Greatest military blunder of WWII

[Elmas]

Entry of Italy into the war. Mussolini believed the war, after the defeat of France, was over: not at all, the war was just starting...

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Ive fought Market Garden on the sand table at staff college. I was the lucky SOB given command of the irish guards, tasked with flying down hells highway to relieve the paratroopers. our paratroop force had elected to drop in the DZ adjacent the town, rather than the DZ some miles from the target. it helped, but the incessant attacks along that highway made the job of my relief force almost impossible, much as it was historically.

monty was the ideal general for the british army of 1944. by that time the british were out of men. there were no replacements left. Every loss to the new BEF was a permanent loss. Consequently, every yard gained every little piece of resistance erncountered had to be utterly crushed before allowing the ground to be occupied. this was the only game the british army could play by 1944. monty understood it perfectly. these rules of engagement applied as much to the market garden operation as any. trouble was, these basic, unalterable rules of enagement also made the objectives of the operation impossible to meet.

monty's plan would have been great if it had worked, and would have materially shortened the war if it had. but it never had the slightest chance of success really, which makes all the more tragic really.

The worst defeat? no, not a chance. Dunkirk and Burma '42 were both worse. probably the greatest defeat for the british in WWII came at Singapore

FWIF here- just googled a website devoted to WW2 History- They listed the "top ten" reasons why Hitler lost WW2- some of which are not relevant to aviation, but a few might pertain. Here are the ones I feel are relevant even yet today. (1) Have the Luftwaffe concentrate the bombing missions to the RAF bases, and to the chain of Radar towers- "The old expression: he who is forewarned is forearmed" applies here to the Radar advantage the RAF had, and which apparently Goering ignored.(2) Take the advice of his Generals and Field Marshalls-- as a Corporal in WW1- Hitler felt the enlisted soldier's distrust of the Prussian upper class who comprised 90% of the Officer Corps when he invaded Poland in 1939. (3) Accelerate the "Wunderwaffen" program, instead of waiting until late 1944, when the available supply of raw materials needed was almost "kaput"! (4) Waiting to invade Russia through Poland until the Japanese allies had agreed to also invade Russia- forcing Stalin to fight a 2-front war. Just a guess here, but think Japan would have to change their timetable for the attack on PH to make this 'jibe' with Hitler's June 22nd. 1941 op. Barbarossa--History can teach us many lessons, the cost of the tuition can be steep--Hansie

 

[The Basket]

Odd to say Pearl Harbour was a disaster because from a military perspective it was successful with minimal losses.
The decision to go war with USA was political so the mistake was there. Although the politics in Japan was military so you know what I mean.
I don't think Midway was a military mistake either as the Japanese was simply caught out and unlucky.
For s country as weak as Japan was to go to war with the USA was absolutely nonsense.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Odd to say Pearl Harbour was a disaster because from a military perspective it was successful with minimal losses.
The decision to go war with USA was political so the mistake was there. Although the politics in Japan was military so you know what I mean.
I don't think Midway was a military mistake either as the Japanese was simply caught out and unlucky.
For s country as weak as Japan was to go to war with the USA was absolutely nonsense.

Our ability to break the Purple Code the Japanese were using was a great advantage. And Adm. Nimitz's decision to have an uncoded message about the salt water treatment facilities being "kaput" from Midway, and the response over the Purple Code-- "AB" forewarned the USN. Darn shame the elevators were not functioning, as Adm. Spruance had to send the torpedo planes sans fighter escort- but the Japanese were indeed "caught with their pants down" when they were ordered to change from bombs (for the second strike on Midway) to torpedoes (for attacking potential American Naval vessels. History sometimes "turns on a dime"-- The USN was lucky at Midway, the Japanese were not.

 

[pbehn]

The definition of blunder usually involves the word "stupid". Mussolini's insistence on joining Adolf in attacking the UK in 1940 must rank high up in the stupid territory. 20 aircraft lost and many more damaged dropping 54 tons of bombs on places like Harwich while at the same time RN Swordfish torpedo aircraft sank/damaged half of Benito's capital ships.

 

[parsifal]

The definition of blunder usually involves the word "stupid". Mussolini's insistence on joining Adolf in attacking the UK in 1940 must rank high up in the stupid territory. 20 aircraft lost and many more damaged dropping 54 tons of bombs on places like Harwich while at the same time RN Swordfish torpedo aircraft sank/damaged half of Benito's capital ships.

With the benefit of hindsight, the entry of Italy into the war was a mistake, because of the very poor state of readiness of not just the armed forces, but indeed the whole country. Mussolini badly misread the mood of the nation, and badly over-estimated the capabilities of his own armed forces.

