This is a very serious allegation. It may or may not be right. The problem is that in a lot of circles, it seems to have become boilerplate. The trouble is that I cannot find it in myself to believe in that level of malfeasance or incompetence.
Boilerplate or orthodox tend to form around the available evidence, deciding this is wrong requires evidence to the contrary.
Sayings, "Maintenance of Objective", "No situation is as good or bad as it seems", history is full of operations that stopped just before they would have been very successful, and others where continued operations turned a set back into a major defeat. In early 1944 there is a Spaatz quote along the lines Arthur Harris was winning or about to win either the air war or the entire war before the USAAF could prove itself.
Try once someone is trained in the big picture, in this case the self defending bomber in mass, the more they fit the evidence to the big picture, not the other way around. The 8th Air Force was growing and probably faster than the defences in the first half of 1943. The bombs were being dropped way more accurately than the average night raid and so causing more specific economic damage. At the same time there was a need to keep the command combat worthy, which meant keeping average losses down, in addition new units needed introductions to combat, but losses when going beyond escort range were consistently high to too high and the defences were improving.
Even Eaker was asking for P-38s in 1942.
Given the use of P-47 on fighter sweeps in the first half of 1943, or as escorts to B-26, saying I want P-38 is simply not enough, the RAF were doing escorts.
Arnold had to make a choice and he chose to keep them in the Pacific.
The USAAF managed to get 3 P-38 groups to Europe late 1942/early 1943, they were sent to the Mediterranean where they proved useful, but no more were sent there. Then it was August 1943 before another P-38 group arrived in Europe. One of the issues to confront is with hundreds of aircraft coming off the production line why so few combat units? In part for the USAAF in 1943 was training time, as well as training the training system. The aircrew rotation system required a bigger training system as another reason. Maintenance requirements. Add the continual improvements being done, making earlier examples look or feel obsolete, the amount of flying hours an airframe could take before its performance was considered degraded, then there were the casualties.
End June 1943, the USAAF had 1,267 front line P-38 from 2,295 P-38 accepted to end of month, there were 477 P-38 in the US, 514 in the MTO for 3 fighter groups or about 100% reserves, and 187 deployed against Japan and yes the totals do not add up. The P-38 went to the MTO, the ETO was ignored and the war against Japan was given enough to have a few top cover/long range units because that was all the system could provide in 1942/43 and keep the combat units viable.
What would those ramifications have been if he had sent those P-38s to England instead? I doubt we will ever really know.
What if is always a never really know. The P-38 in the MTO had lots of combat and non combat issues in 1943, the P-38 in the 8th Air Force had lots of non combat issues in 1943/44 and were probably losing one aircraft for each one they shot down. The 8th Air Force chose to convert some P-47 units to P-51 ahead of the P-38 units because of the range issues and the presence of P-38 did seem to reduce bomber losses.
I'm questioning how the figures were interpreted, where and by whom.
Reports were being sent up the chain of command, various people had their opinions on what it meant, Washington generally deferred to the local command and also tended in early/mid 1943 to conclude the self defending bomber was showing promise, echoing the ETO view
Did the right arm know what the left arm was doing? This, along with what I said earlier about Eaker, is one reason why I'm reluctant to accept the "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!" bomber mafia argument.
There ware few full speed ahead by those involved or at least "the USAAF" in 1943. The USAAF kicked off the longer range for its fighters project in January 1942, end 1942 Eaker asked for drop tanks but not as a main priority, switched fighter sorties to escort instead of sweep and also decided that escorting the bombers half way to target was enough to keep losses sustainable long term, despite the gap in losses between escorted and unescorted raids. There were undoubtedly USAAF officers who kept the self defending bomber idea as truth in 1944, while others in 1942 were of the no escorts no way school. The USAAF ended in between the two in the ETO until October 1943, despite mounting evidence.
The 8th Air Force had the task of introducing the P-47 into combat and inevitably found lots of issues doing so, which delayed their effective deployment.
My understanding, FWIW, was that 305 gallons came with the D series. For 1943, the vast majority were C models......My understanding, FWIW, was that 305 gallons came with the D series. For 1943, the vast majority were C models.
All P-47B and C had 305 US gallons of internal fuel, or 254 imperial gallons. The 1943 P-47 had a greater range on internal fuel than the P-38, but could not carry as much external fuel. At the same time the 8th Air Force tactics tended to limit the early B-17 to targets within 320 miles of base, the Tokyo tanks were needed to go further. However escort tactics come into play, flying at bomber speed means a longer range but lower chances of intercepting the interceptors, flying at fighter speed cuts radius.
Calculated fighter ranges, no reserves, 16,000 feet
P-47B, 305 gallons, 75% power, 315 mph TAS, range 750 miles.
P-47B, 305 gallons, 50% power, 280 mph TAS, range 1180 miles.
P-51B, 180 gallons, 75% power, 350 mph TAS, range 740 miles.
