Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

As noted production schedules kept being updated, the further out they projected the less accurate they became.

AFHRA 218.8.2 Special Monthly War Dept Report of Airplanes
March 1940, estimate for YP-38 acceptances July to November 1940, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, for P-38 January to June 1941, 8, 9, 12, 14, 20, 3. YP-38 delay due to contractor's effort to build redesigned first article using untried production tooling. P-38 the delays incurred on the YP-38 airplanes are automatically affecting P-38 airplanes.

Actual acceptances, YP-38 1 in Sep-40, 1 in Jan-41, then March to June 2, 4, 4, 1, P-38 July to October 1941, 1, 22, 12, 1

Note the delays in Curtiss P-40 acceptances in 1940 are put down to shortage of engines, manufacturing difficulties and changes required due to failure of wing on static test.

1942
P-38 allocations for RAF, starting in January, monthly, 20, 20, 20, 20, 55, actual deliveries 17 in January and 120 in July.

13 May 1942, allocations for May and June 1942,
May 135 US + 50 RAF P-38, ? F-4/5, actual deliveries 100 P-38, 18 F-4
June 91 US + 50 RAF P-38, ? F-4/5, actual deliveries 100 P-38, 29 F-4
29 July 1942, allocations for August 1942, 100 P-38, 20 F-5, actual deliveries 105 P-38, 24 F-4, 1 F-5

1943
P-38 and F-5 allocations, 180, 200, 225, 250, 260, 270, 280, 290, 300, 310, 320, 325 total 3,210
P-38 and F-5 actual deliveries, 163, 171, 220, 154, 99, 175, 266, 105, 156, 352, 384, 316, total 2,562
Deficiency (allocations - actual deliveries) 649 for year.

P-47 allocations for year, 4,720, deficiency 536, P-51 allocations 2,269, deficiency 961.

 

[ggiumarra]

As noted production schedules kept being updated, the further out they projected the less accurate they became.

AFHRA 218.8.2 Special Monthly War Dept Report of Airplanes
March 1940, estimate for YP-38 acceptances July to November 1940, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, for P-38 January to June 1941, 8, 9, 12, 14, 20, 3. YP-38 delay due to contractor's effort to build redesigned first article using untried production tooling. P-38 the delays incurred on the YP-38 airplanes are automatically affecting P-38 airplanes.

Actual acceptances, YP-38 1 in Sep-40, 1 in Jan-41, then March to June 2, 4, 4, 1, P-38 July to October 1941, 1, 22, 12, 1

Note the delays in Curtiss P-40 acceptances in 1940 are put down to shortage of engines, manufacturing difficulties and changes required due to failure of wing on static test.

1942
P-38 allocations for RAF, starting in January, monthly, 20, 20, 20, 20, 55, actual deliveries 17 in January and 120 in July.

13 May 1942, allocations for May and June 1942,
May 135 US + 50 RAF P-38, ? F-4/5, actual deliveries 100 P-38, 18 F-4
June 91 US + 50 RAF P-38, ? F-4/5, actual deliveries 100 P-38, 29 F-4
29 July 1942, allocations for August 1942, 100 P-38, 20 F-5, actual deliveries 105 P-38, 24 F-4, 1 F-5

1943
P-38 and F-5 allocations, 180, 200, 225, 250, 260, 270, 280, 290, 300, 310, 320, 325 total 3,210
P-38 and F-5 actual deliveries, 163, 171, 220, 154, 99, 175, 266, 105, 156, 352, 384, 316, total 2,562
Deficiency (allocations - actual deliveries) 649 for year.

P-47 allocations for year, 4,720, deficiency 536, P-51 allocations 2,269, deficiency 961.

Thanks so much for the info. As per usual I am tardy in replying, but I just wanted to add that my primary interest in asking about the production schedules vs actual output when it came to the P-38 is that I am have been wondering if there might have been a realistic but ultimately unrealized expectation among the AAF leadership (I was thinking principally Arnold, but it need not stop with him) that their supply of Lightnings might "catch up" sufficiently that there might be enough to satisfy the minimum demands of the Pacific, and the prioritized (properly, I believe) demands of the Mediterranean while still having enough to bring into service at least one P-38 FG in England. It seems like your figures for 1943 (which is really the more important of the two years in terms of my question) shows that they might indeed have reasonably expected something like that since early in the year it looked as if Lockheed was building towards getting actual deliveries up the scheduled quantities, but then in the April - September period they fell well short of the expected output and even of what they demonstrated they could do earlier in the year (like in March) in every month with the exception of July. So I was ready to say, "yes, someone like Arnold could have reasonably concluded in March 1943 he could cover his current commitments while still having enough to stand up one or more P-38 FGs for the 8th AF in the coming months", but then I compared your numbers with the ones found in The Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, Table 76, and found some major differences:

Jan-42​	Feb-42​	Mar-42​	Apr-42​	May-42​	Jun-42​	Jul-42​	Aug-42​	Sep-42​	Oct-42​	Nov-42​	Dec-42​
32​	113​	80​	100​	100​	85​	170​	60​	132​	145​	124​	124​

Jan-43​	Feb-43​	Mar-43​	Apr-43​	May-43​	Jun-43​	Jul-43​	Aug-43​	Sep-43​	Oct-43​	Nov-43​	Dec-43​
151​	168​	133​	122​	84​	180​	264​	102​	66​	350​	387​	206​

Of course, the Statistical Digest figures do not include the F-5 so that explains some of the differences but not all of them (in Table 76 for the F-5 in 1943 I see 24 deliveries in January, 69 in March, 89 in September and 1 in October, the other months all being 0). I am not 100% insisting those figures are correct and yours are not, but now I am not sure what to think about my "catch up" hypothesis.

The one puzzling part of your response, however, were the figures you had of "actual deliveries" of Lightnings to the RAF. I believe the total number for the entire war actually pretty close to 0. Everything I have ever read was that Britain cancelled all their Lightning orders early on (1941?) and they were subsequently taken over by the AAF and used as trainers (they did not have turbos), but more seemingly definitively I was just at Kew a couple of months ago and found in AIR 19/524 a pretty comprehensive list of RAF aircraft deliveries to the UK and overseas which also show next to no deliveries to the RAF. One of the reports was titled "Arrivals in the U.K. of Aircraft and Airframes Despatched from the U.S.A. and Canada" and it shows a total of 3 Lightnings delivered in 1942 and 0 every other year, and another titled "Arrivals of Aircraft Shipped or Flown Direct from the U.S.A. to Overseas Command and Dominion Governments" shows nothing for Lightnings for the entire war. So I am just wondering about your source for Lightning deliveries to the RAF.

Getting back to the main topic, however, one problem with Greg, IMO, is that he talks as if the "Bomber Mafia" describes a monolithic conspiratorial sect rather than just being an inexact term indiscriminately thrown around to describe AAC/AAF officers who are generally like-minded regarding air power doctrine, but who in reality did not necessarily always agree on everything (I think others have also made this point, or something similar). I am currently of the opinion that Arnold himself is a separate case from Eaker and Spaatz, who I do think deserve some at least real critical scrutiny if not outright blame when it comes to the fighter escort issue. I am still weighing the evidence so I am not at the moment ready to categorically absolve or condemn any of them, though I will say I have come some way in the positive direction when it comes to Arnold based on my recent research.

On the other hand, with respect to Eaker, 55th FG activated just 1 day after 2nd Schweinfurt, what's up with that? IIRC the first few P-38 escort missions for 55FG went pretty well as far as keeping down bomber losses, so it started out looking fairly promising at least. So there was no way to push forward the use of even 1-2 squadrons of the 55FG for 2nd Schweinfurt or perhaps delay the mission slightly? Just some thoughts.

 

[drgondog]

The reason that F-4/F-5 deliveries were 'down' after September 1943 is that Arnold ordered Recon versions of the P-38J and P-51B suspended until further ordered. The issue was the upcoming ARGUEMENT campaign and forecast needs for escort fighters.

Getting back to the main topic, however, one problem with Greg, IMO, is that he talks as if the "Bomber Mafia" describes a monolithic conspiratorial sect rather than just being an inexact term indiscriminately thrown around to describe AAC/AAF officers who are generally like-minded regarding air power doctrine, but who in reality did not necessarily always agree on everything (I think others have also made this point, or something similar). I am currently of the opinion that Arnold himself is a separate case from Eaker and Spaatz, who I do think deserve some at least real critical scrutiny if not outright blame when it comes to the fighter escort issue. I am still weighing the evidence so I am not at the moment ready to categorically absolve or condemn any of them, though I will say I have come some way in the positive direction when it comes to Arnold based on my recent research.

Both Eaker and Spaatz were 'optimistic' in November 1942 that losses against the Luftwaffe could be sustained in future without target escort. Eaker was very upset however that P-38s were removed from his command and re-directed to Torch. Eaker/Doolittle happy to use P-38s in escort in 12th AF.

Eaker became increasingly alarmed regarding daylight losses between Jan 31, 1943 and May 1943 as losses steadily increased and his actions to secure combat drop tanks for P-47s changed from 'asking Echols' for status of US deliveries to going to VIII ATS to design a 125-gal steel tank for local manufacture - in March 1943. History revealed that Bowater-Lloyd was denied rolled steel priority by Air Marshal Sir Withold Freeman, which resulted in the design and delivery of the 108-gal composite paper tank in August (for test and acceptance) and deliveries in October 1943.

