Weather limitations in carrier aviation in the interwar and WWII eras (1 Viewer)

[Admiral Beez]

Comparing her and her sisters to modern ships (like the US Wasp and Ranger) ignores the advances made in Steam machinery and other 'details' that could save well over 1000 tons of weight to use on other things.

They were old, that's for sure. Ironically of all the RN's carriers of 1939, only their half-sister Furious (and Argus) survived to postwar. The saddest loss for the RN was that of HMS Ark Royal with her modern machinery and advanced design. Those skinny lifts made Ark ideal for the F4F and F6F.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I wouldn't call the Ranger a modern ship. It was with good reason that she saw limited combat use and was never sent to the Pacific even after the US had lost Lexington, Yorktown Wasp and Hornet.

Aside from anything else, the absence of useful torpedo defense in a theater that had shown Japanese torpedoes to be a serious threat would certainly be folly. Look at what happened to Wasp or Hornet to see how bad that could get.

 

[Shortround6]

I wouldn't call the Ranger a modern ship.

It was one of the treaty limited ships, trying to fit a quart in a pint pot.
But she had early 1930s engines and boilers and early 1930s construction techniques/engineering. Compared to 1914-15 engines/boilers/engineering.
Furious and sisters had boilers that were good for 5000hp each, Rangers boilers were good for 8900hp each. They may have been bigger but the power per ton was a lot lower which meant there was more tonnage in her limited hull for other things. Wasp did even better, 11,666hp per boiler.

Have to search for actual armor weight but According to Friedman the Ranger had none, except for 2in on the steering gear sides and bulkheads and 1 in deck over the steering gear.
Nothing over the machinery and magazines. A real egg shell.

 

[don4331]

Excellent points. Mind, the post-Midway Japanese made due with conversion carriers that were not much better. Give Courageous and Glorious to the IJN and they'd be happy enough. Though they'd probably extend the flight deck in a light weight fashion, like on the merchant conversion carrier Kaiyō, shown below.

View attachment 786970

That merchant conversion has much more 'robust' lines, especially in the bow. than the Courageous class LLC conversion. Block coefficient is ~.56 for IJN CVE versus 0.50 for the RN CV. RN CVs were 4k tons overweight vs as built (additional 0.7m draft and bow wasn't up to required strength to begin with. The structure on Kaiyo might be open but the weight of the deck is still there.

To extend the deck over the bow, C/F/G need a bulbous bow to restore trim, then they need to be razed to the keel to increase the hull strength so the ship doesn't split in 2 the 1st time it heaves. Even the Japanese would sooner just move the nameplate across.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

According to Friedman the Ranger had none, except for 2in on the steering gear sides and bulkheads and 1 in deck over the steering gear.
Nothing over the machinery and magazines. A real egg shell.

Wasp was little better. Granted, no carrier would likely survive three Type 95s landing so quickly, but the Stinger got stung where she really had little defense at all. Put those same three fish into an Essex, pray for great DC or kiss 'er goodbye.

Ranger, and Wasp, would have little hope even against two Type 95s. No torpedo defense integrated, and both built light for treaty reasons. Shake, rattle and roll ... over.

 

[GrauGeist]

I beleive the thinking behind the early carriers, were that they were a compliment to a battle group in the age of battleships.

The carriers were not force projection, but rather a tool to aid a battle group, so they were not armored as such.

Of course, this ideology would soon change in massive learning curve.

 

[z42]

I beleive the thinking behind the early carriers, were that they were a compliment to a battle group in the age of battleships.

The carriers were not force projection, but rather a tool to aid a battle group, so they were not armored as such.

Of course, this ideology would soon change in massive learning curve.

Yes, initially the main task of the carrier was scouting (and countering enemy scouting) for the fleet. When aerial strikes were introduced, the primary target was enemy carriers, not because they per se were the largest threat against the fleet, but because successfully striking the enemy carriers would blind their fleet.

And yes, Billy Mitchell notwithstanding, few believed that aircraft would constitute much of a threat against a capital ship. This would of course change; strike aircraft in 1945 were ridiculously more capable than their brethren in 1925.

Not sure if this per se has any direct implications for how much armor the early carriers had?

 

[EwenS]

The Ranger was the USN's first purpose-built carrier, where Langley, Lexington and Saratoga were conversions.

She was modern in comparison to others, as she was from the mid-30's and the reason she was kept in the Atlantic, was because of her speed (less than 30 knots), not because of her abilities.

