Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (2 Viewers)

[drgondog]

Thank you again for the informative post.
I've never suggested that engine-less airframes are shipped from NAA to the UK, but that Mustang airframes already in the UK get towards the Mk.X. That is for 1943, not for 1944.

I understood that, but pulling all Mustang I depends on decision date may not yield a significant fighter force due to continuing operational attrition.

BTW - when you say 'in far higher quantities in 1943' - do you mean in, say, Spring to early Summer of 1943, or after October of 1943?

After October, actually after December when both Inglewood and Dallas were producing at near optimal quantities.

Rommel was not in Normandy before late 1943.

Agreed, but beachead defenses were in play from 1941.

As per your questions:
- 1) Wasn't the RAF doing the escort as much as the combat radius allowed them? RAF was also doing the high-altitude recon, up to the interwar German-Polish border. There are still the Tyhoons and Spitfires doing the short range low altitude work, that I have no wish to remove from there.
- 2) Spitfire.
- C) Of course.

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

Thank you.
As you can see, I have no intention to sweep any Mustang (be it in parts or as whole aircraft) from NAA to be given to just anyone.

Lol - I get that.

 

[tomo pauk]

After October, actually after December when both Inglewood and Dallas were producing at near optimal quantities.

From the point of view of the 8th AF bombers and their people, that means no P-51s in 1943.

Agreed, but beachead defenses were in play from 1941.

Make the photos of these defenses by using short-range aircraft.

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

That is my point here all the time - Spitfires cannot do what the Mustangs can, due to the relatively small fuel tankage and worse mileage of the former.

 

[ColFord]

Oct 24th 1941, First Mustang I arrives in England.
Nov 11th 1941, four more arrive in England.
Jan 1942, Mustang I production peaks at 92 per month.
April 1942. No 2 squadron is the first unit to get Mustang Is in the RAF.
May 10th 1942 is the first combat operation. No 2 squadron raids (strafes?) a German airfield near the French coast.
July 1942, last Mustang I comes off the production line. Here is were things get tricky, How many Mustang Is are in California or in transit?
Aug 18th 1942 The British had 4 squadrons equipped with Mustang Is. Where are the rest of the 617 Mustang Is? In British depots? on ship? being crated at Inglewood?
Aug 19th 1942. Perspective. The RAF also has 4 squadrons of Typhoons for Dieppe and just 4 squadrons of Spitfire IXs in service.
Jan 1943, RAF has 15 squadrons of Allison powered Mustangs in service.
This will rise to a max total of 21 squadrons. (when?)

No.26 Squadron RAF gets its first NA-73 Mustang I on 9 January 1942.

Other Squadrons as follows:

Added to that other RAF users of Mustang I in UK in at least more than 4 on strength at any given time include: 41 Operational Training Unit (OTU for Army Co-operation and Tactical Reconnaissance); A&AEE; AFDU; 83 GSU; 84GSU; No.285 (AA Support) Sqn.

Getting equipped with the Mustang is one thing, getting operational is another. Of note, a number of the RAF Army Co-operation Squadrons that re-equipped with the Mustang I in late 1942 into early 1943 eg: 168, 171, 231, had continued to operate the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk in the AC role until such time as sufficient Mustangs became available for them to re-equip with the Mustang.

No.26 Squadron RAF based at RAF Gatwick, flew the first recorded operational sortie on the Mustang I on 10 May 1942 against a Luftwaffe airfield near Berck-sur-Mer and also strafed railway engine and rolling stock nearby and a coastal defence (AA) post.

Most of the units who didn't fly operational sorties before October-November 1942 were largely taken up in that timeframe since receiving their Mustangs participating in a number of large scale Army exercise in the UK - doing Army Co-operation. You also then have the situation in late 1942 where a number of the ACC Squadrons equipped with the Mustang I are earmarked to be moved to the MTO to provide the Tac/R support for Operation Torch. Included in those are No.225 Squadron and No.241 Squadron who passed their Mustang I back into the 'pool' and proceeded overseas without their aircraft, re-equipping with Hurricane IIs on arrival in the MTO.

Make the photos of these defenses by using short-range aircraft.

But that doesn't meet the requirements of the planners from Day 1. The required low level coverage from late 1942 was of all beaches from the Hook of Holland, all the way around to Lannion on the Brest Peninsular AND all potential airborne landing zones behind the immediate potential beach head areas AND all enemy installations, encampments, supply depots, repair facilities, airfields AND road, rail and river/canal transport and resupply lines to a depth of 100 miles from the coast. The planners require that for not just the initial landing planning, but for the planning for the development and expansion of the beach head, including location where the Allied forces would place their airfields, supply dumps, etc; and then planning for expected enemy counter attacks and movement of enemy reserves from other areas; and then eventual Allied breakout from beach head area. In terms of those short range aircraft available at the time. The Hawker Hurricane wasn't suitable - range, performance and camera installations. (When it was suggested in early 1944 that some of the Tac/R Squadrons earmarked to particpate in the Invasion might have to re-equip with Hurricanes due to a potential shortage of Allison engine Mustangs, there was a near revolt. The re-equipment of some of the Squadrons with Spitfire Vs was considered at the time barely acceptable and when the two squadrons equipped with the Spitfire V were used in relation to the invasion in 1944, their role was strictly limited to naval gunfire direction where they would be able to utilise a drop tank to extend their time on station - which they could not use in the low level Tac/R role to extend range.) The Spitfire V which would be the primary replacement candidate wasn't suitable - first issue in 1942 into 1943 is getting airframes released from Fighter Command, demand at home and abroad was exceeding available supply - so who then misses out Malta? MTO? Darwin? Reverse Lend Lease to USAAF in ETO or MTO? And if they are planning for a 1943 invasion they will be wanting to ramp up the number of dedicated 'pure' fighter squadrons. Range is second issue with Spitfire V, as well as limited camera installations without significant modifications - PRU was having enough trouble keeping up with their own demands for modifications for PR Spitfires at that time. Hawker Typhoon wasn't suitable - range, performance, reliability and as was discovered in 1944 when the Typhoon was utilised briefly in the role, significant issues in relation to the quality of photography obtained due to transmission of engine and airframe vibration to the cameras. And more broadly at the inter-service and political level, any percieved reduction in the capabilities of the aircraft available to perform the role would be siezed upon by the War Office - they were already highly reticent about any potential invasion of France in 1943 for a number of factors and the level and degree of support being provided and proposed to be provided by the RAF in the plans for any potential invasion in 1943 was considered by the War Office to be underwhelming and unbalanced.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Hawker Hurricane wasn't suitable - range, performance and camera installations. (When it was suggested in early 1944 that some of the Tac/R Squadrons earmarked to particpate in the Invasion might have to re-equip with Hurricanes due to a potential shortage of Allison engine Mustangs, there was a near revolt.

I would not suggest the Hurricane.

The re-equipment of some of the Squadrons with Spitfire Vs was considered at the time barely acceptable and when the two squadrons equipped with the Spitfire V were used in relation to the invasion in 1944, their role was strictly limited to naval gunfire direction where they would be able to utilise a drop tank to extend their time on station - which they could not use in the low level Tac/R role to extend range.) The Spitfire V which would be the primary replacement candidate wasn't suitable - first issue in 1942 into 1943 is getting airframes released from Fighter Command, demand at home and abroad was exceeding available supply

The RAF FC will be getting way more than a good replacement for the Spitfire V in the fighter role.
Spitifre V will most likely be getting some fuel tankage in the wings so the range/endurance can be better, as well as the Merlin 20s nicked from Hurricane production (yes, these engines fit on the Spitfires) so the low-alt performance can be improved vs. the 'normal' Mk.Vs.

- so who then misses out Malta? MTO? Darwin? Reverse Lend Lease to USAAF in ETO or MTO?

In 1943, Russians get less of Hurricanes and Spitfires, say about 200 of each less? They - Stalin - was complaining that Hurricanes are not at their liking anyway.

And more broadly at the inter-service and political level, any percieved reduction in the capabilities of the aircraft available to perform the role would be siezed upon by the War Office - they were already highly reticent about any potential invasion of France in 1943 for a number of factors and the level and degree of support being provided and proposed to be provided by the RAF in the plans for any potential invasion in 1943 was considered by the War Office to be underwhelming and unbalanced.

I'll agree that the whole idea of Mustang X conversions in hundreds will be much more troubled by the inter-service and political messing, rather than by some technical or tactical considerations.

 

[GrauGeist]

Aug 18th 1942 The British had 4 squadrons equipped with Mustang Is. Where are the rest of the 617 Mustang Is? In British depots? on ship? being crated at Inglewood?

This just reminded me of something I had read ages ago.

Quite a few NA-73s being shipped to Britain were lost in a U-Boat attack in the Atlantic in 1942.

There were other instances, but this may help in accounting for discrepancies between units manufactured and units put into RAF service.

 

[ColFord]

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

Low level fighter escort by Mustang Is to RAF 2 Group Bostons to target in north-western Netherlands outside range of Spitfires in September 1942, Norway September 1942 - Lewkowicz without formal approval; Eastern Netherlands & Western Germany October 1942. Then in December 1942 thru February 1943, low level escort to RAF 2 Group Bostons, Venturas, Mitchells and Mosquitos - a number of those ACC Mustang operations escorting 2 Group where FC couldn't, apparently by all reports got a number of very high level FC noses out of joint which led to a directive that the Mustangs were not to be used for any more 2 Group bomber escort work. Interestingly in 1943, a number of the ACC Mustang Squadrons were used working in conjunction with RAF Coastal Command, flying INSTEP sorties to potentially intercept Luftwaffe long range fighters - mainly Ju-88 - intercepting returning RAF CC long range maritime patrol aircraft returning from their anti U-boat patrols out over the Bay of Biscay. And in late 1942 through into 1943 the low level performance of the Allison Mustangs called upon by FC for the standing patrols against the Luftwaffe low flying hit and run raids against the southern English coast - Spitfires couldn't catch them down low and the Typhoons given their fuel usage rates could not stay on patrol for anywhere near as long.

The RAF FC will be getting way more than a good replacement for the Spitfire V in the fighter role.
Spitifre V will most likely be getting some fuel tankage in the wings so the range/endurance can be better, as well as the Merlin 20s nicked from Hurricane production (yes, these engines fit on the Spitfires) so the low-alt performance can be improved vs. the 'normal' Mk.Vs.

