Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2 (1 Viewer)

Anonymous · Jan 7, 2005

plan_D said:
10 Panzer Divisions were in France in June 1944. There is a road network running right across the northern coast of France, giving access to everywhere from Cherbourg to Calais.
Place those 10 Panzer Divisions behind the beaches, with easy access to the road network. Have you just tried to tell me that heavy bomber raids would be used on a Panzer division? Do you think I mean actually right behind the beaches? What makes you think they'll know about the 10 Panzer Divisions? They failed to pay attention to two SS Panzer Divisions in Holland September 1944.

I don't think you've read up on this. Only from the Allied point of view, if at all. I advise you to read Panzer Leader - Guderian and Panzer Battles - Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin (Ia to Rommel in Africa) both talk of D-Day and the German preparations. Both agree in the claim that Rommel was wrong.

Allied intel about German movements in France immeadiately prior to D-Day was excellent. The French resistance provided extreme detail. If the Panzer's had positioned themselves as you say, they would have immeadiately become prime targets for massive allied bombing.

As for those roads... Allied fighter bombers would have wiped out any Panzer's moving along them during the day, and probably they would have dropped motion sensitive bombs all along the roads to prevent German tank movements to Normandy. The smart thing to do was to hold them back where they were realtively safe form Allied bombing and the number of alternative routes to wherever the invasion was were much larger.

However... when the invasion started the tanks had to roll. They didn't and even if they'd have been where you say, they'd still have been fixed in position until Hitler woke from his post drug binge drug induced sleep to release them.

I really think that had the Panzers been stationed near the coast within Spitfire range, and within the heavy loaded range of the B-17 and Lancaster, they'd have been wiped out long before the invasion by massive carpet bombing.

=S=

Lunatic

plan_D · Jan 7, 2005

You think so, huh? The Panzers would have been wiped out during the day, just like the 21st Panzer Division was wiped out on 6th June when moving to the beaches?

Anonymous · Jan 7, 2005

plan_D said:
It was his say to move them forward or not, before the invasion. If it wasn't, then Guderian wouldn't have gone to him. Rommel had control before 6th June, he had the chance to move them forward.
Hitler had control on the day but you can't move men OUT of combat when they would have been drawn into it by the Allies attack. So, Hitlers control would mean nothing.

The tanks would mostly have been stationed up near Calaise, where the invasion was expected. They could certainly have been ordred to hold that position. Hitler's orders would still have been in effect, the tanks would have stayed where they were.

plan_D · Jan 7, 2005

See, that is where you're wrong. The idea, of Guderian, was not to send all 10 Divisions to Calais. He said all 10 Divisions had to have access to the coast road. This meant they would be station all along the northern coast, CAPABLE of reacting to the situation with speed as it came.

Anonymous · Jan 7, 2005

plan_D said:
You think so, huh? The Panzers would have been wiped out during the day, just like the 21st Panzer Division was wiped out on 6th June when moving to the beaches?

Between June 6th and June 8th 1944, 54 of 124 PzKw IV's had been lost to allied air attacks. By August 1 they were down to 42 vehicles (all tanks?). They didn't make contact with troops until August 10th. By Aug. 25th they were down to 12 tanks.

Had they been moved up prior to D-Day, they'd have been primary targets, and many would have been lost before the invasion even started.

=S=

Lunatic

plan_D · Jan 7, 2005

You think 21st Panzer Division was only equipped with Pz. IVs? And 12 tanks due to losses beyond air attacks. Maintenance and enemy ground action. Do you honestly believe all 10 Panzer Divisions could have been wiped out?

Lightning Guy · Jan 7, 2005

But by your own argument not all 10 panzer divisions would have had to have been wiped out, at least not all at once. With the panzers spread out all along the coast of France only a franction of that force would have been able to react immediatedly. And there was no way Hitler was moving anything out of the Calais area.

