Greatest aviation myth this site “de-bunked”.

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The Hawker Henley was much faster than the Fairy Battle, it cruised faster than the Battle's top speed. It would have been far less vulnerable than the battle. It would also have supported the British Army better in France in 1039/40. Apart from external bombs it had a 500lb bomb bay so could maintain penetration speed. On only 1030hp it could maintain 272 mph while towing a target and in trials achieved 295 mph level speed. Imagine it with a Merlin 24 or even a Griffon (it was used as a Griffon test bed).

Hawker Henley target tug and dive-bomber.

Eventually variants of the Mk XIV bombsight would have made it accurate at both dive bombing and low level bombing.

The case of the A36 is interesting. It clearly was fast and agile enough to self defend. Had the aircraft had a radial engine it might have transformed the aircraft by reducing the aircrafts vulnerability to ground fire.
 
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I said the myth was the Mustang was the only fighter capable of escorting bombers to Berlin and back. I didn't say when.
I would like to see mid-'43 P-47s with drop tanks too. I'd like to see them at the Cradle of Aviation Museum, the Planes of Fame Museum, Francis Gabreski Airport and at Floyd Bennett Field in Gateway National Park, New York.

Gen. Kenney was doing so in the South Pacific with his P-47s. But, he didn't have much of a choice but to innovate and push things through, given the combat ranges required in the theater and the lack of resources devoted to the area. He had also figured out through experience that unescorted daylight bombing raids simply had too high a casualty rate to be sustainable.
 
The case of the A36 is interesting. It clearly was fast and agile enough to self defend. Had the aircraft had a radial engine it might have transformed the aircraft by reducing the aircrafts vulnerability to ground fire.
You'd be better off building an entirely new aircraft than trying to convert an A-36 Mustang to a radial engine.

Granted, the A-36 had a high attrition rate, but it was a terror to the poor souls in it's sights.
 
The case of the A36 is interesting. It clearly was fast and agile enough to self defend. Had the aircraft had a radial engine it might have transformed the aircraft by reducing the aircrafts vulnerability to ground fire.

I doubt that would have made much of a difference. Light flak in the ETO and MTO was abundant and effective, so any low altitude flying stood a good chance of taking a beating.
 
I doubt that would have made much of a difference. Light flak in the ETO and MTO was abundant and effective, so any low altitude flying stood a good chance of taking a beating.

When the Luftwaffe started using the StuVi 5B computing bombsight on the Ju 87 I suspect release altitudes became much higher and thereby reduced losses to AAA. These dives were still vertical near verticals (60 degrees or so) . On the Ju 88 the StuVi was updated continuously fed data from a computer called a BZA which allowed it to bomb in shallow angles of around 22 degrees without dive brakes. Without the BZA the sights computations was only accurate within a narrow range of preset angles and altitudes.

What I'm saying is that dive bombing improved and allowed greater standoff distances and shallower dives. The USAAF and RAF weren't very interested in dive bombing but the USN was and must have some fancy equipment (radar altimeters computing mechanisms) and like the Luftwaffe had toss bombing sights in combat trials.

Some kind of computing sight might have raised the release height of the A36. The RAFs Mk 14 could carry out the far more difficult shallow dive bombing calculations.
 
The prescribed dive bomb attack of 60 degrees was for the normal Mustang.

For the A-36 "... the essential element in a successful dive bomb attack is a vertical dive. Accuracy of the bombing varies directly with the steepness of the dive and any dive of less than 72 degrees is considered as glide bombing." - NWAAF HQ report (Jul '43)
 
The USAAF and RAF weren't very interested in dive bombing but the USN was and must have some fancy equipment (radar altimeters computing mechanisms) and like the Luftwaffe had toss bombing sights in combat trials.

The 382nd, 383rd, 384th, and 385th Bombardment Squadrons were all activated on 27 July 1942 as dive bomber units of the 311th Bombardment Group (Dive), training on the V-72. The latter three served overseas as the 528th, 529th, and 530th Fighter-Bomber squadrons of the redesignated 311th Fighter-Bomber Group flying the A-36 in the CBI theater.

There may well have been other groups that transitioned to the A-36, I haven't checked the entirely of the USAAF's squadron/group histories. But the 311th Group definitely did.
 
The P-47s also based out of Italy took a beating in ground attack missions but had a better survival rate.
The A-36 was used to great effect, so much so, that the Germans, in certain areas, strung steel cables across valleys to deter them.

Do you have any specific stats handy? It would be interesting to see the differences between the different types of aircraft used in the ground attack role.
 
Rhetorical statements that the early 320 gallons P47 with the commercially available but not supplied Republic 200 gallon drop tank couldn't escort to Berlin is overstated.

At the time of the August 1943 Regensburg Schweinfurt raids the P47 had no drop tanks provisioned at all despite being plumbed for them.

