German war production without war with West

I think it took all three, Britain, USA and USSR to beat Germany. Without Britain no D DAY, no lend lease or other aid to the USSR, and the Med and the middle east with it's oil fields presumably under German control. Without the USSR no massive human sacrifice to destroy the German forces and without the USA neither the man power to challenge the Germans in the West or the arms to challenge the Germans in the East. The Germans took some beating.

Gixxerman said:

...Most of all neither can I see any way that the USA and British (inc Empire) just stand idly by whilst this happens without assisting the Russians...

Click to expand...

Why not, eveybody stood by and watched Poland get carved up. Tell me which nations rushed in to aid Finland when the Soviet Union was beating on thier door. And the list goes on.

If Britain was not at war with Germany then the United States would have most likely followed it's neutral path (which was a strong sentiment among the U.S. population until Pearl Harbor)

wiking85 said:

I did state that the war in the West happens, but Britain drops out by March 1941.
Still, if there was not a war with the West over Poland, what would their reaction be in 1941 when the invasion of the USSR happens?

Click to expand...

If Britain had 'dropped out' in March '41 (and it's hard to think why), then on the one hand there's little time for the German's to take advantage of it straight away - the benefits would be delayed. Though, also little time to change things for the Russians.
The concept of 'Lend Lease' is already established - so the US may carry that over to Russia - via the Far East.
The gains for Germany are huge - even if Hess had succeeded in May - only minor R R garrison forces in the West, no North-African adventure to supply, and keep supplied, more able to use French plants e.g. Renault. Indeed the French may want to cosy up to Hitler to be No 2 to Germany, and to maintain their borders as much as possible - so this could lead to French forces in the East!
Also, I don't see fuel as being so much of an issue - no blockade in the west, indeed it could be part of the deal with Britain.

Alternatively, if (e.g. not with Churchill) the 'deal' was done before the Battle-of-Britain - then the Lw would be in better shape, US industrialists would go to Germany. But Russia would wonder if you've won the war, why don't you de-mobilise!!

If britain does make some kind of peace with the germans, I dont think an invasaion of the USSR is even likely. Hitler invaded Russia for a complex raft of reasons, some ideological, some to result of what he saw as realpolitik. His warped idea of rational policy was that the elimination of the last possible ally of britain would force the British to the negotiating table. Eliminate Britain before June 1941, and there is no rationale for further agression to Russia. Germany is likly to postpone, or cancel any overt aggressive moves to the Soviets.

We then need to decide or estimate to what extent hitler was driven by political dogma, and how much he was driven by "realpolitik"....

Can't agree with that I'm afraid. Hitler was driven by ideology. Anyone who has waded through the turgid prose of Mein Kamf will see that the expansion to the East for the German Volk was one of the foundation stones of Nazi ideology. The exploitation of the resources and people of Eastern Europe is explicit in the text as is the desire to eliminate Bolshevism which was perceived as being exported from the USSR, polluting the rest of Europe with its communist/Jewish ideology.
Whether this move would have occurred in 1941 is another question, but the idea that Germany attacked the USSR in order to eliminate Britain's only remaining ally is I think false. Hitler liked to talk at anyone who would listen and I have never read an account of him suggesting that the USSR should be dealt with to remove an ally of Britain. Most seem to agree that he almost lost interest in the British problem as he concentrated on his real ideological objectives in the East. Britain's real remaining ally in everything but name was the USA, not the USSR, and Hitler couldn't attack them.
What help did the USSR furnish to the UK in 1939/40? Certainly not destroyers, aircraft, the weapons and means to stay in the fight.
Cheers
Steve

I agree with stone. There was not much question that Hitler saw German "living space" to be possible in East, opposed to Kaisers colonial expansion policy. So the "where" was decide, but the "when" was not set in stone, nor particularly eagerly waited by Hitler. The decision was very reluctantly made in late 1940 when Stalin's expansionist plans threatened vital German interests and critical materials in Finland, Turkey, Ruminia Bulgaria.

Tante Ju said:

There was not much question that Hitler saw German "living space" to be possible in East, opposed to Kaisers colonial expansion policy.

Click to expand...

Yes. He said and wrote both explicitly on several occasions, making it quite clear that his idea of "lebensraum" was in Europe, not in African or other colonial acquisitions.
These were explicitly European territories to be settled by the German race who would then exploit the people and resources of the territories to their own ends. Lebensraum itself was not a Nazi concept but the racist ideology associated with Hitler's view of an expanded Reich, tainted by his own jaundiced view of history, certainly was.
Cheers

Steve

Hitler was definately NOT driven by ideology.