Anonymous · Jan 7, 2005

plan_D said:
You think 21st Panzer Division was only equipped with Pz. IVs? And 12 tanks due to losses beyond air attacks. Maintenance and enemy ground action. Do you honestly believe all 10 Panzer Divisions could have been wiped out?

No other tank types were listed in the commander's report.

I think they could have been very seriously hurt. The German's had no idea how long it might be before the Allies invaded, and stationing large numbers of tanks within 5 miles of the coast would have subjected them to constant air attacks. Let's say they'd moved the tanks up in early April... that would have given Allied airpower 2 months to work on them. Then, when the invasion did come, they'd have been heading along those coastal roads, prime targets for Allied air strikes.

All I'm saying is that puttining the tanks near the coast would have probably improved the German defense much less than was originally implied. Those forces that were within 20-25 miles of the invasion beaches might have had some significant impact, those that were further away probably would not have. And most of those forces would undoubtedly have been deployed up in Calaise, not down in Normandy.

Besides, according to what I've read (which is still minimal), it was Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt that wanted to hold German forces in a central position, not Rommel.

Opinions on the best method of defeating the Allies differed greatly. Rundstedt and others advocated a central reserve that would be used to repel the invaders after their intentions were known. Rommel challenged that plan because he believed that Allied air superiority would prevent the central reserve from conducting an effective counterattack. The time to defeat the invasion force, Rommel believed, was when it first hit the beaches. To that end, he worked to have the strongest units stationed along the coastline and built coastal batteries and strongpoints, augmented by thousands of anti-invasion obstacles and millions of mines.
http://www.historynet.com/wwii/blmightyhost/

=S=

Lunatic

DerAdlerIstGelandet · Jan 8, 2005

The Panzere were under direct control from Hitler. He was reluctant and the fact that Rommel was on leave did not help the situation.

Meanwhile, the German high command, in the absence of Rommel, who was home on leave, began to respond. Hitler was initially unwilling to release the armoured divisions for a counterattack. When he relented after midday, elements of the 21st Panzer Division drove into the gap between the British 3rd and Canadian 3rd divisions at Sword Beach and Juno Beach and almost reached the sea. Had they done so, the landings might have failed. Fierce resistance by British antitank gunners at Périers-sur-le-Dan turned the tide in late evening.
http://search.eb.com/normandy/week2/invasion.html

Here is some of the mistakes made and the Panzer divisions are listed in them:

There was no German counterattack. Rommel's plans for fighting the D-Day battle were never put into motion. There were many reasons.

First, German surprise was complete. The Fortitude operation had fixed German attention on the Pas-de-Calais. They were certain it would be the site of the battle, and they had placed the bulk of their panzer divisions north and east of the Seine River, where they were unavailable for counterattack in Normandy.

Second, German confusion was extensive. Without air reconnaissance, with Allied airborne troops dropping here, there, everywhere, with their telephone lines cut by the Resistance, with their army, corps, division, and some regimental commanders at the war game in Rennes, the Germans were all but blind and leaderless. The commander who was most missed was Rommel, who spent the day on the road driving to La Roche-Guyonan -- another price the Germans paid for having lost control of the air; Rommel dared not fly.

Third, the German command structure was a disaster. Hitler's mistrust of his generals and the generals' mistrust of Hitler were worth a king's ransom to the Allies. So were Hitler's sleeping habits, as well as his Wolkenkuckucksheim ideas.

The only high-command officer who responded correctly to the crisis at hand was Field Marshal Rundstedt, the old man who was there for window dressing and who was so scorned by Hitler and OKW. Two hours before the seaborne landings began, he ordered the two reserve panzer divisions available for counterattack in Normandy, the 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr, to move immediately toward Caen. He did so on the basis of an intuitive judgment that the airborne landings were on such a large scale that they could not be a mere deception maneuver (as some of his staff argued) and would have to be reinforced from the sea. The only place such landings could come in lower Normandy were on the Calvados and Cotentin coasts. He wanted armor there to meet the attack.

