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Actually, they are. As of 1 April 1942, the fighter unit of the 4th AG, originally made up of pilots and aircraft of the Chitose AG from the Marshalls, and the Kawai Buntai from Palua (itself made up of pilots from Tainan and 3rd AGs), was amalgamated into the Tainan AG, the main body of which did not arrive at Rabaul until mid-April aboard Komaki Maru. The 4th AG fighter unit was originally equipped with A5Ms but these were kept at Rabaul and steadily augmented by Zeroes. By 28 April the Tainan had 24 Zeroes at Lea and eight more at Rabaul, along with six A5Ms. The A5Ms, while scoring some early successes against RAAF Catalinas and Hudsons, were no match for B-17s and B-26s and were withdrawn from front line duties during May.Not all the claims are against Tainan.
OK I lied. It is too mentioned in Attack and Conquer. Page 33. Falletta and Meng arrived at Port Moresby 6 April with a small contingent of Airacobras.5 P-39s of the 36th PS arrived at Port Moresby on 5 April 1942, led by Col "Buzz" Wagner as part of the first flexing of USAAF muscle, as it were, along with B-26s of the 22nd BG and B-25s of the 3rd BG. This is attested in several Australian war diaries. Strangely, it is not mentioned in Attack and Conquer, the popular history of the 8th FG by Stanaway and Hickey.
sure i will go to the hangar tomorrow afternoon and get a photo, its a bit corroded, but its pressed to be belly shapeSee post #62 this thread.
Here is the point where the Tainan's decision not to wear parachutes cost them a great pilot (credited with 15 kills)....
No, no, that only applies to the Allies who are notorious liars and exaggerators, not the Japanese and the Germans, who are universally known to be meticulously accurate in their scoring of kills!!So at best Yoshino may have had 4-5 "actual" kills, right? That's if we use a calculation oft performed on this forum, when discussing allied victory credits....
Who knows? Who cares? Different air forces used different criteria for awarding kills. Some awarded full credit for shared kills, others did not. In the end what mattered was which side could sustain the attritional nature of protracted air operations. The Tainan probably lost more aircraft on the ground to bombing and strafing and to operational accidents than in actual air combat. This is probably true for all air forces. Parsifal pointed that out earlier when he highlighted the disastrous losses suffered by the 8th FG just trying to get their planes from Townsville to Port Moresby. They were not unique.So at best Yoshino may have had 4-5 "actual" kills, right? That's if we use a calculation oft performed on this forum, when discussing allied victory credits....
Who knows? Who cares?
Totally agree and its often overlooked as people get hung up with numbers. If you have the resources to handle the losses and can impose your will onto the battlefield then you win and the other guy losesAbsolutely. In the end, the Japanese report in their own tallies the loss of more than 6500 a/c to the end of 1943. Major cause from that wasnt due to air combat with enemy (Allied ) fighters. they lost something like 40% of a/c on the ground and a large percentage that simply failed to return, often when allied aircraft were nowhere near them. Navigational errors are thought to be the most prevalent cause for these unexplained losses.
The application of airpower is subtle and yet brutal at the same time. Losses to direct combat are not the major determinant of losses, or even the major cause or measure for victory. The losses arose from a whole host of other associated activities....being bombed, getting lost, simply wear and tear. The measure of success isn't that you shoot down 50 or 100 a/c, but that you are able to do the things you want to do with your air assets, whilst preventing, or making excessively costly for the opponent to do the same. its called force projection.
8FG took one hell of a beating May-September. they lost more than they shot down. that is absolutely not the way to measure their success.. They extracted a cost from the Japanese that was sufficient, and prevented their (the Japanese) air assets from materially affecting the battle on the ground and at sea. In the end that was what mattered. .