Not to the perspective of RAF Fighter Command at the time which was still very much focussed on home defence and the 'leaning into Europe' operations within the useable range of the aircraft involved. At that time, FC did not have an identified long range fighter requirement as the RAF's primary bomber activity was at night. There was a lot of talk in the Air Staff about converting RAF 2 Group over to heavy bombers to add to the long range night time bomber offensive. 2 Group survived in part because of the pressure from the War Office for light/medium bombers for the immediate battlefield interdiction role as/when an invasion took place, and as more information came back from the MTO on the use of light/medium bombers used in conjuction with fighter bombers for support of the Army in the field on active operations - doing what the heavy bombers could not do.

And I can imagine the reaction from 'Bomber' Harris hearing that a supply of additional Merlins suited for use on Bomber Command's heavy bombers was opening up. He would have jumped on them in an instant. There was enough tension between Fighter Command and Bomber Command on allocation and prioritisation of resources, especially Merlins, notwithstanding what Coastal Command was seeking, or training command or what was being proposed as the transport aircraft requirements. 200+ extra Merlins Harris would view as fair game for 50 extra heavy bombers for his use - he was already decrying the 'political' supply of aircraft to theatres outside the ETO and to Allies as detracting from his ability to build Bomber Command up to the levels he considered neccessary for the "knockout blow" by the heavies. At the same time, Harris is playing the political game of RAF night time vs USAAF daylight bombing, so how invested is he in seeing the USAAF wavering about their ability to continue on with their daylight campaign in the absence of suitable long range escort fighters?

The need for the RAF's own long range fighters even into 1943 is still being conceived with the focus always coming back to large twins not single engine types, and always the program stalls because in addition to the long range, home defence requirements keep getting added to the specification eg rapid rate of climb, overly high upper operational ceiling, excessive armament weight.

(The above based on Greg Baughen's very well researched series of books about the RAF's policy environment from WW1 onwards, plus my own digging into Air Ministry files, Air Staff records and minutes, multiple RAF wartime and post-War analysis papers, plus discussions with quite a few who were actually there involved in all this at the time.)

 

[Dana Bell]

Hi All,

I finally listened to this webcast today, then read all of the follow-up comments. I don't know Greg (or even his last name), but the more I dig through the Archives, the more I see massive holes in his arguments. I suspect entering the argument would be a waste of time, especially since I don't even know if he reads the notes presented on this site. Critically, he makes no mention of the budget, which was one of Arnold's primary concerns before and during the war. Why would he have wasted money developing drop tanks for the P-36 when it was soon to be replaced by better aircraft. (He rejected upgrading Hawaii's P-36As to P-36C standards for exactly that reason.)

He also forgets that Arnold, Eaker (which he should pronounce "Acre"), and Spaatz (which he should pronounce "Spots") were not in total control - they were still subservient to the Army. The Eighth Bomber Command (not the Eighth Air Force) was sent to England to support Marshall's planned spring 1942 invasion of France. When that adventure was postponed, the focus moved to a Mediterranean second front. Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker had to fight to keep any air power in the UK, and that was to develop strategic bombing capabilities.

Yes, the "bomber mafia" failed to imagine what was needed for their plans to succeed. But in the 1930s they planned for an escorting fighter force - they just didn't recognize they'd be flying from England rather than France, that ground-based radar would become far more effective in organizing enemy defenses, or that the Germans would build and train so damn many defensive fighters. (The plans against the less developed Japanese defenses in the early war are often overlooked, but I suspect those air battles were closer to what the AAF originally expected.)

It all makes me wish I'd been more knowledgeable and had better questions when I interviewed Eaker in 1976 - I'd have loved to taken the time to hear his insight back then.

Cheers,


Dana

 

[ColFord]

This just reminded me of something I had read ages ago.

Quite a few NA-73s being shipped to Britain were lost in a U-Boat attack in the Atlantic in 1942.

There were other instances, but this may help in accounting for discrepancies between units manufactured and units put into RAF service.

The actual number of NA-73 lost in transit to the UK is around 20. In digging through all the various source documentation on losses for NA-73 Mustang I from the USA to the UK, there is contradiction between figures in original documentation in the exact number lost and which airframes were lost, but it keeps coming out on average around 20.

On top of the actual losses during shipping, there were a number of airframes in the early, initial batches, where damage was incurred during transit. That covered things like saltwater ingress into the shipping crates, movement of components in the shipping crates, within the cradles holding major airframe components, which led to airframes and airframe components requiring repair or replacement before a complete airframe was available for issue to a Squadron. (Other issue to consider at this stage, is that airframe component spares included as a part of the purchase package had NOT started shipping to the UK - this led to mix n match upon reassembly between undamaged major airframe components - undamaged fuselage from one aircraft, matched with undamaged wings from another aircraft, which leads to some 'dodgy fixes of c&m between 'A' scheme and 'B' scheme airframes, and later mis-identification of airframes at crash sites due to mixing of serials on major components.) Rapid feedback to the NAA in the US from the UK on the issues, led to changes in the crating arrangements and where the aircraft crates were placed on ships for shipment across the Atlantic, that reduced the level of damage in transit.

Then there was the issue of unmodified and modified NA-73 Mustang I to units. That is a story in itself. The NA-73 Mustang I that arrived in the UK, had a number of items that were intended to be supplied and installed in the UK upon arrival. There were also modifications identified early in the production run and in early trials that needed to be implemented into the aircraft already received in the UK and those still in the process of being manufactured by NAA in the USA. Included in that were things like the armour plate behind the pilot's seat: RAF radio equipment and UK RAF oxygen equipment and connectors; RAF IFF; fixes for the early issues identified with the chemical reaction between UK specification and formulation glycol and the US manufactured radiator system materials; then the armament mounting and ammunition feed chutes and case and link ejection chute modifications; gun sight mount modifications; etc to arrive at what the RAF would consider at the time to be an operationally modified NA-73 Mustang I airframe, cleared for operational use. That list would change over time.

But, to allow Squadrons to become familiar with the NA-73 Mustang I, a large percentage of the aircraft were initially issued to Squadrons in an 'unmodified' state - for conversion to type only, not for operational use except in an 'emegency'. It was intended that as future deliveries in the UK arrived, they would be modified before issue to Squadrons, the unmodified aircraft would be handed back to 'someone' to then be modified and brought up to operational status, and then issued out to a Squadron. That turned into a beaurocratic 's***t fight' between the various parties involved, a fight about who was responsible, who was going to do the works, what the priorities for the works to be conducted were, priorities on the material/resources required. Part of the fight came back to a decision made when the NA-73 Mustang I were first offered to Army Co-operation Command and the desire of the senior officers in that command to have something, anything, better and potentially more reliable than the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawks ACC was using at the time - which were going through a particularly bad period of serviceability with over 95% of the Tomahawks with ACC in the UK at that time grounded for a range of technical and serviceability issues with no timely solution in sight.

As a result of that, the total number of NA-73 Mustang I available for issue to Squadrons for operational use was low. That improved over time, and by the time the first of the NA-83 Mustang I started to arrive, the arrangements for getting them reassembeld after shipping, modified and issued out to Squadrons was significantly better.

So by August 1942 you have 15 RAF ACC Squadrons either converted to and operational on the Mustang I, or in the process of converting to and working up to operational status on the Mustang I. If push were to have come to shove in mid-August 1942 (Operation JUBILEE timeframe), more Squadrons could have been used operationally if required, but at the time the need was not seen to exist. As an example, pilots from two of the RAF ACC Mustang I squadrons that had already commenced operations before Operation JUBILEE, whilst their squadrons were not directly involved, they were attached to FC squadrons taking part in the operation and flew a number of operational sorties. The decisions also on which squadrons were involved in Operation JUBILEE, including a number where it was their first operational use and experience, did raise some pointed questions in the post operation analysis.

 

[tomo pauk]

And I can imagine the reaction from 'Bomber' Harris hearing that a supply of additional Merlins suited for use on Bomber Command's heavy bombers was opening up. He would have jumped on them in an instant. There was enough tension between Fighter Command and Bomber Command on allocation and prioritisation of resources, especially Merlins, notwithstanding what Coastal Command was seeking, or training command or what was being proposed as the transport aircraft requirements. 200+ extra Merlins Harris would view as fair game for 50 extra heavy bombers for his use - he was already decrying the 'political' supply of aircraft to theatres outside the ETO and to Allies as detracting from his ability to build Bomber Command up to the levels he considered neccessary for the "knockout blow" by the heavies. At the same time, Harris is playing the political game of RAF night time vs USAAF daylight bombing, so how invested is he in seeing the USAAF wavering about their ability to continue on with their daylight campaign in the absence of suitable long range escort fighters?

Thank you again for the informative posts.
I thing that we're in some broad agreement - it will be a political opposition to be worried about here, not the fear that industry will not do it's part on my suggestion for the hundreds of Mustang X.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

First, the strategic role of airpower in the form of heavy bombers destroying enemy industry was the 'mantra'. Not the 'bomber will always get through'.

Yet AWPD-1 and -42 expected unescorted heavy bombers to fulfill the destruction of industry, therefore while the bomber would always get through was an overstatement the assumption was get through with on average acceptable casualties with good bombing results.

Second, Eaker (proxy for Arnold) committed to the successful application of daylight strategic bombing to Churchill at Casablanca. There were no caveats expressed. In fairness to Eaker, his commitment was based on achieving a 600 bomber strike force (roughly 900 in inventory) - which in turn was committed by Arnold.

As I read it, 300 strong to drive losses down to acceptable levels, a figure from 1942, then 600 to actually do the required damage in the required time frame?

Arnold however was immediately undermined by the RAF's insatiable desire for majority provision of US production, and USSR and China also intruded via FDR decrees.

I would disagree with the RAF part of the above, and substitute "Air War" in general, maintaining the forces already deployed by the allies, including the USSR, around the world.

Another key point is the RAF was taking small numbers of the B-17, B-24, P-38 and P-47 the USAAF wanted for the 8th Air Force. The P-47 was the USAAF planned new single engine single seat fighter, giving the P-38, P-47, B-17 and B-24 as the USAAF turbo supercharged 1942/43/44 planned front line combat force.

Sticking to end 1943 Britain had 45 B-17E January to June 1942 and 19 B-17F August to October 1943, plus of course the 1941 B-17. Ignoring the LB series of the B-24 Britain had 368 B-24D and 188 B-24J, Canada another 19 B-24D, the USN 361 B-24D or J. All up 5 P-47 delivered for foreign customers to end 1943. The ex France standard P-38 had been rejected and no P-38 ordered, about the only direct pressure point the RAF was exerting would be the P-47G versus P-40 from Curtiss orders.

By April/May it was clear that even with much better crews and tactics, addition of chin turret, etc.,

Not quite about the turrets, First B-17G were accepted in August 1943, first 8th Air Force B-17G loss 4 October.

