Weather limitations in carrier aviation in the interwar and WWII eras

[z42]

One reason I've read for why battleships were still a thing in WWII (apart from shore bombardment etc.) was that they were less weather dependent than WWII era naval aviation, and only later in the post-WWII era carrier aviation became more or less all-weather.

So, what were these limitations, and what specifically caused them? Presumably wind per se wasn't an issue, as more wind just made it easier to launch and recover aircraft. Was it an issue of wind gusts, where a gust coming in from a slightly different direction could flip a plane over the side of the ship? And this was related to the wing loading of the aircraft? As aircraft got bigger, faster and got higher wing loading, they were relatively less impacted by wind gusts? Or was it something else that made aircraft capable of operating in windier conditions?

I would guess night operations per se should be doable in WWII, or at least the RN had developed and used that capability.

The ship rolling and pitching presumably can be a problem as well, but my guess would be that as carriers are pretty big ships, at the point where the ships movement in the sea prevents air operations the wind is above the limit as well? Unless we're talking about the aftermath of a big storm or such.

Anyway, did navies have regulations specifying when air operations were allowed, or was it up to the individual commanders? And in either case, what were the practical limits then, say, spanning 1920-1945 (presumably they changed dramatically over that time)?

 

[EwenS]

AIUI there were no instructions in Admiralty Fleet Orders about flying condition limits. But there was a personnel structure on each carrier to advise the Captain in relation to all flying matters. The roles of these senior aviators in the carrier were set out in AFO in 1939 as

Commander or Lt Commander Flying (aka Wings) responsible for
1. Technical administration, discipline (later deleted) and organisation of the FAA on board
2. Co-ordination of maintenance and readiness of squadrons embarked.

Commander or Lt Commander Air Staff (often referred to as "Little F" or Ops) responsible to the Captain for co-ordination of ... and training of the squadrons embarked.

Together these two officers, with help from their staffs (numbering between 40 and 60 in 1939 depending on the carrier) acted as staff officers for planning and ordering air operations and exercises. To these were added the Naval Wing Leaders in late 1943 which were then replaced in June 1945 with the Carrier Air Group Commander.

So there were plenty of experienced personnel who, in conjunction with squadron commanders, could decide if it was safe to fly on any day given the conditions, and advise the Captain accordingly, while also taking account of the job that needed to be done.

Taking off in bad weather was less of a problem than finding the carrier again and landing on again safely. You will find plenty of stories around of pilots having to land back on a carrier deck that was moving vertically by 50-60 feet particularly in the North Atlantic or Arctic waters. Not just escort carriers, but fleet carriers like Ark Royal and Victorious. See their activities during the search for Bismarck.

Wind very much was an issue, because with high winds came heavy seas.

The RN had practiced night operations pre-war and used it from the earliest days especially against the Italians (Taeanto). But they continued throughout the war culminating in the operations in arctic waters in 1944/45. There were some NF Fulmar & Firefly flights on escort carriers 1944/45). The Indomitable had a small group of experienced night flyers who flew ordinary Hellcats on dawn / dusk CAP sorties in the Pacific in 1945. They often took off / landed in the dark. That flight transferred to Formidable for the final ops off Japan. The first RN carrier to be given a dedicated Night Air Group with Hellcat NF.II and Firefly NF.I was Ocean, completed Aug 1945 and, after modifications, began trials in Nov 1945.

Improvements were made to deck lighting and DLCO equipment and Vindex used a midified radar from a Swordfish III to provide a rudimentary carrier controlled approach system to guide her airfraft back to the deck in 1944/45 at night or in bad weather.

Over in the Pacific the USN had dedicated Night fighter flights on its carriers from early 1944 and flew its first night strikes against Truk in Feb 1944. From Oct 1944 they began to operate dedicated Night carriers, both defensively and offensively.

Check out the damage suffered by US carriers in the big Pacific typhoons of Dec 1944 & June 1945. Big Essex class with the forward end of their flight decks crushed.