Rundstedt's reasoning was sound, his action decisive, his orders clear. But the panzer divisions were not under his command. They were in OKW reserve. To save precious time, Rundstedt had first ordered them to move out, then requested OKW approval. OKW did not approve. At 0730 Jodi informed Rundstedt that the two divisions could not be committed until Hitler gave the order, and Hitler was still sleeping. Rundstedt had to countermand the move-out order. Hitler slept until noon.

The two panzer divisions spent the morning waiting. There was a heavy overcast; they could have moved out free from serious interference from Allied aircraft. It was 1600 when Hitler at last gave his approval. By then the clouds had broken up and Allied fighters and bombers ranged the skies over Normandy, smashing anything that moved. The panzers had to crawl into roadside woods and wait under cover for darkness before continuing their march to the sound of the guns.

"The news couldn't be better," Hitler said when he was first informed that D-Day was here. "As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them." He had an appointment for a reception near Salzburg for the new Hungarian prime minister; other guests included diplomats from Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. They were there to be browbeaten by Hitler into doing even more for the German war economy. When he entered the reception room, his face was radiant. He exclaimed, "It's begun at last." After the meeting he spread a map of France and told Goering, "They are landing here -- and here: just where we expected them!" Goering did not correct this palpable lie.

Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400. "Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."

Goebbels's and Hitler's thinking was explained by one of Goebbels's aides, who had pointed out in an April 10, 1944, diary entry: "The question whether the Allied invasion in the West is coming or not dominates all political and military discussion here.

"Goebbels is afraid that the Allies dare not make the attempt yet. If so, that would mean for us many months of endless, weary waiting which would test our strength beyond endurance. Our war potential cannot now be increased, it can only decline. Every new air raid makes the petrol position worse." It had been galling to the Nazis that the Allies had been able to build their strength in England, untouchable by the Luftwaffe or the Wehrmacht. Now they had come within range of German guns.

But Hitler was more eager to hit London than to fight a defensive war. He had a weapon to do it with, the V-1. It had first been flown successfully on Christmas Eve, 1943; by June 1944, it was almost ready to go to work. The V-1 was a jet-powered plane carrying a one-ton warhead. It was wildly inaccurate (of the 8,000 launched against London, only 20 percent even hit that huge target), but it had a range of 250 kilometers and flew at 700 kilometers per hour, too fast for Allied aircraft or antiaircraft to shoot down.

On the afternoon of June 6, Hitler ordered the V-1 attacks on London to begin. As was so often the case, he was giving an order that could not be carried out. It took six days to bring the heavy steel catapult rigs from their camouflaged dumps to the Channel coast. The attack did not begin until June 12, and when it did it was a fiasco: of ten V-1s launched, four crashed at once, two vanished without a trace, one demolished a railway bridge in London, and three hit open fields.

Still, the potential was there. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler had picked the wrong target. Haphazard bombing of London could cause sleepless nights and induce terror, but it could not have a direct military effect. Had Hitler sent the V-1s against the beaches and artifical harbors of Normandy, by June 12 jammed with men, machines, and ships, the vengeance weapons (Goebbels picked the name, which was on the mark -- they could sate Hitler's lust for revenge but they could not effect the war so long as they were directed against London) might have made a difference.
http://www.worldwar2history.info/D-Day/Hitler.html

Here is an arguement that states that it was Rundstedt who wanted the Panzers to be kept in reserve:

By June 1944, the number of German divisions positioned in Western Europe stood at fifty-eight, an increase of twelve since the previous fall. Some were bodenständige (earth-rooted or static) divisions without motorized transport, filled with men in their late thirties and with former prisoners of war from the Eastern Front who had volunteered for service in the German army. Others were training divisions, containing the underage and unfit. That still left some thirty divisions of adequate strength in France to oppose any Allied landing. Twelve of these divisions lined the Channel coast, backed by a reserve of ten panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. The size and tank strength of these divisions varied greatly, but all contained a nucleus of battle-experienced veterans.