Eaker also sniffed out pressure from Eisenhower and Spaatz to relocate 8th AF to Italy following the invasion - and Eisenhower was requesting even more than the B-24 groups already dispatched to 9th AF for Tidal Wave.

Is invasion operation Torch or the invasions of Italy?

The 8th's B-24 groups had an interesting 1943, with detachments to the Middle East, of which the Ploesti raid is the most famous. By mid year the 8th had 10 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups operational. The detachments meant that from the end of June to the beginning of September 1943 the 8th flew no B-24 operations while the number of B-17 groups rose to 16. It also meant despite having 4 operational B-24 groups in mid September the 8th was down to 1 as of the 19th, then back up to 4 on 4th October.

Torch itself had 3 squadrons of the 93rd deployed 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, what is termed Husky, Ploesti, Post Husky from 2 July to 22 August for the 44th, 93rd and 389th, then the same groups again 21 September to 1 October in 5th Army Support. For most of 1943 the Mediterranean offered the best opportunities to the western allies. Then with well supplied bases available in Foggia places out of range of Britain, like Ploesti and Austria were now in range. AWPD-1 southern force except the bombers were in Italy instead of Egypt.

The 8th Air Force had 21 B-17 groups on D-day, it still only had 4 operational B-24 groups in early December 1843, 7 by the end of the year, and 19 on D-Day. The 15th Air Force formed with 4 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups in November 1943, added 8 B-24 groups December/January, then 2 B-17 and 5 B-24 groups February/March. Constraints on the forces were now mostly logistical, not crews and aircraft.

The overarching dilemma that confronted Arnold, was that Eaker had to get results or Churchill was going to prevail and 8th AF would be absorbed by Bomber Command for joint night attacks.

As I understand things there was no chance of absorption, if anything a pure night campaign would end up with the US absorbing the RAF given the numbers. Rather the 8th would convert a number of units to night operations while retaining others to do day operations where they had adequate fighter cover.

Over this was by mid 1943 everyone understood the combat radius of the P-51B even with 180 gallons of internal fuel was better than the existing P-38 and P-47, 500 miles with 150 gallons of external fuel. With probably better performance as well but it would be a 1944 fighter. While the plans for more internal fuel in all three fighters were being advanced. It makes the chances of the USAAF going over to night bombing in large numbers quite small.

Still the suggestions, like those for army and navy related operations, rubbed nerves still raw from the inter war period about airpower and who had the final say, present in all air forces.

There is truth to observations of Anglophobia existed through US military ranks - and certainly with Adm King, probably Arnold and maybe Marshall. I personally think the disease was a major factor in the slow acceptance of the P-51 Mustang.

Admiral King definitely to the point there are claims it hampered the war effort. Not so sure about Arnold and Marshall, though they certainly had some strong comments about the British, mirroring some British comments about Americans. Patriots tend to assume "we" are the best. Some comments indicate the Mustang had a not invented here stigma. A lot of time and effort had gone into creation of the mass production and deployment systems backing the USAAF, sudden changes were most unwelcome and almost certainly going to cost aircraft numbers when everyone was screaming for more. You say you want North American to build the B-24 needed to drop bombs, now you say stop that, build P-51 to enable the B-24 built somewhere else to drop bombs? But you still want lots more B-24? Dallas had 1 B-24G accepted in March 1943, the next in June, ending B-24 production in November 1944. First P-51C in August 1943, one factory, two new designs, what could possibly go wrong? Remember we need all those Dallas built AT-6 as well. Meantime at Inglewood we have shut down AT-6 to free capacity mostly for B-25, now you want to transfer all B-25 production to Kansas City?

Interesting to me is the USAAF deployments of the P-51B seem to really be about the use of the P-51 and P-51A, not picking up on the altitude performance increase. 1943 was the year the allied production system caught up to war needs instead of always being behind and that took time to understand, 1944 saw the wind down begin. I would not rule out inertia, an unwillingness or perceived inability to make big changes or deciding the current situation could not afford the change costs.

21 of the first RAF order for 320 Mustang I were lost at sea, 4 more to the USSR, all 300 of the second order arrived, as did 92 of the Mustang Ia order, plus 50 Mustang II as compensation for Mustang Ia taken over by USAAF. As of end February 1943 the RAF reported 510 Mustang I and 93 Mustang Ia on strength, by end 1943 it was 365 Mustang I, 80 Mustang Ia, 50 Mustang II, 257 Mustang III. When considering extra 2 stage Merlins remember Spitfire V production ended in August 1943 at Castle Bromwich and October at Westland.

When it comes to Photographic Reconnaissance Spitfire IV production ended in February 1943, Spitfire IX began in November 1942, the 16 mark XI were build April/May 1944. One factor in reconnaissance aircraft shortages was the USAAF time to deploy its own reconnaissance units in 1943.

When it comes to invading France any 1942 operation was a save the USSR idea, as of mid 1942 the US Army had the 1st Armoured and 34th Infantry in Britain and 5th Infantry in Iceland. As of mid 1943 the 5th was still in Iceland (until August) the 29th Infantry was in Britain, there were 9 US divisions in the Mediterranean. North Africa not cleared until May 1943 ruled out an invasion of France in 1943 along with all the material shortages and the U-boat threat, again unless it was to save the USSR.

Requirements for tactical reconnaissance grew as the invasion came closer and the Germans began intensive work on defences, not only coastal but field works further inland. As far as I know the 1943 raids on France normally used the standard reconnaissance units as did the transport plan etc. strikes in 1944.

By the way low level operations over the sea tends to give engines problems from the salt water spray they ingest.

In creating the Army/Air system the Middle East proved the crewed bombers were no real use for battle support, they took too long to arrive and needed escorts. Coming up with a Battlefield Interdiction plan required things to interdict, the western desert had few bridges, rail lines, cross roads etc. to attack which left the light and medium bomber units looking for targets, the heavy bombers tended to be more efficient bombing the ports or fixed enemy positions. To an extent the non heavies survived as there were not enough heavies present, then came Tunisia, Sicily and Italy. Easy to see why back in Britain 2 Group seemed worth changing yet as fighter sweeps tended to be ignored the group was needed to provide the day bomber force the Luftwaffe needed to stop, while releasing the heavies for longer range work but remember the day of the fighter bomber was dawning. Yes there were lots of ideas about the future. So 2 group in June 1944 had 6 Mosquito fighter bomber squadrons,2 Boston/A-20, 4 Mitchell/B-25. With the Mosquito largely dedicated to night interdiction.

To translate the ideas required the strength, Bomber Command still had 16.5 Wellington squadrons at the start of 1943, along with 11 Halifax ,17 Lancaster and 8 Stirling, plenty more candidates for heavy bombers before doing the 2 Group units.

One difference between the USAAF and RAF was the RAF idea of fighter range, the P-51 without the rear fuselage tank was RAF long range given perceived pilot work load and navigation skills. As of early/mid 1943 the RAF was going to obtain lots of P-51, perfect for those long patrols defending the battlefield. And you wonder whether that had any influence on USAAF deployment plans.

 

[J.D.]

To answer your question requires a list of bomber mafia members and where they were in 1943, with particular reference to having influence over 8th Air Force target decisions. To turn it around how did the 8th Air Force command continue to justify the tactic and account for the problems so far? Please provide the quotes.

I'm asking you.

You need to define few, an absolute number or a percentage of operations done? Under what conditions?

Definitions aren't going to answer this. It's a question of working with reason and trade offs. Everyone has their opinion on how much is too much.

As for conditions, you've provided the figures for that already.

Let me ask you again: what options did Eaker really have? Because it's pretty hard to come up with a scenario where either they are bombing something relatively unimportant because it's within fighter range or they are bombing something important and taking big losses.

For whom, at which level? Think combat units taking heavy losses might have a different perspective than a more senior command?

Next mission to where? In any case in 1943 weather dictated a lot of 8th Air Force operations and therefore timings.

See above. And yes: weather was a critical factor that nearly everyone overlooks.

Yet it is coming across as the exact opposite, and quite clearly.

I don't see how. The only reason you have given me for believing that Eaker and Arnold ignore the results is because you say they did. This is the same approach applied by Vlaun. The mission data doesn't support a conclusion like that unless you ignore all other factors. When human judgement is involved you can't get a complete picture unless you know exactly what was in their minds. Not every waking minute of every day but what went into their reports or the private notes.

Let's take what drgondog said about the gunners' claims. Even if they accepted a third of the number, it's entirely possible to envisage a situation where Eaker has a set of figures on one side of the ledger saying that the Luftwaffe is losing aircraft in large numbers and on the other side is the Eighth's losses. Pretty soon one side is going to reach a breaking point. So it becomes a question of which balance sheet you believe over the other. That's not doctrine: that's probability.

Eaker and Arnold ignored lots of advice from others, good and bad. Perhaps as Bill has pointed out the advice on gunner shoot down claims? The advice a long range high performance fighter was impossible? As it turned out as far as the USAAF is concerned, there was only a small gap in bomber versus fighter range the late 1930's if the fighters could carry external fuel, it grew when the B-17 became a mass item, which shrank in 1944 only to blow out again with the B-29.

How do you know they ignored it? Where do they say that?

Being in a sealed room with fingers in ears does that.

I'll repeat: I'm trying to keep this polite and I'd appreciate the same in return. These kind of remarks are not helping you get your point across.

If there is so much information out there that you have drawn this conclusion so clearly, do you think you could provide some direct quotes?

Your obvious misunderstanding of the situation indicates you did not do the reading.

I stopped reading here.

This is not acceptable in the context of a reasonable discussion and I see no point in continuing. I really hate doing this Geoffrey but it serves no further purpose.

You have a lot of excellent information Geoffrey and I have continually acknowledged that but you have not shown:

1) Any concrete evidence via quotes that either Arnold or Eaker "ignored" the advice, despite repeated requests;
2) That there was a direct link between the extensive figures you have presented and the claim that they ignored advice. In fact, the only supporting thing you have said what that the trend was obvious, which is not the same thing;
3) Any alternative high value targets that could have been bombed without sustaining heavy losses.

I'll remind you of something you said in relation to my original point:

Boilerplate or orthodox tend to form around the available evidence, deciding this is wrong requires evidence to the contrary.

In journalism, the object in normal circumstances, is to get both sides of the story and the best available version of the truth. Very often that means asking difficult and occasionally confronting questions.

What it is not is saying, "This is how it is, now prove me wrong."

You could have helped here Geoffrey, you really could.

J.D. out.

 

[J.D.]