He was two things. He was firstly an unashamed opportunist. He tended to follow the path of least resistance. If something looked easy or cheap to obtain, you can be fairly certain Hitler would be nosing around trying to steal a cheap feed. Its a common claim he was driven by ideology, but there is nothing in his wartime experiences to support that he was. if he was driven by ideology, he would never have signed a non aggression pact with the russians, would never have entered into a pact with the Japanese, would not have become an ally with the Finns, and would not have entered any sort of alliance with the Slovaks or the other "inferior" races. He was a blatant opportunitist, through and through. Its what gave him his early victories, and what cost him the war. Short sighted opportunism does not produce coherent, co-ordinated war strategy, and thats precisely the trap the Germans fell onto, as they lurched from one "opportunity" to the next, based on nothing more than a whim here or there of the fuhrer. Hitlers (and the Germans generally) shallow and short sighted conduct of their war is in sharp contrast to the measured, well thought out strategies of the allies. even the Russians were better at formulating long term strategies, based on ideological goals than the Germans ever were with their short term will of the wisp war conduct...

The second element of hitlers character was his inveterate risk taking. He was a gambler, a bluff merchant. If he could bully, cajole, surprise, or lie his way to success, he would take that road anytime to actually undertaking the hard slog, or adopting a measured, well thought out series of steps to achieve a higher purpose. This goes to why, even in the most desperate of situations, hitler would never trust anybody, even his most closest of associates. he firmly believed in telling people only a small part of the big picture. this severelly hampered the ability of his military staffs to plan and execute long term strategies in anything like a considered way. if Hitler was wedded to a long term ideology, he would never have believed in the gamble as a valid way of conducting war.

People who take Mein Kampf seriously are deluding themselves, and give Hitler a respectability he simply does not deserve. Mein Kampf is a veritable jumble sale of mixed up ideas, party slogans and downright lies, all designed to work on German nationalistic emotions, and most basic of instincts. hitler did not really believe it himself. And he didnt really ever follow its maxims all that faithfully or closely either.

There were several events that I can see that turned hitler east. the first was the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in 1940. Hitler always considered these regions to be German spheres of influence. When the Russian invaded them, Hitler saw it as a breach of trust. Hitler asnd the word trust in the same sentence...now theres a contradiction....

Next, at various conferences in 1940 with the Russians, the germans had suggested a move southward, into Turkey, Iran and the middle East. This was consistently evaded by the Russians. the russians, who were driven by ideology, wanted to establish an eastern European sphere of influence, which brought them into direct conflict with germany, who wanted the same thing. This gave the prospect of war with Russia and germany a certain amount of inevitability, but it was never ideogical for the germans, at least in the sense you guys are suggesting. With Britain subdued, there is no longer the imperative for Hitler to move east, and he may well have dropped it as an issue, thereby avoing conflict with the Russians. Unlikley to be avoided, but worth noting at least.

Lastly, however, it was the inability to bring Britain to the peace table that drove Hitler to attack the Russians. This without a doubt was his ,main reason for planning the attack (as hitlers directives clearly show) he locked himself away, toward the latter part of the BoB, and realized (with some truth I think). that the British were attempting to build alliance to contain and defeat Germany. Hitler rightly recognized that the last continental ally for Britiain had to be the Russians. Read his directives for Barbarossa, it almost word for word uses this as his reasoning for attacking the russian, that is, to deny the british any ability to build an alliance to contain Germany as they had done against Napoleon . .

Do you honestly believe that had Britain come to terms with Germany in late 1940 then Hitler would not have attacked the Soviet Union shortly thereafter?

Have you actually read Mein Kamf or looked at the threads in German society and culture that informed it? I agree that it is a jumbled and sometimes confused work, but it is hardly original.
A great thinker Hitler was not.

I've just re-read Fuhrer Directive No. 21 and can't find anyway of interpreting it as you suggest above. By No.32 Hitler is planning how to prosecute the war against Britain, and possibly the USA, following the defeat of the USSR.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Do you honestly believe that had Britain come to terms with Germany in late 1940 then Hitler would not have attacked the Soviet Union shortly thereafter?

