Greatest military blunder of WWII

[carbonlifeform]

Geeez, the biggest blunder? There are sooooo many to choose from but for me, it's gotta be the invasion of Russia. The invasion itself wasn't dumb as a good number of Russian soldiers happily surrendered in the beginning. They didn't wanna fight for Stalin. The blunder was the other war the SS was carrying on behind the lines. Burning villages and murdering the inhabitants. This greatly strengthened the Russian soldiers resolve. They were no longer fighting for Stalin and communism, they were fighting for their homes and families and friends.

 

[Clay_Allison]

Attacking all three of Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus Mountains was the mistake that cost Germany the war. Cutting off Russian fuel and taking it for themselves on top of taking the strategic high ground overlooking North Africa would have been a war-winning victory that would have forced the Allies to the negotiating table.

 

[carbonlifeform]

I could never pinpoint the greatest blunder of the war; a war is made up of mistakes - the side with the fewest wins.

For Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attack can't really be considered a blunder in military terms. The strike was excellent, surprising and, to a degree, crippling. Of course the U.S recovery was short, given our hindsight, but 6 months is a long time in war - and it's all credit for the U.S industry. Just remember the Taranto attack by the Royal Navy which in terms of destruction was no greater than Pearl Harbour but so much more effective due to Italy being much less capablet to cope. Of course, the IJN could have wreaked more havoc with concentrated attacks on fuel depots and communication targets (and hunting the carriers) but as port strikes go - it's the best in history.
Maybe you could see the U.S side of Pearl Harbour as a blunder because they allowed themselves to be in that position. Looking back we can say that the Japanese should have never been allowed to be in a such an advantageous position on the day; given the events after Pearl Harbor though, the day becomes irrelevant in military terms.

As for German blunders; they're in their hundreds. Allowing the BEF to escape has never been a blunder in my eyes; the German logistical situation was stretched at best - pushing that far, that fast was excellent going (especially against the largest military in Western Europe). Imagine, though, the logistical nightmare dealing with all the troops that would be captured. At the time, allowing the troops to leave instead of risking lives at the end of their supply was a good choice. The politics of it are a front, in my opinion. The fact that those men went on to fight later in the conflict would have been irrelvant if the Germans had not tripped up in Russia. Just a quick nit-pick also, the BEF escaped through Dunkirk - not Calais, which fell the day before the Dunkirk evacuations started.

The German aid in the Balkans was a mistake of the Italians, who were a hinderance to the German war effort by attempting to extend their empire. Greece was a required element to remove the British from the continent, but Yugoslavia was really the time waster. By postponing the invasion of the Soviet Union by 6 weeks it really slowed the German advance during the later stages of 1941; however, even with that delay it was mistakes during the invasion period that cost them that winter - diverting forces away from Moscow and not allowing Guderian to pull back from Tula to prepared defences in Smolensk were the two great blunders of that year - if the Wehrmacht had concentrated their forces in the summer and then pulled back in winter; Moscow would have been under the Swastika by Spring '42; instead they were pushed away in the winter ice and snow, and couldn't recover.

Pearl Harbour wasn't a US blunder. Roosevelt knew the attack was coming. British decrypters had broken the Japanese Naval codes and Churchill had given Roosevelt 7 weeks warning.I contend that Pearl Harbour was intentionally sacrificed to get a very unwilling American population involved in the war. Kinda curious that the entire Pacific Fleet was moored there EXCEPT, the carriers. The one ship type most needed to defeat Japan.

I gotta agree with you about the German blunders tho. That's what happens when you have a syphilis affected megalomaniac at the helm of one's military. Hitler's drastic decisions could read like a comedy of errors, if war wasn't so horrible.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Pearl Harbour wasn't a US blunder. Roosevelt knew the attack was coming. British decrypters had broken the Japanese Naval codes and Churchill had given Roosevelt 7 weeks warning.I contend that Pearl Harbour was intentionally sacrificed to get a very unwilling American population involved in the war. Kinda curious that the entire Pacific Fleet was moored there EXCEPT, the carriers. The one ship type most needed to defeat Japan.

Hogwash.

