, leaving no such guns for the army (Heer).

2400 of the 7.5cm pieces (the differentiation between the M(18)97 and other types is noted as not yet being done) is counted as captured in the West. Out of that number, 44 of the M97 was given to the navy, 428 for the LW, 438 is earmarked for the 'Sea Lion' operation, and there is another 416 that are being shipped to Germany but are not yet delivered to anyone(?).
Second page offers some explanantion as to why LW was to be main recipient of the captured guns - a quantity of them was supposed to be used in the 'fire barrage' (Sperrfeuer) mode in the air defense, where a veritable curtain of fire was to be laid against the incoming enemy aircraft. Obviously, the guns will need the suitable carriage in order to boost both elevation and azimuth.
(the fire barrage mode was later judged as a waste of both ammo, guns, and manpower - no surprises there)
Doc says that there is another 1114 gun in the West available, that the LW is 1st to be taking a look on it.
Point 3 notes that 60 captured 75mm M97 guns are with rubber tyres, ie. set for motor transport.
Point 4 notes that the tests are to be done with the ordnance of the gun installed on the carriage of the 10.5cm lefH howitzer.

My take on all of this: giving the captured guns of this type to either navy or LW in 1939-40 (continuing into 1941?) was a big mistake, that deprived the Heer of the perfectly useful guns, that were also capable of tackling enemy tanks. Expecting that the French 75 is a good AA or anti-ship gun in ww2 enviroement was the fools errand, and it took Germans many months to figure all of this.

Docs:

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The folly of the 'speerfeuer' Flak batteries run deep indeed. Almost 330 (!) such batteries were constituted from 1941 to 1942, and most of them were disbanded by 1943. These that were left to serve, were outfitted with 'normal' heavy AA guns, changing the name in the process. Seems like that everyone's least favorite Austrian painter was behind this scheme.

List (can be easily translated).
 
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Not disputing that. Just saying that having less volume per cylinder could have been an advantage for the USAAF while remaining irrelevant for the LW due to the fuel situation. Now whether that was foreseen back when the engines were designed is another matter entirely.
But it wasn't an advantage in reality so your point is moot.
 
More importantly is it any better.

IMO, it would've been better.
German access to a good coal - even if it was not perfect coal - was much greater than it was their access to any liquid fuel. Ironically, their access to the coal was improving as Germany was gobbling up the territory. Any boiler design for the steam truck should have the quality of the coal in mind in the time the back-of-the-napkin stage is in.
 

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