Have you actually read Mein Kamf or looked at the threads in German society and culture that informed it? I agree that it is a jumbled and sometimes confused work, but it is hardly original.
A great thinker Hitler was not.

I've just re-read Fuhrer Directive No. 21 and can't find anyway of interpreting it as you suggest above. By No.32 Hitler is planning how to prosecute the war against Britain, and possibly the USA, following the defeat of the USSR.

Cheers

Steve

Click to expand...

forget Mein Kampf, his second book that he decided not to publish because it gave away too much of his future plans is much more a blue print of his later behavior than anything:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zweites_Buch

After the Nazi Party's poor showing in the 1928 elections, Hitler decided that the public did not fully understand his ideas. He retired to Munich and began dictating a sequel to Mein Kampf focusing on foreign policy, expanding on that book's ideas.

Moreover, Hitler attacked Stresemann for his goal of restoring Germany to its pre-1914 position. In Hitler's view, merely overthrowing the Treaty of Versailles and restoring Germany to its pre-1914 borders was only a temporary solution. In Zweites Buch, Hitler stated his belief that Germany's real problem was the lack of sufficient Lebensraum ("Living space") for the German people. In Hitler's view, only states with large amounts of Lebensraum were successful. In Zweites Buch, Hitler announced that overthrowing the "shackles" of Versailles would be only the first step in a Nazi foreign policy, whose ultimate objective was to obtain the desired Lebensraum in the territory of Russia.

There are a number of similarities and differences between Zweites Buch and Mein Kampf. As in Mein Kampf, Hitler declared that the Jews were his eternal and most dangerous opponents. As in Mein Kampf, Hitler outlined what the German historian Andreas Hillgruber has called his Stufenplan ("stage-by-stage plan"). Hitler himself never used the term Stufenplan, which was coined by Hillgruber in his 1965 book Hitlers Strategie. Briefly, the Stufenplan called for three stages. In the first stage, there would be a massive military build-up, the overthrow of the "shackles" of the Treaty of Versailles, and the forming of alliances with Fascist Italy and the British Empire. The second stage would be a series of fast, "lightning wars" in conjunction with Italy and Britain against France and whichever of her allies in Eastern Europe—such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia—chose to stand by her. The third stage would be a war to obliterate what Hitler considered to be the "Judeo-Bolshevik" regime in the Soviet Union.

In contrast to Mein Kampf, in Zweites Buch Hitler added a fourth stage to the Stufenplan. He insinuated that in the far future a struggle for world domination might take place between the United States and a European alliance comprising a "new association of nations, consisting of individual states with high national value".[2] Zweites Buch also offers a different perspective on the U.S. than that outlined in Mein Kampf. In the latter, Hitler declared that Germany's most dangerous opponent on the international scene was the Soviet Union; in Zweites Buch, Hitler declared that for immediate purposes, the Soviet Union was still the most dangerous opponent, but that in the long-term, the most dangerous potential opponent was the U.S.[3]

In regard to the Soviet Union, Hitler dismissed the Russian people as being Slavic Untermenschen ("sub-humans") incapable of intelligent thought. Hitler consequently believed that the Russian people were ruled over by what he regarded as a gang of bloodthirsty but inept Jewish revolutionaries. By contrast, the majority of Americans were in Hitler's view "Aryans", albeit Aryans ruled by what Hitler saw as a Jewish plutocracy. In Hitler's point of view, it was this combination of "Aryan" might, coupled with a more competent "Jewish rule" which made the U.S. so dangerous.

Click to expand...

PDF of the book:
http://www.nazi.org.uk/political pdfs/HitlerSecondBook.pdf

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Führer_Directive_21

stona said:

Do you honestly believe that had Britain come to terms with Germany in late 1940 then Hitler would not have attacked the Soviet Union shortly thereafter?

Have you actually read Mein Kamf or looked at the threads in German society and culture that informed it? I agree that it is a jumbled and sometimes confused work, but it is hardly original.
A great thinker Hitler was not.

I've just re-read Fuhrer Directive No. 21 and can't find anyway of interpreting it as you suggest above. By No.32 Hitler is planning how to prosecute the war against Britain, and possibly the USA, following the defeat of the USSR.

Cheers

Steve

Click to expand...

we dont know.