During the June visit by Asst Secy War/Air Lovett, Eaker petitioned his help in convincing Arnold to prioritize the delivery of the P-38 and P-51B - which Lovett did. Also,

Opinion - Eaker's complaints about P-47 range and the paucity of drop tanks had the necessary (finally) effect on Materiel Command at Wright Field. On June 1st, MG Branshaw CG of Wright Field finally Ordered Republic to 'attach' adaptors for the existing 75 and 150-gal tanks in the UK and Republic delivered two prototypes for testing in July. Notably in July, both the P-51B and the P-38J tested their new fuselage and leading edge internal fuel tanks - Republic didn't test their change to main fuel tank from 205-gal to 270-gal until November. In parallel to ETO issues were the struggles Kenney had with getting drop tanks for the P-47in SWPA.

Opinion - June/July 1943 is the approximate timeframe that the realization that AAF standard drop tanks in production were not attachable to existing P-47 external ferry tank racks.

Opinion - I am also of the opinion that July 1943 marks a decided lack of trust from Arnold regarding Echols' leadership and Branshaw's role at the heart of AAF engineering and production management was the first step. Also in parallel was the Plans/Materiel Command (Fairchild vs Echols) review of XP-75 progress. Plans recommended cancelling and Echols appealed for continuation. Arnold supported Echols through flight test but ordered cancellation based on disappointing results. Recall that by July 1943 Echols track record of fighter development included XP-46, P-60 and repeated rejections of the A-36 and P-51A and XP-51B prototype - all overruled by Plans in 1942. There is no criticism in writing by Arnold, but replacement of leadership at Wright Field and restricting Echols authority over flight testing, R&D, airframe decisions - as well as Echols never receiving a promotion after Jan 1942 speaks volumes.

At the same time, Eisenhower/Spaatz requested all the new P-38 FG in training in US plus several more heavy and medium BGs from 8th AF for the planned September invasion of Italy in September. Arnold and Devers denied, with support from Marshall, Eisenhower's request (Demand?). In July Arnold ordered the re-direction of Both the 20th and 55th FG to the ETO and they arrived, respectively in August and early September. The 20th was deemed inadequately trained and did not begin full FG ops until mid-December 1943. Arnold also overruled Directorate of Air Defense (Saville) choice of assigning the P-51B to TAC and ordered them to the ETO. The first of several P-51B-1 arrived in ETO in September but did not reach 100 deliveries until end of November, including Mustang III. Arnold appealed to Portal to return Mustang III in RAF to AAF in early December, and all were transferred by end of December. All the Mustang III and existing P-51B's required depot mods to install the 85-gal fuselage kits. The arriving P-51B-5 and P-51C in December/January had been modified at Buffalo for the tank.

IIRC the P-38 equipped FG, the 475th FG activated May 1943, was the last to be directed anywhere other than 8th, then 9th AF. The MTO never expanded beyond the 1st, 14th and 82nd originally dispatched to MTO in 1942. Of the ones trained in the US, the 20th, 55th, 364th, 479th went to 8th and the 367th went to 9th.

On the other hand, with respect to Eaker, 55th FG activated just 1 day after 2nd Schweinfurt, what's up with that? IIRC the first few P-38 escort missions for 55FG went pretty well as far as keeping down bomber losses, so it started out looking fairly promising at least. So there was no way to push forward the use of even 1-2 squadrons of the 55FG for 2nd Schweinfurt or perhaps delay the mission slightly? Just some thoughts.

See above. I suspect that VIII FC 'penciled in' October 15 as planned first day of ops, back in early September. That said, it was 8th AF SOP to fly early combat ops with sweeps into Luft III AOO. Their first Target Escort was Wilhelmshaven on November 3rd. In hindsight, IMO, the 55th would have been crucified by Luftwaffe on October 14th.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Thanks so much for the info. As per usual I am tardy in replying,

Which imposes costs on any replies, what was fresh in the mind dissipates, temporary notes need to be recreated.

I am have been wondering if there might have been a realistic but ultimately unrealized expectation among the AAF leadership (I was thinking principally Arnold, but it need not stop with him) that their supply of Lightnings might "catch up" sufficiently that there might be enough to satisfy the minimum demands of the Pacific, and the prioritized (properly, I believe) demands of the Mediterranean while still having enough to bring into service at least one P-38 FG in England.

That has two components, at the start of 1943 the allied day fighter forces excluding in Britain were still generally reacting to axis operations, which put a big unknown on expected losses, by the end of 1943 the allies were controlling the tempo, which meant better control over losses and ability to adjust as required. In terms of aircraft numbers the schedules of 1942/43 tended to the optimistic side but then comes unit formation and training, the rule of thumb for a bomber group was 12 months from formation to first operation, fighter groups would not be too far behind, so you want deployable mid 1943 P-38 groups, look at ability to create and train them from mid 1942. Next add the time to deploy to Britain and the extra time to acclimatise before operations. As experience built up (both in US and UK) the times generally decreased.

1st FG arrived 10 June, first operation 29 August 1942, or 80 days
14th FG arrived 18 August, first operation 2 October, or 45 days

20th FG arrived 26 August, first operation 28 December 1943, or 103 days, had received P-38 in January 1943
55th FG arrived 16 September, first operation 15 October 1943 or 29 days
364th FG arrived 10 February, first operation 3 March 1944, or 22 days, activated 1 June 1943
479th FG arrived 15 May, first operation 26 May 1944, or 11 days, activated 15 October 1943.

It raises a question on the state of training in the 20th FG before departure from the US.

then I compared your numbers with the ones found in The Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, Table 76, and found some major differences:

Not surprising, the Statistical Digest numbers are acceptances, when the aircraft had passed the tests required for the government to buy (accept) it, the figures in message 241 are deliveries, when the aircraft arrived at a USAAF base.

The difference can be seen (including F-5) in message 53 at

A Thread for Data Files

B-24 production (acceptances), deliveries (delivery), distribution, details, designations, orders, serials, blocks, users Consolidated Field Service Bulletin summary

ww2aircraft.net

The one puzzling part of your response, however, were the figures you had of "actual deliveries" of Lightnings to the RAF. I believe the total number for the entire war actually pretty close to 0. Everything I have ever read was that Britain cancelled all their Lightning orders early on (1941?) and they were subsequently taken over by the AAF and used as trainers (they did not have turbos), but more seemingly definitively I was just at Kew a couple of months ago and found in AIR 19/524 a pretty comprehensive list of RAF aircraft deliveries to the UK and overseas which also show next to no deliveries to the RAF. One of the reports was titled "Arrivals in the U.K. of Aircraft and Airframes Despatched from the U.S.A. and Canada" and it shows a total of 3 Lightnings delivered in 1942 and 0 every other year, and another titled "Arrivals of Aircraft Shipped or Flown Direct from the U.S.A. to Overseas Command and Dominion Governments" shows nothing for Lightnings for the entire war. So I am just wondering about your source for Lightning deliveries to the RAF.

The Lightnings are actually in AIR 19/524, reporting 3 imports in the March 1942 monthly figures.

Next comes the disposition of the French/British order A-242 for 667 P-38. Of these 143 were delivered in the US for the RAF but only 3 were exported, they were tested then handed to the USAAF in Britain. The rest were taken over by the USAAF and used as trainers. Production from the order was

143 P-322
29 P-38F-13
121 P-38F-15
374 P-38G-15
667 Total, which is all the P-322, P-38F-13, F-15 and G-15 built.

Getting back to the main topic, however, one problem with Greg, IMO, is that he talks as if the "Bomber Mafia" describes a monolithic conspiratorial sect rather than just being an inexact term indiscriminately thrown around to describe AAC/AAF officers who are generally like-minded regarding air power doctrine, but who in reality did not necessarily always agree on everything (I think others have also made this point, or something similar). I am currently of the opinion that Arnold himself is a separate case from Eaker and Spaatz, who I do think deserve some at least real critical scrutiny if not outright blame when it comes to the fighter escort issue.

Eaker as the commander on the spot bears a significant amount of the responsibility, he was operating under orders and instructions from Arnold, which were definitely of the bomb key targets in Germany variety. Eaker made the decisions to try rather than alter the targets and also what information was sent to Arnold. It is clear there were moves in both the US and UK to at least up the average range of fighters before mid 1943, less in terms of more fighters sent to the UK but as the 20th FG shows sending is different to ready for combat.

Spaatz and Doolittle were in the Mediterranean where keeping the bombers within escort range was the usual procedure, helped by average range to target.

I am still weighing the evidence so I am not at the moment ready to categorically absolve or condemn any of them, though I will say I have come some way in the positive direction when it comes to Arnold based on my recent research.

A rather binary choice, rather than the reality many contributed to what happened. Given what the 8th Air Force actually had in 1943 was decided during 1942 the fighter to bomber ratio was set then based on the projected ability of both the fighters (range) and bombers (self defending), the expected numbers of aircraft available with trained crews, the expected targets as well as the ideas of the people making the decisions. Easiest way to look wrong/foolish is make predictions of the future. Any judgements on who is to blame are also likely to tell a great deal about the knowledge and ideas of the judge.