Direct responsibility for the defense of the Channel coast fell to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of Army Group B (Armed Forces Netherlands, Fifteenth, and Seventh armies). The defense of southern France, both Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, was the responsibility of Army Group G, commanded by General Johannes Blaskowitz. Both he and Rommel reported to sixty-eight-year-old Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West (OB West). However, the chain of command between von Rundstedt and Rommel was muddled by the quasi-independent nature of Rommel's command and by their fundamental disagreement over the appropriate strategy to repel the expected invasion. Rommel, because of his disastrous North African experience with Allied air superiority, believed that the invasion would have to be turned back on the beaches, within forty-eight hours, if it was to be defeated at all. He therefore argued forcefully for personal command of all mobile reserves under OB West and for the positioning of those reserves well forward so that they could counterattack quickly. Von Rundstedt and his panzer group commander disagreed. They wished to hold the mobile panzer and panzer grenadier divisions in deep reserve, to be committed to battle only after the strength and axis of the invasion had been ascertained. In March 1944, a compromise was reached whereby Hitler gave Rommel control of three panzer divisions, the 2d, 21st, and 116th, while holding four others-Panzer Lehr, 1st SS Panzer, 12th SS Panzer, and 17th SS Panzer Grenadier-in reserve under the command of OKW, the Armed Forces High Command.
http://www.history.rochester.edu/mtv/overview.htm

And just to clarify things here is the breakdown of some of the Panzer divisions in Normandy:

2. Panzer Division

The division was depleted after prolonged fighting on the eastern front and during the winter 1944 it was transferred to France for refitting. Since it had arrived in France early in 1944, the division was at full strength in most respects. It had also had time to train its replacements. Already on 1 April, the division was 573 men above authorized strength.
The panzer regiment was strong. It had 94 operational Panzer IV in the II. Abteilung, plus 2 in workshops on 31 May. The I. Abteilung reported 73 Panthers operational and 6 in workshops on 5 June. Most likely the division recieved no tank replacements during the fighting in Normandy.
Casualties during June amounted to 275 killed in action, 1 021 wounded and 95 missing. On 1 July the division had 85 Panzer IV operational and 11 in workshops requiring short term repairs, while the number of operational Panthers was 21. Another 29 Panthers were in short term repair, while 9 were in long term repair. Twenty had been lost during June. During June, the Panther battalion was credited with the destruction of 89 enemy tanks and 19 AT guns.

21. Panzer Division

Of the German panzer divisions that participated in the Normandy campaign this was probably the most unique. It had no Panther battalion like the other panzer divisions (except 10. SS-Pz.Div.). On the other hand it had both an assault gun battalion and an anti tank battalion with towed 8,8 cm AT guns (such were not found in the other panzer divisions). Each of its infantry regiments had one SPW battalion which was rather unusual. Another unusual feature was that it had two, rather than one, of its companies in the engineer battalion equipped with SPW. Finally it had many modified captured vehicles included in its organization.
Altogether this meant that the division had 98 Pz IV lg and six obsolete Pz IV kz. However, on 24 May another fourteen Pz IV lg were sent to the division. Possibly they had not arrived by 1 June, since deliveries before 24 May comprised 98 vehicles. The division also received tanks during the battle in Normandy. On 8 July seventeen Pz IV were sent and three weeks later three Pz IV (Bef.Wg.) were also sent. Finally on 10 August another ten Pz IV were dispatched to 21. Pz.Div. It is highly doubtful that the last ten arrived in time to take part in the battle.
From 6 June to 11 July the division lost 3 411 men, and during the entire month of July it lost 229 killed in action, 601 wounded and 1 019 missing. These losses were however covered by the arrival of 2 399 replacements and 26 convalescents that returned. This meant that the division had suffered 4 703 casualties 1 June &endash; 31 July and received 2 479 men to cover losses. Some of the replacements received were probably infantry from the 16. LW. Feld.Div.