Arnold was well aware that deep strikes into Germany and the campaign to destroy the LW in preparation for Overlord was of highest priority for AAF. He was skeptical that the P-38 was suitable as 'the choice' and more skeptical that the P-47 would not be the solution. While he was getting input from multiple sources that the P-51B might work, he KNEW that the P-75 was increasingly behind schedule. That said, he could only Personally do two things short term. One divert P-38s to Britain. Two, hold Eaker's feet to the fire - 'Fight with what you have while I orchestrate help from above'. For longer term, The FAREP directives issued to expedite the Long Range Escort were in motion, P-38J and P-51B added more fuel internally to contribute to already tested wing drop tanks - but Arnold made the delivery of THE long range escort by January to his new Chief of Staff LG Barney Giles.

In the context of that timeframe, this makes for an interesting conundrum and one that would doubtless invoke inter-service rivalries. I did wonder about how long range bombing could be prioritised over the invasion of Sicily.

The overarching dilemma that confronted Arnold, was that Eaker had to get results or Churchill was going to prevail and 8th AF would be absorbed by Bomber Command for joint night attacks. Everybody but Churchill knew that course would be a disastrous change of course, perhaps fatal, to the dream of an independent Air Force. At times Arnold felt like RAF was a more formidable foe than either Germany or Japan.

This would have been a disaster. With the Americans, at least they showed some sense of priority. Harris was a different story. It became clearer the longer the war went on that Harris was running his own war. Target choice was quixotic and without any serious signs of cooperation. My understanding is that he was asked to bomb the Schweinfurt factories by night but declined because he believed the target too small. This was almost reasonable by his lights.

Result of Arnold's view after recovering from his cardiac arrest in the May-July 1943 period-
"we are where we are"
"stuff is coming at the end of the year. but I'm ordering immediate P-38 diversion from MTO"
"pressure is being applied to Republic for drop tank compatibility but not available until late summer"
"fight with what you have and I'll (Arnold) do my best to bring reinforcements"
"I expect results"
'That will be all!"

Was this one memo or part of a series?

 

[drgondog]

Yet AWPD-1 and -42 expected unescorted heavy bombers to fulfill the destruction of industry, therefore while the bomber would always get through was an overstatement the assumption was get through with on average acceptable casualties with good bombing results.

Geoffrey, Agreed, partially. This is a complicated discussion. Just before AWPD-1 delivered in Sept 1941, USAAC FM-1-15 "Tactics and Techniques of Air Fighting" led by the same key contributor Muir Fairchild. The basic tenant was that a primary mission of the Air Forces was to 'Destroy the Hostile Air Forces Freedom of the Air". The re-prioritized Emmons Board 'to-do' list placed the 1500mi range singe engine fighter as number one for FY42 Developments. That said, there was a key statement made in AWPD-1, namely "It is unwise to neglect the development of escort fighters designed to enable bombardment formations to fight through to their objective".

My agreement is that if war started the day after AWPD-1, then there were no escort fighters capable of reaching German targets (Japan was not really contemplated) in the inventory. By early 1942 Drop tanks for both ferry and tactical purposes were issued A-1 Priority, but Spaatz advanced the notion of 'escort bomber' in April 1942 as recognition that given the high-altitude capable fighters coming on-stream, they still would not be able to escort bombers over bomber ranges at the envisioned target.

Hence - The B-40 and B-41 development - and the first introduction of chin turrets on the B-17 and B-24.

AWPD/42 issued in Sept 1942 complimented AWPD-1 but it was more about allocations of air assets to focus on Germany first. AWPD/42 was an articulation of the agreements that Arnold and Adm Tower's visit to Britain in May 1942. More on this below.

As I read it, 300 strong to drive losses down to acceptable levels, a figure from 1942, then 600 to actually do the required damage in the required time frame?

I have to re-check, but I believe the Eaker commitment to AWPD-1 and the agreed joint Combined Bomber Offensive was 600 to achieve the objectives by generating 300 plus sorties per mission on a frequent basis. It was not until the mid-July 1943 timeframe that Eaker ever dispatched 300 on a mission culminating August 17th, which set back his inventory until all the B-24s had been returned and refitted. Even so, the B-24s did not participate except as decoys for the October 14 Schweinfurt mission.

I would disagree with the RAF part of the above, and substitute "Air War" in general, maintaining the forces already deployed by the allies, including the USSR, around the world.

I would cite the Slessor arrangement arising from ABC conversations Jan-Mar 1941, followed by the Arcadia Conference between FDR and Churchill Dec/Jan 1942 as reference. From Huston (American Airpower Comes of Age) -- "it called for Britain to retain all the output from her own production, all US produced aircraft from their orders in process, all French orders, an allocation from continuing US production as well as the 'entire output, from any new expansion. If America drawn in the war new US capacity would be split 50-50".

The underlying issue was that ALL of the allocations were new US aircraft, approximately 5 percent for B-17/B-24, and 8 percent of Transport. I don't remember the A-20, B-25 etc. allocation but it was high. More important 82% of the British allocation were modern medium and light bombers and pursuit. After Pearl Harbor, the US not only had most of its offshore modern aircraft destroyed, but most of the aircraft in the US inventory were P-36, P-43, B-18 and early model P-40/P39. The effect was a major dilution in the training and expansion of AAF to agreed objectives. Coupled with the attrition in growth was the pressure to subordinate US rmy and Navy to British Command. "You provide the resources, we'll run the operations. Run along littel boy". was the perceived attitudes that Marshall, Arnold and King experienced. The committed allocation pointed to RAF and Coastal Command receiving 31% of total 1942 US tactical airplane production.

The above issues were the stimulus for Arnold and Tower's visit to Britain in May 1942. At the table for the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting were:
British were more interested in 'here and now' (understandably) than US achieving its aims for full partnership in combat under US leadership.
The Slessor/Arnold-Portal Agreement pre-Dec would cripple AAF ability to meet committed objectives.
New demands for Martlets and C-47s for RN and Army would cripple USN fleet defense and AAF transport and logistics capability.

The final agreement from the meetings resulted in a huge scale down of Heavy bomber, medium bomber and pursuit allocations, overall a 55% reduction from RAF demands to US/RAF agreement between January and June 12, 1942.

It was also after this trip that Arnold joined Eisenhower to appeal to Marshall to remove Cheney, and replacing him with Eisenhower as CG ETO

Another key point is the RAF was taking small numbers of the B-17, B-24, P-38 and P-47 the USAAF wanted for the 8th Air Force. The P-47 was the USAAF planned new single engine single seat fighter, giving the P-38, P-47, B-17 and B-24 as the USAAF turbo supercharged 1942/43/44 planned front line combat force.

Coastal Command was taking the bulk of B-17 and B-24 allocations, The RAF wanted P-40s and P-51s, specifically did not want P-38 or P-39. Also Coastal Command wanted 500 PBY from USN but Tower/King were able to reduce that allocation to less than 100 later.

Not quite about the turrets, First B-17G were accepted in August 1943, first 8th Air Force B-17G loss 4 October.

First Chin turret delivered on modified B-17F as YB 40, operational in July.

Is invasion operation Torch or the invasions of Italy?

I lost the thread - Torch castrated the Bolero inspired 8th AF build up in late 1942. The planned invasion of Italy is what inspired Eisenhower to raid the 8th AF chicken coop once again in days leading to invasion of Sicily. June-July activities well documented in Davis
"Carl A. Spaatz" works.

The 8th's B-24 groups had an interesting 1943, with detachments to the Middle East, of which the Ploesti raid is the most famous. By mid year the 8th had 10 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups operational. The detachments meant that from the end of June to the beginning of September 1943 the 8th flew no B-24 operations while the number of B-17 groups rose to 16. It also meant despite having 4 operational B-24 groups in mid September the 8th was down to 1 as of the 19th, then back up to 4 on 4th October.

IIRC the movement of the 2nd BD B-24s began in May 1943. 8th AF operational bombers were entirely B-17 until the first of four B-24 groups went operational (again) on 2 October. Three by October 8th and all four by 9 October but none flew the second strike at Schweinfurt on the 14th. Our sources (mine:Freeman) could differ.

Torch itself had 3 squadrons of the 93rd deployed 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, what is termed Husky, Ploesti, Post Husky from 2 July to 22 August for the 44th, 93rd and 389th, then the same groups again 21 September to 1 October in 5th Army Support. For most of 1943 the Mediterranean offered the best opportunities to the western allies. Then with well supplied bases available in Foggia places out of range of Britain, like Ploesti and Austria were now in range. AWPD-1 southern force except the bombers were in Italy instead of Egypt.

Spaatz joined Eisenhower in posing that 8th move to Italy in summer 1943.

As I understand things there was no chance of absorption, if anything a pure night campaign would end up with the US absorbing the RAF given the numbers. Rather the 8th would convert a number of units to night operations while retaining others to do day operations where they had adequate fighter cover.

My understanding was that the plan in process would be to re-train on-site aircrew and provide for training in-bound B-17/B-24 crews to RAF BC tactics and infrastructure. There would be zero sense in subordinating RAF, either philosophically or practically to US Command for night operations. It was a horrible idea from my perspective. Fortunately the 8th was permitted to scale attacks to those in or close to P-38 escort, while re-building - and plan for Ops to re-start in January with anticipated increases to the hoped for long range fighter escort and promised range extensions for the P-47.

Over this was by mid 1943 everyone understood the combat radius of the P-51B even with 180 gallons of internal fuel was better than the existing P-38 and P-47, 500 miles with 150 gallons of external fuel. With probably better performance as well but it would be a 1944 fighter. While the plans for more internal fuel in all three fighters were being advanced. It makes the chances of the USAAF going over to night bombing in large numbers quite small.

Totally agree

Still the suggestions, like those for army and navy related operations, rubbed nerves still raw from the inter war period about airpower and who had the final say, present in all air forces.

Totally agree.

Admiral King definitely to the point there are claims it hampered the war effort. Not so sure about Arnold and Marshall, though they certainly had some strong comments about the British, mirroring some British comments about Americans. Patriots tend to assume "we" are the best. Some comments indicate the Mustang had a not invented here stigma.

Totally agree, and specifically to the 'not invented here' animosity in1942 and even 1943.

A lot of time and effort had gone into creation of the mass production and deployment systems backing the USAAF, sudden changes were most unwelcome and almost certainly going to cost aircraft numbers when everyone was screaming for more. You say you want North American to build the B-24 needed to drop bombs, now you say stop that, build P-51 to enable the B-24 built somewhere else to drop bombs? But you still want lots more B-24? Dallas had 1 B-24G accepted in March 1943, the next in June, ending B-24 production in November 1944. First P-51C in August 1943, one factory, two new designs, what could possibly go wrong? Remember we need all those Dallas built AT-6 as well. Meantime at Inglewood we have shut down AT-6 to free capacity mostly for B-25, now you want to transfer all B-25 production to Kansas City?