However in a letter to Mussolini dated 21 June 1941, hitler lays out his case to a man whom he trusted more than any other. In that letter he wrote

"The situation: England has lost this war. With the right of the drowning person, she grasps at every straw which, in her imagination, might serve as a sheet anchor. Nevertheless, some of her hopes are naturally not without a certain logic. England has thus far always conducted her wars with help from the Continent. The destruction of France—fact, the elimination of all west-European positions—directing the glances of the British warmongers continually to the place from which they tried to start the war: to Soviet Russia.

Both countries, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a Europe fallen into ruin, rendered prostrate by a long war. Behind these two countries stands the North American Union goading them on and watchfully waiting. Since the liquidation of Poland, there is evident in Soviet Russia a consistent trend, which, even if cleverly and cautiously, is nevertheless reverting firmly to the old Bolshevist tendency to expansion of the Soviet State. The prolongation of the war necessary for this purpose is to be achieved by tying up German forces in the East, so that—particularly in the air—the German Command can no longer vouch for a large-scale attack in the West. I declared to you only recently...."

Further on, he makes his reasons for attacfking the Soviets even clearer

"The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention".


HITLER'S EXPLANATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION, JUNE 21, 1941

It doesn't matter so much what Hitler said because Hitler was not trust worthy, and for the same reason it doesn't matter what pacts he signed either. Anything that was signed by Hitler wasn't worth the paper it was written on, we know this for a fact and I shouldn't need to give examples. I don't know how it is possible to believe that Hitler did not have ideals when you consider what he did to the Jews and others, Hitler clearly had racist ideals that were put into action in the form of genocide. I consider this to be the inescapable truth from what actually happened. Hitler did not believe in fair play or honesty and lying was after all the least of his crimes.

Hitler ended his June 21 letter to Mussolini as follows

"In conclusion, let me say one more thing, Duce. Since struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. The partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies".

Im not saying that Hitler did not have ideologies, but it is one thing to have ideologies, and another to be "ideological" in your approach to your international relations and national decision making. Hitlers last statement clearly identifies his natural distaste of the Soviets. no argument there. It also clearly shows that he was quite prepred to sacrifice those "ideals" when necessity required. And this shows him to be what he was, an opportunist and a gambler, and not an idealist. I believe Hitler when he says that he had made real efforts to reach an accommodation with the Soviets. The fact that his accommodation of the Soviets, and what he was prepreed to give tham did not suit the Soviets, seems to have escaped him... I also believe him when at least part of his decision to attack the Soviets was driven by his desire to isolate the British.

There is circumstantial evidence to support this opinion that hitler was driven to attacking the USSR by Britains intransigence. One of his right hand men, Hess, flew to Britain in May 1941, with the intention of trying to make peace with them. A complete miscalculation, i agree, but why would Hess take such a risk and defy his leader so badly. I think because he (Hess) feared the coming attack on the Russians, or wanted the "natural ally" (Britain) to join the Germans in the coming attack. Make peace with the British, and one of the main reasons for such a risky attack (Hitler himself recognized its risks....his speech about "all we have to do is kick the door in" was largely propaganda for the consumption by his wavering soldiers). Remove that reason by making peace, and you remove the reason for the attack, or at worst, gain a valuable ally with which to completely crush the Soviets.

Parsifal we have here in germany a lot of historians who have researched countless of archived sources.

Hitler spoke the first time of his war goals 1937 and 1938 in a smal circle of military leaders were the UDSSR was explicit mentioned as primary goal.
Finaly Hitler decided to invade the UDSSR beginning August 1940 before BoB , he gave the order the general staff to work the plan and take all preparation for supply and infrastructure work. Also he canceled the reduction of the Heer from 150 to 120 Divisions, which was declared and ordered at August 1940 before BoB!

To all my sources and what I have read the UDSSR was the primary goal of Hitlers "war goals" from the beginning. The war against Polen, France and Britain was a revenge war and primary to get the german people on his side for a war or a general war and to make them "war spirit". To my understanding and interpretation it was only a interstation of the way to the east.

which again presupposes he was working to a masterplamn, which he was not. In 1937, Hitler had vague and confused ideas of attacking the Soviets eventually. He believed he would be joined in this crusade by massive alliances in Europe against the Soviets. He also believed the British would behave rationally and come to an agreement with him once their position was isolated. He in fact was confronted with a quite different situation; stirrings of the old containment alliances of the first world war. The old Triple Entente. This was months or years away, so to circumvent it, Hitler pursued and achieved a non-agression and partition agreement with the Soviets, along with a genuine treaty of economic co-operation. Hitler was not pursuing an ideological or long range plan, he was making it up as he went along in fact. At the beginning of the Soviet/German pact, there were genuine efforts to reach rapprochement with the Soviets, but Soviet duplicity, mostly the occupation of the Baltic States, and the aggression into the vital Rumainia border areas, soured such relations. Hitler is on record to Mussolini as saying he was influenced by continued British resistance. These are not interpretations of issues, they are basic known facts. What we make of those facts is up to us, but trying to deny they exist, or reqwrite them to suit a different view is simply trying to rewrite history

