German war production without war with West

[GrauGeist]

The only scenario where the germans come out worse

As long as Hitler remains in charge, all scenarios are doomed...

His shining example during the invasion of Russia, was striking towards Stalingrad simply for the sake of capturing Uncle Joe's namesake, instead of focusing on Moscow and other objectives that actually hurt the Red army.

 

[bbear]

No, please feel free to contribute.

Ok, I'll take a junior shot at it:

No matter what Germany produces or how much of it or whether there is lend lease or not - or whether all the forces released in the west are used in the east or demobilised. Barbarossa is doomed to fail, pretty much as in the OTL and the more forces used in the east and the further they encroach territory the worse (better) their eventual defeat becomes.

An army cannot advance beyond the rate determined by it's resupply. And resupply in Barbarossa/ the steppes is largely determined by railway capacity (because truck convoys can't operate long distance on Russian dirt roads in the autumn or winter and cant haul the heavy stuff at speed at any time).

The germans had a plan of logistic support based on rail, there were some invalid assumptions, they couldn't be compensated for, the best that could be done was done and still the offensive came up short of objectives in distance and left some red army units intact around Moscow. It had to - no other result is possible. Moeltke had a rule of thumb about combat distance from a railhead. Hitler of hubris ignored it, October rains put the frontline troops beyond the effective range of the trucks to resupply them from the railheads. Winter effectively further extended the supply distance in terms of tons delivered per hour. The Siberian armies arrived (on Russian locos : which burnt Russian brown? coal and were winter proof, german precision engineered locos, not so much...)

÷ïåîîáñ ìéôåòáôõòá --[ ÷ÏÅÎÎÁÑ ÉÓÔÏÒÉÑ ]-- Stolfi R. H. S. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted

David M. Glantz, Barbarossa de-railed (no I haven't read it all)


In summary: Technically : railways, 5' gauge, blown bridges, 'scorched earth' marshalling yards, conversion speeds, Baltic states used standard gauge, double tracking, scheduling, signalling, partisans, Luftwaffe not configured for strategic use etc. Supply lines are a bottle neck in the east throughout the period so production is less important.

Actually, tentatively: I tend to agree with Grau Geist. The reason behind the reason appears to be Hitlers arrogance /paranoid delusion borne of easy victory in the west. That plus docile tenacity turned to unexpected fury in the Soviet peoples, plus the unexpected strength in depth of the Red Army despite the worst Stalin could do ...


Now shoot me down please.

 

[stona]

Now shoot me down please.

The assumption therefore is that had the major Soviet European cities, including Moscow, fallen in 1941 and the Soviet leadership been forced to flee or been destroyed that the remnants of the Soviet Union would have continued to fight. I'm not sure that that was possible economically, never mind politically.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

Ok, I'll take a junior shot at it:

No matter what Germany produces or how much of it or whether there is lend lease or not - or whether all the forces released in the west are used in the east or demobilised. Barbarossa is doomed to fail, pretty much as in the OTL and the more forces used in the east and the further they encroach territory the worse (better) their eventual defeat becomes.

An army cannot advance beyond the rate determined by it's resupply. And resupply in Barbarossa/ the steppes is largely determined by railway capacity (because truck convoys can't operate long distance on Russian dirt roads in the autumn or winter and cant haul the heavy stuff at speed at any time).

The germans had a plan of logistic support based on rail, there were some invalid assumptions, they couldn't be compensated for, the best that could be done was done and still the offensive came up short of objectives in distance and left some red army units intact around Moscow. It had to - no other result is possible. Moeltke had a rule of thumb about combat distance from a railhead. Hitler of hubris ignored it, October rains put the frontline troops beyond the effective range of the trucks to resupply them from the railheads. Winter effectively further extended the supply distance in terms of tons delivered per hour. The Siberian armies arrived (on Russian locos : which burnt Russian brown? coal and were winter proof, german precision engineered locos, not so much...)

÷ïåîîáñ ìéôåòáôõòá --[ ÷ÏÅÎÎÁÑ ÉÓÔÏÒÉÑ ]-- Stolfi R. H. S. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted

David M. Glantz, Barbarossa de-railed (no I haven't read it all)


In summary: Technically : railways, 5' gauge, blown bridges, 'scorched earth' marshalling yards, conversion speeds, Baltic states used standard gauge, double tracking, scheduling, signalling, partisans, Luftwaffe not configured for strategic use etc. Supply lines are a bottle neck in the east throughout the period so production is less important.

