Greatest aviation myth this site “de-bunked”.

[Deleted member 68059]

Thunderbolts all the way to Berlin in June of 1943? Man I'd have to see some hard data/source material for that first.

I`ve certainly never seen any.

SOURCE: US Air Force Historical Research Agency Microfilm. Reel A1128, Frame 269 of:

 

[Capt. Vick]

That I actually build models?

 

[Koopernic]

Archive source + quotations and ORIGINAL data please: >

In minute 4.06 of this video the document showing Happ Arnold banning drop tanks is reproduced


Now you have to ask if they were obsessive enough to actually proactively ban drop tanks perhaps they were lackadaisical, indifferent and suppressive about developing wing tanks and enlarged fuselage tanks for the P47. With these men in charge of fighter development is it any surprise that their belief that fighters couldn't intercept bombers became a self fulfilling prophecy eg P39,P40 being the main USAAF types posted of inadequate altitude performance. Moreover despite seeing the fate of the
Luftwaffe over Britain and being given advice from the RAF they didn't take that advice.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

In minute 4.06 of this video the document showing Happ Arnold banning drop tanks is reproduced


Now you have to ask if they were obsessive enough to actually proactively ban drop tanks perhaps they were lackadaisical, indifferent and suppressive about developing wing tanks and enlarged fuselage tanks for the P47. With these men in charge of fighter development is it any surprise that their belief that fighters couldn't intercept bombers became a self fulfilling prophecy eg P39,P40 being the main USAAF types posted of inadequate altitude performance. Moreover despite seeing the fate of the
Luftwaffe over Britain and being given advice from the RAF they didn't take that advice.

A pre-war document, dated May 1939, nearly half a decade before the strategic offensive, discussing a totally different aircraft (the P36).

Sorry but what exactly is that supposed to be evidence of with respect to a P-47 in 1943 and 1944 ?

 

[fastmongrel]

Thunderbolts all the way to Berlin in June of 1943? Man I'd have to see some hard data/source material for that first.

No one said they had to fly back from Berlin

 

[fubar57]

Well down FUBAR. I have a request in to AFHRA even as I type this, Korean War air combat related. Where did you get your data??

 

[Shortround6]

I think the Thunderbolts to Berlin in 1943 may be backwards projection.

Thunderbolts to Berlin in mid to late 1944 was possible(?) so why not claim it was only stubbornness/stupidity that they couldn't have done it in mid 1943 by adding piping and enough drop tanks?

Simply ignore better props and possibly the water injection fitted to P-47s over the 1943/44 winter.
Might also ignore the length of runway needed?
P-47D with 370 gallon internal (1943 P-47s had 305) and pair of 150 gallon drop tanks was rated at 600 mile radius.
But that is at 16600lbs take-off weight. Trying that weight with the toothpick propeller might require an awful lot of runway.

edit, not sure if the later planes got little things like different tires to handle the increased weight.

 

[pbehn]

In minute 4.06 of this video the document showing Happ Arnold banning drop tanks is reproduced


Now you have to ask if they were obsessive enough to actually proactively ban drop tanks perhaps they were lackadaisical, indifferent and suppressive about developing wing tanks and enlarged fuselage tanks for the P47. With these men in charge of fighter development is it any surprise that their belief that fighters couldn't intercept bombers became a self fulfilling prophecy eg P39,P40 being the main USAAF types posted of inadequate altitude performance. Moreover despite seeing the fate of the
Luftwaffe over Britain and being given advice from the RAF they didn't take that advice.

Those pics dont look like 1943 P-47s, it only started to be introduced in late 1942, any thing new takes 3 months from factory in USA to flying in UK, if they all make it the Battle of the Atlantic was still going on in 1943. As others have suggested, a long range tank helps get you there, it is internal fuel gets you back after combat, that big ole engine had a thirst on her.

 

[33k in the air]

It wasnt just the bomber mafia ideology that was the problem it was the "panacea target" ideology too. The idea that one raid could end or massively shorten the war led people to think huge losses would be justified. The RAF battle of Berlin, dambusters raid and Schweinfurt were all examples of it.

That was an example of prewar theory running up against real-world testing. It turned out that one raid was not enough knock out a target; rather, it had to be hit, repeatedly, to keep it out of action. Everyone pretty much underestimated the degree to which industrial facilities could be brought back into operation by a large, industrialized nation-state. And to keep hitting targets in that fashion required a larger bomber force than most anticipated. The Allies were also led astray by bomb damage assessment — recon photos from 30,000 feet looked impressive, showing a bomb-scarred landscape. Only at ground level, the damage was frequently far less than such high-altitude photos implied.

Nevertheless, the Oil and Transportation Plans proved highly detrimental to the Germany war economy — its armaments production index peaked in July 1944 and fell off rapidly after that. Bomber Command's effort against the Ruhr in 1943 also had a big impact, effectively flat-lining German production for about seven months. (Adam Tooze covers this in his book The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy.)

Moreover, there were critical target types not attacked, e.g. the German electrical supply. A sustained campaign against that could have had a huge impact. But for various reasons it was left off the target lists.