My wife's grandfather was a Cryptographer on MacArthur's staff and was stationed in the PI prior to the start of WW2 and had access to the most sensitive intelligence information prior to the start of the war. He witnessed first hand communications between Washington, Pearl Harbor and the Philippines prior, during and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only Japanese codes broken by anyone on the allied side prior to hostilities were diplomatic codes. In his book "Surviving the Day" he documents this on several occasions. The allies knew for the longest time that something was coming but where and when was the real question. Despite wanting a way to get into the war, Roosevelt was not going to "sacrifice" anything in the manner described as there would have been too many witnesses to the intelligence traffic that would have sounded the alarm before and after the attack.

Conspiracy theories are easy ways out to explain the seemingly preventable. Bottom line, the US was plain and outright skunked by the Japanese and we initially got our butts kicked.

BTW my wife's grandfather? He stated if he knew of any type of plan to "allow" the Japanese to attack or invade anywhere in the Pacific, we would have taken himself and his wife out of the PI. Instead they were both captured on Bataan and spent over 3 years as a POW.

 

[jag.rosso]

Geeez, the biggest blunder? There are sooooo many to choose from but for me, it's gotta be the invasion of Russia. The invasion itself wasn't dumb as a good number of Russian soldiers happily surrendered in the beginning. They didn't wanna fight for Stalin. The blunder was the other war the SS was carrying on behind the lines. Burning villages and murdering the inhabitants. This greatly strengthened the Russian soldiers resolve. They were no longer fighting for Stalin and communism, they were fighting for their homes and families and friends.

excellent point......
in the beginning the wehrmacht get flowers and food from the people in russia ukraine etc.they was happy that somebody kick away stalin facists.many russians wanted to fight with the wehrmacht against stalin...but hitler said no!!but than ss arrive and show them another face of german army.so a big partisan problem start.

two differnet armys ( wehrmacht--ss ) who fight two differnt wars for the same regime and not really work together was a big big blunder in my eyes.

andre

 

[Clay_Allison]

Invading Russia was not a blunder, attacking Moscow and Stalingrad was the blunder. If they had focused their entire strength on the Caucasus Mountains they could have destroyed Russian Industry in its infancy, denying them fuel and taking the oil for themselves. In addition they'd have flanked North Africa and been in position to drive the British from Egypt.

 

[carbonlifeform]

Hogwash.

My wife's grandfather was a Cryptographer on MacArthur's staff and was stationed in the PI prior to the start of WW2 and had access to the most sensitive intelligence information prior to the start of the war. He witnessed first hand communications between Washington, Pearl Harbor and the Philippines prior, during and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The only Japanese codes broken by anyone on the allied side prior to hostilities were diplomatic codes. In his book "Surviving the Day" he documents this on several occasions. The allies knew for the longest time that something was coming but where and when was the real question. Despite wanting a way to get into the war, Roosevelt was not going to "sacrifice" anything in the manner described as there would have been too many witnesses to the intelligence traffic that would have sounded the alarm before and after the attack.

Conspiracy theories are easy ways out to explain the seemingly preventable. Bottom line, the US was plain and outright skunked by the Japanese and we initially got our butts kicked.

BTW my wife's grandfather? He stated if he knew of any type of plan to "allow" the Japanese to attack or invade anywhere in the Pacific, we would have taken himself and his wife out of the PI. Instead they were both captured on Bataan and spent over 3 years as a POW.

Perhaps your wife's grandfather wasn't privy to communications between London and Washington since he was stationed in the Phillipines???
Look, sometimes leaders make those kind of sacrifices for the greater good. Churchill did something similar during the Blitz. British codebreakers had discovered the city of Coventry was the next target. Churchill chose NOT to warn the populace so he wouldn't give away the fact they had broken the Luftwaffe's codes.
That knowledge was more important to the war effort than warning civilians of an impending raid. The entire British cryptology community wasn't told at the time either. It was kept VERY hush hush.
The British knew what was going to happen in the Pacific as well, and when. Why do you think they spent the weeks leading up to the December attacks, trying desperately to reinforce their holdings?
I'm not condemning Roosevelt or trying to demonize him. I just think he did what he thought was necessary to get the US population riled up enough to really wanna get involved cuz before Dec.7th, the average American couldn't care less.
I don't believe in conspiracy theories and I don't believe everything I hear. I believe in probability. I reached my own conclusions based on numerous factors gleaned from studying the whole event for over 20 years and the fact that too many coincidences adds up to no coincidence.
I'm not trying to diminish the terrible losses at Pearl either. I've even been to the USS Arizona Memorial to pay my respects even tho I'm not American. No matter which side of the coin you look at it from, it was a very dark day for the US Pacific Fleet and it's sailors.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Perhaps your wife's grandfather wasn't privy to communications between London and Washington since he was stationed in the Phillipines???

