Hindsight, again is tainting your view. You are not reading what is being said because you are allowing the aircraft's capabilities to determine the outcome. Yes, the He 111 was used as a strategic bomber, but that doesn't mean the Luftwaffe was not a "tactical air force". Almost all historians and researchers on the subject agrees with the synopsis that the Luftwaffe was a tactical air force.
Greatest aviation myth this site “de-bunked”.
- Thread starter SaparotRob
- Start date
Evidence and research.
I've posted the numbers and did the reserach to back my story.
That my story does not follow the post-1945 matra coming from USA and UK that Luftwaffe was a tactical force is really not my problem.
Tomo, if you think that the Luftwaffe was not specifically a tactically oriented air force, then put your evidence into an article or paper and get it published. It's good to read different appraisals of a known subject and personally I do like seeing common myths being debunked. With regard to this particular subject, good luck, you've got work to do in changing perceptions.
Adolf and Hermans words would lead anyone to believe the LW was a strategic bombing force in 1939/40, the fact that they didn't know what was required to do what they boasted they could do is another issue. o one had the capacity to conduct an effective strategic bombing campaign of any sort until 1942 and it didn't become effective until 1944 when the USA did what the LW tried to do in 1940.
I don't have a task or a duty to change people's perceptions, but will always add my opinion on the stuff I've comfortable with. Reading & research - yes, then see how something passes (or does not pass) the smell test. If I think there is something worth commenting or coming out with information that can be a contribution, I post it, mostly here.
FWIW, here is a bunch of translated data sheets for the German bombers: link.
FWIW, here is a bunch of translated data sheets for the German bombers: link.
With a little help from Bomber Command...
Don't we all. Writers and researchers don't do it out of duty or obligation (unless it's their primary source of income, that is), it's done because of interest in the subject matter. I've been writing and publishing articles for more than 15 years, as a freelancer as a second job, and I do it because people are interested in the subject matter and I do find that it is not always a bad thing to challenge perceptions.
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
The He111 was an outlier amongst German bombers. It was long ranged relatively slow, couldn't dive bomb, a good load carrier and didn't cram it's crew into a glasshouse.
Take away the He111 and you do have a tactical force that could be crowbarred into the strategic role for which it wasn't best suited.
Take away the He111 and you do have a tactical force that could be crowbarred into the strategic role for which it wasn't best suited.
It did actually. It's not very big in the cockpit of an He 111 and visibility wasn't very good, particularly on a strong sunny day, when that multi-faceted glass tended to cause light refraction, which interfered with the view. Not to mention the fact that on the ground, the pilot could only really see out by sliding the panel above his head open and raising his seat so his eyeline was above the sill of the canopy top. There was a pop-up windscreen though...
Well yes, but if the strategy is to wipe out the enemies defences it is hard to do that by night bombing. However long before that it was decided who would bomb by day and whom by night. It wasn't just bomber command that gave the US bombing effort assistance it was the whole thing, massive recon efforts, intelligence, feints and protection. No one knew what was involved until they tried it, it was much harder to do than anyone thought in the 1930s and they all thought there was no defence and just a few bombs would bring victory.With a little help from Bomber Command...
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Speaking of smell tests, doesn't this description have the aroma of "Lufthansa" all over it? Wasn't the design started as an airliner with possible bomber conversion in mind? Long ranged, good load carrier, (not so) relatively slow when it first came out. Smells like a DC3 era airliner to me.
This is true, and it took the USAAF and Bomber Command time to implement a strong unified strategy to do it, once it had the resources. Arguably however, the Luftwaffe at the outbreak of the war was better positioned to do such a thing than any other air force in the world. By 1940 the Germans had far more reconnaissance assets and the ability to process the raw data than its contemporaries, it had a reasonably effective and sophisticated bomb sight, better than the British Mk.IX Course Correcting sight, it had radio navigation aids to enable its bombers to find their way to the target and drop their bombs within a reasonable CEP for the time - in fact it was very accurate for the time - evidence from deducing where bombs fell during the Coventry raid gave the British scientists a bit of a fright because of the potential that kind of accuracy had, and it had reasonably well performing bombers, and a lot of them.
The odds were stacked against their enemies. Never before in the history of warfare had as many bombers been launched against one country so technologically prepared and laden with potential to succeed as during the Luftwaffe assault against Britain in mid 1940 to mid 1941. That the campaign failed was not specifically due to the Luftwaffe's resources, but how they were managed and applied, not to mention the defences they were ranged against.