Totally agree - again.

Interesting to me is the USAAF deployments of the P-51B seem to really be about the use of the P-51 and P-51A, not picking up on the altitude performance increase. 1943 was the year the allied production system caught up to war needs instead of always being behind and that took time to understand, 1944 saw the wind down begin. I would not rule out inertia, an unwillingness or perceived inability to make big changes or deciding the current situation could not afford the change costs.

Totally agree - with amplification. The CAS branch of Military Requirements embraced the A-36, P-51A and P-51B as close air support/battlefield air superiority, while most of the other senior leaders picked sides and championed the P-47 and P-38. Barney Giles closed the discussions and convinced Arnold to order all new P-38J and P-51B to ETO. Even then, the Director of Air Defense, who was given assignment authority globally, assigned the P-51FG (354, 357, 363FG) to 9th AF with Invasion Tactical Air role.

Geoffrey - Before I bow out, I wish to thank you publicly for the Major contributions you made to my new book!

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

For those who want to skip the JD part search for ColFord.

I'm asking you.

To answer your question requires a list of bomber mafia members and where they were in 1943, with particular reference to having influence over 8th Air Force target decisions. To turn it around how did the 8th Air Force command continue to justify the tactic and account for the problems so far? Please provide the quotes.

Let me ask you again: what options did Eaker really have? Because it's pretty hard to come up with a scenario where either they are bombing something relatively unimportant because it's within fighter range or they are bombing something important and taking big losses.

There seems to be single definition of important being used, US only. Stay within fighter range and attack targets the Luftwaffe was willing to defend, that is considered important, or go after the ground targets the US said were important but out of escort range. In early 1943 the Luftwaffe knew it had to oppose the USAAF raids as they were going to continue and build and they had the bomb lift to do real damage to targets. Convincing the US to pause would be useful, to stop even better.

The only reason you have given me for believing that Eaker and Arnold ignore the results is because you say they did.

Once again Arnold is drawn in at a lower level command. The loss results were available, the raids continued, ipso facto the 8th Air Force ignored the accumulating results.

The mission data doesn't support a conclusion like that unless you ignore all other factors. When human judgement is involved you can't get a complete picture unless you know exactly what was in their minds.

So in other words we need to read the minds of dead people.

Not every waking minute of every day but what went into their reports or the private notes.

Which has nothing to do with the reality the attacks continued. Should I describe Frank Capra's movie night with FDR, Harpo Marx and others? How about his private conversations with General Marshall?

Let's take what drgondog said about the gunners' claims. Even if they accepted a third of the number, it's entirely possible to envisage a situation where Eaker has a set of figures on one side of the ledger saying that the Luftwaffe is losing aircraft in large numbers and on the other side is the Eighth's losses. Pretty soon one side is going to reach a breaking point. So it becomes a question of which balance sheet you believe over the other. That's not doctrine: that's probability.

So we depart from reality to how about if. To be winning the battle of material required about 3.5 to 1 losses, to be winning the personnel casualties around 20 to 1. Meantime though Eaker while in Britain flatly refused to learn about Ultra, he had members of his staff who knew, plus the RAF reports about German losses and strengths. Spaatz was Ultra cleared.

Yes the USAAF was willing to use overestimates of bomber gunner successes. The above winning the battle of attrition idea means ignoring the loss rates are above sustainable to go with the other side is even further above sustainable.

Also note Harris does not seem to have learnt about Ultra until 1945 or not at all, so no direct information on the oil campaign, but did learn all the 1941/42/43 Panacea targets did not give the expected results.

How do you know they ignored it? Where do they say that?

Again because the operations continued, including going deeper and therefore upping the risks. How many commanders have ever been quoted as saying they ignored their casualties?

If there is so much information out there that you have drawn this conclusion so clearly, do you think you could provide some direct quotes?

How about you providing some direct figures? After all I have pointed out I do not collect quotes, having seen too many times how they can be misused.

I stopped reading here.

When asked to provide proof of a statement and Just before, To misquote your first sentence, Nowhere in that quote from J.D. does he provide any first hand quotes from anyone that backs up what he said. So why should I accept his version of events? Please adhere to this level of proof from now on.

This is not acceptable in the context of a reasonable discussion and I see no point in continuing. I really hate doing this Geoffrey but it serves no further purpose.

Providing the level of proof you demand of others is obviously not possible.

You have a lot of excellent information Geoffrey and I have continually acknowledged that but you have not shown:

1) Any concrete evidence via quotes that either Arnold or Eaker "ignored" the advice, despite repeated requests;
2) That there was a direct link between the extensive figures you have presented and the claim that they ignored advice. In fact, the only supporting thing you have said what that the trend was obvious, which is not the same thing;
3) Any alternative high value targets that could have been bombed without sustaining heavy losses.

1) As I have repeated I provide the figures, you provide reasons why they must be set aside until a quote appears and again, drag Arnold into the 8th Air Force command structure.
2) It seems pointing out the operations continued and adding here were going deeper is not providing evidence the casualty figures were being ignored, glossed over, downplayed etc. Though I did like the fallback of they were not ignored, they just might have magnified the losses on the other side to make it look like it was working.
3) As noted what was high value to the US was not the necessarily the same to the Luftwaffe, to expand, the RAF operations had not delivered large bomb loads, the USAAF ones were going to and were going deeper as well. The Luftwaffe was obviously willing to fight over France, so continue that.

In journalism, the object in normal circumstances, is to get both sides of the story and the best available version of the truth. Very often that means asking difficult and occasionally confronting questions.

Can you provide a provable quote you have been a journalist? I note the creed and I note your failure to answer the difficult and occasionally confronting questions. Something those who dislike journalists point out, the often one way nature of "prove it".

What it is not is saying, "This is how it is, now prove me wrong."

Fine, I laid out the numbers of what happened, and in reply it is show me the quote, and ONLY the quote, otherwise scenarios like loss rates can be invented.

You could have helped here Geoffrey, you really could.

Help, some refuse it. Also helping to write fictional history is not my preference.

I did wonder about how long range bombing could be prioritised over the invasion of Sicily.

So where is the quote showing the priorities? The 8th Air Force temporarily transferred 3 B-24 groups to the Mediterranean. How many more before priority is reversed? Next comes what resources the commanders wanted, how many more heavy bombers? Next comes how many more aircraft could be supported as air forces are supply heavy units.

Harris was a different story. It became clearer the longer the war went on that Harris was running his own war.

Actually the reverse was the case. The Battle of Berlin left a legacy, next came the period of SHAEF control and the known success of the oil campaign (unlike almost any other economic target the allies, mostly via the Luftwaffe, gained a good idea of the bombing results).

Target choice was quixotic and without any serious signs of cooperation.

So how is quixotic defined? How often did the 8th Air Force co-operate with Bomber Command?

At the end of the campaign Eisenhower had more praise for Harris than Spaatz, if you understand the main objective was to get the allied armies into Germany that rates Harris above Spaatz. Harris flew to the SHAEF meetings, Spaatz tended to delegate. In 1944/45 Bomber Command reports 119,935 long tons of bombs on troops and defences, Richard Davis thinks the 8th Air Force dropped 43,932 short tons on tactical targets, the 24 and 25 July 1944 Operation Cobra bombings were 4,088.8 short tons.

My understanding is that he was asked to bomb the Schweinfurt factories by night but declined because he believed the target too small.

When was this asked? As for small it looks like Schweinfurt had 36,000 people on around 293 acres, or under 0.5 square miles, in late 1943 and early 1944 for targets in Germany Bomber Command was putting around 55% of its bombs within 3 miles of the aiming point. There are a number of night raids where the marking was far enough off the target was effectively missed, the further into Germany the bigger the errors. The night raid of 24/25 February 1944, 734 aircraft sent 662 credited with attacking, 32 missing, 3 category E, 1,372.8 short tons HE, 1,160.8 short tons incendiary followed the USAAF raid of the 24th, 238 attacking, 11 missing, 399.3 short tons HE, 175.3 short tons incendiary, the raid reports tend to merge the overall results. In theory this was part of an idea for day bombers to light fires to guide night bombers, did not work well fire wise and in any case in February 1944 the last thing Bomber Command could afford was becoming predictable or going deep inside Germany.

This was almost reasonable by his lights.

Then let us be reasonable, Bomber Command knocked out all its assigned oil targets before the 8th Air Force did, Harris then waited for Portal to ask for more. Bomber Command raids on specific targets, say a refinery, that hit bad weather could be reclassified city strikes, post war the 8th Air Force altered its target classifications removing city and substituting things like marshalling yards. When you look at the Bomber Command city strikes and 8th AF bombing through 8 to 10/10 cloud from the second half of 1944 on, they keep matching.

Harris followed orders, in particular he attacked the specific targets and made the point he did so because otherwise the people behind the ideas about targets would blame Bomber Command for failing, rather than admit they were wrong. In the end the allies largely stopped trying for industrial bottlenecks, the Harris Panacea Targets, oil for Wehrmacht mobility an exception, and concentrated on knocking out the transport links. The big rail marshalling yards tended to be well within city limits as the rail system had allowed the city growth, many of the key industries tended to be the more modern ones and more located on the city fringes.

Thanks to the rise of electronics sometime in the second half of 1944 the night attacks started to be on average more accurate than the day ones, dropping bigger bombs and staying over target longer which suppressed damage control, making them more long term damaging. Remarkable how much of the shorthand of the bomber campaign simplifies things.

The thousand bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942 actually had three aiming points, one was basically the centre of the built up area, the other two on the fringes, near rail junctions, they were outside the Hohenstaufen Hollenzollern "ring road". Listed as city strike.

On 13 October 1944 the 8th and Bomber Command were ordered to undertake operation Hurricane, a demonstration of a short term maximum effort allied air power against targets in the Ruhr. This seems to be the explanation of the 8th mainly hitting targets around Cologne on the 14th, 15th, 17th and 18th of October. Bomber Command hit Duisberg on the 14th, a daylight raid of over 1,000 aircraft and then again that night with another 1,000 aircraft raid, overall nearly 9,000 tons of bombs hit Duisberg within 24 hours, or around 20% of Bomber Commands bomb tonnage dropped against towns in the month. All up that 24 hours was the largest effort made by Bomber Command on any day in the war, with 10,050 tons of bombs dropped.

The actual number of NA-73 lost in transit to the UK is around 20. In digging through all the various source documentation on losses for NA-73 Mustang I from the USA to the UK, there is contradiction between figures in original documentation in the exact number lost and which airframes were lost, but it keeps coming out on average around 20.