Yes he was - he had one of the highest IF NOT THE HIGHEST security clearances in the South Pacific and would report directly to MacArthur and saw communication not only from the SWP, but from other channels, communications with Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Remember these places along with the Philippines were attacked right after Pearl Harbor, so you're going to tell me that these places were sacrificed too? Again there was heavy intelligence communication through out the SWP in the days leading up to Pearl Harbor but there was no inkling on where and when the attack was going to happen. There were at least two other men who he worked with who were privy to the same information and held similar clearances and I believe at least one of them perished on the Bataan Death March.

Look, sometimes leaders make those kind of sacrifices for the greater good. Churchill did something similar during the Blitz. British codebreakers had discovered the city of Coventry was the next target. Churchill chose NOT to warn the populace so he wouldn't give away the fact they had broken the Luftwaffe's codes.
That knowledge was more important to the war effort than warning civilians of an impending raid. The entire British cryptology community wasn't told at the time either. It was kept VERY hush hush.

You're talking a raid vs. the demolition of an entire Navy and if that was the case Roosevelt would have had no control of the carrier fleet being removed from Pearl

The British knew what was going to happen in the Pacific as well, and when. Why do you think they spent the weeks leading up to the December attacks, trying desperately to reinforce their holdings?

The only thing the British knew, like the Americans, that something was going to happen. This is well documented in the book "Bloody Shambles" as well as in my wife's grandfather's book as well.

I'm not condemning Roosevelt or trying to demonize him. I just think he did what he thought was necessary to get the US population riled up enough to really wanna get involved cuz before Dec.7th, the average American couldn't care less.

He would not have sacrificed a portion of his navy, almost his entire battleship force and gamble with his carriers to do so, sorry..

I don't believe in conspiracy theories and I don't believe everything I hear. I believe in probability. I reached my own conclusions based on numerous factors gleaned from studying the whole event for over 20 years and the fact that too many coincidences adds up to no coincidence.

Coincidences or facts - you show me facts - other cryptographers, messengers, diplomats who could support your cvlaims an I'll believe it. Something like that would not and could not have been hushed up for long and it would have been a matter of time before someone who had access to that information would have leaked it to Roosevelt's political adversaries. Sorry, but it seems your research does not include an understanding of the people in the US intelligence corps, how they worked and how many of them would of had access to this type of information if it had existed.

I'm not trying to diminish the terrible losses at Pearl either. I've even been to the USS Arizona Memorial to pay my respects even tho I'm not American. No matter which side of the coin you look at it from, it was a very dark day for the US Pacific Fleet and it's sailors.

We'll I've been there - several times, as a civilian and as a member of the US Navy and I could tell you you're entitled to your opinions about this. Until you could produce proof and show evidence in the form of communication or even eye witnesses (someone who was actually there, like my wife's grandfather) this is nothing more than a conspiracy theory.

 

[Hop]

Look, sometimes leaders make those kind of sacrifices for the greater good. Churchill did something similar during the Blitz. British codebreakers had discovered the city of Coventry was the next target. Churchill chose NOT to warn the populace so he wouldn't give away the fact they had broken the Luftwaffe's codes.
That knowledge was more important to the war effort than warning civilians of an impending raid. The entire British cryptology community wasn't told at the time either. It was kept VERY hush hush.

That's a myth as well. RV Jones was involved in countering the German guidance beams. They knew an attack was coming, they knew it was aimed at one of 3 targets, "Umbrella" (Birmingham), "All One Price" (Wolverhampton) or "Korn". They had no idea which of the 3 targets was to be selected, or what the codename "Korn" referred to. On the night of the Coventry raid the consensus among those in the know was that none of the 3 targets was going to be attacked and it would be another raid on London.