With this 200 gallon tank the P47 could have escorted all the way to Regensburg-Schweinfurt and back albeit with significant compromises to reserve standards. Probably only 3 minutes WEP, 5 minutes Military Power and 20 minutes reserves. (My calcs but others have stated similar: This could be done.) Even if P47s that had contact with the Luftwaffe had to turn back at that point or reserve standards were fully applied it still meant that the B17 and B24 were escorted nearly twice as deep and that Luftwaffe fighters were busy with P47 rather than formatting to attack B17/B24. The B17 may have been left unescorted for only the last 30 minutes into target, when they were lighter and faster, and quite often some P47 would have made it all the way in. Certainly the Me 110 and Me 210 would have been rendered far less effective.

Just supplying drop tanks before August 43 surely makes a big difference. Would the drop tank have halved losses from 60 and 70 to say 30 and 35 on the two raids?

On the way out presumably the B17 could fly up to 30,000ft at speed to minimise their exposure. Perhaps it would become possible to have a second wave of escorts to meet up with the egressing bombers.

Either way the Bomber Mafia clutched on to straws to hang on to their faith.

Now while the P47 fueselage fuel tankage increased from 305 US gallons to 370 gallons why couldn't wing tanks also be developed? The spitfire managed 12 Imp gallons in each wing why couldn't the big American be given say 2 x 18 US gallons or more. There is another 10% range. Why wait till the P47N and it's new wing.
 
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At the time of the August 1943 Regensburg Schweinfurt raids the P47 had no drop tanks provisioned at all despite being plumbed for them.

Just supplying drop tanks before August 43 surely makes a big difference. Would the drop tank have halved losses from 60 and 70 to say 30 and 35 on the two raids?

Now while the P47 fueselage fuel tankage increased from 320 US gallons to 370 gallons why couldn't wing tanks also be developed? The spitfire managed 12 Imp gallons in each wing why couldn't the big American be given say 2 x 18 US gallons or more. There is another 10% range. Why wait till the P47N and it's new wing.
"Because we can't afford to divert any resources away from building more bombers!"
 
Here you go. He uses archival documents from test flight reports and shows more charts than you want to see.



This video and the validity of its points has already been thoroughly discussed elsewhere on this forum.... I particularly recommend the information dug up by "Drgondog" which come in
on "page" 5 onwards. (see in particular the documents dug up on Hap Arnold, and the stuff on tank pressurisation)

P-47: Range, Deceit and Treachery
 
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Gen. Kenney was doing so in the South Pacific with his P-47s. But, he didn't have much of a choice but to innovate and push things through, given the combat ranges required in the theater and the lack of resources devoted to the area. He had also figured out through experience that unescorted daylight bombing raids simply had too high a casualty rate to be sustainable.
P-47 Pacific.PNG
P-47 pacific 2.PNG

The development of drop tanks in the Pacific took place at the same time there were solving the same problems in Europe.
I have previously posted extensive excerpts from a USAAF history showing the time line for drop tank deployment in Europe. Both efforts started in summer of 1943.
P-47: Range, Deceit and Treachery
 

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The 382nd, 383rd, 384th, and 385th Bombardment Squadrons were all activated on 27 July 1942 as dive bomber units of the 311th Bombardment Group (Dive), training on the V-72. The latter three served overseas as the 528th, 529th, and 530th Fighter-Bomber squadrons of the redesignated 311th Fighter-Bomber Group flying the A-36 in the CBI theater.

There may well have been other groups that transitioned to the A-36, I haven't checked the entirely of the USAAF's squadron/group histories. But the 311th Group definitely did.

I forgot the USAAF used dive bombers in the Pacific, the A24 (army SBD) and Vultee Vengence both used by the RAAF).

I'm extremely surprised that not more single engine fighters were given A36 style dive brakes. One would think Fw 190, spitfire, p47, p40 were all candidates.
 
The development of drop tanks in the Pacific took place at the same time there were solving the same problems in Europe.
I have previously posted extensive excerpts from a USAAF history showing the time line for drop tank deployment in Europe. Both efforts started in summer of 1943.

Yes, but the point is Gen. Kenney obtained results faster than was the case in Europe. Although to be fair there were issues in Britain which contributed to the delay.
 
For the A-36 "... the essential element in a successful dive bomb attack is a vertical dive. Accuracy of the bombing varies directly with the steepness of the dive and any dive of less than 72 degrees is considered as glide bombing." - NWAAF HQ report (Jul '43)
I thought 60-degrees was the cut-off between dive and glide-bombing? Did the USAAF & USN have the same criteria?
 
It sounds like in this case it was aircraft-dependent, not service-dependent.

ie: when you're bombing in an A-36 over 72 degrees use this methodology, under 72 degrees use that methodology.

Determined more by the flying & vision characteristics of the A-36 and less by a textbook somewhere. :)
 

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