P-51B, 180 gallons, 50% power, 280 mph TAS, range 970 miles.
As of 19 September 1943 the 6 P-47 groups reported 114 P-47C and 304 P-47D, plus a P-51B, an L-4B, a Tiger Moth and a Miles Master.
The second group of P-38s arrived on the last day of the year so the picture isn't quite as clear as it seems at first glance. By that time, the weather would have been unsuitable.
The time period was early 1944, which I usually interpret as Q1. The fact the 8th received a P-38 group late August 1943 and another late September, with 1 going operational mid October and the other on the last day of the year is irrelevant. By early March 1944, 3 P-38, 7 P-47 and 3 P-51 groups operational, plus the 9th Air Force P-51.
One of the factors usually omitted is the 8th Air Force operations late 1943 and early 1944, before Big Week, these operations denied the Jagdwaffe its usual winter R&R, helping to set up the spring fighting. The 8th dropped all its bombs visually to end August 1943, for the final 4 months of 1943 %visual, 88.9, 75.2, 39.2, 47.3, cumulative bombs dropped on Germany to end September 1943 8,723.1 tons, by end of 1943, 27,185.2, USAAF fighter claims for 1943 were 451 in the air, of which 205 were in November and December, add another 203 in January 1944, so 6 months in 1943 for the first 50 or so claims, 4 months for another 200, 2 months for the next 200, 1 month for the third.
It also helped the Luftwaffe put a lot of effort into reviving the twin engined day fighter force, to carry extra firepower, just in time for the raids to have escorts.
Overcoming weather problems was important, of 236 raids expecting visual bombing weather at target 155 actually did.
Drop tanks:
What's wrong with it? As i've said, it's largely noise, in my opinion, anyway.
Almost everything is wrong.
P-47 ferry tanks:
I assume this is theoretical, rather than operational.
The most basic reading would reveal the ferry tanks were used on operations, half filled as that was the fuel needed to get a P-47 from start up to near operational height.
The fighting in western Europe was not a priority for either side in the first half of 1943. The Luftwaffe minimised its commitments and the USAAF preferred to build up strength in the Mediterranean. In WWII the 8th Air Force was largely unable to take advantage of summer weather, it missed 1942, in 1943 substantial strength was sent to the Mediterranean including temporary deployment of the B-24 units, plus units were late arriving, in summer 1944 it was Overlord number 1, the war ended before summer 1945.
In July and August 1943 the Luftwaffe received a series of significant wake up calls, in date order,
1) On July 5 the Kursk offensive begins, for the first time in the east the Luftwaffe is unable to secure air superiority where it wants it, the Red Air Force is able to intervene effectively. The Luftwaffe needs to become bigger, given the Red Air Force largely ignores its opposite number the Luftwaffe can still usually operate.
2) 10 July the allied invasion of Sicily, in the air fighting before and during the invasion the Luftwaffe discovers the more aircraft it commits the higher the casualties without changing the overall situation. The Luftwaffe needs to become much bigger or leave.
3) 27 July the firestorm at Hamburg.
4) 17 August the strikes on Schweinfurt and Peenemunde.
The next day the Luftwaffe chief of staff committed suicide.
Starting in July, after the failures of the Kursk and Sicily operations and with pressure on the home defences the Luftwaffe focus shifted to defending Germany.
Richard Davis is a USAF historian who wrote a biography of General Spaatz, to do this he compiled spreadsheets of all USAAF 4 engine bomber and all RAF Bomber Command and 205 group raids, quite detailed, the 8th Air Force has 5,576 entries of which only 313 are to end October 1943. Cross reference to RAF records, or the usual books, to see which raids had what escorts and losses. Then see the patterns.
Then it was a matter of priorities.
No, it was a matter of doctrine and ignoring considerable numbers of warning flags.
To use an Arnold letter from August 1943 to advance the idea he had understanding is doing the exact opposite, he had been pushing for more range for existing fighters since January 1942. The P-38 had a very strong wing centre section well off the ground, able to carry large weights or volumes, the P-47 ended up non standard in order to carry a lot of extra fuel, then being the last to go into mass production and the hardest to find extra internal room, took the longest to modify. Meantime the P-51 appeared and thanks to the A-36 version had wing racks installed.
We also agree that the USAAF had already placed an order for 1,350 P-51s in October, 1942.
Actually the USAAF ordered 150 P-51 for the British in September 1941, then what became a mixture of P-51A and B in August 1942, then in late December 1942 what became P-51C from Dallas and in early January 1943 what became mostly P-51B, making the program as of end January 1943,
100 P-51A-1
210 P-51A-5
400 P-51B-1
400 P-51B-5
400 P-51C-1 (Dallas)
550 P-51D-1
640 P-51D-1 (150 not yet contracted)
600 P-51E-1 (Dallas)
350 P-51E-1 (Dallas) (not yet contracted)
There are plenty of people in recent times who have been really, really hard on Arnold
As I see it the difference is what evidence is being emphasised, pro or anti a given figure instead of examining the entire situation, the main characters have to be on 1 side or the other, using various quotes from their many writings.
