German war production without war with West

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Let's assume that the Germans would have attacked the USSR no matter what if Britain was out of the war. Let's also assume the war lasts beyond the initial campaign, but the Germans do better in 1941, perhaps taking Murmansk and or Leningrad, but logistics keep Moscow out of Germany's grasp. In late 1941 the US extends Lend-Lease to the USSR, giving greater aid than historically to help make up for the losses of Murmansk/Leningrad. Persia and Siberia are the only supply routes, with the Siberian route only able to ship non-contraband war materials due to Japanese inspection of shipping into and out of Vladivostok (until 1944). Japan stays neutral. Germany and the Axis have access to world markets and have reparations in the form of raw materials from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial empires. German industry is able to recruit labor from abroad and can try and recruit soldiers from anti-communist groups abroad and the German diaspora. Spain and Portugal send more soldiers and airmen than they historically did, rotating men through the 'Blue Divisions' to train their army and air forces. France also generates tens of thousands of recruits for the German military (historically IIRC over 20,000 served). The Italians are also able to furnish many more men, aircraft, and other equipment for the east, as the Allies have returned the Italian POWs and there is not other active front for the Italian military.

So this is the scenario, what does production look like for the Axis?
 
Let's assume that the Germans would have attacked the USSR no matter what if Britain was out of the war. Let's also assume the war lasts beyond the initial campaign, but the Germans do better in 1941, perhaps taking Murmansk and or Leningrad, but logistics keep Moscow out of Germany's grasp. In late 1941 the US extends Lend-Lease to the USSR, giving greater aid than historically to help make up for the losses of Murmansk/Leningrad. Persia and Siberia are the only supply routes, with the Siberian route only able to ship non-contraband war materials due to Japanese inspection of shipping into and out of Vladivostok (until 1944). Japan stays neutral. Germany and the Axis have access to world markets and have reparations in the form of raw materials from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial empires. German industry is able to recruit labor from abroad and can try and recruit soldiers from anti-communist groups abroad and the German diaspora. Spain and Portugal send more soldiers and airmen than they historically did, rotating men through the 'Blue Divisions' to train their army and air forces. France also generates tens of thousands of recruits for the German military (historically IIRC over 20,000 served). The Italians are also able to furnish many more men, aircraft, and other equipment for the east, as the Allies have returned the Italian POWs and there is not other active front for the Italian military.

So this is the scenario, what does production look like for the Axis?
 
Unless Germany goes to a total war industrial footing earlier than historic, there probably won't be much more than a minor increase in quantity.

OTOH, due to access to raw materials world-wide, quality should go up. The new tanks (Tigers and Panthers) should be more reliable due to access to better machine tools and raw materials. Likewise engine reliability and power should go up - maybe the TK-11 turbocharger (and others) can be developed.

There's no need for a U-boat campaign, so more material is available for "other" production, whether the Z-plan, AFVs, trucks, whatever. If there's no Z-plan, then there's the ability to produce more AFV armor (and maintain quality). The freed-up steel could also go towards production of more train rails for use in the East.

Since the occupation of Western Europe and Scandinavia ends, the trained manpower pool available to fight (both Heer and Luftwaffe) in the USSR is much larger. Therefore there's not as much need to recruit labor from Germany's own factories so there's less need to use slave labor in "defense" industry (maybe farming and making pots and pans and such), which should help improve quality and output.

Other Axis powers will also have access to these raw materials, so the effect on their industries should be similar (e.g. Hungary might be able to make more licensed 109s).

I'm undoubtedly missing a bunch of stuff, too.

As an aside, there will (obviously) be more benefits than just better production, but they're beyond the scope of wiking85's revised scenario.
 
I am not sure if the Italians would have wanted to fight. I don't say this disrespectfully about the Italians I say this because from what I understand many Italians by this time had seriously begun to question the war. The Italians had been dragged by their nuts through the brambles to many times by Mussolini and were starting to come to their senses. The Germans would have needed to of made sure that the good Italian soldiers such as the Alpini were properly equipped, supplied and used in mountains rather than in trenches on the steppe.
 
Thanks Viking 85: the specifics in the scenario may allow for an estimate to be made of production needs:

according to an internet source - group centre needed 13,000 tons a day on the offensive . That figure is from the plan I think, not the actual amount delivered...

To spare your agony, doing the obvious scale up and subtract this, add that, apply fudge factors ,,.for an attack force of 7 million men - it comes to about 70,000 tons a day of production averaged over the year (which I know will be wrong, but I tried). Just for operations.

To replace the 'scorched earth' infrastructure you may need a lot more (Rail, ties, signals,,,,,,, or road levelling ballast, diggers.. in any case bridging materials.....) if you want a 300 mile advance per year that would be approximately 2 million tons more. Plus the replacement rate of the motor pool and stock, plus tools, motor parts, fuel for the transports.... another 3million perhaps

So the production for immediate war work is : very approximately, 30milion tons per year as a planned amount for a force of 7 million men - cut to size for the force you envisage.

With a GDP of 900million dollars equivalent to pay for it.... 30$ a ton, hmmm... Can Hitler afford to invade?
 