This is no agression, I respect your opinion but I think that Hitler had a general plan, which was not stringent and quite opportunist, but at the end of it the goal was the war with the UDSSR and Stalin.

One of the younger and well-known german historians is:
Sönke Neitzel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sönke Neitzel

I have studied at the same time at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz not directly history, but I know him, we have talked about this issue and also about a lot of his military historian work and I highly respect him and he has also the opinion, that Hitler had a defuse general plan with the war against the UDSSR at a primary goal at the end.

But everyone has an other interpretation.

I do respect what you are saying DonL, and i would be wrong to suggest there is not some truth to your position. He had wanted to deal with the Soviets since Mein Kampf. The question is, was that a specific plan, or a general sentiment, and further, how can we exlain these obvious, documented, deviations from his origiinal ideas. He went through a phase where he wanted to be friewnds with the Soviets, but his nbatural dislike of them soon pushed him an entirely direction.

By early 1941, perhaps earlier, he had specific plans on how to attack them. What drove him to change from wanting a "friendly" relationship to wanting to destroy his big eastern neighbour. Certainly his pre-disposittion (his ideology if you like) had something to do with it. But I think there was more...And there is evidence to support me on that.

An observation here:
If Hitler had been intending to attack Russia early on, he surely would have forbidden the Soviets from purchasing German aircraft like the He100 from Heinkel.

I suspect that Hitler wrote to Mussolini exactly what Mussolini wanted to read. Comments like those need to be taken in the context of Italy's position vis a vis the British in the Mediterranean. None of the Nazi leadership had a very good grasp of foreign affairs. I don't believe that Hitler or any of his panjandrum had the faintest inkling of the real relationship between Britain and the USSR in the late 1930s.
I'd also like to see some evidence that Britain was working for this alliance with the USSR.
They sent William Seeds, a man about to retire as ambassador in 1939. His diplomatic career hardly set the world alight. He'd spent a good chunk of the 1930s in what was then the diplomatic backwater of Brazil.
It wasn't until 1940 that Stafford Cripps, a man of Marxist, socialist leanings, who might at least be able to negotiate with Stalin took up the post. He was successful, but only after the attack on the USSR. It is important to remember that before the Germans tore up the various bi-partite treaties with the USSR, the Soviets were constrained by them in their relationships with the other powers like France and Britain.
It wasn't until 1942, after the Soviets were in the war that Clark Kerr was sent. He was a very experienced, heavyweight, and nowadays under rated diplomat who capitalised on Cripps' earlier work and finally got things moving. By this time of course both Britain and the USSR had a common enemy. He stayed until 1946.
There's not much evidence in British cabinet papers etc that any great efforts were being made to forge an economic/military alliance with the USSR before 1941/2. Hardly surprising given the USSR's relationship with Nazi Germany.
There is a lot of evidence of efforts to involve the USA, including very frequent contacts at all levels, right up to the top.
Cheers
Steve

I listened to the Hitler/Mannenheim recording of the meeting in 1942. If it's not a hoax there's one thing I notice - Hitler is reading from a script. Not word for word, but a choreographed sequence of 'bullet points' leading up to something, some request or proposal (the recording is cut short). And it's a poor sales pitch (not rambling, just poor). And the choice of 'talk em to death' presentation is a bad one. I'm no diplomat, but whatever Hitler is proposing is not what Hitler thinks is a good move for the other party. And he's trying to conceal it. And he's no good at the concealment.

If that's a fair sample of his interpersonal communications style overall - I'd tentatively say that Hitler may just be a 'Ham'. A phoney, and not even good at being phoney. Perhaps not a long term strategist, nor an opportunist, not an idealist or a pragmatist - just not a statesman or leader of any kind, out of his depth. Some of the rest of his behaviour might explained by his attempts to cover up the fact.

That's a big conclusion on slim evidence, but then: I am a ham at research. Takes one to know one perhaps.