Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[ljadw]

Excuse me but come again? They were air operations conducted in the same theatre at the same time as the assets directly involved in the BoB. They were flying through the same airspace.

Again, how can the Luftwaffe have obtained air superiority over the Channel if Bomber Command aircraft were operating there?

Thus you are saying that during the Baby Blitz in 1944 the RAF had lost air superiority over England ? Or that the attack on the Dortmund-Ems canal on 12/13 August 1940 by BC means that the LW had lost air superiority in that area ?
BC was not operating in the Channel .

 

[buffnut453]

Thus you are saying that during the Baby Blitz in 1944 the RAF had lost air superiority over England ? Or that the attack on the Dortmund-Ems canal on 12/13 August 1940 by BC means that the LW had lost air superiority in that area ?
BC was not operating in the Channel .

You're the one who's confused over the meaning of air superiority. You claimed that the Luftwaffe gained air superiority over the Channel in 1940 because the RAF was only operating over land. My point is that the RAF WAS operating over the Channel in the form of BC...so how can the Luftwaffe have achieved air superiority there?

 

[pbehn]

Which proves that it was the LW who had air superiority over the Channel .

When all aircraft cross the channel twice on a sortie, you have air superiority. When a lot dont come back, you dont.

 

[pbehn]

Chain Home was a fixed, non rotational system that could not see beyond its sixty-degree transmission arc or behind it once the targets had flown overhead and so raid plotting over land was down to ground observers .
Neither could CH guess what would be the target of the incoming German aircraft .
Other point : plotting over land did not indicate where and when the German aircraft would be, it could only give a vague indication where the Germans could be at a certain point .
Last point : I see that there are still some people who are unable to grasp the essence of the Battle of Britain :the burden was with the LW ,not with RAF: the LW had to eliminate FC, or to prevent FC to intervene if/when Sealion would be started (which it never could be ) ,FC could always avoid this by retreating to the north,where it was save from the LW .
What the Germans need was not air superiority over southern England before Sealion, but air superiority over southern England at the start of Sealion and during the buildup of Sealion(which would take months ).
The Battle of Britain was not a battle that would decide the outcome of the war, but only a necessary tool (one of the many ) to make Sealion possible, not to make Sealion successful .

Wrong on every count, the LW needed air supremacy, to eliminate the RAF because they needed to defend their ports and support a landing. CH was a radar system, it doesnt guess anything, neither did the Observer Corps, all information was put together to tell those on control what was happening.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Last point : I see that there are still some people who are unable to grasp the essence of the Battle of Britain

You seem to have no clue how an integrated air defense system really works. When the Cuban missile crisis began in 1962, Civil Air Patrol cadet squadrons all across the state were inducted into the Air Observer Corps. We had to learn aircraft identification, reporting format and proper phraseology, altitude estimation, and rudimentary weather observation, and we stood assigned watches, mostly relief periods for adult observers for breaks and meals. We were students and had homework to do, so we weren't expected to stand full shifts except on weekends. We called in every aircraft we saw with type, altitude and direction of flight, which was kind of a joke most ot the time, as there wasn't much air traffic out here in the sticks. Mostly Pipers and Cessnas, but there was a nearby SAC low level navigation route and we got treated to the occasional B47, BUFF, or tanker.
Our calls went to a filter center that plotted the tracks and compared them with tracks on the repeaters that they had from air defense radars. Suspicious tracks were investigated by the Air National Guard's F89s. Woe betide any flock of bears that chose to trespass; those Scorpions toted nuclear tipped Genie missiles. Between the radar, the observer corps, and the Scorpions, our section of the northern border was locked down pretty tight.
Our effort was thrown together pretty quickly, so we barely got it figured out when Khrushchev blinked and the crisis was over. The Brits, OTOH, had plenty of time and plenty of practice and got really good at it.
One other point. In the Navy I maintained and ran a radar interception and tactics trainer for the F4, so I have a bit of an idea what it's about. If you wait til you know the target before you send your fighters up, you've already lost the battle. You meet them beyond the edge of your airspace and you peck away at them all the way to the target and back. If you're flying especially short ranged point defense interceptors you send them up in relays and you land them as transients at the nearest airstrip to refuel and rearm, then launch them again to tackle the bad guys as they're egressing after the raid. If their escorts are toting drop tanks, tackle them as far out as you can and make them drop their extra fuel. Now you may soon have unescorted bombers to pick on. Don't worry, you won't lose track of them after they've come past the radar; there'll be so much commotion going on overhead, people on the ground will keep you informed. That, my friend is how it was done.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

re "Chain Home was a fixed, non rotational system that could not see beyond its sixty-degree transmission arc or behind it once the targets had flown overhead and so raid plotting over land was down to ground observers ."