That the German raids pale in comparison to future RAF night and USAAF daylight raids is no poor reflection of the abilities of the Luftwaffe at the time.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
I tend to look at the "battle of the Beams" in 1940.
Those systems were not developed in a matter of weeks and those systems only make sense for a "strategic" air force.
While the Luftwaffe was used to support the army (tactical) during army campaigns it did not sit idle on the ground at other times.
We can tend to confuse ideas in translation, The RAF wanted to fight the war in the air without the army.
The Luftwaffe had as ONE of it's missions the bombing of sources of production/supply to help the army out. They had a number of other missions/tasks.
We can argue for a long long time as to whether that made the Luftwaffe a strategic force or a tactical one or we can accept that the Luftwaffe, while predominantly tactical could and did plan for, equipe for and execute strategic missions.
The RAF was the reverse, it planned for, equipped for and executed long range strategic missions and in 1939-40 not very well, In 1940 it's tactical performance was much worse as it was trying to use those early strategic bombers (being replaced by the Wellington, Whitley and Hamden) as general purpose tactical bombers but without training/experience.
German tactical aircraft of 1939/40 were not burdened with 1000 mile ranges.
The Germans did have, as pointed out, a fair number of bombers that could reach strategic targets, they had the training/doctrine to do so, they had equipement coming on line that would help them do so. The British strategic bombers, even the new large twins, depended on a clear night, a starry sky and luck.
Please look at the number of defence plants the Germans bombed over the summer and fall of 1940. Yes they screwed up with insufficient force size, (everybody did at that point) and truly terrible damage assessment post strike for alloting 2nd and 3rd strikes. They didn't hit those plants/factories by missing beachfront pill boxes.
For the British do not confuse the term "light bomber" with tactical bomber in the 1930s. Once the biplanes started going away (the single engine ones) the "light bombers" like the Battle and Blenheim were intended to perform in the strategic strike role. Sanity did prevail and they were not used on such missions by 1939/40 or at least not after the Wellington with it's two power gun mounts proved incapable of defending itself in 1939.
Things changed very quickly in the 1930s and the capabilities of aircraft also changed.
Old William Green book (correction welcome) says the He 111B-2 in mid 1937 could carry 1653lb(750kg) bomb load 1030 miles and 3307 (1500kg) 565 miles, while the latter could certainly be considered tactical the first was??????
DB 600CG engines if 950hp for take-off and 910hp at 13,120 ft.
Ju 86D with Diesel engines was listed as having a tactical radius of 354 miles with max bomb load but a max range of 932 miles, bomb load not given but with auxiliary fuel tanks range was stretched to 1240 miles. Late 1937/early 1938.
600hp diesel engines?
Everybodies "strategic bombers" were in their infancy (or built in very small numbers) at this time.
We also have to consider who was the enemy. We in the post war era tend to see Britain and Germany as the main opponents but for most of the 1930s France would have been the most important enemy facing Germany, few seeing it collapse so quickly.
France was introducing these in the spring of 1937
They only built about 80 but it was listed as having a range of 1240miles with a 5510lb bomb load. More bombs over shorter distance.
In 1940 they were starting to deliver a version with four Hispano V-12s. A single plane of the later type did bomb Berlin twice in 1940 but that is more along the line of the Doolittle raid than an example of French policy.
Those systems were not developed in a matter of weeks and those systems only make sense for a "strategic" air force.
While the Luftwaffe was used to support the army (tactical) during army campaigns it did not sit idle on the ground at other times.
We can tend to confuse ideas in translation, The RAF wanted to fight the war in the air without the army.
The Luftwaffe had as ONE of it's missions the bombing of sources of production/supply to help the army out. They had a number of other missions/tasks.
We can argue for a long long time as to whether that made the Luftwaffe a strategic force or a tactical one or we can accept that the Luftwaffe, while predominantly tactical could and did plan for, equipe for and execute strategic missions.
The RAF was the reverse, it planned for, equipped for and executed long range strategic missions and in 1939-40 not very well, In 1940 it's tactical performance was much worse as it was trying to use those early strategic bombers (being replaced by the Wellington, Whitley and Hamden) as general purpose tactical bombers but without training/experience.
German tactical aircraft of 1939/40 were not burdened with 1000 mile ranges.
The Germans did have, as pointed out, a fair number of bombers that could reach strategic targets, they had the training/doctrine to do so, they had equipement coming on line that would help them do so. The British strategic bombers, even the new large twins, depended on a clear night, a starry sky and luck.