 

[33k in the air]

I think the Thunderbolts to Berlin in 1943 may be backwards projection.

The one criticism that may be warranted was that drop tank development was slow in the ETO.

Gen. Kenney in the South Pacific had a 200 gallon belly drop tank for his P-47s designed and into production by August of 1943; the ETO wouldn't see a 200 gallon belly tank for its P-47s until about a year later. Had European P-47s had a 200 gallon drop tank by late 1943, that would have meant about a 400 mile escort radius, allowing the bombers to be easily escorted as far as Ruhr.

 

[pbehn]

That was an example of prewar theory running up against real-world testing. It turned out that one raid was not enough knock out a target; rather, it had to be hit, repeatedly, to keep it out of action. Everyone pretty much underestimated the degree to which industrial facilities could be brought back into operation by a large, industrialized nation-state. And to keep hitting targets in that fashion required a larger bomber force than most anticipated. The Allies were also led astray by bomb damage assessment — recon photos from 30,000 feet looked impressive, showing a bomb-scarred landscape. Only at ground level, the damage was frequently far less than such high-altitude photos implied.

Nevertheless, the Oil and Transportation Plans proved highly detrimental to the Germany war economy — its armaments production index peaked in July 1944 and fell off rapidly after that. Bomber Command's effort against the Ruhr in 1943 also had a big impact, effectively flat-lining German production for about seven months. (Adam Tooze covers this in his book The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy.)

Moreover, there were critical target types not attacked, e.g. the German electrical supply. A sustained campaign against that could have had a huge impact. But for various reasons it was left off the target lists.

I remember reading about the Schweinfurt raid and "ball bearing theory". The theory was wiping out Schweinfurt and destroying ball bearing production would cripple Germany. In fact it wouldn't, there were of course stocks of ball bearings all over, some other made ball bearings and re starting would start immediately. As was proved by many sides, if people want to continue fighting they will and Germany had no real means to give up. The idea that someone would say to Adolf "we have no ball bearings" and Adolf says "hand out white flags then" takes no account of him being a madman. Same with the dambusters raid, if they had breached all the dams it may have justified the losses, but they had no hope of breaching the Sorpe dam, which was by far the biggest.

 

[Zipper730]

Honestly, what are you talking about. You are trying to hijack this thread with your politics the same way you did with Barbarossa?

A dive bomber is a precision weapon that can usually hit within 20ft hence its use by the RN, USN and IJN against ships.

It's of little use in killing civilians are causing broad damage to a factory because while its precision is good its lift is not high.

I think he was talking about their vulnerability to ground-fire, not for bombing cities.

 

[33k in the air]

I remember reading about the Schweinfurt raid and "ball bearing theory". The theory was wiping out Schweinfurt and destroying ball bearing production would cripple Germany. In fact it wouldn't, there were of course stocks of ball bearings all over, some other made ball bearings and re starting would start immediately.

It was key node, and the strikes had an impact, but there was two months between them, and there was no follow-up after October due to the lack of long-range fighter escort. Bomber Command didn't assist either due to Harris' insistence on area raids.

Same with the dambusters raid, if they had breached all the dams it may have justified the losses, but they had no hope of breaching the Sorpe dam, which was by far the biggest.

That illustrates the balance struck between technological and operational limitations. There was also a lack of follow-up there as well — raids against the dam repair efforts would have been beneficial.

 

[pbehn]

I think he was talking about their vulnerability to ground-fire, not for bombing cities.

Honestly, what are you talking about. You are trying to hijack this thread with your politics the same way you did with Barbarossa?

A dive bomber is a precision weapon that can usually hit within 20ft hence its use by the RN, USN and IJN against ships.

.

I am talking about using twin engine bombers in general and "developing twin engine dive bombers" in particular. The early RAF twin engine bombers suffered massive losses in daylight raids, some squadrons were wiped out in a day without dive bombing. German losses up to the fall of France in twin engine bombers were actually unsustainable but it was only a campaign lasting 5-6 weeks. Dive bombers cannot be escorted, you can escort them until they start the dive and when they have re formed after a dive but not in between. The Ju 87 was quickly removed from the battle of Britain because it was very vulnerable, you cannot make an argument for a twin engine aircraft ding the same thing being less vulnerable, it is much bigger and it is massively more expensive in men and material. The last month of the BoB was mainly Bf-109s dropping bombs from high altitude, the twins had been withdrawn and they hadn't even tried dive bombing. How were most German ships attacked from the air? Tirpitz was sunk by Lancasters, Bismarck was hit by a torpedo most others were hit in port by level bombing. The B-26 was a twin engined bomber fast, reasonable defensive armament, on a raid against a power station at IJmuiden in Netherlands all 11 unescorted B-26s were lost to AA and Fw-190s. Last pot a dive bomber is only a precision bomber when it can see the target, frequently they couldnt because of smoke haze or cloud but during a raid only the first few can see the target, once the first bombs drop the dust and smoke obscure the target for anyone coming in later.