I do not have the individual aircraft cards, I do have the RAF Serial Registers and British Import Reports. Four from UK to USSR AG348, AG352 to 354

From the first order of 320, 21 lost en route to UK: AG370-373, AG406-410, 428, 429, 434, 436, 440, 448, 468, 473, 480, 481, 483, 501, but AG406 assumed lost at sea, serial register entry ambiguous

AG370 to 373 SOC 16 Dec 41
AG406 to 410 SOC 23 Dec 41 (AG406 entry ambiguous, at Speke 30 Jan 42?)
AG428, 429, 434, 436, 440, 448, 468, 473, 480, 481, 483, 501 SOC 17 Feb 42

Imports were 691 mark I and 50 mark II, mark I/Ia orders were 320+300+150, total 770, less 58 Ia retained by US and 21 lost at sea is 691.

For the first order all 320 acceptances finished in March 1942, final 2 deliveries and exports in May. Second order, all 300 acceptances March to July 1942, with 1 delivery in August making 298 deliveries, then 1 delivery in January and the final 1 in June 1943, which match the single imports reported in February and July 1943. The mark II arrived June/July, the first mark III in September 1943.

This is a complicated discussion.

Yes things kept changing often rapidly.

Just before AWPD-1 delivered in Sept 1941, USAAC FM-1-15 "Tactics and Techniques of Air Fighting" led by the same key contributor Muir Fairchild. The basic tenant was that a primary mission of the Air Forces was to 'Destroy the Hostile Air Forces Freedom of the Air". The re-prioritized Emmons Board 'to-do' list placed the 1500mi range singe engine fighter as number one for FY42 Developments. That said, there was a key statement made in AWPD-1, namely "It is unwise to neglect the development of escort fighters designed to enable bombardment formations to fight through to their objective".

Yes, no one came out and said give up on escorts but did either say or imply keep going and see anyway, for me AWPD-1 translated part of this into self defending bombers, while AWPD-42 seems to have cut the required escort range from B-29 to B-17, then later came the shorter range of the B-17 in Europe using 8th Air Force tactics.

I would cite the Slessor arrangement arising from ABC conversations Jan-Mar 1941, followed by the Arcadia Conference between FDR and Churchill Dec/Jan 1942 as reference. From Huston (American Airpower Comes of Age) -- "it called for Britain to retain all the output from her own production, all US produced aircraft from their orders in process, all French orders, an allocation from continuing US production as well as the 'entire output, from any new expansion. If America drawn in the war new US capacity would be split 50-50".

As far as I know in 1941 the US did not desire any British aircraft, I have no idea of the month to month status, one book claims as of 1 December 1940, 2,100 US aircraft delivered to British out of 23,000 on order. One point at this stage British tended to be the Empire, as time went on the dominions part started to order for themselves.

March 1941 effectively predates Lend Lease which means Britain was paying cash for the orders, the allocation sounds Lend Lease, the take any extra is a remarkable bid. I would like to know what the US was projecting as the 1942 output, if the usual it would be optimistic. 1940 had seen the upheaval of France dropping out, 1941 saw lend Lease, then December saw a lot of assumptions proven incorrect.

The underlying issue was that ALL of the allocations were new US aircraft, approximately 5 percent for B-17/B-24, and 8 percent of Transport. I don't remember the A-20, B-25 etc. allocation but it was high.

I assume high in terms of percentage of production.

Coupled with the attrition in growth was the pressure to subordinate US rmy and Navy to British Command. "You provide the resources, we'll run the operations. Run along littel boy". was the perceived attitudes that Marshall, Arnold and King experienced.

I can understand that, the we are number 1 attitude, the Americans faced a command now over 2 years into a war, the US was theory, and would learn the gap in Casablanca, they were much less prepared and so the "British view" prevailed. Even though Eisenhower was in charge in the MTO. I assume there was also the apprehension FDR was giving anything the British asked for.

The committed allocation pointed to RAF and Coastal Command receiving 31% of total 1942 US tactical airplane production.

Putting the USN to one side that seems about right for the actual combat operations in 1942. The US point of view would prefer more investment in US units turning up 1943. One of the British complaints was the US kept underestimating the effort needed to keep up front line strength.

Coastal Command was taking the bulk of B-17 and B-24 allocations,

B-17 definitely, end February 1943, Coastal Command had 44 B-24, there were 30 more in reserve etc. in Britain, 11 en route from US to either Britain or overseas, 20 being assembled in Britain, another 13 with BOAC, 13 in Middle East, 21 in India, 21 in Canada, total 173, losses put at 40 in Britain, 23 overseas. This includes what the US called LB-30 etc.

Also Coastal Command wanted 500 PBY from USN but Tower/King were able to reduce that allocation to less than 100 later.

That sort of puts the Cinderella Command at the ball dripping in jewels. PBY production in 1941 was 395, and 729 in 1942. I cannot find anything about an order for 500 in the USN production reports. Order 88477 LL from 30 June 1941 ended up as 60 USN, 90 Empire, the supplement dated 19 December was 75 for Empire, after that British PBY were offsets from USN orders. Also no idea where the 500 PBY were intended to go but I suspect it includes RCAF and RAAF aircraft at least.

First Chin turret delivered on modified B-17F as YB 40, operational in July.

Did not think of the YB-40, Richard Davis idea of combat record,
29-May-43 St. Nazaire 7 sorties.
22-Jun-43 Huls 11 sorties, 1 loss.
25-Jun-43 Misc., Ge 4 sorties.
28-Jun-43 St. Nazaire 6 sorties.
04-Jul-43 Nantes 3 sorties.
10-Jul-43 Caen/Carpiquet 3 sorties.
24-Jul-43 Heroya 1 sortie.
26-Jul-43 Hannover/Nordhafen 1 sortie.
28-Jul-43 Kassel/Bettenhausen/Fieseler 2 sorties.
29-Jul-43 Kiel 1 sortie.
16-Aug-43 Le Bourget 1 sortie.

I think the 327th squadron of 92nd Bomb Group had YB-40 added around 8 May 1943 and removed in July, but the above says some YB-40 were around in August.

IIRC the movement of the 2nd BD B-24s began in May 1943. 8th AF operational bombers were entirely B-17 until the first of four B-24 groups went operational (again) on 2 October. Three by October 8th and all four by 9 October but none flew the second strike at Schweinfurt on the 14th. Our sources (mine:Freeman) could differ.

My in theory daily 8th AF OOB, based on sources including Freeman, has 2 operational and 1 non operational B-24 groups on 11 June, down to 1+1 on 25 June, 0+1 on 27 June, 0 in early? July, back up to 1 non operational on 1 August, 2 on the 24th, 4 on the 26th, 3+1 on 8th September, 4 on the 9th, to 3 on the 17th, 1 on the 19th, back to 2 on 2nd October, 3 on the 3rd, 4 on the 4th, stayed that way until 4th November when 2 new non operational groups arrived in Britain.

Spaatz joined Eisenhower in posing that 8th move to Italy in summer 1943.

Odd, Italy only became available in September, and it was further away from most of Germany. Sounds at least partly empire building, or believing they were headed to the Alps by end of year.

The CAS branch of Military Requirements embraced the A-36, P-51A and P-51B as close air support/battlefield air superiority, while most of the other senior leaders picked sides and championed the P-47 and P-38.

Almost like RAF Army Co-operation, sounds like the relevant commanders pitched for what they had a good chance of getting while trying to avoid the older types, while the majority went with we agree with the official program, in house is best.

Before I bow out, I wish to thank you publicly for the Major contributions you made to my new book!

Thanks, I think, not quite sure what I did but I will take it, let me know when the book is published so I can figure things out.

 

[drgondog]

Geoffrey, in addition to details concerning timing and quantities of the P-47 deliveries in SPWA your cited FAREP details led me to believe that much of Bernard Boylon's research data might be found in one location. A2069 reel from USAFHRC was the crown jewel of daily correspondence, questions and decisions surrounding the Long Range Escort development. So both Droppable Tank Program section and FAREP sections in A2069 were critical in nailing down the Republic 'questions'.

As to the rest of your comments, your data trumped my hazy memory regarding YB-40 start of ops (as an example) and I had no dispute with the rest of your individual citations and data based opinions.

 

[SaparotRob]

...Should I describe Frank Capra's movie night with FDR, Harpo Marx and others?...

YES YES YES!

 

[ColFord]

I do not have the individual aircraft cards, I do have the RAF Serial Registers and British Import Reports. Four from UK to USSR AG348, AG352 to 354

From the first order of 320, 21 lost en route to UK: AG370-373, AG406-410, 428, 429, 434, 436, 440, 448, 468, 473, 480, 481, 483, 501, but AG406 assumed lost at sea, serial register entry ambiguous

AG370 to 373 SOC 16 Dec 41
AG406 to 410 SOC 23 Dec 41 (AG406 entry ambiguous, at Speke 30 Jan 42?)
AG428, 429, 434, 436, 440, 448, 468, 473, 480, 481, 483, 501 SOC 17 Feb 42

Imports were 691 mark I and 50 mark II, mark I/Ia orders were 320+300+150, total 770, less 58 Ia retained by US and 21 lost at sea is 691.

For the first order all 320 acceptances finished in March 1942, final 2 deliveries and exports in May. Second order, all 300 acceptances March to July 1942, with 1 delivery in August making 298 deliveries, then 1 delivery in January and the final 1 in June 1943, which match the single imports reported in February and July 1943. The mark II arrived June/July, the first mark III in September 1943.

AM Form 78 and other RAF 'in-service' documentation variously gives 19, 20 or 21 lost in transit.

Example AG434 is shown allocated to No.225 Squadron RAF as part of their initial allocation of NA-73 Mustang I and then also recorded in a casualty from a ground accident 1 June 1942. So multiple documents and instances in reporting of AG434 being in service with RAF. Then begs the question did someone make an error in the paperwork at the time and incorrectly list another airframe as AG434, but then which one is not evident from the Form 78 entries and other documentation.

As you have indicated, AG406 is another one with ambigious entries.

The four to Russia had all been assembled and flown in the UK before being disassembled and shipped to Russia.

Also the end of February 1943 'census' accounting for the Mustang IA shows 93, whilst 92 actually received by UK/RAF. This one I have long suspected was someone incorrectly, mistakenly including the NA-83 Mustang I that was used as the 'proof of concept' and trials aircraft for the 20mm Hispano armament AM180 as a IA rather than its true status as a modified NA-83.

So in other words we need to read the minds of dead people.

