Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

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That the Western allies supplied 1/3 of the explosives used by the Soviets,does not mean that without these explosives,the Soviets would have used 1/3 less explosives .
It is the same for the aluminium,copper and avgas.

Then where do these things come from if not the Western allies? Who was in a position to provide hundreds of thousands of tons of explosives.

Accounts are all over the place, from claiming the soviets were saved in 1941/42 by lend lease to the other side saying that without lend lease the Soviets would have taken only a few month to a year and half to defeat the Germans even without the western allies let alone lend lease.

We have statements like this.
"No doubt statistics can be massaged to support any point of view".
followed by
" Lend-lease supplied the USSR with 1.9% of all artillery, 7% of all tanks, 13% of all aircraft, 5.4% of transport in 1943, 19% transport in 1944 and 32.8% in 1945. Lend-lease deliveries amounted to 4% of Russia's wartime production."

which certainly tends to down play the role of lend lease but the very same article says.
" The list of other supplies, equally vital to the Soviet supply effort, is impressive – 57.8 per cent of aviation fuel requirements, 53 per cent of all explosives, almost half the wartime supply of copper, aluminium and rubber tyres. "

Bolding by me. Without the LL explosives and propellents a large part of the Soviet artillery production would have been useless. Likewise tanks do not always fight tanks, they are often used to support infantry but with few HE shells per tank and less machine gun ammo having large numbers of tanks with 1/2 filled ammo bins doesn't contribute that much. (more targets for German anti-tank equipment?)
So which is it? Lend lease supplied little in the way of combat equipment or Lend-lease supplied large amounts of material/supplies that allowed the Soviet troops to perform at a much higher level?

Steel has already been mentioned. Without lend lease rails and wheel sets how well would the soviet rail system have held up?
Armor steel for tanks.
38,000 machine tools for armaments factories. You don't make tanks in blacksmith shops.

Some writers seem to have a skewed view.

from earlier in the article I have quoted several times.

"The aluminum and other alloys, the metallurgic technology, the locomotives, the radios and other smaller items, the foodstuffs, all these items helped to strengthen the USSR in their struggle against Germany and her Allies. There is no question. But to state bluntly that without them the USSR would have collapsed is simply untrue, and this is the perspective most often put forward in English-speaking lands. The USSR is/was a great country, with enormous resources, and the Russian people are among the most resilient in the world. With or without Lend-Lease, Germany would sooner or later have been defeated, simply because such a small country could never sustain a war against one so large and so wealthy. The Second World War was a war of attrition, and Germany simply did not have the resources to outlast the USSR. Once German troops were stopped before Moscow, it was only a question of time. "
Now it is quite true that the USSR had enormous resources but Iron ore, coal and oil in the ground, while perhaps counting towards a country's wealth and resources do little good if you can't get them out of the ground in a timely fashion AND process them into the needed items/equipment. The USSR had resources, it lacked the manufacturing capacity to match the Germans in a war of attrition. If you are only making 1/2 to 1/3 of the steel per year of your opponent due to the capacity of your steel mills it doesn't matter how much iron ore you have in the ground.
A quick example, a single Russian 122mm howitzer, firing 2 rounds per minute will fire about 1 ton of steel in 25 minutes. Four such guns firing at that rate for 3 hours will have launched the equivalent of a T-34 tank towards the enemy. If you have thousands of artillery pieces you can use up a lot of steel very quickly. And this is finished steel. A number of pounds of shavings/swarf will be on the shop floor for each shell made until collected and sent back to the steel mill. Artillery shells, while not armor steel are a high quality steel.

Steel production was a rough indicator of a countries manufacturing capability. Not all of a country's industries were in proportion but it was the easiest measurement.
Unfortunately for the Soviet Union the numbers for 1940-41 for number of things changed dramatically in the last half of 1941. The Soviets did not evacuate ALL factories. They may have lost some sources of supply. They certainly lost around 40% of their agricultural lands, which put a real crimp in food production, back yard potato patches not withstanding.
They also lost a large percentage of their farm machinery.
Soviet steel production in 1942 was less than 1/2 of what was in 1941, it barely reached about 2/3rds in 1945. If your railroads are moving troops and equipment and raw materials to factories they are not moving food stuffs around the country. Rails wear out. Steel wheels on railroad cars wear out. Locomotives wear out.
Every ton of railroad rail supplied by Lend Lease freed up a Russian ton of steel for armament production.