Matter of fact, the Ranger tried to lure the Tirpitz out of hiding, which didn't happen, unfortunately.

In Nov 1942 FDR asked Churchill for assistance in the south Pacific in view of the loss of Wasp, Hornet & the damage to Enterprise, so leaving Saratoga as the only fully operational carrier. On 2 Dec 1942 Churchill replied offering both Illustrious (then in the Indian Ocean) and Victorious (detached to Force H from the Home Fleet) if Ranger could be sent to join the Home Fleet. FDR responded as follows (with my emphasis):-

"[PREM 3/163/1] 5 December 1942

Carrier reinforcements for South West Pacific

Your Despatch No. 217 of December 2, 1942, has received serious consideration. Your offers of co-operation are deeply appreciated. In spite of the advantages which would result from the employment of both VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS as a tactical unit in the Pacific other considerations make it necessary to forego the services of VICTORIOUS there. If it becomes necessary to send yet another carrier to the Pacific in the near future, RANGER would be chosen because she does not require special preparation for operations with other American forces. The early arrival of ILLUSTRIOUS in Pearl Harbor is looked forward to with anticipation."
The RN subsequently decided to send Victorious (she left the UK on 20 Dec 1942), while bringing Illustrious home for a refit in Jan 1943.

Ranger's design speed was 29.25 knots, and she must have been able to run close to that in 1942. There were plans formulated in Jan & Dec 1943 to modernise her which would have included blistering her hull, which would have reduced her speed. After that her speed was expected to be 28 knots. Instead she was given a much more limited modernisation in early 1944 for use as a training carrier as she would have caused delays to the completion of the Essex class Shangri-La and Lake Champlain at the Norfolk Navy Yard.

Victorious' design speed was 30 knots, just 0.75 knots faster than Ranger. That seems to me just not enough to make a difference.

Wasp' design speed was 29.5 knots.
As noted in earlier threads, the general carrier group operating speeds were in the 15-25 knot range, so while her speed was lower than the Lexingtons and subsequent Yorktowns, I do question just how much of a limiting factor that alone was. Perhaps more importantly, Friedman also notes ".....she could not operate in common Pacific swells nearly as comfortably as could the larger ships." So it was perhaps the combination of factors that made her unsuitable. Between 1935 & 1939 she had been operated in the Pacific so the USN would have been fully aware of her limitations.

Ranger was sent to join the Home Fleet in Aug 1943 to release Illustrious to go to the Med to join Force H as a replacement for the torpedoed Indomitable. But I fear you may be confusing the operations she participated in.

8 Sept 1943 she sortied from Scapa with the Home Fleet in a vain attempt to intercept Tirpitz, Scharnhorst & the 9 destroyers that carried out Operation Zitronella against Allied facilities on Spitzbergen. The KM were back in port long before the Home Fleet got anywhere close.

On 2 Oct 1943 she again sortied with the Home Fleet. The purpose of this Operation, Operation Leader, which took place on 4 October 1943 was to strike shipping in the Bodo area, 370 miles south of Tirpitz lair in Kaa Fjord. Add to that Tirpitz had been badly damaged on 22 Sept during Operation Source by the X class midget subs so was going nowhere. The suggestion in some US newspapers that Tirpitz was hiding from Ranger & her air group was a bit of Allied morale boosting propaganda. As shown here

Operation Leader - October 4, 1943 - Air Group 4

Air Group 4 During World War II - Casablanca to Tokyo

airgroup4.com

She remained with the Home Fleet until late Nov 1943.

Operation Leader was a follow up to Operation Camera in July 1943, when the Home Fleet simulated an assault on southern Norway as a diversion from what was happening in the Med. All part of a plan to tie down German forces in Norway.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I beleive the thinking behind the early carriers, were that they were a compliment to a battle group in the age of battleships.

They would have been useful at Jutland. Unfortunately seaplane carriers, especially those that could not launch their aircraft from the ship were of little use.

Naval aviation in the Battle of Jutland

The Battle of Jutland, fought a century ago, is principally remembered as the biggest clash of battleships ever – one of the last hurrahs of the mighty surface fleets before air power began t…

navalairhistory.com

The article above gets us back on the topic of weather and naval air ops.

 

[EwenS]

Wasp was little better. Granted, no carrier would likely survive three Type 95s landing so quickly, but the Stinger got stung where she really had little defense at all. Put those same three fish into an Essex, pray for great DC or kiss 'er goodbye.

Ranger, and Wasp, would have little hope even against two Type 95s. No torpedo defense integrated, and both built light for treaty reasons. Shake, rattle and roll ... over.