My preferred method was talking, corresponding, questioning as many of the relevant people as I could before they died and keeping records of their responses. The other alternative, has been getting access to wartime correspondence and diaries kept by various people which can give good insights into their views and opinions at the time. I was also fortunate to get access to the unpublished personal accounts of a number of key people, which contained a lot of quite candid accounts about events and opinions of various things - aircraft, places, people - that certainly provided a different perspective (and some new 'rabbit holes' to go down on research).

The personal papers, diairies and other ephemera of quite a few of the senior figures involved are held in various collections, some public, some private, and I know a few researchers who have made good use of such material.

The various official files can also often provide good insight into the thought processes behind various decisions and actions. Some of the 'gold' is the files where drafts of proposed responses to intra or inter-service discussions, or drafts of proposed policy decision documents are included. The pencil written notes in margins of the drafts by the very senior people can give great insights; as can file notes from some of the lower staff people when they are making inquiries about a particular subject and feeding the input up to the very senior people and the very senior person hand writes their opinion of the file note - often an uncensored opinion of policies and other people.

 

[yosimitesam]

People, and groups of people, did make mistakes. I in my own opinion there is a difference between make a 'mistake' and covering it up to avoid criticism and making a 'mistake' or making choices to advance a certain agenda. Sometimes the agenda was not inline with actually winning the war.
Now at what point does a 'mistake' cross the line from simple mistake to willful suppression of technology or tactics in order to further an agenda that should be secondary to winning the war?
Much like the Japanese Army and Navy fighting each other for 'glory' instead of trying to fight the allies together.
Many Allied armed forces were fighting each other for 'dominance' in their own countries as much as they were fighting the enemy, the upstart air forces were starting from further behind and were fighting for funding, prestige, (promotions?) and their own future. The existing Armies and Navies were fighting to maintain their own funding, dominance, prestige.

Given that, at what point do we look at certain actions/decisions made by certain officers/leaders and declare them the result of a 'mafia', a semi secret group trying to control the outcome of the war, campaign for their own benefit? This can be as crass as getting kick backs from war contracts to just expanding their own branch of the service to increase it's influence (budget). For the US it took until 1957 for the first Joint Chief of Staff be an Air Force Officer. Now without the Strategic Air Command and nuclear bombs would that have ever happened? And without the 8th Air Force or the 20th and 21st Air Forces/groups operating against Japan would SAC ever had come into being. British commonwealth members can substitute in Bomber Command.
The pre war Air Forces were concerned with expanding the size/budget/prestige of their own Force at the expense (somewhat fixed defense budgets) of the Army and Navy and the only way they could do that was by claiming they could "win" the war in a different way than a WW I blood bath.

US Torpedo Scandal was bad enough but that was about keeping their own cushy jobs (not getting fired or losing the contracts) not steering policy decisions affected tens of thousands (hundreds?) of men and wide spread policy/procurements that affected many parts of war fighting.

Agree. Also keep in mind the 400lb gorilla in the room: The AAF wanted to be an independent force like the Army and Navy (and the RAF) and I think that fact hovered over AAF policy like smoke in a room. Maybe not always spoken about, but always there. Proving that air power could "win the war" without putting boots on the ground was a means to an end, that end being the culmination of the universal desire in AAF to be an independent force, come what may. Because of this desire, the entire upper command of the AAF was a "good fella" (Mafia) in a sense and this occasionally blinded them to what was obvious and practical.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Excerpts from The Name Above The Title by Frank Capra

The day the White house showing of Prelude to War was scheduled General Marshall invited me to lunch alone with him in his office. He was most friendly and most pleased that his idea of troop information films had started so auspiciously with Prelude to War. He asked me if all the film was authentic. I said it was. Our only re-creations were newspaper headlines and, of course, the animated expository war maps. He asked where the enemy film came from. I told him I had possession of all German, Japanese, and Italian newsreels made in the last twenty years. And also most of their propaganda documentaries made before and during the war.

Then he wanted to know how I obtained the film. "General Marshall, it's a long, boring story. Point is, I've got all the captured enemy film, I'm negotiating for Russian war film, T. Y. Lo of the China News Agency has promised me all their Chinese film, and Donovan's O.S.S. is stealing current enemy newsreels for me in border countries . . ."

I was hoping he wouldn't bring up the next subject, but he did. "Osborn has hinted that you've had problems with the Signal Corps. Have you?" "No real problems, sir." "Frank, these Why We Fight films are of enormous value, for us and for our allies. Any delays from any source — and you come direct to me." "General Marshall," I said jokingly, "I'll make you a deal. I'll let you stick to winning the war, if you let me stick to minding the film store."

He grinned. He liked people who knew they could get things done. He then said Secretary Stimson wanted to make certain that all policy statements made in Prelude to War had been checked for accuracy. "Have they?" he asked. I answered that all policy questions had been checked with State, OWI (Office of War Information), and Presidential advisers such as Lowell Mellett. To most questions we got clear-cut answers; to some, elliptical answers or none at all. On these matters my staff and I stood back and did what the General himself had advised: made the best objective guesses as to what our policies had been.

Again he beamed at my answer, and said he would have Osborn run the films for State, OWI, and for congressional leaders. Only then did it dawn on me just how far General Marshall was sticking his neck out in having the Army make information films (propaganda his detractors would call them) for captive Army audiences. Only his great faith in the belief that free men are better fighting men when they are well informed could make this great soldier step into a psychological arena where civilian angels feared to tread.

In the next couple of years I was to enjoy many such talks with General Marshall, especially during dinners with him alone at the Chief of Staff's house, "Quarters Number One," the large, comfortable, two-story red-brick building at Fort Myer, Virginia, across the Memorial Bridge. Only a Filipino enlisted cook would be with the General. Between seven and seven thirty we would have two stiff, bourbon old-fashioneds which the Chief liked to mix himself.

There would be talk of course, but absolutely no war talk. That day he probably had had to make decisions that affected the fate of nations; tomorrow he would face problems equally crucial. But that evening he would be calm and unworried as he listened to my chatting. Once, I asked him how he stood up under the strain; he answered: "I've had to train myself never to worry about a decision once it's made. You worry before you make it, but not after. You make the best judgment you can about a problem—then forget it. If you don't, your mind is not fit to make the next decision."

At exactly seven thirty the Filipino would serve dinner at a small table, and for the next hour and a half I would answer questions about all the techniques of motion pictures: acting, photography, sound recording, animated cartoons, musical comedies. Or, I would tell him about my early years, or Papa's green thumb; how he could make mature orange tree limbs grow roots, then saw them off and present them to friends as full-bearing orange trees; how he sprinkled ground-up minerals around the roots of rose bushes and changed the colors of the roses.

And when he found out I owned a large fruit ranch he wanted to know all the details, and being a compost buff himself, he flipped his top when I described to him our large concrete compost pits and the machinery for making and turning the compost. This in turn would inspire the General to talk in glowing terms about his Dodona Manor in Leesburg, Virginia, where he hoped to retire and plant all kinds of fruits, vegetables, and flowers. And I would plead with him not to use any poisonous sprays.

His eyes shone as he spoke of working with soil. But they shone brightest when he talked of his experiences in commanding CCC boys' camps in Florida and the Pacific Northwest. For in those camps he first met the frail, anemic, poverty-stricken youths of the Great Depression. In those camps he first decided to bring young men back to health, courage, and manhood through education—feeding the mind as well as the stomach—teaching them to acquire abilities that would make the most of their born-with capacities.

It was his experience with the CCC boys that led him to conceive and add a new and revolutionary concept to the American Army—a Morale Division which catered to the welfare of the mind and soul of a soldier. For the first time a heart was implanted into a military system that had referred to service men as "bodies" and "numbers." One result of that new concept: The Why We Fight series of Army information films. Another result: lasting friendship with one of the great men of our century, George Catlett Marshall.

To those who knew and loved G.C.M., it was no accident that Chief of Staff Marshall, the architect of military victory in Europe, should, as Secretary of State Marshall, be the architect of the Marshall Plan to help Europe recover from "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos". Nor did it surprise us when he was honored with the Nobel Peace Prize.

...

"CAPRA!" SAID GENERAL SOMMERVELL as we rode from the Pentagon to the White House in a staff car flying three-star flags, "Have you ever met the President?" "No, sir." "Have you ever seen the Grand Canyon?" I nodded. "Well, meeting F.D.R. is like seeing the Big Hole the first time — you feel puny."

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was not the largest man in the world, nor even the largest President. Taft was. But F.D.R. made you feel he was. At least he loomed large to me as I shook his hand with all the aplomb of a man standing on his first pair of ice skates. His head was the biggest, his face the widest, and his smile the most expansive I had ever seen. By every measure he was a big man—including time; he had occupied the White House longer than any other President, and gave not the slightest indication that he was about to call a moving van.

As Secret Service men wheeled him into the middle of the front row of chairs, the President introduced us to a woman guest who sat down next to him—Duchess "somebody," from Luxembourg or "some place"--"and," he said to me, indicating two other guests, "you must know these two jackanapes." I nodded to Harpo Marx and Alexander Woollcott.

"Sommervell!" called out the President, sky-writing with a lighted cigarette on the end of a very long holder, "an Army picture, tonight, Well, how about briefing us with some of the gory details—and don't forget the meaning of the word 'brief'" His laugh was big, too, and truly infectious--in spite of the noblesse oblige to laugh at Presidential "jokes" General Sommervell laughed the loudest. Apparently, he and F.D.R. were old friends, used to guying each other. The President turned to Woollcott. "Alex there was a play about brief---brief something—" "Brief Moment, Mr. President, by Sam Behrman--"

''That's it. Come forward, Sommervell! And enjoy your brief moment." (It always shocked me to witness the monkeyshines of national leaders in wartime, not realizing how desperately they needed occasional release from nerves rubbed raw by worry.)

The General stepped in front of F.D.R. He seemed to relish the horseplay. "Instant brief, Mr. President. All you need to know about this film, in five little words: It's a Frank Capra film." Harpo Marx guffawed and led the applause.
"Touché, touché!" applauded the President. Then he turned back to me, "Take a bow, young man, take a bow—" I rose, bowed in all directions. Evidently, you either got off on the right foot with F.D.R., or you didn't get off at all. Harpo gave me a big Mack Sennett wink of approval.

I waved to the projectionist to roll the film. The lights went out. General Sommervell sat down on my right, and suddenly a wraith-like man slipped into a chair on my left. "Frank Capra," he whispered, "I'm Harry Hopkins. Welcome." I shook the soft hand and looked into the soft doe eyes of F.D.R.'s lean, lanky, hatchet man whose name and ulcers had become international items.