The Lend lease was small in effect and didn't change much argument rarely looks deep into what was really going on.
They also get somethings wrong. It is often claimed that the Soviets blended LL aviation fuel with their own fuel to make higher octane, which may be true to some extent. However the Allies also supplied large amounts of anti-knock compound which was a much more efficient way of raising the octane rating of Soviet fuel.
Mix one gallon of 100 octane with one gallon of 80 octane to make two gallons of 90 something octane? Or add 2-3 CCs of anti knock compound to the gallon of soviet 80 octane to make 90 octane or above? Which is easier to ship?

Why ship small arms ammo when you can supply a Soviet factory with Brass (or copper to make brass ) and propellent and let the soviets provide the other materials, and labor.

The US supplied the Soviet union with 140 million tons of smokeless powder.
 
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I have to say that you are very good at ignoring questions that are difficult or impossible to answer, using the age old tactic of just asking more questions.

I am waiting for a response to the question.

You may want to think about how many tanks Russia could have produced with less than 50% of the available armour plate, a similar loss of aluminium for aircraft and engines for the tanks and a massive reduction in the rail network to move the material across the vastness of Russia.

Do you believe that this would have hindered in any way the ability of Russia to defend itself?
About the rail network : at the start of the war,the Soviets had a big reserve of unused rail material..
It is not on me to give the number of tanks the Soviets could have produced without LL armour plate,the same for aluminium for aircraft and tank engines .
If you want to convince people, it is on you, not on me,to prove your claim .
This means: how many aluminium was available for the Soviets ?: stock and production .
How many aircraft could they produce with their aluminium ?
How many aircraft were produced with LL aluminium ?
How many of this second group were used ?Aircraft without pilots and support units are useless .
Is there a proof that without LL supplies,the Soviets had only less than 50 % of armour plate available ?
 
About the number of LL locs sent to the USSR ( was it 350 , or 2000 ,or another number ? ),were these US locs or Soviet locs made in the US ?Could US locs operate in the US ?The Soviet railways were different :in width and a lot of them were using wood during the war .If the LL locs had to be build following the Soviet norms, how long would it take to build one ? Were these locs steam,or diesel locs ?
As the outcome of the war was decided in the Summer of 1941,when no US LL deliveries had arrived, it is very doubtful that without LL supplies the USSR would have collapsed .
Maybe the Soviet advance would be slower,but it is doubtful that the speed of the Soviet advance was depending on LL trucks : there were in June 1941 almost no decent roads in the USSR . The speed of he Soviet advance was also depending on what the Germans could and would do .It took the Soviets 2 months to go from Smolensk to Warsaw (operation Bagration ) ,would it take them longer if they had no LL trucks ?
 
How Lend-Lease Spam helped solve Soviet urinary frequency on the Russian Front. :thumbleft:

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(The Taste of War)
 
How Lend-Lease Spam helped solve Soviet urinary frequency on the Russian Front. :thumbleft:

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(The Taste of War)
I know all of this ,but you start from the unproved and unlikely assertion that every thing Stalin asked for and received was with the intention to use it .There are no figures about the % of spam that was used by the Red Army .It is not because X tons of spam was arriving ( I will look at Moskoff for the exact figures ) that X tons of spam were used .
A part was used , but another part ( maybe bigger ) was not used and was kept in reserve .
Before the war,and maybe during the war,the Soviets produced more oil than they consumed and after the war, they bought more food from the West than they were using .
We are talking about a society ( several societies,because in a lot of Western societies the situation was not much different ) of EIGHTY years ago,a society where people never knew how many food would be available the next day; there had been in less than 50 years 3 very big famines in Russia ,famines who could reappear every day ,this means that the regime needed to have a big food reserve for the population of the cities and for the army (not only the 6 million front troops ) . The peasants would feed themselves .
LL food was essentially used as a reserve in case there was a food crisis ,meanwhile the army would live of the land ,as armies always do .
There was no affluent society in 1941 in the USSR, neither in 1990 .
 