Actually, tentatively: I tend to agree with Grau Geist. The reason behind the reason appears to be Hitlers arrogance /paranoid delusion borne of easy victory in the west. That plus docile tenacity turned to unexpected fury in the Soviet peoples, plus the unexpected strength in depth of the Red Army despite the worst Stalin could do ...


Now shoot me down please.

i agree that Barbarossa was very unlikely to succeed, but it could have gone better than historically with more forces. Its not outside the realm of possibility for Leningrad and Murmansk to fall with greater air support and more mobile infantry (paratroopers and the Afrika Korps).
The question is what happens after the initial invasion stalls. Grau Geist seriously misunderstands what Case Blue was all about and what happened with Stalingrad if he thinks that Hitler just went after it because it was had Stalin's name; in fact going after Moscow was worse due to Soviet reserves being concentrated on it in 1942.

In the long term the Soviets are going to suffer a lot more (1943 and on) than historically, as the Axis has a lot more men and equipment, not to mention supplies to throw into the Eastern Front. The Italians will send many more men and won't exit the war in 1943; Stalingrad is almost guaranteed not to play out the same way here. At the worst case scenario the Axis is going to get a peace of exhaustion and at best they will cause the Soviet state to implode by inflicting so much damage on the Soviet armed forces and economy that they cannot cope with continued war. Of course the most likely scenario is somewhere in between that leaves Axis forces with major territorial gains and the USSR badly hobbled, but still a threat.

 

[GrauGeist]

On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.

If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.

Then in July, Hitler re-wrote the objectives in the campaign to include the capture of Stalingrad, making it a priority.

This was the tactical mistake that became the turning point of the eastern front. You can delve into the smaller details, such as his insistance on dividing Army Group South into two units, pulling units from the seige of Sebastopol which caused serious delays in Case Blue's start, etc etc...but the bottom line is that HAD Hitler followed the plan as laid out, Stalingrad would have been cut off entirely by Army Group South and eventually capitulated.

Instead, thanks to Hitler's ego, Stalingrad became a sucking chest wound to the Wehrmacht and the tipping point to the war in the East.

 

[wiking85]

On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.

If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.

Then in July, Hitler re-wrote the objectives in the campaign to include the capture of Stalingrad, making it a priority.

This was the tactical mistake that became the turning point of the eastern front. You can delve into the smaller details, such as his insistance on dividing Army Group South into two units, pulling units from the seige of Sebastopol which caused serious delays in Case Blue's start, etc etc...but the bottom line is that HAD Hitler followed the plan as laid out, Stalingrad would have been cut off entirely by Army Group South and eventually capitulated.

Instead, thanks to Hitler's ego, Stalingrad became a sucking chest wound to the Wehrmacht and the tipping point to the war in the East.

What about seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus and using Stalingrad as a defensive position to hold the flank of the Caucasian advance???
The reason that Stalingrad took on such importance was that it threatened the advance to the south, as the Soviets having a toe hold on the other bank of the Volga gave them the ability to cut off the mobile units advancing against Baku.

 

[wiking85]

On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.

If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.

Then in July, Hitler re-wrote the objectives in the campaign to include the capture of Stalingrad, making it a priority.

This was the tactical mistake that became the turning point of the eastern front. You can delve into the smaller details, such as his insistance on dividing Army Group South into two units, pulling units from the seige of Sebastopol which caused serious delays in Case Blue's start, etc etc...but the bottom line is that HAD Hitler followed the plan as laid out, Stalingrad would have been cut off entirely by Army Group South and eventually capitulated.

Instead, thanks to Hitler's ego, Stalingrad became a sucking chest wound to the Wehrmacht and the tipping point to the war in the East.

What about seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus and using Stalingrad as a defensive position to hold the flank of the Caucasian advance???
The reason that Stalingrad took on such importance was that it threatened the advance to the south, as the Soviets having a toe hold on the other bank of the Volga gave them the ability to cut off the mobile units advancing against Baku.

 

[GrauGeist]

And, had Army Group South Followed the original plan, flanking Stalingrad and cut off the Volga and capturing key centers during thier advance (in full unit strength as planned), then Stalingrad would have strangled slowly...nothing in, nothing out.