After the raids on Birmingham and Coventry they worked out the next raid was to be on Wolverhampton and Jones spoke to the head of Anti-Aircraft Command, who moved extra flak batteries to defend Wolverhampton. The raid never happened. After the war Jones interrogated senior Luftwaffe officers who said they had cancelled the big attack on Wolverhampton because they had spotted the big concentration of flak guns in the area and realised the British had found out about the attack.

So not only do those involved say they did not know of the Coventry raid in advance, when they did know about Wolverhampton action was taken. Why Wolverhampton if not Coventry?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

One can say that the Germans made hundreds of blunders. But few of them were military. Almost all of them were political and racially or ideologically inspired. And THAT's why the Germans lost the war.

Kris

I think that sums it up very well. The Germans had the military power to win the war up until Barbarossa. Political blunders (many of them ideological and racially inspired) blew it for them.

 

[parsifal]

The idea that the Pacific Fleet was served up as a sacrificial lamb is not supported by any serious analysis that I know of. Costello in his book "Pacific War" goes into some detail about this. Though it was written at a time that some of the decypts were still classified, he takes the view that the Americans knew something was coming, and surmised that the main attack was likely to fall in the far east. The attack on Pearl came as a complete surpise.

Another problem was the US command system. The information gleaned from the US decrypts was not properly circulated, so even though the the information was there, it was not having much effect on command decisions.

I agree with Joe, conspiracy theories are a convenient cop out for what was really a much bigger systemic failure in the US military. They just did not know how to use and take advantage of their intelligence advantages before the war. The same criticisms can be levelled at the Russians because of their failure to heed the numerous warning they had received about the impending German attack in 1941.

Perhaps the greatest failure for the US before Pearl was a gross underestimation of the Japanese. They believed that the Japanese possessed inferior aviators, that their equipment and training was inferior to the west, that they lacked the iniitiative, organization skills and military prowess to undertake a successful attack on the US. They under-estimated the audacity of the Japanese and their minute attention to detail. They seriously expected to halt the Japanese at the beaches of the PI, and that the B-17s based in the Far East would deal a crushing blow to the Japanese navy and the home islands factories if the Japanese were foolish enough to attack. They believed that they could outfight the Japanese fleet at night, that cruisers were there to protect destroyers, that radar would solve all battle problems at sea, that convoys were not needed, and that the US Pacific Fleet would have a relatively easy time fighting its way across the pacific in a matter of days. None of these assumptions were correct.....it was a classic case of under-estimating ones enemy, and over estimating ones own abilities.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The idea that the Pacific Fleet was served up as a sacrificial lamb is not supported by any serious analysis that I know of. Costello in his book "Pacific War" goes into some detail about this. Though it was written at a time that some of the decypts were still classified, he takes the view that the Americans knew something was coming, and surmised that the main attack was likely to fall in the far east. The attack on Pearl came as a complete surpise.

Another problem was the US command system. The information gleaned from the US decrypts was not properly circulated, so even though the the information was there, it was not having much effect on command decisions.

I agree with Joe, conspiracy theories are a convenient cop out for what was really a much bigger systemic failure in the US military. They just did not know how to use and take advantage of their intelligence advantages before the war. The same criticisms can be levelled at the Russians because of their failure to heed the numerous warning they had received about the impending German attack in 1941.

Perhaps the greatest failure for the US before Pearl was a gross underestimation of the Japanese. They believed that the Japanese possessed inferior aviators, that their equipment and training was inferior to the west, that they lacked the iniitiative, organization skills and military prowess to undertake a successful attack on the US. They under-estimated the audacity of the Japanese and their minute attention to detail. They seriously expected to halt the Japanese at the beaches of the PI, and that the B-17s based in the Far East would deal a crushing blow to the Japanese navy and the home islands factories if the Japanese were foolish enough to attack. They believed that they could outfight the Japanese fleet at night, that cruisers were there to protect destroyers, that radar would solve all battle problems at sea, that convoys were not needed, and that the US Pacific Fleet would have a relatively easy time fighting its way across the pacific in a matter of days. None of these assumptions were correct.....it was a classic case of under-estimating ones enemy, and over estimating ones own abilities.