116. Panzer Division

The 116. Pz.Div. was formed by merging the remnants of 16. Pz.Gren.Div., a unit worn after battles on th eastern front, with the 179. Res.Pz.Div.1 The 16. Pz.Gren.Div. did not arrive in France until April 1944. This made it impossible to create a new fully battle worthy division before the allies landed.
Including four Panthers sent to I./Pz.Rgt. 24 in January, two Panthers (Bef.Wg.) with the 16. Pz.Rgt.6 and the 70 sent at the beginning of June the division had 76 Panthers available when it departed for Normandy. It seems that the division had 86 Panzer IV. No further tanks were sent to the division during the summer 1944. The Pz.Jäg.Abt. 228 received 21 JagdPz IV in July9, bringing it to its authorized strength.

The division also had a few extra armoured vehicles. According to a report dated 8 June 1944 it had three Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV kz., seven Pz.Kpf.Wg. III lg., three Pz.Kpf.Wg. III kz., six StuG III lg. and six 7,5 cm Pak (Sf).10 These vehicles were not included in the authorized organization for the division, and it was planned that some of them would be handed away.
The division received 665 men as replacements during August. Also it received 127 men on 6 September and another 442 six days later. According to a report dated 23 September the division suffered 5 186 casualties from the allied invasion until 13 September.

Panzer-Lehr Division

When this division arrived in Normandy, it was probably better equipped than any other German division during the war.
It was formed from various training units and was considered to be among the best divisions in the German army. Its equipment most likely surpassed any German division during the war. On 1 June it had, including the attached 316. Pz.Kp. (Fkl), 99 Panzer IV, 89 Panther, 31 JagdPz IV, 10 StuG III, 8 Tiger (five of them were Tiger II). This gave a total of 237 tanks and assault guns. The division was remarkable in other aspects too. It had all its four panzer grenadier battalions carried by armoured half tracks. Also the engineer battalion was fully equipped with armoured half tracks. Altogether the division possessed 658 operational SPW and 35 in short term repair.

Each panzer grenadier battalion had 108 machine guns, six 8 cm mortars and 39 Panzerschreck, nine 3,7 cm guns on halftracks and eight 7,5 cm infantry guns on half tracks.

The artillery regiment had one battalion with twelve 10,5 cm howitzers and one battalion with 15,2 cm howitzers. The I. Abteilung was in Germany equipping with Wespe and Hummel. Fuel shortages hampered it on the march to Normandy and by 20 June it had reached Vire. It was renamed to be the II. Abteilung, while the previous II. Abteilung became the I.

Usually the Flak battalion of a Panzer division was authorized eight or twelve 8,8 cm Flak guns, but Pz.Lehr had eighteen.

The division had a manpower strength of 14 699 on 1 June 1944.
The Pz.Lehr division continued fighting British forces until relieved by the 276. Inf.Div. This was accomplished gradually between 26 June and 5 July. June had been a month of intensive fighting for the Pz.Lehr divisions. Casualties during June amounted to 490 killed in action, 1 809 wounded and 673 missing. Equipment losses included the following vehicles1:
24 Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV
82 SPW
23 Panther
76 motorcycles
1 JagdPz IV
57 Cars
2 StuG III
151 Trucks
1 s.IG. (SF)
10 towing vehicles
1 FlakPz 38 (t)

1. SS-Panzer Division "Leibstandarte"

The Leibstandarte had been fighting on the Eastern Front since the autumn 1943 and was badly worn when in April 1944 it was transferred to Belgium to rest and refit. It was far from combat ready at the beginning of June. Even though it had a strength of 19 618 on 1 June, many of the men were recently arrived recruits which had to be trained. On 15 May it had reported a shortage of 4 143 men. Also on 1 June 1 081 NCO:s and men, mainly drivers and technicians, were in Germany for training.

Another problem was the lack of motor transport. The division was authorized 3 887 trucks of all types, but had only 1 070 in running order and 621 in workshops. Also, it had no armoured half tracks operational.