Please look at the number of defence plants the Germans bombed over the summer and fall of 1940. Yes they screwed up with insufficient force size, (everybody did at that point) and truly terrible damage assessment post strike for alloting 2nd and 3rd strikes. They didn't hit those plants/factories by missing beachfront pill boxes.
For the British do not confuse the term "light bomber" with tactical bomber in the 1930s. Once the biplanes started going away (the single engine ones) the "light bombers" like the Battle and Blenheim were intended to perform in the strategic strike role. Sanity did prevail and they were not used on such missions by 1939/40 or at least not after the Wellington with it's two power gun mounts proved incapable of defending itself in 1939.
Things changed very quickly in the 1930s and the capabilities of aircraft also changed.
Old William Green book (correction welcome) says the He 111B-2 in mid 1937 could carry 1653lb(750kg) bomb load 1030 miles and 3307 (1500kg) 565 miles, while the latter could certainly be considered tactical the first was??????
DB 600CG engines if 950hp for take-off and 910hp at 13,120 ft.
Ju 86D with Diesel engines was listed as having a tactical radius of 354 miles with max bomb load but a max range of 932 miles, bomb load not given but with auxiliary fuel tanks range was stretched to 1240 miles. Late 1937/early 1938.
600hp diesel engines?
Everybodies "strategic bombers" were in their infancy (or built in very small numbers) at this time.
We also have to consider who was the enemy. We in the post war era tend to see Britain and Germany as the main opponents but for most of the 1930s France would have been the most important enemy facing Germany, few seeing it collapse so quickly.
France was introducing these in the spring of 1937
They only built about 80 but it was listed as having a range of 1240miles with a 5510lb bomb load. More bombs over shorter distance.
In 1940 they were starting to deliver a version with four Hispano V-12s. A single plane of the later type did bomb Berlin twice in 1940 but that is more along the line of the Doolittle raid than an example of French policy.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
A number of companies either designed dual purpose aircraft or tried to use as many parts as possible between a bomber and an airliner during the mid 1930s,
The world was coming out of the great depression and money was tight. defence budgets were not anywhere near what they would be and airlines were only ordering in small numbers.
Stretching design, development and production tooling over as many airframes as possible seemed to make good economic sense.
A lot of european Airlines were subsidized by their governments (out right or mail contracts) so sometimes fast planes were ordered for prestige even if they weren't going to make money.
Germany gets picked on a lot for the He 111 but a few years latter Lockheed hit ball out of the park with the converted Lockheed 14 airliner (Hudson bomber) and Lockheed 18 (longer fuselage) and Ventura.
Of course the He 111 never got BMW 801s let alone R-2800s
Amazing what a crap load of power can do
Boeing did use a new fuselage on the 307 Stratoliner but the wings, tail, landing gear and engine nacelles (no turbos) were pretty close to the B-17C. (verticalstablizer and rudder were closer to the E)
- Thread starter
- #398
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
You had to be there.
- Thread starter
- #399
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The B-18 Bolo was derived from the DC-3 (or maybe the DC-2).A number of companies either designed dual purpose aircraft or tried to use as many parts as possible between a bomber and an airliner during the mid 1930s,
The world was coming out of the great depression and money was tight. defence budgets were not anywhere near what they would be and airlines were only ordering in small numbers.
Stretching design, development and production tooling over as many airframes as possible seemed to make good economic sense.
A lot of european Airlines were subsidized by their governments (out right or mail contracts) so sometimes fast planes were ordered for prestige even if they weren't going to make money.
Germany gets picked on a lot for the He 111 but a few years latter Lockheed hit ball out of the park with the converted Lockheed 14 airliner (Hudson bomber) and Lockheed 18 (longer fuselage) and Ventura.
Of course the He 111 never got BMW 801s let alone R-2800s
Amazing what a crap load of power can do
Boeing did use a new fuselage on the 307 Stratoliner but the wings, tail, landing gear and engine nacelles (no turbos) were pretty close to the B-17C. (verticalstablizer and rudder were closer to the E)
IIRC, conventional wisom is, that during the BoB, the Me-109 was too shortranged, while the Me-110 was to sluggish to duke it out with single-engined fighters. Now, the P-47 wasn't exactly a flying ballerina either, but gave a good track record of itself utilizing its speed in "boom-and-zoom" tactics, right? I think I read on wikipedia some time ago, that the Me-110 might have used similar tactics to give a better account of itself but got shackled to the bombers to provide close escort, thus unable to rely on its speed to offset its lack of agility. Is there truth in that?