On the other hand, with respect to Eaker, 55th FG activated just 1 day after 2nd Schweinfurt, what's up with that? IIRC the first few P-38 escort missions for 55FG went pretty well as far as keeping down bomber losses, so it started out looking fairly promising at least.

Losses taken depended on how deep the target was, Luftwaffe reaction and USAAF fighters on escort, using Donald Caldwell and Roger Freeman

14 October, Schweinfurt, 616 Luftwaffe, 196 P-47 some of which escorted a B-24 diversion operation, one group unable to find bombers.
20 October, Duren, 364 Luftwaffe, 39 P-38, 321 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 4-1-1
3 November, Wilhelmshaven, 139 Luftwaffe, 45 P-38, 333 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 21-3-24
5 November, Gelsenkirchen/Munster, 611 Luftwaffe, 47 P-38, 336 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 22-4-8
11 November, Munster/Wesel the latter abandoned, 189 Luftwaffe, 59 P-38, 342 P-47, USAAF bombers (94th BG) claimed 10-0-2
13 November, Bremen, 366 Luftwaffe, 45 P-38, 345 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 20-14-13
26 November, Bremen/Paris, 330+ Luftwaffe, 28 P-38, 353 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 24-5-3
29 November, Bremen, 365 Luftwaffe, 36 P-38, 314 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 15-11-10
30 November, Solingen, around 150 Luftwaffe, 20 P-38, 327 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 1-0-0
1 December, Solingen/Leverkusen, 283 Luftwaffe, 42 P-38, 374 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 4-5-5
11 December, Emden, 335 Luftwaffe, 31 P-38, 313 P-47, 44 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 86-22-23
13 December, Bremen/Kiel/Hamburg, 47 Luftwaffe, 31 P-38, 322 P-47, 41 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 7-3-18
16 December, Bremen, 91 Luftwaffe, 31 P-38, 131 P-47, 39 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 18-11-11
20 December, Bremen, 202 Luftwaffe, 26 P-38, 418 P-47, 47 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 21-14-23
22 December, Osnabruck/Munster, 226 Luftwaffe, 40 P-38, 448 P-47, 28 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 22-8-6
30 December, Ludwigshafen, 401 Luftwaffe, 79 P-38, 463 P-47, 41 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 12-4-9

The bomber claims can be taken as an idea of how many interceptions occurred, it is clear the presence of escorts did keep the bomber losses down but note the targets and number of P-47 present. Hard for the Luftwaffe fighters to do double missions unless the raid goes deep or at least more central Germany.

So there was no way to push forward the use of even 1-2 squadrons of the 55FG for 2nd Schweinfurt or perhaps delay the mission slightly? Just some thoughts.

The usual rule is you try for maximum effort on a big operation, the 55th flew sweeps on 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 October, first escort on the 20th. Consulting the 55th FG and 66th FW records for October 1943 is required.

 

[Shortround6]

Getting to Europe or the med/Italy was only the start.
P-38s were in short supply and sometimes units did not arrive with full numbers and due to needs in other places in 1942 and the 1st half of 1943 (or even Sept 1943) supplies of replacement aircraft were often behind schedule. Aug 1943 P-38 losses in the Med are 60 planes and further 24 in the first week of Sept.
In Aug there was a decision to send no more P-38s to the Med and instead keep them in England for the bomber offensive. But just about all flyable P-38s in Britian, and pilots and ground crew had been transferred to the Med so any incoming P-38 groups had no (or little) back-up or training cadre's.

 

[drgondog]

Which imposes costs on any replies, what was fresh in the mind dissipates, temporary notes need to be recreated.


That has two components, at the start of 1943 the allied day fighter forces excluding in Britain were still generally reacting to axis operations, which put a big unknown on expected losses, by the end of 1943 the allies were controlling the tempo, which meant better control over losses and ability to adjust as required. In terms of aircraft numbers the schedules of 1942/43 tended to the optimistic side but then comes unit formation and training, the rule of thumb for a bomber group was 12 months from formation to first operation, fighter groups would not be too far behind, so you want deployable mid 1943 P-38 groups, look at ability to create and train them from mid 1942. Next add the time to deploy to Britain and the extra time to acclimatise before operations. As experience built up (both in US and UK) the times generally decreased.

1st FG arrived 10 June, first operation 29 August 1942, or 80 days
14th FG arrived 18 August, first operation 2 October, or 45 days

20th FG arrived 26 August, first operation 28 December 1943, or 103 days, had received P-38 in January 1943
55th FG arrived 16 September, first operation 15 October 1943 or 29 days
364th FG arrived 10 February, first operation 3 March 1944, or 22 days, activated 1 June 1943
479th FG arrived 15 May, first operation 26 May 1944, or 11 days, activated 15 October 1943.

It raises a question on the state of training in the 20th FG before departure from the US.


Not surprising, the Statistical Digest numbers are acceptances, when the aircraft had passed the tests required for the government to buy (accept) it, the figures in message 241 are deliveries, when the aircraft arrived at a USAAF base.

The difference can be seen (including F-5) in message 53 at

A Thread for Data Files

B-24 production (acceptances), deliveries (delivery), distribution, details, designations, orders, serials, blocks, users Consolidated Field Service Bulletin summary

ww2aircraft.net

The Lightnings are actually in AIR 19/524, reporting 3 imports in the March 1942 monthly figures.

Next comes the disposition of the French/British order A-242 for 667 P-38. Of these 143 were delivered in the US for the RAF but only 3 were exported, they were tested then handed to the USAAF in Britain. The rest were taken over by the USAAF and used as trainers. Production from the order was

143 P-322
29 P-38F-13
121 P-38F-15
374 P-38G-15
667 Total, which is all the P-322, P-38F-13, F-15 and G-15 built.


Eaker as the commander on the spot bears a significant amount of the responsibility, he was operating under orders and instructions from Arnold, which were definitely of the bomb key targets in Germany variety. Eaker made the decisions to try rather than alter the targets and also what information was sent to Arnold. It is clear there were moves in both the US and UK to at least up the average range of fighters before mid 1943, less in terms of more fighters sent to the UK but as the 20th FG shows sending is different to ready for combat.

Spaatz and Doolittle were in the Mediterranean where keeping the bombers within escort range was the usual procedure, helped by average range to target.


A rather binary choice, rather than the reality many contributed to what happened. Given what the 8th Air Force actually had in 1943 was decided during 1942 the fighter to bomber ratio was set then based on the projected ability of both the fighters (range) and bombers (self defending), the expected numbers of aircraft available with trained crews, the expected targets as well as the ideas of the people making the decisions. Easiest way to look wrong/foolish is make predictions of the future. Any judgements on who is to blame are also likely to tell a great deal about the knowledge and ideas of the judge.


Losses taken depended on how deep the target was, Luftwaffe reaction and USAAF fighters on escort, using Donald Caldwell and Roger Freeman

14 October, Schweinfurt, 616 Luftwaffe, 196 P-47 some of which escorted a B-24 diversion operation, one group unable to find bombers.
20 October, Duren, 364 Luftwaffe, 39 P-38, 321 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 4-1-1
3 November, Wilhelmshaven, 139 Luftwaffe, 45 P-38, 333 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 21-3-24
5 November, Gelsenkirchen/Munster, 611 Luftwaffe, 47 P-38, 336 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 22-4-8
11 November, Munster/Wesel the latter abandoned, 189 Luftwaffe, 59 P-38, 342 P-47, USAAF bombers (94th BG) claimed 10-0-2
13 November, Bremen, 366 Luftwaffe, 45 P-38, 345 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 20-14-13
26 November, Bremen/Paris, 330+ Luftwaffe, 28 P-38, 353 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 24-5-3
29 November, Bremen, 365 Luftwaffe, 36 P-38, 314 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 15-11-10
30 November, Solingen, around 150 Luftwaffe, 20 P-38, 327 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 1-0-0
1 December, Solingen/Leverkusen, 283 Luftwaffe, 42 P-38, 374 P-47, USAAF bombers claimed 4-5-5
11 December, Emden, 335 Luftwaffe, 31 P-38, 313 P-47, 44 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 86-22-23
13 December, Bremen/Kiel/Hamburg, 47 Luftwaffe, 31 P-38, 322 P-47, 41 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 7-3-18
16 December, Bremen, 91 Luftwaffe, 31 P-38, 131 P-47, 39 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 18-11-11
20 December, Bremen, 202 Luftwaffe, 26 P-38, 418 P-47, 47 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 21-14-23
22 December, Osnabruck/Munster, 226 Luftwaffe, 40 P-38, 448 P-47, 28 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 22-8-6
30 December, Ludwigshafen, 401 Luftwaffe, 79 P-38, 463 P-47, 41 P-51, USAAF bombers claimed 12-4-9

The bomber claims can be taken as an idea of how many interceptions occurred, it is clear the presence of escorts did keep the bomber losses down but note the targets and number of P-47 present. Hard for the Luftwaffe fighters to do double missions unless the raid goes deep or at least more central Germany.


The usual rule is you try for maximum effort on a big operation, the 55th flew sweeps on 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 October, first escort on the 20th. Consulting the 55th FG and 66th FW records for October 1943 is required.