But Mussolini's reading of the situation was not at fault, IF that decision is based solely on the cursory examination of the situation. Italy joined the war on the verge of the surrender of France, and Mussolini believed Hitler's lies that Germany could meet the raw materials needs of Italy, and that Britain would capitulate after the fall of France. Neither of these pre-conditions were ever honoured or met. But then it gets even worse. At just about every juncture the germans patronised and lectured the Italians, goading Mussolini to make rash military decisions. This was the thinking behind the attack on Greece. The germans failed to consult properly over the invasion of Yugoslavia. The germans failed or did not bother to even advise the Italians about the invasion of the USSR.

Some of the bad tactical decisions were all of Mussolini's making. Graziani's advance into the western desert was the result of Mussolini's incessant goading. The Italian army knew that it lacked the logistic support to undertake the invasion of Egypt properly. The deployment of the expeditionary force to assist in the attacks on England was another example of Mussolini's folly, though it is a stretch and quite inaccurate to claim these aircraft might have made any difference to the outcome at Taranto. The Italians knew that the Med flt was at sea and was intending to attack the coastline. They had attacked the fleet several times from the air during its approach, with no effect. A few more bombers would not have altered that. Because the Swordfish attacked at night, the presence of a reinforced fighter group over the harbour would have made no difference. Italian fighters were ineffective at night. Nobody, least of all the Italians believed it possible for torpedoes to be launched into a harbour protected by anti-torpedo netting. The IJN watched that achievement by those 21 courageous Swordfish crews with keen interest. The Americans failed to heed the warning. So too the british, as a year later their battleship force in Alexandria was attacked and disabled by a handful of Italian frogmen.

The Italians did prove to be something of a paper tiger though one needs to be very careful not to accept many of the accounts completely at face value. They are often heavily biased…..the germans frequently try and shift as much blame as they can on their allies for mistakes that ultimately they themselves were responsible for. The British frequently was to paint a glorious chapter in their history books when in fact their performance was average at best. In both cases it served a useful purpose to paint the Italians in a worse light than they actually needed to.

 

[swampyankee]

Entry of Italy into the war. Mussolini believed the war, after the defeat of France, was over: not at all, the war was just starting...

One wonders how the war would have changed had Italy remained neutral. First, rather obviously, it would free up a lot of RN resources, as they'd not have any worries about Suez. Germany wouldn't have had its sideshow in Greece and the Balkans but, on the other hand, there were about 300,000 Italian troops on Eastern Front, and Italian submarines operating out of Bordeaux -- there was never more than about 30 -- sunk about 500,000 tons of shipping in the Atlantic (in terms of exchange rates, Italian submarines were about 15% less effective than German, and there were also far fewer of them). The Luftwaffe also used Italian torpedoes (List of Torpedoes of Italy - NavWeaps) as German air-launched torpedoes were significantly less effective (why else use imports?)

Personally, I think that Germany would have been significantly worse off, if for no other reason than the RN would not need to keep many units in the Med and would have free use of the Suez Canal. Italy would have been far better off. Overall, had Mussolini not actively supported Hitler, he'd probably have gotten to retire without being riddled with bullets and hanged from a lamppost.

Italy had a lot of internal problems, many of them due to regional differences. For example, Sicilian, an Italian "dialect" and Venetian, another one, are not mutually comprehensible. Indeed, they differ more than Danish does from Swedish or Norwegian.

Sources:

Battle of the Atlantic
BETASOM - Wikipedia
Italian participation in the Eastern Front - Wikipedia

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Parsifal and Swamp Yankee have the correct "gen" on Italy's limited part of the Axis Forces in the ETO- thanks to, in part, the "mutual admiration society" comprised of Mussolini and Hitler. Neither had previous military command experience in WW1, As both you gentlemen have said it all, I'll close with a quote from FeldMarschall Gerd Von Rundstedt: "Mussolini-all he thinks about is his ulcer, and his whore!"

 

[Elmas]

When the war was looming Italo Balbo, whose name I do not need to explain in this Forum, was desperate: "The Duce has never seen the thickness of a N.Y. phone book…" he used to say. He knew that Americans would not stay idle if a punch-up in Europe was in view.

After three costly wars in Spain, Abissynia and the reconquest of Lybia, after the sanctions from Society of Nations and consequent autarchy, after "Quota 90" ( an artificial imposed parity of 90 Lire for 1 Pound Sterling, something like the Euro of nowadays) the Italian economy was stranded, and with no raw materials nor energetic supplies in any quantity to declare the war was recklessness.

Mussolini was so excited and convinced that U.K. would try, somehow, to get out of the war that, after May 1940, there was even no need of Hitler to convince him.