Even the big super carriers of today can suffer a significant amount of deck movement, that might limit operations.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Rain, pitch and roll, nighttime ... all were concerns in the 30s.

 

[ThomasP]

re "weather limitations"

See my post

"Weather Minimums for Operations"

The above is the only semi-specific/official information I have found over the years.

also

"Fairey Albacore. Was so awful?"

 

[Admiral Beez]

I understand it was intentionally low and open to facility seaplane ops, but in a following or beam sea the aft deck and open lift on HMS Hermes must have been unusably wet. No wonder Hermes was deployed mostly in calmer eastern seas.

 

[SaparotRob]

That mast looks ridiculous. I can no longer keep quiet about it.

 

[Admiral Beez]

That mast looks ridiculous. I can no longer keep quiet about it.

Considering that there are no large surface guns or anything else to guide from the top mast, it does seem silly.

 

[z42]

Considering that there are no large surface guns or anything else to guide from the top mast, it does seem silly.

View attachment 762911

Perhaps it was a private jacuzzi, swimming pool, sauna and bar for the admiral.

 

[ThomasP]

The "fighting top" was originally intended to aid in directing the planned 10x 6" guns, though as built the number of guns was reduced to 6x 5.5".

The idea of the trade protection carrier was similar to that of the trade protection cruiser, and she was expected to be able to fight a gun battle vs enemy raiders on the trade routes. Plus the Admiralty realized that the Hermes was too slow to be sure of evading gun combat with enemy cruisers and destroyers, or possibly even merchant cruisers and 'Q' ships.

If she had received a more extensive refit and modernization it was planned to remove the fighting top - but such a refit never happened.

 

[EwenS]

Eagle, when finally completed, had a similar mast and fighting top arrangement for her 9x6" guns.

Battleships-Cruisers.co.uk

Lest those in the USA think this a peculiarly British thing, here is the superstructure of the CV-2 Lexington as completed at the end of 1927 cobtaining all the fire control and spotting facilities to support its 4 twin 8" turrets.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The idea of the trade protection carrier was similar to that of the trade protection cruiser, and she was expected to be able to fight a gun battle vs enemy raiders on the trade routes. Plus the Admiralty realized that the Hermes was too slow to be sure of evading gun combat

That's why you have a dozen torpedo armed bombers onboard to kill an enemy raider before they get within range. Of course, Hermes could be captained like HMAS Sydney and sail right up to an enemy raider - then you'll need your guns, but at that range you don't need the fighting top and huge mast.

Too bad HMS Glorious couldn't keep her one or both of her twin 15" guns into April 1940. I jest of course. This is ridiculous.

 

[SaparotRob]

Eagle, when finally completed, had a similar mast and fighting top arrangement for her 9x6" guns.


View attachment 762983View attachment 762984

Battleships-Cruisers.co.uk

Lest those in the USA think this a peculiarly British thing, here is the superstructure of the CV-2 Lexington as completed at the end of 1927 cobtaining all the fire control and spotting facilities to support its 4 twin 8" turrets.

View attachment 762982

The Lexington's did actually have 8X8 8' guns so...

 

[EwenS]

Lets seee. G keeps her two 15" turrets. That means a flight deck of about 300ft (cut from 530ft, with a corresponding reduction in hangar length and aircraft capacity). Even a Bogue class CVE had about 440-450ft.

The reason for the 5.5-6" guns on the RN carriers was not to do with them operating in a trade protection role. It was envisaged from late WW1 that the carriers, icluding Hermes, would be operating in conjuction with the battlefleet but might become detached from it at some point (e.g. while launching / recovering aircraft or to avoid the ensuing big gun fleet action) and would run into enemy cruisers or destroyers, against which they would have to defend themselves.