Good summary. Would add that originally, it was estimated that the number of escort fighter groups should equal the bomber strike force Groups.

Also not mentioned by many is the RAF was actually fighting the LW during August 17 penetration, namely LuftFlotte 3. It is also lost on many historians that RAF continued short range escort plus forays by Mustang III into April 1944. I am personally guilty of forgetting that well into the early 2000-2005 timeframe.

The other fact that many folks overlook is that Eaker was not stupid. While he was seduced by the absurd bomber gunner claims into think the 8th AF was rapidly decimating the LW and (correctly) noting that large/tight formations suffered fewer losses than smaller task forces as a function of %, he clearly noted the trend before Blitz Week. He is also guilty of believing the intelligence that the Luftwaffe plan was to provide a very strong 'ring' along the German Border with no plan for a very strong 'core' so he was optimistic that the 8th AF could prosecute several deep penetrations strikes before target escort was available.

That said, his only choice was to resign or 'salute and go' as the loss % increased monthly for strikes beyond escort range. His commitment (and conviction) that the 8th AF Combined Bomber Offensive would succeed if he had enough inventory to sustain heavy losses over high value targets - in time to make the Daylight Strategic bombing case while awaiting the return of the P-38 and new P-51B.

 

[J.D.]

The other fact that many folks overlook is that Eaker was not stupid. While he was seduced by the absurd bomber gunner claims into think the 8th AF was rapidly decimating the LW and (correctly) noting that large/tight formations suffered fewer losses than smaller task forces as a function of %, he clearly noted the trend before Blitz Week.

This is what I was alluding to a few months ago. Eaker was acting or both the limited - and often unreliable - information he had available at the time and on the directives and obligations of his job.

That the trend was getting worse was clear and perhaps the only reliable statistic he had was combat losses. But in a battle of attrition, which this was, it really comes down to who can sustain losses longer.

While a lot of people have focussed on what Eaker should have known or what he shouldn't have done, I haven't seen a reasonable suggestion of what people think he should have done.

You put it well when you said he had the choice of resigning or carrying on with his duties. That's the obligation of high command and it extended beyond simply his responsibility to the men under him.

Then there's the question of the toll it was taking on the Luftwaffe.

We know that the German pilot losses were every bit as unsustainable as Eighth AF losses. Perhaps someone knows what they were (the number 39 rings a bell) but I can't recall. Superficially, the numbers sound small but by 1943, new Luftwaffe pilots were a scarce commodity.

That said, his only choice was to resign or 'salute and go' as the loss % increased monthly for strikes beyond escort range. His commitment (and conviction) that the 8th AF Combined Bomber Offensive would succeed if he had enough inventory to sustain heavy losses over high value targets - in time to make the Daylight Strategic bombing case while awaiting the return of the P-38 and new P-51B.

And this aligns exactly with my (less well-informed) assessment. It's also the single best argument against the "faceless men" assumptions that are so common. Who'd want the job?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Eaker was acting or both the limited - and often unreliable - information he had available at the time and on the directives and obligations of his job.

After Eaker replaced Spaatz in Britain he did not know what Ultra meant when Churchill asked. By the time his indoctrination interview was arranged he had been warned by Spaatz that Ultra equals no combat missions or going anywhere near the front line. Eaker therefore refused to learn about Ultra, relying on staff members to provide briefings.

The Luftwaffe was the most penetrated of the German armed forces, with information least abundant for units in Germany but against that the RAF was deeply interested in such, mostly night fighter, units. Also many of the 8th Air Force raids were against targets in France, giving Ultra plenty of chances to provide actual Luftwaffe losses against bomber claims.

The US was very much into the scientific management, cannot measure, cannot manage, with dedicated units analysing daily through yearly figures. Again when you look at the number of 8th Air Force raid days it was always possible to come up with a reason for why an operation did not work, rather than consider it part of a trend.

Outside of Eaker's control was the assignment of units to Africa, as of April 1943, 8th+12th Air Force, operational units, 12 Bomber, 11 Fighter groups. Remembering the US in the second half of 1942 was trying for an invasion of France in mid 1943 and still had advocates in early 1943 assuming the fighting in North Africa would end much earlier than it did. Next came the requirements to bomb French U-boat bases which took 1,291.8 out of 3,487 tons of bombs dropped on France January to May 1943, while attacks on German U-boat yards used 1,752 out of 2,478.3 tons of bombs dropped on Germany.

While a lot of people have focussed on what Eaker should have known or what he shouldn't have done, I haven't seen a reasonable suggestion of what people think he should have done.

Merge the 8th Air Force fighter and bomber wars much earlier than it did, handing over escort of the medium bombers to the RAF. Question the two core assumptions in the light of experience and German reaction, that 300 bombers in a deep penetration raid were enough and central Germany had few day fighter units. It was clear in the first half of 1943 that the 300 figure was too small, around 400 or more were needed and that was assuming having around twice as many aircraft on the mission would not increase the losses to either flak or interceptors that failed to contact the smaller force.

In July 1942 Alfred Price lists the Luftwaffe single engine day fighter force in Germany as JG1 with 158 out of the Luftwaffe strength of 1,335 fighters. Luftflotte 3 had 244 fighters.

As Germany was used to refit Luftwaffe units simply choosing one day can be misleading. That said on 17 May 1943 with JG1 now split to create JG11 the two had 174 fighters, with "visitors" stab/JG3, I/JG3, I/JG27 and III/JG54 adding 125 more out of 1,422 fighters on Luftwaffe strength, Luftflotte 3 had 192 fighters. The dedicated western defence units had gone from 402 to 366 fighters over the year despite the force growing by 87, though another 125 fighters were in the area. The soft core idea did look good.

To overcome the numbers issues the Luftwaffe stocked airfields with what they needed to turn around fighters, enabling double sorties against deep penetration raids, also tasking night fighters for day defence, the latter generally the inexperienced crews untrained in formation flying and took disproportionate losses, both these measures were a surprise to the allies.

However III/JG54 had been in residence in Germany since mid 1942, while both I/JG3 and I/JG27 stayed in Germany and in May JG1 and JG11 both added a third gruppe, western defences as of 1 June 1943 had jumped to 590 fighters ignoring the mainly training JGr Sud. With the German failures in the east and south and allied air successes over Germany in July and August the Luftwaffe western defences grew to 946 fighters on 1 September, including 145 twin engined types. The core was no longer soft but then again the planned single 17 August raid had become two thanks to fog so the one 300 aircraft raid idea was still untested.

he had the choice of resigning or carrying on with his duties.

Option 3 presenting his superiors with the very unpalatable fact that core assumptions had proven wrong with the result the campaign had to be recast, shorter range targets where adequate fighter cover was possible, expanding the target list as fighter numbers and range increased. Living with the US politics (the price of Torch given the P-38 deployments perhaps) and RAF I told you so.

Then there's the question of the toll it was taking on the Luftwaffe. We know that the German pilot losses were every bit as unsustainable as Eighth AF losses.

According to Williamson Murray in 1943 the Luftwaffe lifted fighter pilot output to 3,276, up from 1,662 in 1942, for the first time the Luftwaffe was graduating pilots to make the Battle of Britain losses sustainable. Pilot losses in 1943 were 2,870, enabling small reserve but training times had been cut including instrument training, one reason why Luftwaffe fighter activity declined in the 1943/44 winter.

Note a lot of the 1943 Luftwaffe casualties fighting the 8th Air Force came from the night fighter force, a different pool of pilots. Night fighter units in Germany had 278 aircraft in July 1942 and 417 in May 1943.

According to Williamson Murray, January to May 1944, Luftwaffe single engine fighter force, started with 2,395 pilots (1,491 combat worthy) and took 2,262 casualties.

D-Day strength 8th+9th Air Force, 55 Bomber and 29 Fighter groups.

 

[Nick Beale]

After Eaker replaced Spaatz in Britain he did not know what Ultra meant when Churchill asked. By the time his indoctrination interview was arranged he had been warned by Spaatz that Ultra equals no combat missions or going anywhere near the front line. Eaker therefore refused to learn about Ultra, relying on staff members to provide briefings.

The Luftwaffe was the most penetrated of the German armed forces, with information least abundant for units in Germany but against that the RAF was deeply interested in such, mostly night fighter, units. Also many of the 8th Air Force raids were against targets in France, giving Ultra plenty of chances to provide actual Luftwaffe losses against bomber claims.

Discussions about what ULTRA could/would/should have told the Allies are all the better for reading the traffic from the period concerned. While the 'Main Series of Reports to Allied Commands' is free to download, that's over 50,000 signals for 1944–45 alone. My experience is that active battlefronts where landlines are absent or disrupted generate signals (and get priority from Bletchley Park). Hence in summer/autumn 1942 practically everything is from the Mediterranean and North Africa, almost nothing from Western Europe. From September 1943 to early June 1944, it's mostly Italy with just a little from France (often training and reconnaissance units) and only the occasional item from inside Germany. After June the MTO fades into the background. In early 1944 you'd hardly know the Steinbock raids had happened—let alone Nuremberg. Come D-Day, the traffic from France explodes but material from Germany itself only really takes off from Autumn.