The Red Army was given an advantage because Army Group South was divided. Note that key infantry units were no longer accompanied by Panzer support as they had been diverted per Hitler's orders during his revision. The Wehrmacht's initial successes lulled Hitler into thinking the Red Army would break at the Wehrmacht's advances in a divided capacity. It was dellusional thinking along those lines that seriously weakened the German's effectiveness.

The Wehrmacht's successes were due to mobile infantry being supported by armor and mobile artillery. Remove any one of the key components and you've created a handicap.

 

[silence]

To clarify:

The goals for the '42 summer campaign were to hold the center, capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns, and capture the Caucasus oil fields.

Early on AG South was split into Army Groups A and B under Fuehrer Directive 45. A was to drive on the Caucasus and capture the oil fields, while B was to Guard A's northern flank and establish a defensive line on the Volga in the general vicinity of Stalingrad. With the splitting of AG South and the subsequent transfer of Fourth Panzer Army from B to A, B's progress slowed to almost a stroll.

However, it wasn't until late September - about two weeks after actually entering the city - when 6th Army raised a flag over Gov't buildings in the city that Paulus was ordered by Groefaz to take the city at any cost.

On the other side, Stalin was determined to fight to the death for the city from the outset.

Enter Chuikov and his brilliant defense, which decided this clash of monster egos.

Really, both wiking85 and GrauGeist are correct

 

[bbear]

i agree that Barbarossa was very unlikely to succeed, but it could have gone better than historically with more forces. Its not outside the realm of possibility for Leningrad and Murmansk to fall with greater air support and more mobile infantry (paratroopers and the Afrika Korps).
.

No (smile), more forces do no good unless you can resupply them. And with an inherited Soviet rail system, with only steppe sandy soil to bear weight, under reconstruction in 1941 or under partisan attack there after, feeding a dirt road system or any distance in a bombed out city you cannot shift enough tons in winter to keep your elite high tech forces supplied at any distance from a railway. The more you use motorised divisions the worse it gets, because they need fuel and spare parts. Horse fodder and man food on the other hand can be obtained locally.

Look at the casualty statistics, every winter when german forces are perforce immobile and defensive - casualties go up - just an eyeball impression you understand.

A lesson hard learned in WW1, thrown away in WW2: no matter how grand your breakout may be it will fizzle out and be vulnerable to counter attack if you cannot supply it. Barbarossa had to stall before Moscow, the Archangel - Astrakhan objective was impossible.

No matter what promising or crucial stage the offensive is at in the end of August if you don't spend September falling back on whatever rail head there may be to establish a well supplied defensive line before the first big rains of autumn your hi-tech, resource hungry, elite forces are vulnerable and likely to become more so as winter sets in the more forces you field the more resupply they need the more vulnerable they become.

Red Army peasants with terrible locos and tough little ponies on the other hand can keep an offensive of sorts supplied right through the winter, and shove 100 miles forward from Moscow in winter 1941/42 for example. If my memory and reading materials serve me well.

 

[wiking85]

No (smile), more forces do no good unless you can resupply them. And with an inherited Soviet rail system, with only steppe sandy soil to bear weight, under reconstruction in 1941 or under partisan attack there after, feeding a dirt road system or any distance in a bombed out city you cannot shift enough tons in winter to keep your elite high tech forces supplied at any distance from a railway. The more you use motorised divisions the worse it gets, because they need fuel and spare parts. Horse fodder and man food on the other hand can be obtained locally.

Look at the casualty statistics, every winter when german forces are perforce immobile and defensive - casualties go up - just an eyeball impression you understand.

A lesson hard learned in WW1, thrown away in WW2: no matter how grand your breakout may be it will fizzle out and be vulnerable to counter attack if you cannot supply it. Barbarossa had to stall before Moscow, the Archangel - Astrakhan objective was impossible.

No matter what promising or crucial stage the offensive is at in the end of August if you don't spend September falling back on whatever rail head there may be to establish a well supplied defensive line before the first big rains of autumn your hi-tech, resource hungry, elite forces are vulnerable and likely to become more so as winter sets in the more forces you field the more resupply they need the more vulnerable they become.

Red Army peasants with terrible locos and tough little ponies on the other hand can keep an offensive of sorts supplied right through the winter, and shove 100 miles forward from Moscow in winter 1941/42 for example. If my memory and reading materials serve me well.