The day was on the verge of becoming too much for my trick stomach when the opening chords of Alfred Newman's magnificent music made us all sit up. (Newman had composed, arranged, conducted, and recorded the score of Prelude to War at Twentieth Century-Fox without charge.) On the screen our Liberty Bell tolled its paean to freedom. Over the ringing bell these titles appeared,

The U.S. Army
presents
Prelude to War
Produced by
The War Department

followed by a written statement over General Marshall's signature, declaring that this film and subsequent films in the series were made by the War Department to "acquaint members of the Army with factual information as to the causes, the events leading up to our entry in the war, and the principles for which we are fighting . . ." (No names of any individuals were ever mentioned or credited in any of our Army information films.)

Franklin Roosevelt was not one to yield the floor lightly to any person or any thing. But after the first five minutes of being "on"—chatting to those around him and to the screen—he settled into a statue-like stillness. Harry Hopkins nudged me, and whispered: "Congratulations, Frank. You've got him. And he's the world's biggest ham."

The film ended on the faces of marching citizen-soldiers of all free nations. Superimposed over these young men was this Draconian statement of their task:

"No compromise is possible and the victory of the democracies can only be complete with the utter defeat of the war machines of Germany and Japan." G. C. Marshall. Chief of Staff

When the lights went on, F.D.R. triggered an applause that sounded very sincere. "Every man, woman, and child in the world must see this film," he asserted over the din.

Both Harpo Marx, a favorite of the Eastern "in" clique, and Alex Woollcott, one of the clique's bellwethers, shook my hand profusely. That was holy oil from the intellectual curia.

"Frank Capra," said the President, "will this—what's the title—yes, Prelude to War. Will it be shown in theaters?"

"No, Mr. President. Only in Army camps."

"Why? Civilians need to see it as much as soldiers."

"Mr. President," I answered, in defense of our industry, "movie houses are privately owned. If they play one government information film they fear a flood of others. And they say the public will resent dull official films. Besides that, Mr. President, I acquired some free film and free services on condition the film plays only in Army camps."

"Well, isn't that all just too bad," said Mr. President with biting sympathy. Then he ordered Harry Hopkins to see Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, and Lowell Mellett, Federal Coordinator of Films, about persuading theater owners to show the film.

Later on as we all sat in a small library-like room having highballs, and enjoying the President's trading quip for quip with us, I began to understand why that rich Harvard-bred extrovert had become the patron saint of the downtrodden. Charm he had, and charisma to spare. But his greatest asset was the way he made you—no matter who or what you were—feel important. He did it mostly by being a great listener.

He knew that the overpowering presence of the President of the United States could turn strong men weak, and weak men imbecilic. So with a big friendly smile, and the glint of intense interest in his sparkling eyes, he would encourage you to talk about yourself, your family, your work, anything. "Well, I declare!" he'd exclaim after you'd made some inane statement. By little laughs, and goads, and urgings such as "Really? Tell me more!" . . . "Well, what do you know!" . . . "Same thing's happened to me dozens of times!" . . . "Oh, that's fascinating" . . . his warmth would change you from a stuttering milquetoast to an articulate raconteur. And you would remain forever in his debt. And who knows? You might also walk down the sawdust trail and join the forever-Roosevelt faithfuls. He almost converted me into becoming a Democrat.

...

I think it was Sidney Bernstein, head of the film division of the Ministry Information, who brought me the heart-stopping news: "The P.M. want's to see you in his office---

I wangled a car and driver from Major Hugh Stuart, and rushed to 10 Downing Street.

It had to be the crowning moment of my life when Winston Churchill took my hand in both of his and complimented me so highly for the Why We Fight films. He told me how grateful he was to General Marshall and to me and my boys for the whole project, and that if I would bring a camera and sound equipment to his office I could photograph him speaking a foreword that he had written "to introduce your great films to a grateful British public—"

Before dawn next morning (September 29) a British crew and I were pushing cameras, cables, and mike booms over a wall, across a small garden, and into a rear window of Churchill's office at 10 Downing Street. Tony Veiller was hanging around hoping he could get a glimpse of England's greatest Prime Minister. I told him to go around to the front door and wait. I would try and sneak him in for the filming.

When I walked into the Cabinet Office through a back door, there was Veiller in the Prime Minister's chair reading a paper. "How'd you get in here?" I asked. "Nothing to it,' he said, barely looking up. "I knocked on the front door and said I was Captain Veiller, here to oversee the filming of the P.M. Are you ready, boy?"

We were all ready for the P.M. when he came through a side door with the Spanish Ambassador. My imagination, of course, but I was sure I could smell the P.M.'s brandy breath clear across the room. I introduced him to Tony Veiller. Veiller swayed but remained upright. Then the great man, in good mood, sat in his chair, set down his cigar, and took from his pocket a sheaf of hand written notes — his speech. The thickness of the sheaf worried me. The foreword must not be too long. I asked him for a voice test. He read the first line of his notes. I thought his delivery was too slow. The director in me got the best of me. I leaned over his desk and asked him to please speed up his delivery a little.

He looked up at me roguishly, over his glasses, and said: "Young man, I've been making speeches to audiences since before you were born."

It dawned on me that I was trying to tell the greatest orator of modern times how he should make a speech. I salaamed deeply and retreated. But as I reached the safety of behind the camera, I said: "Yes, Mr. P.M., but this audience is going to pay to hear you talk." With rare good humor he salaamed back at me, and we bowed to each other. His speech brought a lump to my throat, particularly the line: "I have never seen or read any more powerful statement of our cause . . "

There is little doubt that Churchill's public praise of my Army films zoomed my personal stock with our own Army brass in Europe. Indoctrinating the high command to the value of film (not an easy job), and forcing drastic, upgrading changes in the whole Signal Corps system of field photography, became much easier when my personal reputation gained me ready access to Lieutenant General Devers, his staff, and the staffs of Air Force Generals Spatz and Doolittle. Of course, my standing needed no upping to Jimmy Doolittle. He and I had battled and respected each other since we were teenagers.

...

He was Army. In a driving rainstorm I photographed Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower delivering the commencement address to the 1943 graduating class at Sandhurst (British equivalent of our West Point). The gist of his speech

"Gentlemen, in the middle of a war, you have just graduated as professional officers in the profession of war. A profession, my fellow officers, that is the most archaic, brutal, senseless, destructive, bestial, de-humanising profession ever invented by man. It should have been abolished long, long ago. But we have a job to do, a dirty, brutal job. There is an evil loose in the world that glorifies war; that would destroy by war all we old dear. It must not prevail!"

...

He was navy. He stood slim, straight, white-thatched. He was Commander in Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC). He stood alone in the doorway of his office at Pearl Harbor. He was four star Admiral Chester Nimitz.

I was coming downstairs from Admiral "Bull" Halsey's office. I would have to pass right by Admiral Nimitz. Was he waiting for me? Would he renege on the all-important Special Film Coverage directive I had written for him, and he had signed? Had MacArthur nixed the order to integrate all combat photography? Had the Air Force? Marines?

I hesitated, then saluted, and walked by him.

"Oh Capra! Can you spare a moment?"

I went limp. "Of course, Admiral"

Behind his desk, his back to me, he faced a window that looked out over our sunken warships. "Sit down, please" he said, huskily. "I apologise for calling you in here. It's just this - this - goddam sonofabitch of a WAR!"

His hands clasped and unclasped behind him as he slowly rocked back and forth on his heels. Then out of the depths of an overwhelming hurt he cried out: "They cheered me . . . Three thousand of them . . . Eighteen year olds . . . Legs gone, faces gone . . . They cheered me . . . I sent them there . . . They cheered me . . ."

Then he turned, sat heavily in his chair and with tears streaming down his face, he beat the table with both fists: "GODDAM SONOFABITCH OF A WAR! GODDAM SONOFABITCH OF A WAR! What am I going to write to their parents? What can ANYBODY write to their parents? . . ." He grabbed his wet face in both his hands. He was sobbing now. A father weeping for all the sons in the world. "Eighteen year olds . . . kids . . . boys . . . three thousand of them . . . back from Kwajalein . . . I went to the hospital . . . Legs gone . . . faces gone . . . They cheered me . . . I sent them there . . . They cheered me . . GODDAM SONOFABITCH OF A WAR! . . . goddam sonofa-----" His handkerchief was out now. Not once had he looked at me directly.

I sat as if transfixed. Tears had started down my cheeks. The white-thatched admiral blew his nose, composed himself, then looking at me with a shy little smile, he said pleasantly: "Thank you Capra. Thank you."

He had wanted to share his great pain with another human being - someone that was not navy. I rose to my feet, tried to mumble something, I couldn't. So I smiled back and walked out. I had witnessed something rare. Something awesome - the inside of a tormented human soul.

 

[drgondog]

Agree. Also keep in mind the 400lb gorilla in the room: The AAF wanted to be an independent force like the Army and Navy (and the RAF) and I think that fact hovered over AAF policy like smoke in a room. Maybe not always spoken about, but always there. Proving that air power could "win the war" without putting boots on the ground was a means to an end, that end being the culmination of the universal desire in AAF to be an independent force, come what may. Because of this desire, the entire upper command of the AAF was a "good fella" (Mafia) in a sense and this occasionally blinded them to what was obvious and practical.

Another interpretation is that the 'dream was so real that risking failure by being bullheaded in belief that B-17 didn't need escort was a recognized Stupididty'. If Daylight bombing fails, the dream evaporates.

The early issue (1930s) was that there was no belief that any single engine fighter could achieve the necessary fuel fraction to go all the way and still be able to meet much lighter enemy interceptors one on one. Even when the P-51B demonstrated that it WAS feasible, there were still top leaders (Schlatter, CG Directorate, Ground Support and Saville, CG Chief Air Defense) who resisted the allocation of P-51B to escort fighter role. Saville championed the P-38 and actually attempted to give the P-51B to the French to replace their P-39s. Arnold stepped in and forced Saville to allocate ALL new P-51B and P-38J FGs to the ETO in summer 1943.

The XP-75 was the contract vehicle for such '1500 mile fighter' prioritized in the 1941 Emmons Board recommendations. The selection pointed to Echols' bias by awarding the contract to GMC/Fisher based on 'big company' and betting on Don Berlin, recently departed from Curtiss after XP-46 disaster. The YB-40 was the interim solution but clearly only 'convoy escort concept', with no hope of 'denying enemy airpower control of the skies'.

That Schweinfurt and succeeding catastrophic losses occurred between a.) identifying the P-51B as the high potential solution but only just recently in serial production, and b.) actual delivery of the first and high priority P-51B equipped 354th FG, was simply there was a war going on and 8th AF had to fight with what it had at the time.

Shouldn't confuse mistakes in judgement regarding the early selected vehicles as malice toward the concept of escort fighter?