There are big gaps in what I've read (I've not explored 1941, 1942 before July, December 1942–September 1943) but I doubt you'd find sustained information allowing either 8th AF or Bomber Command to better shape their campaigns. Odd flashes of insight, maybe but no regular flow of intelligence.

 

[Engineman]

After Eaker replaced Spaatz in Britain he did not know what Ultra meant when Churchill asked. By the time his indoctrination interview was arranged he had been warned by Spaatz that Ultra equals no combat missions or going anywhere near the front line. Eaker therefore refused to learn about Ultra, relying on staff members to provide briefings.

This, if correct, would seem to be very strange situation, possibly requiring a removal from appointment, the basic premise of being given access (and knowledge of the fact) was based upon the need for that knowledge to perform the appointment. Furthermore, declining such a clearance is in itself an indication that the individual is aware of the subject and that in itself should cause the individual to be bound by the obligations, whether actually Indoctrinated or not. Also, the actuality of his knowledge is demonstrated by the fallacious argument that he could be briefed by others who were indoctrinated.

Cheers

Eng

 

[J.D.]

This, if correct, would seem to be very strange situation, possibly requiring a removal from appointment, the basic premise of being given access (and knowledge of the fact) was based upon the need for that knowledge to perform the appointment. Furthermore, declining such a clearance is in itself an indication that the individual is aware of the subject and that in itself should cause the individual to be bound by the obligations, whether actually Indoctrinated or not. Also, the actuality of his knowledge is demonstrated by the fallacious argument that he could be briefed by others who were indoctrinated.

Cheers

Eng

Seems pretty clear that Eaker was given an "either/or" choice: he could choose command or he could choose information. He couldn't have both. The rule existed for an express purpose: a captured officer in the field could not know that Ultra had been cracked. Anything else would have been a catastrophic security risk.

Discussions about what ULTRA could/would/should have told the Allies are all the better for reading the traffic from the period concerned. While the 'Main Series of Reports to Allied Commands' is free to download, that's over 50,000 signals for 1944–45 alone. My experience is that active battlefronts where landlines are absent or disrupted generate signals (and get priority from Bletchley Park). Hence in summer/autumn 1942 practically everything is from the Mediterranean and North Africa, almost nothing from Western Europe. From September 1943 to early June 1944, it's mostly Italy with just a little from France (often training and reconnaissance units) and only the occasional item from inside Germany. After June the MTO fades into the background. In early 1944 you'd hardly know the Steinbock raids had happened—let alone Nuremberg. Come D-Day, the traffic from France explodes but material from Germany itself only really takes off from Autumn.

There are big gaps in what I've read (I've not explored 1941, 1942 before July, December 1942–September 1943) but I doubt you'd find sustained information allowing either 8th AF or Bomber Command to better shape their campaigns. Odd flashes of insight, maybe but no regular flow of intelligence.

^ THIS ^

Thanks Nick for that remarkably interesting post. It's one of those things that clears up a lot of what people assume was or was not known.

 

[J.D.]

Option 3 presenting his superiors with the very unpalatable fact that core assumptions had proven wrong with the result the campaign had to be recast, shorter range targets where adequate fighter cover was possible, expanding the target list as fighter numbers and range increased. Living with the US politics (the price of Torch given the P-38 deployments perhaps) and RAF I told you so.

What would be the point of that? The Eighth was already bombing everything worth bombing within fighter range. The targets they needed to hit were obviously beyond that. Alright, it removes the Luftwaffe's tactical initiative but it doesn't achieve anything in the process.

That tactical initiative didn't swing to the USAAF until the P-51 arrived in numbers. Fortunately it left the Eighth with just enough time to achieve the POINTBLANK objectives.

And there was the political situation to consider too (Casablanca context). I think people are too dismissive of what was achieved, admittedly at very great cost. Nobody wants a war of attrition but even in this case, the USAAF was still taking an unrecoverable toll on the Luftwaffe fighter force.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The USAAF expanded very fast. The men who were the generals in 1943 were mostly Colonels or less a "few" months ago. Quite a mindset change from expecting to lead a group in combat to running an air force. Spaatz is reported to have felt the 8th might need their general in the air at least a few times, plus knew Eaker's mindset meant a willingness to break the Ultra rules, as a certain Eisenhower did in Normandy, aided by Quesada. Marshall issued a rebuke.

Brigadier General A W Vanaman, recently appointed (May 1944) head of intelligence at 8th Air Force HQ. Reported to be Ultra cleared. On 27 June 1944, strikes on V weapons sites in the Pas-de-Calais area, the B-17 he was in was hit by flak causing a fire, the order was given to bale out, 5 men did so, including Vanaman before the fire went out, 4 evaded, 1 general captured. The aircraft then returned to England, damage proved to be so minor it was ready for operations the next day, apparently a severed fuel line had fed fuel to the exhaust of a damaged engine, causing a spectacular fire trail while the fuel lasted. The claim is the way of his arrival meant the Germans were suspicious he was really a plant and did not make much use of the information they managed to extract from him.

The combining of British and US intelligence in WWII was a remarkable achievement given the people involved had been trained to maximum secrecy even within their own countries. A side effect was both systems were quick to accuse the other of lax security or breaches.

January to June 1943, the RAF fighter command allowed 249 kill claims against Luftwaffe fighters, the true number of kills was 235, according British Intelligence in World War II (Hinsley). There was information coming out of France, Ultra helped tighten up the RAF claims system.

This, if correct, would seem to be very strange situation, possibly requiring a removal from appointment, the basic premise of being given access (and knowledge of the fact) was based upon the need for that knowledge to perform the appointment. Furthermore, declining such a clearance is in itself an indication that the individual is aware of the subject and that in itself should cause the individual to be bound by the obligations, whether actually Indoctrinated or not. Also, the actuality of his knowledge is demonstrated by the fallacious argument that he could be briefed by others who were indoctrinated.

Eaker clearly had a choice, he could have been ordered to learn about Ultra but was not, being offered a chance to know top level "stuff" means no combat is not the same as what the stuff is, allied or axis material for a start. The red white and blue orchestra instead of just the red one? The fantastic idea nearly the entire German encryption system had fatal weaknesses and much was being routinely read in close to real time? RV Jones tells a story of having to invent a spy in the German embassy in Spain to cover for Ultra decrypts.

Apparently Harris was either never or only in 1945 indoctrinated to Ultra, given all those panacea targets he dealt with prior to end 1944 it helps explain why he did not expect as much from the oil campaign.

The Battle of Berlin was a defeat for Bomber Command. However Bomber Command's raid on Berlin that managed to burn the Alkett resulted in a loss of production of as a minimum, 200 to 300 vehicles or around 10% of the years production. Another benefit was the switching of one factory making Panzer IV tanks to Stug IV, the Stug III superstructure on a Panzer IV chassis, to make up for the loss of Stug III production.

A 300 vehicle loss would be a 2 to 3% loss of German AFV production for 1943, where an AFV is either a tank, assault gun, self propelled artillery or anti tank gun, and a 7 to 8% loss of Q4/43 production. 300 vehicles needs to be compared to the loss of around the average loss of tanks (excluding assault guns etc.) of around 650 to 700 per month on average in 1943 and 1944.

The economic indexes calculated post war are disputed these days, claiming a 2% loss of weapons production in the third quarter of 1943 and a near 10% loss in the final quarter of the year. In the final quarter tank production was down 15%, aircraft down 20% versus the expected output.

Seems pretty clear that Eaker was given an "either/or" choice: he could choose command or he could choose information.

Please note, Ultra equals no combat missions or going anywhere near the front line, not a removal from command.

What would be the point of that?

Accurate reporting tends to get better solutions.

The Eighth was already bombing everything worth bombing within fighter range.

When in 1943 is this, March, June, September, December? The total number of raid days in the first half of 1943 was enough?

The targets they needed to hit were obviously beyond that. Alright, it removes the Luftwaffe's tactical initiative but it doesn't achieve anything in the process.

Put it to you this way, at 2 fighters shot down by the USAAF heavies for 3 heavies shot down by fighters then June to October 1943, the 8th reports losing 429 heavies to fighters with say 4,290 crew, in material terms a B-17 cost 3.5 Mustangs, so 1,502 fighters worth of material lost, for 286 Luftwaffe fighters, with say half of the pilots becoming casualties, battle of material Luftwaffe winning 5.25 to 1, personnel losses Luftwaffe winning 30 to 1. During June to end October 1943 the 8th had an average strength in units of 813 aircraft, with 485 serviceable. Also flak losses for the 5 months were 124.

According to Williamson Murray apart from September 1943 June to October the 8th lost at least 31.3% of its bomber crews a month, September was only 20.3%, bomber losses were about two thirds of crew losses. Crew losses in November and December were 14.6 and 17%. Murray notes the west had the biggest number of fighter losses from May 1943 onwards but less than the combined East + South numbers until September and then November for losses of all aircraft types.

June to October 1943 the 8th dropped 10,429 tons of bombs on Germany, November and December it was 14,277.2 tons. The arrival of H2S in September, switching to H2X in November dropped the average accuracy. August 1943 was the last time the 8th dropped 100% of its bombs visually, when it comes to Germany, September to December 1943 it was 47.11, 72.05, 27.56, 30.41% visual.