I know all of this ,but you start from the unproved and unlikely assertion that every thing Stalin asked for and received was with the intention to use it .There are no figures about the % of spam that was used by the Red Army .It is not because X tons of spam was arriving ( I will look at Moskoff for the exact figures ) that X tons of spam were used .
A part was used , but another part ( maybe bigger ) was not used and was kept in reserve .
Before the war,and maybe during the war,the Soviets produced more oil than they consumed and after the war, they bought more food from the West than they were using .
We are talking about a society ( several societies,because in a lot of Western societies the situation was not much different ) of EIGHTY years ago,a society where people never knew how many food would be available the next day; there had been in less than 50 years 3 very big famines in Russia ,famines who could reappear every day ,this means that the regime needed to have a big food reserve for the population of the cities and for the army (not only the 6 million front troops ) . The peasants would feed themselves .
LL food was essentially used as a reserve in case there was a food crisis ,meanwhile the army would live of the land ,as armies always do .
There was no affluent society in 1941 in the USSR, neither in 1990 .


There is so much wrong with this I don't know where to start.

Few modern armies lived off the land. It was quite possible in the middle ages or even in into the 1800s. Battle of Waterloo had about 73,000 French vs 118,000 for the British and allies.
Depending on the size of your divisions the French force was equal to 5-8 WW II Divisions. Many armies supplemented their rations by taking local food stocks/resources which is somewhat different. It also varies enormously depending on local climate and land. Living off the land in North Africa is obviously impossible, but then expecting tens of thousands of troops to live off the land for months during a Russian winter is also impossible.
If you expect your troops to live off the land as they advance (or even march through your on territory to the front) the routes much be chosen that run in parallel a sufficient distance apart (sometimes limited by geography) or else the leading troops get all the good stuff close to the line of march and the following troops have to search further and further from the line of march to find sufficient food. Which delays the arrival of the troops at the back of the line of march.
This was all well known to staff officers well before the 20th century.
Front line troops cannot live off the land. They can steal a few chickens or eggs or whatnot but thousands of troops within a few Kilometers of the enemy cannot wander around the countryside looking for food stuffs that are going to wind up being further and further way everyday.

It appears your contention is that the Russians stopped the Germans in 1941 and then took 4 years to advance on Germany while taking the vast majority of lend lease aid and throwing it in warehouses for post war use.

It is no good for the Soviets to 'produce' oil if they cannot refine it or get it where they need it. Mostly rail transport and a few pipelines. What was the quality of Russian oil?
Not a dig at the Russians, US oil varied from field to field. It seems to run east to west. Poor quality in the east (Pennsylvania) and high quality in the west (California) with the middle of country having somewhat middle 'quality' When using 1920s refining technology Pennsylvania crude yielded about 40 octane gasoline while California crude yielded about 70 octane.
US refining got much better but there were still marked differences as to amount of gasoline you could get from a barrel of crude from different areas.
Back to steel for a moment, The US introduced a new refining technique (or new additive, not lead), I forget which at the moment that saved them the amount of steel needed to build 15 destroyers to get the same yield of high octane gas from existing oil supply stocks. Improved infrastructure requires steel.

US Locos sent to Russia would have the wheels space appropriately for the Russian tracks. Not a problem. Lend lease Locos had very little to do with stopping the Germans (like nothing) as they arrived too late. They did help with the advance in 1944-45. The Russians may have been able to save a fairly large number of the pre war locomotives during the evacuations. These are going to wear out, The US railroads were in much worse shape in 1945 than they were in 1941 due to aging locomotive fleets and lack of maintenance on the rails/roadbeds. British railroads also suffered.

Burning wood in a coal locomotive is possible but is a sign of true desperation. Wood has nowhere near as much heat value per pound or cubic ft as coal and a locomotive designed for wood burning has a much bigger firebox for the same power. Heck, the fireboxes for locomotives burning different types of coal varied considerably. You can move the coal burner using wood, just don't expect to go very fast or pull anywhere near as many cars. Which means you need a crap load more wood burning locomotives to move the same cargo as far, as fast.
US used Locomotive shops to build tanks in the early part of the war. AS did the Canadians and I believe the British.
Large locomotives can only be built in specialty shops although crude repairs can sometimes be carried out with rather primitive equipment.

Once again, you cannot look at war totals and form any sort of valid conclusion. You have to look at what arrived in aid when, what were the Soviet stocks of their own equipment of the time and so on. Lend lease tanks formed the largest percentage of the Soviet tank park in 1942 that they ever did. While deliveries continued the importance of lend lease tanks did diminish as the war went on. Using end of war totals doesn't show the importance in 1942/43.
 