As I said: to attack the Luftwaffe at all levels, from the factory to the fighter pilot.
Which it was not in early 1943 given the Battle of the Atlantic situation. Next came Casablanca, or rather the Desert Air Force experience, defeat the enemy air force before the land battle starts, things work much better than way.
To repeat myself, 8th Air Force lost 599 heavy bombers to enemy fighters to end October 1943, say escorts halve the loss rate, what was gained for the extra losses? What was lost by giving the Germans advanced warning of what bombing strategy was to come and what damage it could do?
Perhaps the best answer to that is to look at what happened between February and June, 1944. But by then the USAAF could go literally anywhere in Germany and bomb whatever it wanted. That is air superiority.
February to June 1944 the USAAF ETO fighters claimed 1,824 enemy aircraft in the air, add the 400 odd from November 1943 to January 1944, compare that to the 250 odd claims for the rest of 1943, yet somehow the superiority of 1944 was built on the unescorted raids in 1943? The near 100% Jagdwaffe pilot casualties January to May 1944?
My question again is: what meaningful attacks could be made in 1943 if places like Bremen, Anklam, Schweinfurt and Regensburg had to be scratched from the list because they were too hard?
If the objective is to fight the Luftwaffe whatever targets the Luftwaffe would react to, like oil in mid 1944. As for meaningful, in terms of bomb damage, the 8th Air force dropped 520,487.90 tons of bombs on Germany, cumulative totals to end of month in 1943.
137.5
396.8
928.8
1,191.8
2,478.3
4,282.0
6,332.9
7,631.6
8,723.1
12,908.0
18,291.5
27,185.2
or about 5% of total tonnage dropped, or around half that before all raids were escorted, almost irrelevant when it comes to bomb damage.
8th Air force to Germany
27-Jan-43 Emden, Wilhelmshaven
4-Feb-43 Emden, Hamm
26-Feb-43 Wilhelmshaven
4-Mar-43 Hamm
18-Mar-43 Vegesack
22-Mar-43 Wilhelmshaven
17-Apr-43 Bremen
14-May-43 Kiel
15-May-43 Emden, Heligoland
19-May-43 Flensberg, Kiel
21-May-43 Emden, Wilhelmshaven
11-Jun-43 Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven
13-Jun-43 Bremen, Kiel
22-Jun-43 Huls
25-Jun-43 Juist Island, Wangerooge Island
25-Jul-43 Hamburg, Kiel
26-Jul-43 Hamburg, Hannover, Langerooge
28-Jul-43 Kassel, Oschersleben
29-Jul-43 Kiel, Warnemunde
30-Jul-43 Kassel
12-Aug-43 Bochum, Bonn
17-Aug-43 Regensburg, Schweinfurt
6-Sep-43 Stuttgart
27-Sep-43 Emden
2-Oct-43 Emden
4-Oct-43 Frankfurt-am-Main, Saarbrucken, Saarlautern
8-Oct-43 Bremen, Vegesack
9-Oct-43 Anklam, Danzig, Marienburg
10-Oct-43 Munster
14-Oct-43 Schweinfurt
20-Oct-43 Duren
03-Nov-43 Wilhelmshaven
05-Nov-43 Gelsenkirchen, Munster
07-Nov-43 Duren, Wesel
11-Nov-43 Munster, Wesel
13-Nov-43 Bremen
19-Nov-43 Gelsenkirchen
26-Nov-43 Bremen
29-Nov-43 Bremen
30-Nov-43 Solingen
01-Dec-43 Solingen
11-Dec-43 Emden
13-Dec-43 Bremen, Hamburg, Kiel
16-Dec-43 Bremen
20-Dec-43 Bremen
22-Dec-43 Munster, Osnabruck
30-Dec-43 Ludwigshafen
The USAAF certainly had the idea mass heavy bomber daylight raids could work even unescorted, by early 1942 enough evidence was available plus removal of peacetime restrictions, to start a program of extending fighter ranges, mostly via external tanks. The various fighter designs had different degrees of adaptability in a situation where changes cost vital production. The more 1942 went into 1943 the more the USAAF saw for itself unescorted bombers were in trouble, otherwise why bother with any P-38 in the Pacific, Japanese defences were usually much weaker than German and there was plenty of neutral territory on the way to target. More USAAF thinking shifted to escorting and effective ways to do it. The 8th Air Force "won" the prize for being the last to switch over.
Meantime the commanders had to use the results of decisions taken years previously on force mixes, strengths, aircraft types and doctrine. The US military made plenty of mistakes in WWII but were generally the least likely to make the same mistake twice, the 8th Air Force was the air exception.
Pretty much everyone in our street had served either in WWI or WWII. Most of my Dad's friends were WWII veterans. He was too young to go.
Australia suffered heavily in WWI and was probably the most militarised of the western allies in WWII.