8th Air Force fighter claims June to October 1943 were 227, November and December 205.

What lasting damage on targets in Germany did the 8th Air Force raids June to October 1943 inclusive achieve to offset the losses taken?

The German economy had 30.3 million Germans and 6.3 million foreigners and PoW in June 1943, total 36.9 million, a year later 29 million Germans and 7.1 million foreigners and PoW, total 36.1 million.

That tactical initiative didn't swing to the USAAF until the P-51 arrived in numbers. Fortunately it left the Eighth with just enough time to achieve the POINTBLANK objectives.

Actually the initiative was with the USAAF all through 1943, it decided when and where fighting would occur. The 8th began winning freedom of action when its raids were fully escorted, this was initially helped by the Luftwaffe building up a twin engine bomber destroyer force starting in August 1943 and accounting for 25% of the defenders in early December, many were Bf110 with performance little better than in 1940, P-47 were much more lethal than Hurricane I and Spitfire I.

In October 1943 the USAAF had 3,063 combat aircraft in Britain including reserves, January 1944 it was 5,133, March 7,171, May 8,351, all could be used offensively, even without a quality edge the numbers could swamp the Luftwaffe then add the supply and command systems working better, 4,771 effective sorties in October 1943, 12,541 in January 1944, 55,358 in May. Making it clear the US really understood mass production and could do it better than anyone else.

And there was the political situation to consider too (Casablanca context). I think people are too dismissive of what was achieved, admittedly at very great cost. Nobody wants a war of attrition but even in this case, the USAAF was still taking an unrecoverable toll on the Luftwaffe fighter force.

Please state the bombing damage done and consider the Germans ended 1943 with more single engine fighter pilots on strength than they started with, backed by major expansion in fighter production. Also in 1943 the USAAF was a partner in the allied air forces destruction of Luftwaffe aircraft and reduction in average aircrew quality, including the fighter arm.

According to Murray the first 6 months of 1943 cost the Luftwaffe 1,046 fighters in combat and 1,046 in accidents, second half 1,850 and 1,236, a 50% jump, first 6 months of 1944 it was 2,855 and 1,345

As everything is connected the fighter expansion was partially done by reduction in bomber output, so when the Luftwaffe launched the Baby Blitz it could not replace the losses, removing the bomber force as a threat to Overlord.

 

[Engineman]

Eaker clearly had a choice, he could have been ordered to learn about Ultra but was not, being offered a chance to know top level "stuff" means no combat is not the same as what the stuff is, allied or axis material for a start. The red white and blue orchestra instead of just the red one? The fantastic idea nearly the entire German encryption system had fatal weaknesses and much was being routinely read in close to real time? RV Jones tells a story of having to invent a spy in the German embassy in Spain to cover for Ultra decrypts.

I find it difficult to believe that Official policy would entertain a situation where Top Commanders could pretend that they were not aware of their main source of valuable Intelligence information merely to pander to their own inclinations on behavior, particularly when they would be seeing and using that information on many occasions. This is even more unlikely as there were many low ranking personnel who worked within the system. Furthermore, there are many examples of precautions that were taken to reduce the risk of knowledgeable personnel falling into enemy hands. No, I feel that any "avoidance" of Indoctrination at the "Top" would have been culpable action. More likely, cases of breaking the rules on the
restrictions by some individuals occurred, possibly sometimes including claims that they never knew about the "Secret".

Please note, Ultra equals no combat missions or going anywhere near the front line, not a removal from command.

Generally, failure to hold a defined security clearance that is associated with a post bars that person from holding the post.

Eng

 

[J.D.]

The USAAF expanded very fast. The men who were the generals in 1943 were mostly Colonels or less a "few" months ago. Quite a mindset change from expecting to lead a group in combat to running an air force. Spaatz is reported to have felt the 8th might need their general in the air at least a few times, plus knew Eaker's mindset meant a willingness to break the Ultra rules, as a certain Eisenhower did in Normandy, aided by Quesada. Marshall issued a rebuke.

Brigadier General A W Vanaman, recently appointed (May 1944) head of intelligence at 8th Air Force HQ. Reported to be Ultra cleared. On 27 June 1944, strikes on V weapons sites in the Pas-de-Calais area, the B-17 he was in was hit by flak causing a fire, the order was given to bale out, 5 men did so, including Vanaman before the fire went out, 4 evaded, 1 general captured. The aircraft then returned to England, damage proved to be so minor it was ready for operations the next day, apparently a severed fuel line had fed fuel to the exhaust of a damaged engine, causing a spectacular fire trail while the fuel lasted. The claim is the way of his arrival meant the Germans were suspicious he was really a plant and did not make much use of the information they managed to extract from him.

The combining of British and US intelligence in WWII was a remarkable achievement given the people involved had been trained to maximum secrecy even within their own countries. A side effect was both systems were quick to accuse the other of lax security or breaches.

January to June 1943, the RAF fighter command allowed 249 kill claims against Luftwaffe fighters, the true number of kills was 235, according British Intelligence in World War II (Hinsley). There was information coming out of France, Ultra helped tighten up the RAF claims system.


Eaker clearly had a choice, he could have been ordered to learn about Ultra but was not, being offered a chance to know top level "stuff" means no combat is not the same as what the stuff is, allied or axis material for a start. The red white and blue orchestra instead of just the red one? The fantastic idea nearly the entire German encryption system had fatal weaknesses and much was being routinely read in close to real time? RV Jones tells a story of having to invent a spy in the German embassy in Spain to cover for Ultra decrypts.

Apparently Harris was either never or only in 1945 indoctrinated to Ultra, given all those panacea targets he dealt with prior to end 1944 it helps explain why he did not expect as much from the oil campaign.

The Battle of Berlin was a defeat for Bomber Command. However Bomber Command's raid on Berlin that managed to burn the Alkett resulted in a loss of production of as a minimum, 200 to 300 vehicles or around 10% of the years production. Another benefit was the switching of one factory making Panzer IV tanks to Stug IV, the Stug III superstructure on a Panzer IV chassis, to make up for the loss of Stug III production.

A 300 vehicle loss would be a 2 to 3% loss of German AFV production for 1943, where an AFV is either a tank, assault gun, self propelled artillery or anti tank gun, and a 7 to 8% loss of Q4/43 production. 300 vehicles needs to be compared to the loss of around the average loss of tanks (excluding assault guns etc.) of around 650 to 700 per month on average in 1943 and 1944.

The economic indexes calculated post war are disputed these days, claiming a 2% loss of weapons production in the third quarter of 1943 and a near 10% loss in the final quarter of the year. In the final quarter tank production was down 15%, aircraft down 20% versus the expected output.


Please note, Ultra equals no combat missions or going anywhere near the front line, not a removal from command.


Accurate reporting tends to get better solutions.


When in 1943 is this, March, June, September, December? The total number of raid days in the first half of 1943 was enough?


Put it to you this way, at 2 fighters shot down by the USAAF heavies for 3 heavies shot down by fighters then June to October 1943, the 8th reports losing 429 heavies to fighters with say 4,290 crew, in material terms a B-17 cost 3.5 Mustangs, so 1,502 fighters worth of material lost, for 286 Luftwaffe fighters, with say half of the pilots becoming casualties, battle of material Luftwaffe winning 5.25 to 1, personnel losses Luftwaffe winning 30 to 1. During June to end October 1943 the 8th had an average strength in units of 813 aircraft, with 485 serviceable. Also flak losses for the 5 months were 124.

According to Williamson Murray apart from September 1943 June to October the 8th lost at least 31.3% of its bomber crews a month, September was only 20.3%, bomber losses were about two thirds of crew losses. Crew losses in November and December were 14.6 and 17%. Murray notes the west had the biggest number of fighter losses from May 1943 onwards but less than the combined East + South numbers until September and then November for losses of all aircraft types.

June to October 1943 the 8th dropped 10,429 tons of bombs on Germany, November and December it was 14,277.2 tons. The arrival of H2S in September, switching to H2X in November dropped the average accuracy. August 1943 was the last time the 8th dropped 100% of its bombs visually, when it comes to Germany, September to December 1943 it was 47.11, 72.05, 27.56, 30.41% visual.

8th Air Force fighter claims June to October 1943 were 227, November and December 205.

What lasting damage on targets in Germany did the 8th Air Force raids June to October 1943 inclusive achieve to offset the losses taken?

The German economy had 30.3 million Germans and 6.3 million foreigners and PoW in June 1943, total 36.9 million, a year later 29 million Germans and 7.1 million foreigners and PoW, total 36.1 million.


Actually the initiative was with the USAAF all through 1943, it decided when and where fighting would occur. The 8th began winning freedom of action when its raids were fully escorted, this was initially helped by the Luftwaffe building up a twin engine bomber destroyer force starting in August 1943 and accounting for 25% of the defenders in early December, many were Bf110 with performance little better than in 1940, P-47 were much more lethal than Hurricane I and Spitfire I.

In October 1943 the USAAF had 3,063 combat aircraft in Britain including reserves, January 1944 it was 5,133, March 7,171, May 8,351, all could be used offensively, even without a quality edge the numbers could swamp the Luftwaffe then add the supply and command systems working better, 4,771 effective sorties in October 1943, 12,541 in January 1944, 55,358 in May. Making it clear the US really understood mass production and could do it better than anyone else.