Parsifal, you hit the nail on the head and many of your points were mentioned by my wife's grandfather. He worked with excellent code breakers and at the start of the war immediately started cracking Japanese codes and setting up code systems that the Japanese couldn't touch. After that the Intel sometimes languished in a sea of protocol and red tape and he stated his frustration the whole time the PI was being overrun.

 

[parsifal]

The blunder was there alright, but it was not a deliberate "mistake" if you get my drift. What is amazing is the speed that the US learnt how to win. Another furphy (ie mistake) is to assume that the US won by superior industrial might alone. This was certainly a part of it, but they also won by learning the trade so to speak.

The Americans started the war as rather poor jungle fighters. But they listened and learned and watched very carefully, and by wars end were as good or better than any of the other players. Thats just one example. There are dozens to pick

 

[Messy1]

Agree with your post 391 100% Parsifal! Under estimating the Japanese I feel was the main contributor to Pearl Harbor. Warnings that something was coming, and those that thought that PH might be the target, went unheeded.

 

[dennis420b]

I had to go with Stalingrad, because you don't use armor to go through a city, you encircle it. And I didn't pick the invasion of the USSR, as that front was bound to open up, better to do it on your terms. But I believe delaying Kursk was the biggest blunder. I have to believe that Manstein could have crushed the salient and at least then those units spearheading the counterattack would be pressed to stop another breakout, if he could have acted on schedule . Perhaps 43 ends up a draw and maybe Stalin seeks a cease fire. eh, who knows.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

I'll have to go with Operation Market Garden. I wanted to go with Pearl Harbor because that is what got the U.S. mobilized and lit the fires in the production plants. But if the carriers were at Pearl, it's would have been trouble. Sure you can point out the oil fields were mostly ignored, but other than that, Pearl was a pretty successful attack.

Operation Market Garden was a cluster F from the word go.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Which one do you guys thing was the worst blunder of WWII?

Operation Market Garden. Ike was caught between a rock and a hard place about Montgomery: What he did against Rommel in Africa did not mean he could lead a multi-national Allied force, combining Airborne, Group and Armored Divisions into a conquest of Holland and thus into Germany, preserving the vital bridges. If Ike hadn't held a grudge against his best Field Commander, George Patton, and had studied the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where Patton outflanked and outmaneuvered Montgomery's troops-hands down, as seen with Messina-- Marshall and FDR picked Ike, a junior officer to Patton until the US entered the war in Europe, because he was more "flexible" in his dealings with the British Command, Patton's biggest deficit in a multi-national alliance was his lack of tact and diplomacy--

When the SHTF in Dec. 1944 in Europe- Montgomery, the "genius" behind Market Garden, told Ike he could get to Bastogne in several weeks- Patton was already in motion-the rest is history.

 

[pbehn]

The failure of Market garden to be completely successful only didn't shorten the end of the war in Europe.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

The failure of Market garden to be completely successful only didn't shorten the end of the war in Europe.

True-- I can only wonder what Hitler and the OKW remaining Officer Corps he retained after the July 1944 ill=fated bombing at the Wolf's Lair thought about that Fubared Op., and if so, how did it influence the German "Autumn Mist" attack in the Ardennes that started on 16 Dec. 1944, and caught the Allied Forces by surprise, General George S. Patton being the exception here.

 

[parsifal]

Ive fought Market Garden on the sand table at staff college. I was the lucky SOB given command of the irish guards, tasked with flying down hells highway to relieve the paratroopers. our paratroop force had elected to drop in the DZ adjacent the town, rather than the DZ some miles from the target. it helped, but the incessant attacks along that highway made the job of my relief force almost impossible, much as it was historically.

monty was the ideal general for the british army of 1944. by that time the british were out of men. there were no replacements left. Every loss to the new BEF was a permanent loss. Consequently, every yard gained every little piece of resistance erncountered had to be utterly crushed before allowing the ground to be occupied. this was the only game the british army could play by 1944. monty understood it perfectly. these rules of engagement applied as much to the market garden operation as any. trouble was, these basic, unalterable rules of enagement also made the objectives of the operation impossible to meet.

monty's plan would have been great if it had worked, and would have materially shortened the war if it had. but it never had the slightest chance of success really, which makes all the more tragic really.

The worst defeat? no, not a chance. Dunkirk and Burma '42 were both worse. probably the greatest defeat for the british in WWII came at Singapore