I was wondering how the quantity of Lend Lease material sent to the Soviet Union compared to the amount of material produced by the Third Reich. How much steel/oil/railroad equipment/etc. was sent to the USSR compared to how much steel/oil/railroad equipment/etc. Germany produced?
 
There is so much wrong with this I don't know where to start.

Few modern armies lived off the land. It was quite possible in the middle ages or even in into the 1800s. Battle of Waterloo had about 73,000 French vs 118,000 for the British and allies.
.
Napoleons armies lived off the land, it is great for logistics because you dont need a wagon train to supply you however it has two huge disadvantages. If you have to retreat you do so across land you just pillaged with people who have nothing because you took it and hate you for making them starve. Living off the land in Spain made the Spanish so hostile to the French that Wellington beat them with an army about a tenth of the size. Even in France they found themselves booted out for free loading when Wellington was paying for food.
 
The problem with food is moving it and keeping it. Every small holding in Russia may have had some surplus, but collecting it and transporting it to the front is a task bigger than its worth. Most meat is kept in the shape of an animal, if you transport the animal it dies long before you get it anywhere. To make it transportable needs equipment. Everyone would prefer beef and pork to Spam and corned beef, until the beef and pork is a week old in summer.
 
In chronological order.
1 BoB
2 Moscow
3 Midway
4 Stalingrad
5 Okinawa

First 4 because if the result was reversed the consequences would have been disastrous, Okinawa because the death toll over one small island led (in my opinion) to the bomb being used.
 
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There is so much wrong with this I don't know where to start.

Few modern armies lived off the land. It was quite possible in the middle ages or even in into the 1800s. Battle of Waterloo had about 73,000 French vs 118,000 for the British and allies.
Depending on the size of your divisions the French force was equal to 5-8 WW II Divisions. Many armies supplemented their rations by taking local food stocks/resources which is somewhat different. It also varies enormously depending on local climate and land. Living off the land in North Africa is obviously impossible, but then expecting tens of thousands of troops to live off the land for months during a Russian winter is also impossible.
If you expect your troops to live off the land as they advance (or even march through your on territory to the front) the routes much be chosen that run in parallel a sufficient distance apart (sometimes limited by geography) or else the leading troops get all the good stuff close to the line of march and the following troops have to search further and further from the line of march to find sufficient food. Which delays the arrival of the troops at the back of the line of march.
This was all well known to staff officers well before the 20th century.
Front line troops cannot live off the land. They can steal a few chickens or eggs or whatnot but thousands of troops within a few Kilometers of the enemy cannot wander around the countryside looking for food stuffs that are going to wind up being further and further way everyday.

It appears your contention is that the Russians stopped the Germans in 1941 and then took 4 years to advance on Germany while taking the vast majority of lend lease aid and throwing it in warehouses for post war use.

It is no good for the Soviets to 'produce' oil if they cannot refine it or get it where they need it. Mostly rail transport and a few pipelines. What was the quality of Russian oil?
Not a dig at the Russians, US oil varied from field to field. It seems to run east to west. Poor quality in the east (Pennsylvania) and high quality in the west (California) with the middle of country having somewhat middle 'quality' When using 1920s refining technology Pennsylvania crude yielded about 40 octane gasoline while California crude yielded about 70 octane.
US refining got much better but there were still marked differences as to amount of gasoline you could get from a barrel of crude from different areas.
Back to steel for a moment, The US introduced a new refining technique (or new additive, not lead), I forget which at the moment that saved them the amount of steel needed to build 15 destroyers to get the same yield of high octane gas from existing oil supply stocks. Improved infrastructure requires steel.

US Locos sent to Russia would have the wheels space appropriately for the Russian tracks. Not a problem. Lend lease Locos had very little to do with stopping the Germans (like nothing) as they arrived too late. They did help with the advance in 1944-45. The Russians may have been able to save a fairly large number of the pre war locomotives during the evacuations. These are going to wear out, The US railroads were in much worse shape in 1945 than they were in 1941 due to aging locomotive fleets and lack of maintenance on the rails/roadbeds. British railroads also suffered.