Please state the bombing damage done and consider the Germans ended 1943 with more single engine fighter pilots on strength than they started with, backed by major expansion in fighter production. Also in 1943 the USAAF was a partner in the allied air forces destruction of Luftwaffe aircraft and reduction in average aircrew quality, including the fighter arm.

According to Murray the first 6 months of 1943 cost the Luftwaffe 1,046 fighters in combat and 1,046 in accidents, second half 1,850 and 1,236, a 50% jump, first 6 months of 1944 it was 2,855 and 1,345

As everything is connected the fighter expansion was partially done by reduction in bomber output, so when the Luftwaffe launched the Baby Blitz it could not replace the losses, removing the bomber force as a threat to Overlord.

Sorry but this doesn't answer the question: what was Eaker supposed to do? Not what was Eaker supposed to do, given 20/20 hindsight at a range of 83 years?

It was Spaatz who gave him the choice of command or information, yet there's an implication that Eaker "should" have chosen something else when he wasn't given a third choice. What happened to Vannaman (hadn't heard of him before) was more than a year later.

If the missions had been limited to only those within fighter escort range then what significant targets could have been bombed that were not already being bombed? There's no getting better information. Nick Beale's post above makes it clear that the better information was not available. If you are saying that these raids you're proposing could still have dragged the enemy into a fight, I can see your point but it would not have been enough to do the requisite amount of damage in time for D-Day. But it doesn't move those critical targets closer and there wasn't enough time.

If this pressure drove Jeschonnek to suicide, what was it doing to Eaker? He was commanding an air force that was bleeding badly, executing a strategic directive he hadn't written, with intelligence that Nick Beale has shown was too sparse to change his options and given a binary choice by Spaatz that left him no third path. That Eaker made mistakes is not in dispute. That Anderson made mistakes is not in dispute. These were men operating under extraordinary pressure with incomplete information making irreversible decisions on a daily basis.

The argument that appears to be building here is that Eaker was unfit for command. If that's the position, just say it. But say it without the benefit of 83 years of hindsight, Murray's figures, Hinsley's volumes, Nick Beale's signal analysis and Spaatz's binary choice. Do it with what Eaker actually had in front of him in August 1943. Option 3 and better information were not open to him.

These were commanders acting under extreme pressure. The only black and white bit was the choice given to him by Spaatz.

 

[wuzak]

Sorry but this doesn't answer the question: what was Eaker supposed to do? Not what was Eaker supposed to do, given 20/20 hindsight at a range of 83 years?

It was Spaatz who gave him the choice of command or information, yet there's an implication that Eaker "should" have chosen something else when he wasn't given a third choice. What happened to Vannaman (hadn't heard of him before) was more than a year later.

I don't understand.

As the Commander of the Eighth Air Force, why would Eaker by involved in combat operations. Why would there be a choice?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

I find it difficult to believe that Official policy would entertain a situation where Top Commanders could pretend that they were not aware of their main source of valuable Intelligence information merely to pander to their own inclinations on behavior, particularly when they would be seeing and using that information on many occasions.

Clearly Eaker was allowed to refuse the offer and as far as the security people were concerned the less who knew the better. Part of security was presenting the Ultra material in a way that hid the origin. Eaker did not pretend, he was offered to know about highly classified material and chose not to. As a result he had no information on what that material was or how it was obtained. Also Ultra was not necessarily the main source of 8th Air Force intelligence. For example it rarely gave target damage reports, the oil campaign was about the only time such information was available thanks to the Luftwaffe sending messages about the fuel situation. RV Jones made a point of doing reviews on various intelligence operations to see how much they could have figured out without Ultra. Things like the 1942 blackout of U-boat signals could easily become all German communications for the rest of the war. The extensive photographic reconnaissance, with an increasing amount of electronic reconnaissance, old fashioned interceptions of in clear transmissions, direction finding, interrogations, enemy news reports and so on all gave useful information, the photographs being the main method of target assessment, vital information for the 8th Air Force.

Captain Arleigh Burke as chief of staff to Admiral Mitscher discovered a relatively junior officer had 24 hour rapid, private access to the Admiral and no one would tell Burke why or what it was about. Who knew about Ultra was a judgement call, Eaker said no, the system said fine. I am not sure if Eaker was told after he was moved to the Mediterranean.

Generally, failure to hold a defined security clearance that is associated with a post bars that person from holding the post.

Yes, and the USAAF decided Ultra security clearance was not necessary for the commander of the 1943 8th Air Force, I am unsure but it seems Doolittle was not told. Nor was being chief of staff of the USN fast carrier task force deemed worthy to know about Ultra, at least initially, Burke was persistent.

Ultra was about as new as strategic bombing, plenty of learning was required on how to do it right.

WWII was the radio war. In 1940, the average British infantry division had 75 radios, most Morse, versus nearly 1,000 in 1944, despite having around the same firepower in 1944 as 1940, organisation matters.

The Germans were not the first to form or even use armoured divisions, they were the first to realise and implement the fact that if the vehicles could move at several times walking pace the communications and command and control systems had to be speeded up as well. Hence things like enigma and the training of junior ranks to exercise initiative.

How all this extra radio traffic using more sophisticated coding systems cleared for or obscured things from the enemy was increasingly only understandable by specialists. Enigma never encoded a latter to itself, that was considered a major feature instead of weakness.

Sorry but this doesn't answer the question: what was Eaker supposed to do? Not what was Eaker supposed to do, given 20/20 hindsight at a range of 83 years?

As already stated, Option 3 presenting his superiors with the very unpalatable fact that core assumptions had proven wrong with the result the campaign had to be recast, shorter range targets where adequate fighter cover was possible, expanding the target list as fighter numbers and range increased. Living with the US politics (the price of Torch given the P-38 deployments perhaps) and RAF I told you so. Options 1 and 2 were find someone else and yes sir, no questions asked, carry out the plan, make it work.

And the data was because of claims about how many Luftwaffe fighters were being lost, as if they were enough, in any case the 8th would know it was losing around a third of available crews per month for several months at a time it took several months to complete a tour.

The idea the Luftwaffe was running out of fighters and fighter pilots thanks to 1943 8th Air Force heavy bomber operations plus was taking dangerously destructive bomb damage fails to explain why the Luftwaffe kept so many fighters on other fronts if this was happening, numbers Ultra and other sources could confirm on a regular basis.

It was Spaatz who gave him the choice of command or information, yet there's an implication that Eaker "should" have chosen something else when he wasn't given a third choice.

Please show what control Spaatz had over the 8th Air Force, including who commanded it, once he moved to the Mediterranean in late 1942, until his return. Spaatz had no control over who was allowed to know about Ultra, he told his friend the consequences of that knowledge.

If the missions had been limited to only those within fighter escort range then what significant targets could have been bombed that were not already being bombed?

Not many in early 1943, then expanding, given the increasing bomb tonnages the targets would be taking heavier damage. Roger Freeman notes as used by the 8th Air Force the non Tokyo tank B-17 had a combat radius of 320 miles. Quite comparable to the P-47 with 100 gallons of external fuel, by July 1943 the Ruhr was coming within range.

There's no getting better information. Nick Beale's post above makes it clear that the better information was not available.

Go back a read what was written, there was information, not a regular flow. British Intelligence in the Second World War by F.H. Hinsley (who was part of the system in WWII) gives some examples. When the Ultra secret broke people thought it would require a rewrite of the histories, turned out to be an overstatement, even at its best it was not all seeing, or able to tell the allies what the Germans were doing before the Germans knew. Units in Germany were the least visible.

The RAF built up a card index system of the Luftwaffe OOB including personnel, it used many sources and was available to the USAAF. As to what the 8th Air Force definitely knew was the loss rate and its trends,

Cumulative (all raids to date counted) % of attacking bombers missing

Month	France	Germany	All Targets
Aug-42​	0.00​		0.00​
Sep-42​	1.41​		1.18​
Oct-42​	3.24​		2.92​
Nov-42​	3.25​		3.09​
Dec-42​	4.28​		4.11​
Jan-43​	5.05​	1.82​	4.72​
Feb-43​	5.30​	8.23​	5.55​
Mar-43​	4.54​	6.48​	4.74​
Apr-43​	4.58​	8.46​	5.26​
May-43​	4.88​	7.08​	5.32​
Jun-43​	4.75​	7.93​	5.87​
Jul-43​	4.57​	8.65​	6.09​
Aug-43​	3.95​	9.81​	6.18​
Sep-43​	3.77​	9.55​	5.72​
Oct-43​	3.84​	9.53​	6.26​
Nov-43​	3.89​	7.93​	5.81​
Dec-43​	3.73​	6.51​	5.22​

Cumulative numbers removes the inevitable very good or bad raid, the results are obvious, even without including the write offs. You can make the figures look better by using airborne sorties, which would cut the loss rates to 75% of the above, still too high for German targets.

What the 8th Air Force also knew was 300 strong raids were not enough to obtain acceptable losses unless the extra aircraft actually cut losses, it also knew fighters and bombers overclaimed enemy losses, the question being by how much. An occasional report via Ultra would confirm overclaiming but not how big it was on average.