Without other fronts to supply there will be more locomotives, not to mention the Italian merchant marine can use the Dardanelles to ship in more goods through the Black Sea. IOTL it was occupied supplying the Axis in North Africa. Also the Germans used a lot of river barges, so supply issues weren't a major issue outside AG-S after 1942. The problem with the Axis advance into the Caucasus was that they couldn't use the Black Sea to ship in supplies thanks to the Soviet Black Seas fleet, which by 1943 was largely a non-factor in the Black Sea due to maintenance issues surrounding the loss of repair facilities in the Crimea. If the Axis can keep the pressure on near Leningrad, which it could supply thanks to Baltic Seas shipping and the ports of Riga and Tallinn enabling very short supply lines for the units of AG-N and Center, then they can use the extra forces. More German LW units, armor, artillery, rockets, and infantry and be supported over and above the OTL numbers thanks to these short Baltic supply lines. So the Germans could conceivably take Leningrad in 1942 or at least inflict much heavier losses to the Soviets than IOTL thanks to greater firepower near the front. The fall of Leningrad would mean an even greater easing of supply lines for the Axis forces in the North and free up the Finns for other efforts, including taking Murmansk.

Axis History Forum • German logistics in the east

 

[pattle]

Yeah, we've strayed very far OT. The thread is about production, not even the outcome of a potential Axis vs. USSR showdown. Unlike Dave Bender, I think the campaign would be a long one, so long term production comes into play; what could Germany produce without the pressures of wars on other fronts? That means no Uboat war, no need for home aerial defense production (beyond the minimum), no diversion of resources to other theaters like Africa (does anyone have information about what equipment and how many men were sent to Africa from 1941-43?), and no bombing campaign disrupting production. There are of course political issues in this, like whether Germany would have enough money to purchase from abroad and how the West would react. But fundamentally this thread is about production output at its core, not politics.

#

Looks like we have strayed off thread again.
I think the question should really have been, would not having to fight a war in the west have given Germany victory in 1941?

 

[wiking85]

#

Looks like we have strayed off thread again.
I think the question should really have been, would not having to fight a war in the west have given Germany victory in 1941?

Its OT, but still a pertinent question.
As to what the OP question was, that's perhaps the first question, as it sets up my question, but the implicit assumption for this thread is that the Germans don't knock out the Soviets in 1941, so the war drags on and production numbers become relevant.

 

[stona]

but the implicit assumption for this thread is that the Germans don't knock out the Soviets in 1941, so the war drags on and production numbers become relevant.

Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve

I did state that the war in the West happens, but Britain drops out by March 1941.
Still, if there was not a war with the West over Poland, what would their reaction be in 1941 when the invasion of the USSR happens?

 

[wiking85]

Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve

I did state that the war in the West happens, but Britain drops out by March 1941.
Still, if there was not a war with the West over Poland, what would their reaction be in 1941 when the invasion of the USSR happens?

 

[Gixxerman]

Isn't the point of Stalingrad, however misguided badly done, that Germany thought it would be one way (perhaps the one way) of forcing Stalin to fight at a time when Germany knew (despite the losses to date) that the Russians had become quite skilled at withdrawing too quickly for the German forces to decisively defeat destroy?

Without a war in the west the primary point (to me at least) still stands; Germany is still simply not equipped to tackle the Russian war and as history shows even some fast heavy defeats did not knock Russia out of the war.
The delusion that it could be done quickly was proved to be so.
I'd also say that without a war in the west Germany would most likely go to war with Russia even worse equipped (in terms of armour especially) than it was.

In my view the most likely outcome is similar to what happened with perhaps Moscow and/or Leningrad taken, Stalin his gang deposed probably shot with an emergency Russian nationalist, probably military, Gov coming into being Russia still recovers comes together to grind down (although over more time) German arms.
The most significant parts of Russia's industrial base are simply out of the LW's reach they have nothing (credible) to do much about it, nor are they likely to for a long time.

Germany is still likely to think it is all over (given the crazy proven hubris of the leadership) with some fast and impressive victories so I do not see wonder-weapons coming on any quicker time-table....and when they do, eventually, it is likely to be much the same story with much wasted effort gross duplication, a badly run affair encouraged by the nature of the German state's leadership of the time.
Similarly I do not see the Hitler gang prepared to consolidate when supply lines become over-stretched in my opinion they are most likely to go repeating the same mistakes, just at places with different names.