Part of the reason for the name Chain Home ( CH aka AMES type 1) was that the radar stations formed an interlinked zone of coverage, hence the Chain part of the name. The individual stations did not have to see more than 60 degrees because the next station/link in the chain would take over. The CH radars could detect targets from +1 to +60 degrees in the vertical, and perform height finding from +1.5 to +15 degrees via lobe switching.

Chain Home Low (CHL aka AMES type 2, in service on the SE coast by the beginning of the BoB) was a rotating system, with a beam narrow in azimuth, and wide in the vertical. The CHL radars could detect/track targets from <0 to +60 degrees in the vertical. The horizontal beam width was 20 degrees, with pointing being done mechanically through 360 degrees in azimuth, and centering via signal strength. It should be noted that versions of the AMES type 2 were used to track the high flying Ju86 recon aircraft.

re "Neither could CH guess what would be the target of the incoming German aircraft ."

I am not sure why you keep saying this. Until the advent of modern heuristic computer algorithms, there was no electronic, mechanical, or electro-mechanical system that could 'guess' where a raid would go.

 

[pbehn]

Thus you are saying that during the Baby Blitz in 1944 the RAF had lost air superiority over England ? Or that the attack on the Dortmund-Ems canal on 12/13 August 1940 by BC means that the LW had lost air superiority in that area ?
BC was not operating in the Channel .

During the Baby Blitz the RAF lost 28 aircraft, half in offensive operations over German controlled airspace, the LW lost over 400 aircraft over UK controlled airspace, most of which were twin engined types. There is no doubt who had air superiority there, German losses also amounted to most of what it had remaining as a bomber force.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Just a note going back to ASR, I was reading (years ago) and damned if I can remember who it was, but he was an Eagle Squadron (4th FG) jock whose Thunderbolt went down in the Channel. As memory serves he was floating, probably in his Mae West or a dingy when his squadron mates circled him waiting for ASR to get to him. The thing that struck me most was he was firing off a couple of flares to let them know where he was and at one point his mates were pretty low so he was actually trying to hit one of the Thunderbolts with a flare. He thought it great fun. On returning to Debden later, virtually none of the circling P-47's saw either him or the flares.

The ocean, or even the Channel can be a big place.

Just wish I could remember where I read that and who it was, effing memory, hell, maybe a shot of Scotch will help...

 

[Peter Gunn]

Chain Home was a fixed, non rotational system that could not see beyond its sixty-degree transmission arc or behind it once the targets had flown overhead and so raid plotting over land was down to ground observers .
Neither could CH guess what would be the target of the incoming German aircraft .
Other point : plotting over land did not indicate where and when the German aircraft would be, it could only give a vague indication where the Germans could be at a certain point .
Last point : I see that there are still some people who are unable to grasp the essence of the Battle of Britain :the burden was with the LW ,not with RAF: the LW had to eliminate FC, or to prevent FC to intervene if/when Sealion would be started (which it never could be ) ,FC could always avoid this by retreating to the north,where it was save from the LW .
What the Germans need was not air superiority over southern England before Sealion, but air superiority over southern England at the start of Sealion and during the buildup of Sealion(which would take months ).
The Battle of Britain was not a battle that would decide the outcome of the war, but only a necessary tool (one of the many ) to make Sealion possible, not to make Sealion successful .

Wow, I haven't laughed this hard since the [REDACTED] thread.

[A...I...R...A...C...O...B...R...A]

 

[pbehn]

One other point. In the Navy I maintained and ran a radar interception and tactics trainer for the F4, so I have a bit of an idea what it's about. If you wait til you know the target before you send your fighters up, you've already lost the battle. You meet them beyond the edge of your airspace and you peck away at them all the way to the target and back. If you're flying especially short ranged point defense interceptors you send them up in relays and you land them as transients at the nearest airstrip to refuel and rearm, then launch them again to tackle the bad guys as they're egressing after the raid. If their escorts are toting drop tanks, tackle them as far out as you can and make them drop their extra fuel. Now you may soon have unescorted bombers to pick on. Don't worry, you won't lose track of them after they've come past the radar; there'll be so much commotion going on overhead, people on the ground will keep you informed. That, my friend is how it was done.