For the USN where the carriers were intended to operate away from thee battlefleet with an 8" cruiser escort, situations were envisaged where enemy 8" cruisers might evade or destroy the USN cruiser escort leaving the carrier to defend itself.

 

[ThomasP]

That's why you have a dozen torpedo armed bombers onboard to kill an enemy raider before they get within range. Of course, Hermes could be captained like HMAS Sydney and sail right up to an enemy raider - then you'll need your guns, but at that range you don't need the fighting top and huge mast.

The above assumes you actually have aircraft available, or that conditions allow you to use them.

The encounter could be at night or in severe weather and/or poor visibility.

Your aircraft could be off attacking some other target, and not immediately available to fend off enemy surface combatants that you run across through bad luck.

The number of aircraft available at the start of the deployment might be reduced to 0 by the time of the surface engagement, through enemy action and/or operational attrition.

Also, remember that her design and the original operational concepts involved were from WWI and/or immediately thereafter. The aircraft were far more vulnerable to operational attrition, far less effective vs enemy ships in the open ocean, and the RN had not yet embarked on their night and all weather operations doctrine yet.

I feel like I am leaving something important out of the above but cannot think of what that is at the moment.

Whoops, I remember. The attack ranges for the aircraft of the time were barely over the horizon.

The reason for the 5.5-6" guns on the RN carriers was not to do with them operating in a trade protection role. It was envisaged from late WW1 that the carriers, icluding Hermes, would be operating in conjuction with the battlefleet but might become detached from it at some point (e.g. while launching / recovering aircraft or to avoid the ensuing big gun fleet action) and would run into enemy cruisers or destroyers, against which they would have to defend themselves.

While trade protection was not the original intent for the Hermes, IIRC D.K.Brown said/implied that that is what it became (or at least largely) from the late-1920s? I could be mistaken. Unfortunately I do not have my D.K.Brown books to hand at the moment (they are in my storage locker).

Hence the reason the 5.5" guns and fighting top were retained?

 

[yulzari]

HMS Unicorn, a carrier serving as a fleet support vessel, carried out shore bombardments in the Korean War with it's 4" guns.

 

[Admiral Beez]

One reason I've read for why battleships were still a thing in WWII (apart from shore bombardment etc.) was that they were less weather dependent than WWII era naval aviation, and only later in the post-WWII era carrier aviation became more or less all-weather.

So, what were these limitations, and what specifically caused them? Presumably wind per se wasn't an issue, as more wind just made it easier to launch and recover aircraft. Was it an issue of wind gusts, where a gust coming in from a slightly different direction could flip a plane over the side of the ship? And this was related to the wing loading of the aircraft? As aircraft got bigger, faster and got higher wing loading, they were relatively less impacted by wind gusts? Or was it something else that made aircraft capable of operating in windier conditions?

I would guess night operations per se should be doable in WWII, or at least the RN had developed and used that capability.

The ship rolling and pitching presumably can be a problem as well, but my guess would be that as carriers are pretty big ships, at the point where the ships movement in the sea prevents air operations the wind is above the limit as well? Unless we're talking about the aftermath of a big storm or such.

Anyway, did navies have regulations specifying when air operations were allowed, or was it up to the individual commanders? And in either case, what were the practical limits then, say, spanning 1920-1945 (presumably they changed dramatically over that time)?

Open hangars and deck parking vs. enclosed hangars and all aircraft struck below is a good indication of weather-related decisions on carrier designs and ops.

 

[SaparotRob]

HMS Unicorn, a carrier serving as a fleet support vessel, carried out shore bombardments in the Korean War with it's 4" guns.

Which carrier was it again that joined the line of battle in the Med?

 

[EwenS]

Which carrier was it again that joined the line of battle in the Med?

Formidable at Matapan in March 1941

 

[SaparotRob]

The problem I have remembering the names of RN ships is it that they all seem to have these stupendous adjectives for names.

 

[SaparotRob]

How does U.S.S. Undiscombobulateable sound?