From the Wasp CV-7 Damage Report (attached below):-

"6. Thus the circumstances involved in the loss of WASP
were somewhat similar to those which caused the loss of
LEXINGTON (CV2)* inasmuch as both vessels had to be abandoned
by reason of the raging internal uncontrolled fires followed
by internal explosions. In neither case were the structural
damage and loss of buoyancy and stability caused by the torpedoes
sufficient to have caused the loss of the vessels."

The Damage Report concluded it was 2 Japanese torpedoes followed immediately by an internal explosion (see para 36), knocking out the fire mains. Followed by gasoline vapour explosions 4mins, 15 mins & 20 mins later as well as numerous other small explosions from munitions and gasoline from aircraft in the hangar and triced in the hangar overhead. It took another 6 hours for her to sink, helped on her way by another 3 US torpedoes.

Hornet also proved tough to put down. Conclusion from her Damage Report:-

"65. HORNET did, in spite of admitted deficiencies in machinery arrangement, survive extreme punishment to the hull. The fact that damage from three [aircraft] torpedo hits, four bombs and two plane crashes did not result in sinking Is impressive. Despite such punishment, the hull was still in condition to allow towing from the scene of action if the tactical situation had permitted. In an attempt to sink HORNET, destroyers fired 369 rounds of 5" ammunition into the hull and a number of torpedoes. This still did not result in immediate sinking and HORNET was left "blazing furiously and in a slowly sinking condition". HORNET'S resistance to damage, as well as YORKTOWN's, exceeded reasonable expectations."

U.S.S. HORNET (CV8) LOSS IN ACTION SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER, 1942

U. S. S. HORNET (CV8) LOSS IN ACTION SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER, 1942

ibiblio.org

She was finally put down by Japanese 24" Long Lance torpedoes (3 of 4 fired were claimed as hits).

Of the Essex class, Lexington (CV-16) was hit aft by an aircraft torpedo on 4 Dec 1943, necessitating a trip home to fix the damage. Intrepid (CV-11) was also hit by an aircraft torpedo in the vicinity of the rudder, jamming it, on 17 Feb 1944. These hits were outside of the Essex class Torpedo Defence System. In the later Essex class vessels changes were made to the gasoline tanks forward to increase their protection as a result of the experiences of 1942. The tanks were physically moved aft to where the TDS was deeper, and the design of the tanks themselves was changed to offer more water protection around them, albeit at a cost of about 10% of their capacity.

 

[pinehilljoe]

American carriers proved very hard to sink, though perhaps easier to disable with the unarmored flight deck.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

From the Wasp CV-7 Damage Report (attached below):-

"6. Thus the circumstances involved in the loss of WASP
were somewhat similar to those which caused the loss of
LEXINGTON (CV2)* inasmuch as both vessels had to be abandoned
by reason of the raging internal uncontrolled fires followed
by internal explosions. In neither case were the structural
damage and loss of buoyancy and stability caused by the torpedoes
sufficient to have caused the loss of the vessels."

The Damage Report concluded it was 2 Japanese torpedoes followed immediately by an internal explosion (see para 36), knocking out the fire mains. Followed by gasoline vapour explosions 4mins, 15 mins & 20 mins later as well as numerous other small explosions from munitions and gasoline from aircraft in the hangar and triced in the hangar overhead. It took another 6 hours for her to sink, helped on her way by another 3 US torpedoes.

Hornet also proved tough to put down. Conclusion from her Damage Report:-

"65. HORNET did, in spite of admitted deficiencies in machinery arrangement, survive extreme punishment to the hull. The fact that damage from three [aircraft] torpedo hits, four bombs and two plane crashes did not result in sinking Is impressive. Despite such punishment, the hull was still in condition to allow towing from the scene of action if the tactical situation had permitted. In an attempt to sink HORNET, destroyers fired 369 rounds of 5" ammunition into the hull and a number of torpedoes. This still did not result in immediate sinking and HORNET was left "blazing furiously and in a slowly sinking condition". HORNET'S resistance to damage, as well as YORKTOWN's, exceeded reasonable expectations."

U.S.S. HORNET (CV8) LOSS IN ACTION SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER, 1942

U. S. S. HORNET (CV8) LOSS IN ACTION SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER, 1942

ibiblio.org

She was finally put down by Japanese 24" Long Lance torpedoes (3 of 4 fired were claimed as hits).