Probably (and almost surely) the King Vittorio Emanuele III had a sort of mental disease, and so was not able to react in the right way to avoid the war.

But above all, the war in Italy was not felt. Twenty years before the Italians had seven hundred thousand dead in a war against Germans, with enormous sacrifices, and no one in Italy wanted a war, except a few fanatics.

Mussolini, once a young socialist, in a political speech once boasted: "If God exists" he said "I'll give him a minute to struck me with a lightning!" looking ostentatiously at the watch.

God spent thirty years instead of a minute, a very reasonable time considering the divine standards.

 

[swampyankee]

When the war was looming Italo Balbo, whose name I do not need to explain in this Forum, was desperate: "The Duce has never seen the thickness of a N.Y. phone book…" he used to say. He knew that Americans would not stay idle if a punch-up in Europe was in view.

After three costly wars in Spain, Abissynia and the reconquest of Lybia, after the sanctions from Society of Nations and consequent autarchy, after "Quota 90" ( an artificial imposed parity of 90 Lire for 1 Pound Sterling, something like the Euro of nowadays) the Italian economy was stranded, and with no raw materials nor energetic supplies in any quantity to declare the war was recklessness.

Mussolini was so excited and convinced that U.K. would try, somehow, to get out of the war that, after May 1940, there was even no need of Hitler to convince him.

Probably (and almost surely) the King Vittorio Emanuele III had a sort of mental disease, and so was not able to react in the right way to avoid the war.

But above all, the war in Italy was not felt. Twenty years before the Italians had seven hundred thousand dead in a war against Germans, with enormous sacrifices, and no one in Italy wanted a war, except a few fanatics.

Mussolini, once a young socialist, in a political speech once boasted: "If God exists" he said "I'll give him a minute to struck me with a lightning!" looking ostentatiously at the watch.

God spent thirty years instead of a minute, a very reasonable time considering the divine standards.

Vittorio Emanuele III may have been mentally ill — clinical depression is quite common — but he may also have felt that Mussolini would bring glory and respect to Italy by military conquest and internal order by suppression of dissent, especially things like labor unions. Agreeing with Il Duce's goals was probably very common for VEIII and the people in his social circle.

Realistically, Italy was not a great power; it would be better off remaining neutral. Until Hitler invaded the Tyrol.

 

[Elmas]

Probably the desire of glory and respect for Italy were common between VEIII an Mussolini, and surely VEIII appreciated conquest and internal order, but to say that Mussolini and VEIII did appreciate or approvate each other is a bit of a stretch. VEIII and most of all, the Court, considered Mussolini a parvenu, while Mussolini considered the Court a viper nest.
Many times, in the Count Ciano Diary, Mussolini is reported to have said about the Monarchy: " ... how many good things I could do if I did not have to pull all these braked carriages..."

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Probably the desire of glory and respect for Italy were common between VEIII an Mussolini, and surely VEIII appreciated conquest and internal order, but to say that Mussolini and VEIII did appreciate or approvate each other is a bit of a stretch. VEIII and most of all, the Court, considered Mussolini a parvenu, while Mussolini considered the Court a viper nest.
Many times, in the Count Ciano Diary, Mussolini is reported to have said about the Monarchy: " ... how many good things I could do if I did not have to pull all these braked carriages..."

Another possible factor in the demise of Mussolini lay in his overt persecution of the Mafia, especially in Sicily. Don Vito Genovese became allied with the American armed forces effort to drive Mussolini and the German forces out of Sicily, and later, the Italian mainland. And on the "homefront", the Eastern seaboard docks were controlled by "Lucky" Luciano's mob, and that "protection" from sabotage and longshoremen striking in wartime moved Luciano from Ossining prison to a lower State (NY) "country-club" minimum security prison, until 1946, when he was freed, on the condition that he went to Sicily and never re-entered the US.

 

[Elmas]

Of course this is a personal point of view and I'm personally not a fan of "What if's" but it could be that it was the sure knowledge that Italy would have entered the war that suggested to Churchill the famous speech of "Dunkerque" in front of the British Parliament, 4th June 1940.

With Italy into the war Suez, and with Suez Gibraltar, were in danger, and with Suez and Gibraltar the whole British Empire: so,if you have to lose all, then is worth to fight until the end.

 

[Elmas]

Already said, but...

My Mother's Dad was the Chief Engineer of the local narrow gauge railway and he used to say that, after some months of war, once exausted the coal stockpiles coming from Cardiff, they were compelled to use the local coal, with a percentage of 6% of Sulphur: and all this Sulphur in another couple of months completely destroyed the steam engines fire grids. And, as there was no iron to replace them, the steam engines had to be stopped. That in an Island with an invaluable strategic importance in the Med. A strange way to win a war.