Allied and Axis GDP
Where did you get the GDP of $900 million for Germany? The modern equivalent of the German economy in 1941 was $412 Billion not including Austria, Italy, or conquered France. The USSR by contrast only had $359 Billion (down from their 1940 peak of $412 Billion) thanks to the massive losses during to Axis invasion.
 
900 million : I guessed

based on 3 independent guesses
$338milion of 'Moscow gold' - from republican spain in the civil war, kept in Paris, and
two trainloads of art works from Leningrad which will now be spoils of war
a guess at euro-axis civil economy GDP
another guess from the internet

it might be $450bn in modern terms : another guess

Sorry to have distracted you.
 
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I'm sorry for that last post of mine - it was, of course, wrong. I can't work backwards from current operational requirements to determine how much production is needed and therefore how much there will be. That's wishful thinking, darn. And I used guess work to illustrate (tut tut, very bad) and now I'll have to do more guessing to explain/redress the last lot of guesses: gulp. ?

It would the other way round, wouldn't it? - the current production there is and what stocks there are in store will determine what operations there can be and what risks will be involved?

I came to my senses when I realised : parts of a tank might (ie I'm moderately confidently guessing) have been in the ground or forest or ocean a year ago (I mean before the mining/lumber-jacking/fishing or what have you : primary extraction I think they call it) . And the labour situation would be determined by policy ( mobilisation/de-mobilisation,involvement of women in the workforce for examples). And the money situation too, is also a policy matter. And policy doesn't get made or take effect over night (I'm guessing again).

If so, then in three months (March '41 to June '41) re-distribution of existing goods and troops to a state of readiness and in location perhaps? I can believe that an armament minister might intervene to facilitate one final assembly line at the expense of another. But that might be the limit - at a guess.

For Barbarossa I think there would only be as much or as many goods as in the OTL And future years production would depend on many other variables (that's the last guess)

I'm back in the fog of uncertainty again. At least that means I'll shut up.
 
The issue of using OTL stock figures is that the Germans will have the other stocks that were committed to other theaters in June 1941 AND what was spent from March 1941 on in those theaters that would not be here. Also there is the added benefit of having access to world markets, as having a limited resource base in blockaded Europe in OTL limited maximum output. Plus not Europe can add to the Axis war machine, as Adam Tooze noted in 'Wage of Destruction' France and occupied Europe de-modernized due to lack of fuel and other resources, which ground their production and economies to a halt. Also without the British keeping resistance going in Europe the rest of Europe is more likely to fall in line with the new order, as there is no hope for liberation, so will furnish less resistance, even potentially passive resistance, requiring less commitment of occupation resources and may even generate more soldiers and workers for the Axis war effort once they get locked into the Axis economies.

Still, even if we ignore the benefits to production that comes from peace, even just using the resources saves in the Balkans, North Africa, Mediterranean, Middle East, and over Britain/the Atlantic in April-June 1941 will result in a major increase in resources for Barbarossa over OTL. Saving on Uboat production, Uboat base production, increased AAA defenses (including the FLAK towers which were started in late 1940), and air assets that only make sense for operations against Britain will also mean that in the April-June 1941 period there are more raw materials and skilled labor for Barbarossa production. IOTL Uboats took up a lot of high quality steel and copper, not to mention what torpedoes, deck gun and AAA shells, naval mines, etc. This could all be turned into material for the army instead.
Before you mention production capacity, remember that there was a labor shortage in 1941 and German factories were mostly running only one shift, as they had yet to embrace slave labor, so didn't have the extra hands to run machines 24 hours. Taking the material and skilled labor from naval construction of all sorts and from air-naval production would mean these get funneled into the under utilized capacity of existing Heer and Luftwaffe factories.
 
Let's assume that the Germans would have attacked the USSR no matter what if Britain was out of the war
Click to expand...
.

Okay fair enough


This is a very dangerous scenario for the Russian. Until 1944, about 80% of lend Lease was actually supplied in British ships using British equipment, ofr British Lend lease equipmenht. For example roughly 2500 Hurricanes were supplied to a few hundred P-40s. Moreover, until September 1942, there was no Persioan supply route, and it was well into 1944 before The rail links were upgraded to take any significant levels of supply. Well into 1943, the lions share of Lend Lease was delivered through Murmansk. Capture murmansk in 1941 and Soviet Russia is basically totally isoalted. There was no significant supply via the far east because of the limits of the transSiberian line and the Alaskan Air Bridge was not yet in place.

Germany and the Axis have access to world markets and have reparations in the form of raw materials from the Belgian, Dutch, and French colonial empires.
Click to expand...