Due to these defects the division was not ready for combat when the allies landed. It also had to await further deliveries of tanks. On 1 June it had 42 Panzer IV, 38 Panther and 44 StuG III operational. Eight Panzer IV and one StuG were in workshops. Further deliveries occurred during June.
The Leibstandarte was in reserve south of Caen when the British Goodwood operation was launched 18 July. Losses suffered until 18 July (inclusive) amounted to 1 441 officers and men.

12. SS-Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend"

At first glance, the division might have appeared to be a very strong formation on 1 June 1944. Nominally it had a strength of 20 540 men, a number that surpassed most divisions on either side of the Channel.
The panzer regiment had the standard organization, i. e. the I. Abteilung equipped with Panthers and the II. Abteilung with Panzer IV. Authorized strength was 17 tanks per company in I. Abteilung and 22 per company in II. Abteilung. Each battalion had four companies. Together with the tanks belonging to the battalion and regiment staffs this gave a total of 79 Panthers and 101 Panzer IV.

The number of Panzer IV amounted to 91 operational and 7 in workshops on 1 June. The situation was less favourable concerning Panthers. At the end of April 1944 the division had only 26 Panthers. Further vehicles were sent in May:
16 May
8 Panthers
17 May
8 Panthers
22 May
16 Panthers (two trains)
24 May
8 Panthers
This made a total of 66 Panthers with the division.
Tank losses are possible to establish up to 9 July:

Pz IV
Panther

6 - 26 June
26
15
27 June - 5 July
18
6
6 July - 9 July
7
11

17. SS-Panzer Grenadier Division "Götz von Berlichingen"

Due to its late formation the 17. SS-Pz.Gren.Div. was still not fully combat ready when the allies landed. It was reported that on 1 June one third of the men had 22 weeks of training and the remainder had 25 weeks of training.

Its manpower strength amounted to 17 321 men on 1 June, but it was short of 233 officers and 1 541 NCO:s, while it had a surplus of 741 privates.3 This meant that the division was short of about 40 % of its officers and NCO, a serious disadvantage.

At the beginning of June the division had many deficiencies. The greatest was probably the lack of vehicles. The supply services of the division completely lacked transportation on 1 June. According to a report concerning the situation 15 May the division had only 257 trucks and towing vehicles of all types. No deliveries of JagdPz IV had yet occurred, but the 3. Kompanie of the had three 7,62 cm Pak (Sf) and nine 7,5 cm Pak (Sf).

By using the Aufkl.Abt., StuG.Abt., SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 38 and one reinforced artillery battalion (consisting of four batteries with le.FH and one battery with s.FH) a mobile Kampfgruppe was formed.

Except for vehicles the division was rather well equipped.
http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html

I believe the 2nd, 9th, and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were also somewhere in France during the invasion.

plan_D · Jan 8, 2005

Who said about putting them there in April?

On 6th June, 1944 - 48 Infantry Divisions. 10 Panzer and panzergrenadier Divisions.
1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte 'Adolf Hitler'
2nd Panzer Division in Amiens - Abbeville
116th Panzer Division east of Rouen
12th SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend in Lisieux
21st Panzer Division in Caen area
Panzer Lehr Division in Le Mans-Orleans
17th SS Panzergrenadier Division in Saumur
11th Panzer Division in Bordeaux
2nd SS Panzer Division 'Das Reich' in Tolouse
9th Panzer Division in Nimes-Arles

"No matter how one may admire the great exertions made, it is nevertheless a matter of considerable regret that Rommel failed to understand the need for possessing mobile reserves. A large scale land operation - which in view of our hopeless inferiority on the sea and in the air offered us the only chance of success - he held to be impossible and he therefore neither wanted nor tried to organise one" Heinz Guderian - 1957 - Inspector of Armoured Forces and head of OKH.

It also mentions that Rommel believed the only landing place was going to be North of the Somme. He made no preparations for any other alternative landing sites, Guderian urged him to think differently.

DerAdlerIstGelandet · Jan 8, 2005

Well anyways it would not have mattered in the long run any how.