My Father, as a youngster, was fascinated by Fascist propaganda but, as the war broke, he could not volunteer as he was just fourteen. But some of his older friends did, and when they returned from N.A., ill and wounded, the news they gave him were not all reassuring. "We are overwhelmed" they said, "we have no trucks, no food, we are infested by lice, while we see that British have <ogni ben di Dio>…." And that was well before 7th Dec, 1941. The italian logistics in the WWI were admirable, in comparison.

Many years ago I did go along with my Father in the Old Cemetery, and he stopped in front of some pictures in a wall. He indicated me one of those pictures: "He was my best friend" he told me " we played soccer together. He voluntereed and embarked in a plane to go to N.A., but afterwards never was heard of him."

Far from being Mare Nostrum Masters, isn't it?

Certainly the war was far from being well conducted, but some blunders like the ARMIR in Russia (Italians in Russia? But what the hell we Italians were doing in Russia? Fighting a people who always demostrated to the Italians the greatest simpathy? Wassily Grossman in his "Life and Fate" says "Germans were very ill treated if they were caught by the populace. And Rumenians even worst. But Italians no, with Italians it was different…" I'll have to write down a story about my sailing mate, Medaglia d'argento in the Russian campaign) were was sent, and lost, our best Artillery, were huge, but nothing in comparison to the main blunder, to enter the war.

Lucky Luciano? Could be, but the main reason is, strange it may sound to you, that Italians are quite realistic ( a little bit too much, sometimes…think to Niccolò Machiavelli...) and after losing Ethiopia and N.A., with food getting more and more scarce, with bombing of the cities every night more heavy, they completely realised, in the first months of 1943, that the war was over and there were no German tricks that could have changed things.

My Uncle, younger brother of my Grandad, was a Maggiore dei Carabinieri that worked with Prefetto Mori in Sicily in the '30s against the Mafia. I still have some cousins in Palermo.

 

[Freebird]

Operation Market Garden. Ike was caught between a rock and a hard place about Montgomery: What he did against Rommel in Africa did not mean he could lead a multi-national Allied force,

You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?

combining Airborne, Group and Armored Divisions
.

Like he did with Overlord?

.

into a conquest of Holland and thus into Germany, preserving the vital bridges. If Ike hadn't held a grudge against his best Field Commander, George Patton, and had studied the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where Patton outflanked and outmaneuvered Montgomery's troops-hands down, as seen with Messina
.

Patton s army hooked around the Western side of the Allied advance, which wasn't as strongly defended, and beat Monty to Messina by what - an hour or So?
And you belive THIS is the criteria to be used for strategic considerations?

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?




Like he did with Overlord?

.

Patton s army hooked around the Western side of the Allied advance, which wasn't as strongly defended, and beat Monty to Messina by what - an hour or So?
And you belive THIS is the criteria to be used for strategic considerations? sorry, duplicated response. Your point about the 1 hour time factor in Messina is well taken.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

You mean a multi national force, like the one Monty had in Africa or Italy?




Like he did with Overlord?

.

Patton s army hooked around the Western side of the Allied advance, which wasn't as strongly defended, and beat Monty to Messina by what - an hour or So?
And you belive THIS is the criteria to be used for strategic considerations?

In Carlo D'Este's book about Patton, I believe he detailed that Sicilian campaign with both Monty's forces and Patton's. I deduced that Patton's strategy was not based on the same factors as was that of Monty, so perhaps it would be fair to say that Messina was a "touchstone" for Patton, a "milestone" for Monty. Ah, if only Patton hadn't slapped two soldiers in field hospitals, in front of witnesses, well who can say how the balance of the ETO campaign might have developed.??

Let me ad this quote about "Monty" by John C. McManus- in the 70th Anniv. D-Day issue of the WW11 magazine: "Britain's most successful and famous general in the ETO had a remarkable knack for angering and alienating others. A prickly personality, insufferable arrogance,and relentless self-promotion earned him a diverse array of enemies among professional peers of all nations. Eisenhower regarded him as his most contentious and difficult subordinate!"--

IMO, Monty, like many of his Sandhurst fellow high-ranking British Officers, were very "class conscious"--regarded Eisenhower as a Kansas farmboy, and Patton as a "cowboy" who chased Pancho Villa around Mexico on horseback- neither were "gentlemen"!! or "to the manor raised"-- Patton, like Monty and many high ranking German Generals, all were "prima donnas"- but Patton was a far better Field Commander, he lacked the political acumen that "Ike" developed in dealing with the British, and indirectly, with the Russians.

 

[Guchi]

Starting WWII