Greatest military blunder of WWII

[109ROAMING]

Pretty sure Germany was gearing up for war a decade before 43

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

That may be true Roaming, but I'm pretty sure that Germany didn't gear up for total war until 43. What I mean by that is, the Germans didn't start saving resources for war production, ie rubber, metal, until 43. I believe the nazi party didn't want to panic the population.

 

[parsifal]

Sorry, but another misconception. The Germans tooled up for war at the maximum that their fragile pre-war economy could take them. Overy has done perhaps the best analysis of this. In 1933, when Hitler took over, the German economy was even more on its knees than those of other western nations. Wheras the US, and even Britain and France, had some reserves (or in the case of the british and the french, their overseas empires) on which to fall back on to tide them through the depression, the Germans had no such resources. they had been sucked dry by the repressive reparations of WWI, and the massively destructive effects of the hyper-inflation of 1923-24. Germany entered the depression in a terrible state.

People often ask "where is the socialism in national socialism". Well look at the reconstruction programmes of 1933-39, and you will see why. Hitler borrowed immensely, mostly from the US, but rather than pouring it into long term economic reconstruction he instead poured the money into short term re-armament. There simply was not the money in the pre-war to re-arm any faster than they did.

People often wonder why Germany went to war in 1939 rather than 1943-4, when militarily Germany would have been far more capable. Its not the only reason, but one reason was that ecomically he had to. Pre-war germany was living in an economic fools paradise, with the creditors starting to get nervous, wanting their money, and Germany not having the means to pay the debts she had rung up. Conquering Europe allowed the germans to fix the exchange rate at artificially advantageous levels for germany, which in turn enabled them to refuel their flagging economy.

The Germans could have ramped up their economy in late 1940, but instead delayed that decision until the beginning of 1942. After that, they introduced increasingly austere rationing, and began the forced labour programs, along with the most ruthless exploitation of their own allies) that sustained and enlarged the German economy to the levels it reached in 1944-5. however, as Speer points out, this level of production was simply unsustainable for germany. Even if the Allies had sat back and done nothing in 1944, there would have been massive reductions in German output, as once again economic realities caught up with the Nazis

 

[Amsel]

Actually blaming Hitler or Stalin for the failures is one of the the great lies of the war. Sure, these men wielded a huge influence on the conduct of operations, but their respective staffs supported many of these decisions, and only after the war were they suddenly emboldened to say "I told him but he didnt listen" In fact many of these detractors were actually ardent supporters of the fateful decisions at the time.

Dont get me wrong, I am not trying to defend either Hitler or Stalin, but it is just untrue that both of them single handedly lost battles or the war.
division...

As I stated in an earlier post the blame game should not be rested on Paulus but Hitler, Goerring, and Von Manstein also. These three men tried to wash their hands of this defeat when in all actuality they played a big role in the loss of over a million men in the Stalingradkessel.

I do agree about the logistical problem the Werhmacht faced. Though I believe the German frontier could have been set at the Volga and the Communists were very close to defeat. Barbarossa was doomed to fail for another reason also. Hitlers hate for the Slavs. The amount of volunteers from the Ukraine and Russia was a great embarrassment to the USSR. They have gone to great lengths to hide the fact that in the collectives the Germans were thought of as liberators. The actual numbers of Russians in the werhmacht is a closely guarded secret that we may never figure out. Hitlers heavy handedness with the Russians was a folly of immense proportions. He could have won the "hearts and minds" of the Russians but he picked up where Stalin had left off in the massacre of the Slavs and Russians.
Barbarossa was a just campaign in theory but it was muddled by bigotry and murder. While the atrocities commited by the Werhmacht are large they pale in comparison to the homocides by the Stalinists.

 

[parsifal]

I think a fortified Dnieper line was a better option after the collapse of the 1941 campaign. An advance to the Volga was in theory a better option, but it simply would strain the germans to get there. This was strain they simply could not afford.

I firmly believe that a better option would be to complete the conquest of the Crimea, fortify around the mius, perhaps even Rostov, and undertake local counterattacks as opportunities arose. Put out the peace feelers, wait for the Russians to immolate themselves on the front line, and pray that you were still scary enough to convince them to make a peace

Your right about the actual numbers of russians grafted into the wehrmacht. But some estimates go as high as 1 million by mid 1942 of the so-called Hiwis Hitler had forbade their use on racial grounds, but the front line units had ignored this directive out of necessity. Mostly they were used for support roles, but according to my stepfather, and even some written accounts, the Hiwis were also used in combat capacities.

The ability of the germans to enlist more tangible support in the Byelorussian, Baltic States and the Ukraine is something still debated today. The extent of support they could have achieved is an open question,. I personally believe that Hitlers racial policies on the Slavics of Eastern Europe cost him about 40 divs of troops. I believe however that Hitlers racial policies of exploitation and extermination were more than a little driven by economic expedients that had been anticipated by the Germans, although it is perhaps ironic that the germans got virtually no economic benefits from their occupation of European Russia.