Most of all neither can I see any way that the USA and British (inc Empire) just stand idly by whilst this happens without assisting the Russians.
A cold-war with the west being highly probable in my view.

But we all have our opinions.

 

[wiking85]

Isn't the point of Stalingrad, however misguided badly done, that Germany thought it would be one way (perhaps the one way) of forcing Stalin to fight at a time when Germany knew (despite the losses to date) that the Russians had become quite skilled at withdrawing too quickly for the German forces to decisively defeat destroy?

Without a war in the west the primary point (to me at least) still stands; Germany is still simply not equipped to tackle the Russian war and as history shows even some fast heavy defeats did not knock Russia out of the war.
The delusion that it could be done quickly was proved to be so.
I'd also say that without a war in the west Germany would most likely go to war with Russia even worse equipped (in terms of armour especially) than it was.

In my view the most likely outcome is similar to what happened with perhaps Moscow and/or Leningrad taken, Stalin his gang deposed probably shot with an emergency Russian nationalist, probably military, Gov coming into being Russia still recovers comes together to grind down (although over more time) German arms.
The most significant parts of Russia's industrial base are simply out of the LW's reach they have nothing (credible) to do much about it, nor are they likely to for a long time.

Germany is still likely to think it is all over (given the crazy proven hubris of the leadership) with some fast and impressive victories so I do not see wonder-weapons coming on any quicker time-table....and when they do, eventually, it is likely to be much the same story with much wasted effort gross duplication, a badly run affair encouraged by the nature of the German state's leadership of the time.
Similarly I do not see the Hitler gang prepared to consolidate when supply lines become over-stretched in my opinion they are most likely to go repeating the same mistakes, just at places with different names.

Most of all neither can I see any way that the USA and British (inc Empire) just stand idly by whilst this happens without assisting the Russians.
A cold-war with the west being highly probable in my view.

But we all have our opinions.

Of course with no need to fight the West in 1940, if we run with that scenario, then the Germans can invade in 1940, which is prior to the T-34 and the German tanks of 1940 were a match for the Soviet models prior to the T-34. Also in 1940 the Soviets have just suffered from the serious drubbing of the Winter War and their army is very badly positioned for an invasion; the Molotov line is even less ready for war and the Stalin line has been dismantled, the Soviets have no new equipment in production, and they have just been badly disorganized by their losses in Finland. So an invasion in 1940 is going to be pretty rough on the Soviets, though I doubt a war winner.

Edit:
Also if the Germans are planning to fight the Soviets in 1940, they wouldn't blockade aid to Finland via the Baltic like they historically did. They drags on the Winter War to the point that the Germans could invade in May or June. Perhaps the Western Allies even are allowed to transit the Baltic and aid the Finns, at which point Germany hops in the war to lead a 'crusade' against Communism, which is Stalin's nightmare scenario.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aftermath_of_the_Winter_War

 

[Gixxerman]

Of course with no need to fight the West in 1940, if we run with that scenario, then the Germans can invade in 1940, which is prior to the T-34 and the German tanks of 1940 were a match for the Soviet models prior to the T-34.

I wouldn't like to go up against KV - 1's in a PzKpfw II or III.
That the KV - 1 was earlier than the T - 34 illustrates that T - 34 was just around the corner (it had much the same gun) whatever the timing of a German attack.
Lessons were learned in 38 39 against Japan in the east the KV - 1 was tested in the 'Winter War'.
In my opinion T - 34 is going to be a part of any prospective early (or similar to history) war and without a war in the west, I think in those scenarios Germany is in for an even bigger shock when it does appear.

After early '38 British opinion (despite the very fresh memories of WW1) has swung firmly against appeasement is for standing up to Hitler's gang, even if it meant war.
I cannot see this reversing to the point where a cold war at least does not come into being.
Similarly I cannot imagine the USA sitting by to do nothing as Germany creates a 'Greater Germany' out of central eastern Europe with Russia included supposedly 'up to the Urals'.

In some respects it is easy to see why the anti-communist crusade idea never got off the ground in the west.
For all the strides made catching up Russia was still far behind the USA UK (inc Empire), a modern Germany with all those resources all that land would be a very different dangerous prospect....and whose to say ideas like the Orient plan to take the ME oil link with the Japanese in India wouldn't have been undertaken later?
The Nazi gang only had themselves to blame that nobody believed they would ever be a safe bet.

 

[pattle]

Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve

I didn't read it that way either, my assumption was the same as yours.