Of the Essex class, Lexington (CV-16) was hit aft by an aircraft torpedo on 4 Dec 1943, necessitating a trip home to fix the damage. Intrepid (CV-11) was also hit by an aircraft torpedo in the vicinity of the rudder, jamming it, on 17 Feb 1944. These hits were outside of the Essex class Torpedo Defence System. In the later Essex class vessels changes were made to the gasoline tanks forward to increase their protection as a result of the experiences of 1942. The tanks were physically moved aft to where the TDS was deeper, and the design of the tanks themselves was changed to offer more water protection around them, albeit at a cost of about 10% of their capacity.

I didn't say they were sunk due to torpedo holes. The absence of a torpedo bulge on Wasp meant that the explosive power of the warhead was released directly into the hull with no energy dissipation. I'm sure that's at least part of the reason those fuel lines ruptured.

As for Hornet, my allusion was to the torpedo that took some boilers offline. After that damage was repaired and the ship regained some speed, a second torpedo hit pretty much where the first one did, undoing all the DC measures and additionally making further repairs that much more unlikely. Immobile warships have a nasty habit of getting sunk.

Thus, my conclusion is that carriers and torpedoes do not play together well and the absence of a torpedo defense system was likely a factor in the decision to keep Ranger in the Atlantic.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Ranger's design speed was 29.25 knots, and she must have been able to run close to that in 1942. There were plans formulated in Jan & Dec 1943 to modernise her which would have included blistering her hull, which would have reduced her speed. After that her speed was expected to be 28 knots. Instead she was given a much more limited modernisation in early 1944 for use as a training carrier as she would have caused delays to the completion of the Essex class Shangri-La and Lake Champlain at the Norfolk Navy Yard.

Victorious' design speed was 30 knots, just 0.75 knots faster than Ranger. That seems to me just not enough to make a difference.

Wasp' design speed was 29.5 knots.
As noted in earlier threads, the general carrier group operating speeds were in the 15-25 knot range, so while her speed was lower than the Lexingtons and subsequent Yorktowns, I do question just how much of a limiting factor that alone was. Perhaps more importantly, Friedman also notes ".....she could not operate in common Pacific swells nearly as comfortably as could the larger ships." So it was perhaps the combination of factors that made her unsuitable. Between 1935 & 1939 she had been operated in the Pacific so the USN would have been fully aware of her limitations.

The Ranger did not meet her design speed. This table gives an estimated speed at full power of 26.9 knots

Compared to Saratoga at 31.8 knots

Or to Essex (Enterprise data not available) at 31.9 knots

The full tables are here:

HyperWar: War Service Fuel Consumption of US Naval Surface Vessels [CV]

Wasp was the same size as Ranger with 30% more horsepower and was rated for 29.5 knots. Realistically Ranger is not achieving the same speed as Wasp

 

[GreenKnight121]

The Invincible-class submarines, formally classified as the Type 218SG submarines, is a class of conventionally-powered attack subs on order by the Republic of Singapore Navy.

RSS Invincible
RSS Impeccable
RSS Illustrious
RSS Inimitable

Considering Singapore's reputation for obsessive cleanliness* RSS Impeccable certainly fits... its officers would all be OCD about cleanliness and order.



* buying, chewing, or importing gum is very illegal. You are legally not allowed to bring it into the country and could face fines of at least $500. Spitting in Singapore in public is illegal as part of broader public cleanliness and health measures. You can be fined due to a disregard of public hygiene.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Weather limitations
Friedman US Carriers, trial (so clean hull) results
Saratoga 212,702 SHP 34.99 knots at 37,600 tons, design power 180,000 SHP
Ranger 54,201 SHP 29.89 knots at 16,140 tons, design power 53,500 SHP
Enterprise 120,517 SHP 33.65 knots at 22,959 tons, design power 120,000 SHP
Wasp 71,302/73,906 SHP 28.2/30.73 knots at 19,187/17,260 tons, design power 70,000 SHP
Essex 154,054 SHP 32.93 knots at 34,364 tons, design power 150,000 SHP

 

[EwenS]

The Ranger did not meet her design speed. This table gives an estimated speed at full power of 26.9 knots

View attachment 787136

Compared to Saratoga at 31.8 knots

View attachment 787137

Or to Essex (Enterprise data not available) at 31.9 knots
View attachment 787139

The full tables are here:

HyperWar: War Service Fuel Consumption of US Naval Surface Vessels [CV]

Wasp was the same size as Ranger with 30% more horsepower and was rated for 29.5 knots. Realistically Ranger is not achieving the same speed as Wasp

I note that you didn't include the headers from the tables. Delve a little deeper.