 

[Amsel]

I firmly believe that a better option would be to complete the conquest of the Crimea, fortify around the mius, perhaps even Rostov, and undertake local counterattacks as opportunities arose. Put out the peace feelers, wait for the Russians to immolate themselves on the front line, and pray that you were still scary enough to convince them to make a peace

That would be more strategically sound. Adolf Hitler was a brilliant man in many ways, economically and politically, but was extremely overconfident of the Reichs' military abilities to take on the whole N. Hemishere.

 

[Amsel]

The second biggest blunder would be the Ardennes offensive in my opinion. And the failure to send troops to bolster the Eastern Front. Hitler knew he was defeated and should have sued for peace while sending all troops to the Vistula instead of the Western Front and Hungary.

 

[Burmese Bandit]

Sorry, but another misconception. The Germans tooled up for war at the maximum that their fragile pre-war economy could take them. Overy has done perhaps the best analysis of this. In 1933, when Hitler took over, the German economy was even more on its knees than those of other western nations. Wheras the US, and even Britain and France, had some reserves (or in the case of the british and the french, their overseas empires) on which to fall back on to tide them through the depression, the Germans had no such resources. they had been sucked dry by the repressive reparations of WWI, and the massively destructive effects of the hyper-inflation of 1923-24. Germany entered the depression in a terrible state.

People often ask "where is the socialism in national socialism". Well look at the reconstruction programmes of 1933-39, and you will see why. Hitler borrowed immensely, mostly from the US, but rather than pouring it into long term economic reconstruction he instead poured the money into short term re-armament. There simply was not the money in the pre-war to re-arm any faster than they did.

People often wonder why Germany went to war in 1939 rather than 1943-4, when militarily Germany would have been far more capable. Its not the only reason, but one reason was that ecomically he had to. Pre-war germany was living in an economic fools paradise, with the creditors starting to get nervous, wanting their money, and Germany not having the means to pay the debts she had rung up. Conquering Europe allowed the germans to fix the exchange rate at artificially advantageous levels for germany, which in turn enabled them to refuel their flagging economy.

The Germans could have ramped up their economy in late 1940, but instead delayed that decision until the beginning of 1942. After that, they introduced increasingly austere rationing, and began the forced labour programs, along with the most ruthless exploitation of their own allies) that sustained and enlarged the German economy to the levels it reached in 1944-5. however, as Speer points out, this level of production was simply unsustainable for germany. Even if the Allies had sat back and done nothing in 1944, there would have been massive reductions in German output, as once again economic realities caught up with the Nazis

Parsifal, I am as always impressed by you, but here I must beg to differ. I shall post a much longer post later, but here I will make only an outline of the reasons why I think you are wrong -

(1) Slave Labour. Could have been done in 1940.
(2) Complete underutilization of female workforce 1933-45 for ideological and prestige reasons.

 

[Messy1]

Could we make this a simpler answer to this question? I feel Both Germany and Japan's biggest mistake was underestimating the resolve, fight, industry, and determination of their enemies, and their over confidence in the skill and superiority they believed they possessed over the rest of the world. I feel a vast portion of their mistakes were because they believed themselves both to be superior to all their enemies. I know this is a broad answer to this question, but it seems to me most of the mistakes made were from not looking at the situations realistically. Weather it was Japan believing that their bushido spirit was all they needed to outfight a enemy with the capacity to out produce Japan with both men and machine. Or Germany who ended up in the same situation, where even something as simple as logistics which has been brought up in this thread, could not even produce or maintain enough trucks and trains to deliver supplies to their troops. Or could it be that they both just never could imagine the amount of men, ships, weapons, tanks, planes, etc. that their enemies could produce.
A simple answer, but I feel this is the underlying reason for many of the biggest mistakes made by the Axis. The U.S. too made many of our own mistakes from overconfidence or from underestimating their enemy.

 

[parsifal]

Germany and Japan were both aggrieved at being left out of the of the colonial era. They both had weak democratic traditions, and strong military traditions. As the economic crises of the 20's and 30's hit the post war world, and the markets for manufactured goods started to dry up, each in their own way sought to redress that imbalance by force. They were, in essence, applying their own military and social experiences to solve their economic problems.

The military traditions of these countries led to the development of highly trained military elites in each country. The idea behind this was the achievment of quick victories that would dishearten the opponents, and make recovery of those conquests prohibitive....The Japanese had applied this formula aginst China in 1895 and Russia in 1904, and had had it applied to them by the US in 1854.