Anonymous · Jan 8, 2005

plan_D said:
Who said about putting them there in April?

When you say they should have been forward deployed prior to D-day you must pick a date well before D-day. The German's had no idea when the invasion might be. It could have been in May, it could have been in June, or it might have been in Sept.

The point is, whenever they were "moved up", the Allies would have known about it and known exactly where they were and planned accordingly. The huge advantage of good intel vs. bad intel, and total air superiority.

=S=

Lunatic

DerAdlerIstGelandet · Jan 8, 2005

I have to agree with Lunatic on this.

Pertsajakilu · Jan 8, 2005

Sorry to bring You the disappointement.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Parliament: "It is the Russian Army that has done the main work of ripping the guts out of the German Army . . . :

When Germans started Barbarossa they had 3 miilion solidiers in that operation. I could not think what those trained troops had done in Normandy. Hollywood bullshit have created totally wrong picture of WWII

Russian front was the bitter front where the German force was killed. US has all the golry, buth in eastenf forn all of the US casualties suffered in whole war was happenig in single battle.

Petsajakilu

DerAdlerIstGelandet · Jan 8, 2005

No it was Hitler that ripped the guts out of Wehrmacht by invading Russia. He should have left the Russians alone atleast until he was done with the British. What I dont understand is how you can say the US suffered all its casualties in a single battle. They fought North Africa, they fought in Italy, they fought in Normandy, The Netherlands, the rest of France, Belgium, and Germany just to name some of the places in Europe. There were thousands of battles fought and that does not include the air war, thousands of Americans lost there lives in the air war. The victory in Europe owes a lot to everyone, the US, England and the Commonwealths, Russia and many more.

Lightning Guy · Jan 8, 2005

I am curious if Pert thinks the Soviets could have continued to stand up to the Wermacht if German industry wasn't being pounded to ruins? Or if the Luftwaffe wasn't required to base countless fighter units in France to fight off the American and British bombers? And if the Russians were doing so well, why was Staling screaming for a second front?

Pertsajakilu · Jan 9, 2005

Ahem... Sorry my wording was very bad! These damned electrical forums. I rarely wrote forums like this and it is sooo easy to sound rude. I apologize my previous post. Let try it again.

Imortance of Russian front is many times ignored when talking about WWII. If we look at war movies or TV it never existed ( few exeptions ). Many people live in believe that western allies did all the important job. US forces did a lot in europe but the meat grinder was in eastern front. In my opinion most of the really critical battles were fought there. In single battle there could be casualties what were equal at size what were whole US losses in second world war. By the time of Normandy German was beaten and quality of its troops were rapidly decreasing.

I doubt that in US public opinion in would have accepted losses of million or more men. And that it would have been without Russian front. It would have been job for an A-bomb like in Japan.

Ex Natzi generals often accuse Hitler of loosing war but that is only excuse for defending themselves.

Pertsajakilu

DerAdlerIstGelandet · Jan 9, 2005

Dont worry Pertsajakilu, you did not sound rude and no offense was taken. I agree the Ost Front was a meat grinder and that the Wehrmacht as a whole was decreasing in quality by the time Normandy cam but 5 years of fighting will do that to you. However if the Germans had been able to concentrate there whole efforts on the Russians, Russia would not have stood a chance. As for the Nazi Generals, yes they have a pivotal role in the defeat of Germany but Hitler pretty much sealed Germanys fate.

lesofprimus · Jan 9, 2005

US forces did a lot in europe but the meat grinder was in eastern front. In my opinion most of the really critical battles were fought there. In single battle there could be casualties what were equal at size what were whole US losses in second world war.

UMmmmmmm.....

In single battle there could be casualties what were equal at size what were whole US losses in second world war.

Do u have any idea what u are saying????? The #'s involved here???

rebel8303 · Jan 9, 2005

What would have happened if the Allies never landed on Europe?
Could the Russians take out the Germans - and conquer Europe themselves?

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