 

[Shortround6]

Dive bombing ships works a lot better than dive bombing land targets.
Ships, aside from their own smoke or smoke from nearby ships are moving into a "clean" area in a matter of moments. Ships show up well against the sea most of the time (not always)

depending on sea state the wake could be several miles long. Plenty of aircraft bombed the wrong ship, now try to identify a factory building in an industrial zone?
Smoke generators had been used in WW I? Dive bombing when you can't see the ground?

And as I have harped on for years, dive bombing works great against high value targets (like ships that take years to build) with poor anti aircraft. It doesn't work so well against low value targets with good AA. Trading dive bombers for trucks is a lousy trade even at several trucks per dive bomber.

Would British dive bombers of any type, fared any better in attacking the Bridges over the Meuse given the same concentration of German AA guns, German fighters and the lack of proper and timely escort by British fighters?

 

[33k in the air]

Would British dive bombers of any type, fared any better in attacking the Bridges over the Meuse given the same concentration of German AA guns, German fighters and the lack of proper and timely escort by British fighters?

Well, Ju 87s didn't fare too well over Britain during that battle. I wouldn't expect RAF dive bombers to fare much better in similar circumstances.

 

[Koopernic]

I remember reading about the Schweinfurt raid and "ball bearing theory". The theory was wiping out Schweinfurt and destroying ball bearing production would cripple Germany. In fact it wouldn't, there were of course stocks of ball bearings all over, some other made ball bearings and re starting would start immediately. As was proved by many sides, if people want to continue fighting they will and Germany had no real means to give up. The idea that someone would say to Adolf "we have no ball bearings" and Adolf says "hand out white flags then" takes no account of him being a madman. Same with the dambusters raid, if they had breached all the dams it may have justified the losses, but they had no hope of breaching the Sorpe dam, which was by far the biggest.

i have many books on various German war machines. It's clear the Schweinfurt raid worked because the shortage of ball bearings is mentioned in most books on post 1943 weapons development. The Germans adjusted by re-engineering many designs to use sleeve or journal bearings. This re-engineering took a lot of resources that might have produced an improved weapon. On the Arado Ar 234 there could be a slight unpleasant stiction in the feel of the controls due to bearring stiction. It may not have observably reduced munitions production but it prevented or delayed an increase in production and quality.

Britain also suffered from bearing shortages to the extent that some meteor jets had oil coolers on the cockpit sides to cool the oil fed sleeve bearings.

 

[Koopernic]

Well, Ju 87s didn't fare too well over Britain during that battle. I wouldn't expect RAF dive bombers to fare much better in similar circumstances.

The Ju 87s losses in the BoB are a kind of received wisdom but I know little of what actually happened first hand. It appears they lost 20 Ju 87 (whose numbers?) in attacks on 3 radar stations. The usual story is they were lost when the Ju 87 were stripped of their escorts after they entered their dives. The iconic Ju 87 attack involved approaching the target with the viewing window between the pilots legs open. The aircraft was set up for a dive and often rolled inverted and pulled into a vertical dive. A contact altimeter (setable between 500m and 4600m) sounded a horn 250 meters before the release point, when it sounded it was time to release bombs. Bomb release initiated automatic pull up. The whole procedure must have taken no more than 50 seconds. If RAF fighters shot these aircraft down there must have been many of them and they must have been aggressive, perhaps overwhelming the escorts in such a short time. Radar effectively made these attacks deep penetration missions even though they were coastal and radar stations were extremely well defended.

There is dive bombing and there is dive bombing. Perhaps tactics might have evolved to protect the Ju 87. Later the StuVi 5B bombsight was added which gave a moving crosshairs to make bombing more accurate at greater distances and particularly angles more than 10 degrees of centre.

The Hawker Henley could dive at 70 degrees, which is enough for good accuracy and more importantly was much faster than a ju 87 or a fairy battle which greatly facilitates escape and penetration.

During the Battle of Britain EK210 (Erprobungs Kommando or probe squadron) which was set up to combat test the Me 210 but flying Me 110 developed dive bombing attacks said to be as accurate as the Ju 87 at the time. I suspect they used a contact altimeter and a special revi gunsight that had a second set of preset cross hairs which have the release point during the pull-up. The Me 210/410 with dive brakes received a computing dive bombing sight.

 

[33k in the air]

The Ju 87s losses in the BoB are a kind of received wisdom but I know little of what actually happened first hand. It appears they lost 20 Ju 87 (whose numbers?) in attacks on 3 radar stations. The usual story is they were lost when the Ju 87 were stripped of their escorts after they entered their dives.

The USAAF took the lesson as being dive bombers, however useful they might be in accurately hitting targets, were simply too vulnerable without local air superiority. Hence why several U.S. squadrons which were to have been equipped with A-24s instead deployed to the ETO equipped with the A-36, an aircraft far more able to defend itself after bombing than the Army version of the Dauntless. It was the rise of the fighter-bomber.

 

[SaparotRob]

I said the myth was the Mustang was the only fighter capable of escorting bombers to Berlin and back. I didn't say when.
I would like to see mid-'43 P-47s with drop tanks too. I'd like to see them at the Cradle of Aviation Museum, the Planes of Fame Museum, Francis Gabreski Airport and at Floyd Bennett Field in Gateway National Park, New York.