The Germans were a bitter nation that emerged from WWI with many believing Germany had been somehow betrayed. The imperious behaviour of the alies at Verailles did not help. These events made Germany a nation eger for revenge, which in turn influenced the ugly nature of Nazism.

The Soviet Union was another nation ostracised and outcast from the family of nations because of its political system. Italy was also treated as an outcast, and because of its mediocre performance in WWI did bot share in the spoils of war very much (at least thats how they perceived it....in relaity I think they did quite well out of the peace treaty)

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Could we make this a simpler answer to this question? I feel Both Germany and Japan's biggest mistake was underestimating the resolve, fight, industry, and determination of their enemies, and their over confidence in the skill and superiority they believed they possessed over the rest of the world. I feel a vast portion of their mistakes were because they believed themselves both to be superior to all their enemies. I know this is a broad answer to this question, but it seems to me most of the mistakes made were from not looking at the situations realistically. Weather it was Japan believing that their bushido spirit was all they needed to outfight a enemy with the capacity to out produce Japan with both men and machine. Or Germany who ended up in the same situation, where even something as simple as logistics which has been brought up in this thread, could not even produce or maintain enough trucks and trains to deliver supplies to their troops. Or could it be that they both just never could imagine the amount of men, ships, weapons, tanks, planes, etc. that their enemies could produce.
A simple answer, but I feel this is the underlying reason for many of the biggest mistakes made by the Axis. The U.S. too made many of our own mistakes from overconfidence or from underestimating their enemy.

I think a mistake from the U.S. would be Kasserine Pass, where we let our guard down.

 

[tomo pauk]

.... He could have won the "hearts and minds" of the Russians but he picked up where Stalin had left off in the massacre of the Slavs and Russians.
...

Sorry for nitpicking, but Russians as Slavs too.

 

[Soundbreaker Welch?]

Italy was also treated as an outcast, and because of its mediocre performance in WWI did bot share in the spoils of war very much (at least thats how they perceived it....in relaity I think they did quite well out of the peace treaty)

Yeah, it is interesting why Italy decided to go with Hitler. It was probably Mussolini's fault, and perhaps that the two countries had similar goverment?

Franco at least, was wise enough to keep Spain out of the war. Their great civil war had been fought in the 1930's, and the whole country had been torn apart by it.

 

[dragonandhistail]

Hitler's declaration of War on the US was by far the biggest blunder. Followe closely by Pearl Harbor. THis move sealed Hitler's fate and ensured Britain would survive. Barbarossa is often cited but with just the Russians to fight? Who knows. It is the subject of endless speculation.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Hitler's declaration of War on the US was by far the biggest blunder. Followe closely by Pearl Harbor. THis move sealed Hitler's fate and ensured Britain would survive. Barbarossa is often cited but with just the Russians to fight? Who knows. It is the subject of endless speculation.

The US would have entered the war at some point anyhow.

What really sealed the fate of Germany, was the failed invasion of Russia. Germany probably could have fought off the Western Allies. Remember they had to land first. If the Germans had not been fighting the Russians in the east, they very well could have possibly prevented D-Day from being successful.

The massive Russian army was what overpowered the Germans, that and poor mistakes by Hitler.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

True, Germany couldn't win a two front war. They could've won if they were just facing the west, or if they were just facing the Russians, but not both.

 

[Ferdinand Foch]

Funny, you think that Hitler would have rethought his idea about fighting on two fronts, considering the toll it took on Germany during the First World War. Anyway, yeah, Germany should have concentrated on one front at a time. I wanna say that if they had all of their men from the West (guarding against Britain), and had them partake in Barbarossa, then the German Army could have fought its way to Moscow before the winter set in in 1941. If the capture of Moscow didn't have Stalin's government surrender, at least it could have shaken up the Russian chain of command until spring of 1942, when the German Army could really begin to advance.

 

[Waynos]

I have often thought about why Hitler would have chosen to do that and, referring back to an earlier discussion of the Battle of Britain, I wonder if Hitler still thought that Britain would negotiate a peace settlement leaving him to fight Russia alone?

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

I have often thought about why Hitler would have chosen to do that and, referring back to an earlier discussion of the Battle of Britain, I wonder if Hitler still thought that Britain would negotiate a peace settlement leaving him to fight Russia alone?

I don't think Britain would've negotiated a peace, Churchill was pretty adamant in fighting Hitler, one of his biggest strengths was his resolve.

Now, if you had Neville Chamberlain still in power, he would have jumped first chance he had to negotiate.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I have often thought about why Hitler would have chosen to do that and, referring back to an earlier discussion of the Battle of Britain, I wonder if Hitler still thought that Britain would negotiate a peace settlement leaving him to fight Russia alone?

I think this is something that we will never know for sure. I for one think that could very well be true however. I do not think that Hitler ever truly wanted to fight England.