Date of this report was Dec 1944. It shows Ranger at 26.9 knots +/-0.3 steady steaming at a mean displacement of 16,900 tons. Estimate 26.1 knots +/- 0.2 steady steaming at 19,900

Edit:- to be clear, the report linked was about determining fuel burn for range and logistical purposes, not about establishing maximum speeds.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I note that you didn't include the headers from the tables. Delve a little deeper.

Date of this report was Dec 1944. It shows Ranger at 26.9 knots +/-0.3 steady steaming at a mean displacement of 16,900 tons. Estimate 26.1 knots +/- 0.2 steady steaming at 19,900

Edit:- to be clear, the report linked was about determining fuel burn for range and logistical purposes, not about establishing maximum speeds.

I understand that but it clearly stated that the estimated maximum speed at 53,500 HP is 26.1 knots. Do you think the Ranger could produce more HP than that? Regardless it is 5 knots slower than Lexington or Essex under what I presume are similar test procedures.

 

[EwenS]

This article turned up on another site, published last year, that refutes the argument that the USN couldn't / wouldn't use Ranger in the Pacific.

https://redirect.viglink.com/?format=go&jsonp=vglnk_172080165288410&key=e4fd14f5d7f2bb6d80b8f8da1354718c&libId=lyiwvuk001029rr0000ULe9ot1zyk&subId=df652cbb333e27fd83dbc0e212b73016&loc=https%3A%2F%2Fpropnturret.com%2Ftully%2Fviewtopic.php%3Fp%3D37895%23p37895&v=1&out=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnrs-scrn.org%2Fnorthern_mariner%2Fvol33%2Ftmn_33_2_207-244.pdf&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fpropnturret.com%2Ftully%2F&title=Interesting%20article%20on%20wartime%20use%20of%20USS%20Ranger%20-%20Tully%27s%20Port&txt=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnrs-scrn.org%2Fnorthern_mari%20...%2007-244.pdf

Synopsis

Since World War Two, the USS Ranger (CV-4) has become perceived as incapable of combat in the Pacific Theater. Digitization has provided a new opportunity to examine its perception by commanders responsible for the carrier's employment. These records reveal that the common perception of the carrier stemmed from diplomatic necessity, from an overworked bureau uneager for additional projects, and from commands eager to acquire Ranger for non-combat duty. Ranger was considered by the US Navy as fit for combat in the Pacific Theater during WWII, but other requirements overrode the need for one additional combatant carrier in the Pacific.

 

[RCAFson]

Agreed. With their wide lifts these two carriers could have fielded early Seafires, and perhaps we'd see more FAA interest in the non-folding Douglas Dauntless. Now that would be something to see at Ceylon in April 1942 when Nagumo arrives - Sommerville gets two extra carriers, each with competitive aircraft.

View attachment 786582

It's odd that the Franklin Mint thought there was a market for a FAA Dauntless.

SBD-5 Dauntless Dive Bomber UK Royal Navy FAA MK.1

Buy Our Franklin Mint Desktop Models Collection Red Baron Fokker DR.1 Tri-plane. A World War I fighter aircraft designed by Reinhold Platz and built by Fokker-Flugzeugwerke, and many more collectibles available at Aiken's Airplanes!

www.aikensairplanes.com

Sept 1939 to Aug 1942 was a bad time for the RN carrier force, loosing HMS Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal, Hermes and Eagle, plus CVEs, along with crippling HMS Illustrious and Formidable. But thankfully, with the exception of two CVEs (HMS Avenger and Dasher) after HMS Eagle's loss in Aug 1942, the RN carrier force never lost another ship. Meanwhile, 1942 was the beginning of the end for the IJN's carrier force, with six losses alone that year.

The SBD-3 (1000hp at TO) didn't have the TO performance needed to operate successfully from most FAA carriers, even with fixed wings. Add another ~400lb for folding wings and things get even worse.

 

[RCAFson]

Wasp was little better. Granted, no carrier would likely survive three Type 95s landing so quickly, but the Stinger got stung where she really had little defense at all. Put those same three fish into an Essex, pray for great DC or kiss 'er goodbye.

Ranger, and Wasp, would have little hope even against two Type 95s. No torpedo defense integrated, and both built light for treaty reasons. Shake, rattle and roll ... over.

The Wasp damage report (posted previously) suspects that only two torpedoes struck her.