Anecdote: 133 Eagle squadron RAF, 1942 B-17 mission to Rouen, did not see enemy aircraft, came home with holes in their Spitfires from the bomber gunners and were told the gunners had lodged claims for 10 destroyed and 15 probable.

If you are saying that these raids you're proposing could still have dragged the enemy into a fight, I can see your point but it would not have been enough to do the requisite amount of damage in time for D-Day. But it doesn't move those critical targets closer and there wasn't enough time.

To switch to exaggeration for a moment, the 8th Air Force for at least the first half of 1943 was a sideshow, it lacked the aircraft and supplies to do much more than learn while at the same time giving similar learning opportunities for the Luftwaffe. The main fighting was in the east and south, supplemented by the RAF in the west.

Mighty Eighth War Diary, raid reports are pages 7 to 503, day after the October raid on Schweinfurt is page 130, so 123 pages for around 15 months of initial operations, 373 for the next 19 months. Richard Davis spreadsheets which include non bombing operations, the 14 October 1943 reports are entries 303 to 305 out of 5,576 entries.

When it comes to the west it was the operations in late 1943 and then into 1944 simply by their sheer number that wrote down the Luftwaffe before we talk about better allied aircraft and tactics. In early 1944 an upgrade in average Luftwaffe fighter firepower increased the ratio to 2 USAAF heavies shot down to 1 Luftwaffe shot down by the gunners. Work out the US casualties if unescorted raids did the writing down of the Luftwaffe day fighter force.

If this pressure drove Jeschonnek to suicide, what was it doing to Eaker?

In July 1943 the Luftwaffe failed in the east, south and middle (Hamburg) then on 17 August the RAF set back the V weapons program at Peenemunde and the USAAF launched their first 300 strong raid. Hitler demanded answers, Goering needed a scapegoat, telling Jeschonnek he knew what he had to do.

What it was doing to Eaker's state of mind is unknown, consulting any biographies of him might give answers.

He was commanding an air force that was bleeding badly, executing a strategic directive he hadn't written,

Heywood Hansell was commanding 1st wing and had input to the plans, things like 76 targets over 6 target systems, U-boats, aircraft, ball bearings, oil, synthetic rubber, military vehicles in that priority order. Based on the early 8th Air Force experience the new plan was April to July 1943 stay within fighter support range, phase 2 July to October 75% aircraft factories, 25% U-boats within 500 miles range in day and night raids, similar for later phases with increasing forces. Hansell wrote the draft, Eaker took it to Washington end April 1943, approved by US Chiefs 29 April, Combined Chiefs 14 May, all leading to Overlord on 1 May 1944.

with intelligence that Nick Beale has shown was too sparse to change his options and given a binary choice by Spaatz that left him no third path.

These statements are simply wrong.

To end July 1943 the 8th Air Force heavy bombers claimed 1,759 enemy aircraft shot down while losing 327 aircraft to enemy fighters, at face value in material terms 1.5 to 1 Germans losing more, personnel 3.7 to 1 US losing more. Given the intelligence picture it was obvious the bomber claims were exaggerated, but by how much? Halve the claims and the US loses in material terms as well.

The argument that appears to be building here is that Eaker was unfit for command. If that's the position, just say it. But say it without the benefit of 83 years of hindsight, Murray's figures, Hinsley's volumes, Nick Beale's signal analysis and Spaatz's binary choice.

The data was there because of claims made about what was actually achieved, now it is reframed as using hindsight to hit below the belt, the claims about Luftwaffe fighter losses are wrong, not the data.

Do it with what Eaker actually had in front of him in August 1943. Option 3 and better information were not open to him.

See the above in terms of solid information, after that comes various ideas on German losses in the air and bomb damage and yes the option was always there to say we are failing, big changes required.

These were commanders acting under extreme pressure. The only black and white bit was the choice given to him by Spaatz.

No and not Spaatz, Eaker had, follow orders while agitating for relevant changes, like drop tanks, resign/ask to be relieved or order the halt of unescorted raids because the self defending bomber idea was not working.

To mid October 1943 the 8th Air Force did not question the 1942 idea of 300 strong raids would keep average losses to acceptable levels, while undertaking operations that consistently took unsustainable losses that also showed the 300 idea was not going to work. At a third losses per month times 3 months to complete a tour means a 30% chance of doing so. Over and above claims about morale the dilution of experience reduced combat effectiveness, and the 1943/44 the USAAF training system would be better the more combat experienced people were in it.

As the Commander of the Eighth Air Force, why would Eaker by involved in combat operations. Why would there be a choice?

Think of the early operations as more the 8th Air Wing, to end April 1943 no more than 4 B-17 and 1 or 2 B-24 groups operational. 8th Air Force Command was really one step up from groups whose leaders regularly flew. Before considering personalities and ideas of leading from the front.

The USAAF assumed a soft centre fighter defence plus precision raids on key targets that would destroy or cause long term damage leading to major loss of production or even collapse of war industries, the Luftwaffe had a minority of its fighters in Germany and the west. Yet it seems with devastating damage being done in Germany the US plans assumed the centre would stay soft.

The 8th Air Force 1943 campaign was based on assumptions that all air forces had pre war, updating them by increasing the bomber size, speed and altitude to make it harder to intercept and shoot down the bombers, plus adding heavy defensive armament to make it more dangerous to uneconomic to intercept. As a rough rule of thumb the lethal distance from a pair of 0.50 inch machine guns for a single engine fighter was about the same as that for a heavy bomber versus a fighter with multiple 20mm cannon. Made it hard for the fighters to get close and kill. Proof air power could undertake operations, perhaps decisive, independent of army and navy. Rather like the 20th Air Force in 1945, same assumptions with higher performing better defended but still unescorted bombers.

The assumptions were rapidly overturned in the USAAF in the Mediterranean in the first half of 1943 which should have been communicated to the ETO or asked for by the ETO. No guarantee it happened.

Like during November 1944 the Paris US Army hospitals start to see a steady stream of cold injury patients, mainly trench foot, by week through November 1.3%, 4%, 20% and 24% of patients admitted are cold injury, some 45,283 cases. Trench foot "accounted for 9.25% of all the casualties suffered on the Continent." Warnings had been given but the seriousness of the problem had been discounted by the units. The standard combat boot was not waterproof but much of the problem was lack of simple precautions. Trench foot joined the VD, AWOL and court martial rates as a measure of unit discipline. It is not until January 1945 that the Mediterranean Theatre report on trench foot (from the previous winter it seems) makes it to the European theatre, and then only after a specific request.

 

[wuzak]

Think of the early operations as more the 8th Air Wing, to end April 1943 no more than 4 B-17 and 1 or 2 B-24 groups operational. 8th Air Force Command was really one step up from groups whose leaders regularly flew. Before considering personalities and ideas of leading from the front.

So, ego?

There was no need for him to fly.

Probably not for the group commanders, either.

I can see that Eaker's level would not have needed access to ULTRA directly - his superiors could do that better, and decide what information is worth acting upon.

 

[Engineman]

Clearly Eaker was allowed to refuse the offer and as far as the security people were concerned the less who knew the better. Part of security was presenting the Ultra material in a way that hid the origin. Eaker did not pretend, he was offered to know about highly classified material and chose not to. As a result he had no information on what that material was or how it was obtained.

Thanks for your info. Although I know little of what is written about Eaker in this context, can you say if the details are written about his position with Ultra in official histories?
Bearing in mind that such information was not in the public domain until many years after WW2, who do we rely upon for the details here?
I remain sceptical that anyone could decline. One is not asked if they would wish to be informed, Need to Know defines the requirement, if One did not Need to Know they would not be told, if they Needed to Know, they had no option. Furthermore, having potential security weaknesses in the high echelons of Command is a serious risk of compromise, precisely because they WILL be dealing with high level intelligence, and this cannot be simply filtered-out to suit an untold individual at the Top who deals with many others who do know.
It is not true to say that "the minimum number" of personnel would be an absolute value in this context, it would be the minimum number required to know, and the USA were very keen to have all the highest level "required" representation in this Intelligence realm. Knowledge is power.

Eng

 

[J.D.]

In July 1943 the Luftwaffe failed in the east, south and middle (Hamburg) then on 17 August the RAF set back the V weapons program at Peenemunde and the USAAF launched their first 300 strong raid. Hitler demanded answers, Goering needed a scapegoat, telling Jeschonnek he knew what he had to do.

What it was doing to Eaker's state of mind is unknown, consulting any biographies of him might give answers.

I haven't seen any but I don't know.

What we're talking about here is a question of degree. Jeschonnek at one end and an American commander on the other end on a good day.

The point is that even on a good day, they were still sending men out to be killed and all I'm asking anyone to do before passing judgement is to walk a mile in their shoes. It must have taken a terrible toll on them, even the successful ones.

We can go on for hours about numbers and performance figures but a good half the story is the human one. We've all looked at it from the tailgunner's point of view but the commanders are the ones who need the closest examination.

So yes, any biography on him would be useful. The only comment I can remember hearing from him after the war was one he made for The World at War: "Naturally I was keenly disappointed" is probably a massive understatement in a time when understatement was still a thing to be heard.