Burning wood in a coal locomotive is possible but is a sign of true desperation. Wood has nowhere near as much heat value per pound or cubic ft as coal and a locomotive designed for wood burning has a much bigger firebox for the same power. Heck, the fireboxes for locomotives burning different types of coal varied considerably. You can move the coal burner using wood, just don't expect to go very fast or pull anywhere near as many cars. Which means you need a crap load more wood burning locomotives to move the same cargo as far, as fast.
US used Locomotive shops to build tanks in the early part of the war. AS did the Canadians and I believe the British.
Large locomotives can only be built in specialty shops although crude repairs can sometimes be carried out with rather primitive equipment.

Once again, you cannot look at war totals and form any sort of valid conclusion. You have to look at what arrived in aid when, what were the Soviet stocks of their own equipment of the time and so on. Lend lease tanks formed the largest percentage of the Soviet tank park in 1942 that they ever did. While deliveries continued the importance of lend lease tanks did diminish as the war went on. Using end of war totals doesn't show the importance in 1942/43.
About living of the land : the Japanese lived of the land in WWII, the Germans did , not only front troops, but also occupation forces .And not only in Russia .They planned to feed the WM with food from Russia .
That using wood is less efficient is true, but that is not the point : the point is that during WWII the Soviet railways used more wood because of production and transport problems of coal .
About the ''quality '' of oil , this is subordinate : the Soviet Air force was not more efficient when it used avgas from the US .
About the importance of LL : a lot of people in the US are still claiming, 80 years after the facts ,that the Soviets would have lost without LL and this for the reasons we know .They ignore/hide that Barbarossa was planned as a short and fast campaign that would be decided after a few weeks and would be finished after a few months . The reason for this was that the Germans knew that Barbarossa could succeed only if it was a fast and short campaign . We all know that during Barbarossa I and Barbarossa II (Taifun ) there was no LL arriving in the USSR . That there were LL tanks in 1942 is irrelevant because with or without LL the Germans had no possibility to defeat the Soviets in 1942 or in 1943 or in 1944 .
The only thing one can say (and even this is dubious ) is that without LL the Soviets would not be in Berlin on May 1 1945 but later .
And why dubious ? Because the importance of trucks, tanks and oil 80 years ago in Russia is much exaggerated : both armies fought in a destroyed country without decent roads ,with few drivers, technicians, with only few spare parts .
Did the Soviets use LL deliveries ? Yes, but only very sparingly : it is not that because half of their explosives were LL deliveries ,that half of the used explosives were LL deliveries .
An increase of production does not mean an increase of consumption .
 
I'm aware some of the larger campaigns in Russia. During the siege of Leningrad and at the gates of Moscow, how did troops live off the land?
 
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My mother's uncle became a nervous wreck delivering petroleum to Russia via the Arctic convoys. His tanker was never hit but he lost plenty of shipmates a tanker of refined oil is a floating bomb and not many crew survived the blast of a torpedo, bomb or shell. If they survived the blast they had only minutes to be rescued before the cold water killed them.

I am sure he would have been sore to know that the fuel wasn't needed and that the Soviet Union was awash with warehouses of supplies that were being kept for the post war.
 
Sticking with aircraft only:

British industry may somehow have covered the needs of the RAF during the war, especially if several thousand Hurricanes and Spitfires hadn't been sent to the Soviet Union - but that would not have been true for the RN FAA - just as many Martlets, Hellcats and F4U Corsairs were supplied to the RN as were Sea Hurricanes and Seafires, not to mention all those "Tarpons". The RAF might have been able to be equipped with British industry sourced aircraft - but what about the Commonwealth partners, Australia, NZ and South Africa?
Could someone correct me if I'm wrong, but if I recall the US supplied the UK and Commonwealth with around 42,000 aircraft - or what was the figure?

The aircraft provided to the Commonwealth did not have to transit the trans-Atlantic supply chain. My question is not about the validity or significance of Lend Lease. It's about the Battle of the Atlantic being the most important battle of WW2.
 
The aircraft provided to the Commonwealth did not have to transit the trans-Atlantic supply chain. My question is not about the validity or significance of Lend Lease. It's about the Battle of the Atlantic being the most important battle of WW2.
To me it was vital that it was won, it was the only thing that kept Churchill awake at night. In hindsight we now know that although losses were huge it wasnt close to actually being lost. It could have been though, suppose Enigma wasnt broken and SONAR and airborne RADAR was harder to develop it could have been much harder than it was historically or even forced a change in policy. How many troop ships and ships full of aircrew/ground crew would the USA stand losing before something changed? Admittedly its a "what if", at the time they didnt know what came next on either side.
 

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