This is also very significant, and greatly increases Axis production capability. Before the war, the germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world. As a ratio of estimated GDP, the Allied to Axis ratio was 2.38:1 in 1938. By 1941 there had been a degree of catch up, with the ratio 1.75:1;with the British removed from the equation this ratio fundamentally changese. German and italian GDP, just based on historical production gives them the advantage of 1.56:1 in their favour. However the british blockade at this time is estimated to have degraded the german economy because of denail to world markets, to the tune of about 20%, so the estimated Axis GDP to Soviet GDP is about 1.71:1. But even this is still insufficient, or is underestimating Axis resources. French GDP in 1939 was about $190 million per year, whilst that of the rest of occupied Europe was roughly $100 million per annum . by 1941 these economies had all slumped to a subsistence level, basically additing nothing to Axis war potential. Overwhelmingly this arose because of the denial to world markets and overseas imports. It is reasonable to estimate occupied Europe at least doubling the German contribution to the Axis war effort. That would increase Axis to Soviet GDP to at least 3.5:1. Soviet GDP would however slump with the loss of Murmansk, and Soviet manpower availability would drop, in my estimation, in 1941-2, by around 35%, due to the need to maintain grain self sufficiency.

Its virtually impossible for the Soviets to be seen as a survivable nation in that scenario.



Spain would have joined the Axis in October 1941 on the conditions outlined in the following article

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=mYumqnXEqW&dl


It ius immediately apparent that it was a physical impossibility for Spain to increase its committment without the capture of Gibraltar, which brings us back to the issue of British belligernecy. it also means the destruction of Vichy, which rules out any support from the French. Finally it wasd conditional to massive injections of aid and raw materials, which Germany could afford neither.




In this scenario, the war will not last longer than 3 months, despite the rider you have tried to apply. Axis to Soviet ratio of GDP will be in the order of 5 to 6 to 1.

An easy and obvious outcome to predict.
 

i was under the impression that the first load of LL items were bombs while still sitting on the dock at murmansk and that immediately afterwards they were delivered to vladivostok by us and other allied ships flying under the russian flag.
 
bobbysocks said:
i was under the impression that the first load of LL items were bombs while still sitting on the dock at murmansk and that immediately afterwards they were delivered to vladivostok by us and other allied ships flying under the russian flag.
Click to expand...

The Lend Lease Act wasn't extended to the Soviet Union until October 1941.

By this time, the British had completed two convoys to Murmansk and werre preparing a third.

The 1941 convoys were mostly a British affair.
 
bobbysocks said:
i was under the impression that the first load of LL items were bombs while still sitting on the dock at murmansk and that immediately afterwards they were delivered to vladivostok by us and other allied ships flying under the russian flag.
Click to expand...

I have over stated the British contribution, but the general gist of what Iam saying for the forst three months is correct.

In the period June to September 1941, a total of 167000 tons of various supplies were shipped to the SU, of which 146000 were of British or Canadian origin. Only 14000 tons were from the US. Of that, approximately 151000 tons were shipped via Murmansk, and none of that shipped to the east was ever shipped or used on the active theatre.

A very similar situation was repeated in the last quarter of 1941.

In total for 1941,360K tons were shipped to Russia, with about 90% of cargoes arriving via the northern ports.

Where I am wrong is in 1942 and after. Once the US got into the war, thre was a fundamental shift in the US effort, moreover, the efforts of 1942 dwarfed the mostly British 1941 effort. Until the end of June, an additional 1.42 million tons was shipped, of which 1.18 million was shipped through Murmansk. The US ships accounted for just over 60% of the transport and US goods accounted for all but 150K tons.

For 1942, 2.4 million tons were shipped, of which 24% were via the south, 25.6% were via the Far East and 50.4% were via Murmansk.

For 1943, 4.8 million tons were shipped, well over 90% was by now of US origin, and well over 70% of the transport also of US origin. RN provided the lions share opf the escort and security. 31.5% went via the southern route, 47.8% via the Far East, and 20.7% via the northern ports.

in 1944 there was another quantum shift. For the Far East, imports slumped to 35.8% of total shipments. The Persian Gulf, now with a massive railway upgrade to support it, rocketed to 45.2% and the northern route slightly decreased as an overall percentage to 19%. Total shipments now amounted to 7.7 million tons

For 1945, until September, 3.7 Million tons were shipped, of which 7.8% were via the Persian Gulf, 18.5% via the newly re-opened Black Sea route, 4.3% via new ports in the arctic, 18.5% via Murmansk and Archangel and 50.9% from the Far eastern ports.

Not included in these totals are 1 million tons of POLS supplied directly from the British controlled oil wells around Abadan
 
Its hard to know the precise contribution Lend Leaser had on the Soviet war making capability, but is certainly more than their post war accounts claim.

Germany overran about 35% of Soviet industry in the offensive phase of her war, and a similar proportion of the Soviet population. Millions were captured, and millions were executed. Soviet GDP was about 2/3 that of Germany at the beginning of the war (estimates do vary on that), so the Russians fought their war with about half the financilal resources of the Germans. But you cannot make direct comparisons like that unfortunately. Key raw industrial indicators like steel production, copper production, and the like, sugggest a closer correlation.

Lend lease certainly delivered critical equipment, in particular MT aircraft and tanks, but perhaps even more critically were the deliveries of railway equipment, including rolling stock and prime movers, and the supply of foodstuffs (which released vast numbers of men for military purposes).

Its very hard to put a quantified figure on that contribution, but I think it was critical. The Germans certainly thought so
 
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