Completely true as a general principle. For Dowding and his system the situation was complicated by geography, every map showing Chain home coverage is different, below is the most extreme I can find in terms of range. Much of the LW in France and Belgium was actually in radar range of Chain Home, perhaps only at a certain altitude and with poor resolution/direction. However certainly in the Pas de Calais a large number of fighters and bombers were parked up at night within 40 miles of the Kent coast, there were a large number of planes taking off and landing all the time but many were test flights, plane movements transport flights etc. Not a boxing match of jabs and hooks but fighting inside, in the clinch. I dont know if the USA has ever defined what its airspace means in terms of range, I am sure 40 miles would be within it.

You seem to have no clue how an integrated air defense system really works. When the Cuban missile crisis began in 1962, Civil Air Patrol cadet squadrons all across the state were inducted into the Air Observer Corps. We had to learn aircraft identification, reporting format and proper phraseology, altitude estimation, and rudimentary weather observation, and we stood assigned watches, mostly relief periods for adult observers for breaks and meals. We were students and had homework to do, so we weren't expected to stand full shifts except on weekends. We called in every aircraft we saw with type, altitude and direction of flight, which was kind of a joke most ot the time, as there wasn't much air traffic out here in the sticks. Mostly Pipers and Cessnas, but there was a nearby SAC low level navigation route and we got treated to the occasional B47, BUFF, or tanker.
Our calls went to a filter center that plotted the tracks and compared them with tracks on the repeaters that they had from air defense radars. Suspicious tracks were investigated by the Air National Guard's F89s. Woe betide any flock of bears that chose to trespass; those Scorpions toted nuclear tipped Genie missiles. Between the radar, the observer corps, and the Scorpions, our section of the northern border was locked down pretty tight.
.

Again true. The problem for CH was its radars were limited ( I know you know this) it was good at finding range, quite good with altitude, estimation of size but wasnt very good at bearing. The CH stations linked together continuously reported the following . By taking two or more reports you get a triangulation.

The message to be transmitted to the filter room was of the form of 10592 AB123C XY1234 N12 46 where

10592 was the time in hours, minutes and tenths of minutes.
ABJ23C was the raid designation for the raid under consideration.
XY1234 was the map reference.
N was the type of aircraft, i.e. hostile or friendly.
12 was the number of aircraft.
46 was the height in thousands of feet.

The result of this is that the people in the filter room had very good information to "hang" the Observer corps reports on when a raid crossed the coast.
Miscellanea

 

[Peter Gunn]

I thought the "Lobster Pots" was a great idea and gave air crew better odds for survival (providing they were downed near one).

Seems to me there was a movie about a couple of LW and RAF guys sitting in one of those rescue pods made in about 1942, damn now I gotta' Google that.

*EDIT*


AHA!!!

One of Our Aircraft Is Missing - Wikipedia

 

[special ed]

I had a somewhat similar argument with an "expert" who tried to convince me that all the wings installed on car trunks were upside down. He believed they should have the curved surface of the airfoil on top to reduce the weight of the car allowing it to go faster. Even with drawings demonstrating aerodynamic forces and the idea of tire (or tyre) traction, he remained unconvinced and the world was wrong.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I dont know if the USA has ever defined what its airspace means in terms of range, I am sure 40 miles would be within it.

Barely inside the inner edge of the offshore coastal ADIZ. The ADIZ would stretch several hundred miles further out. The EC121s used to patrol 100 miles out and beyond. More than once they caught a Bear hovering in the wake of an inbound airliner. One of my uncles, who was an electrician on the REW birds, had a photo taken from overhead of a Bear tucked right up under the tail of a BOAC Stratocruiser inbound to Boston. They scrambled F86s from Otis to break up that little party, and I don't think the BOAC pax ever knew anything happened.

 

[buffnut453]

Wow, I haven't laughed this hard since the [REDACTED] thread.

[A...I...R...A...C...O...B...R...A]

I'm particularly confused by the following rather tangled skein of logic:

"What the Germans need was not air superiority over southern England before Sealion, but air superiority over southern England at the start of Sealion and during the buildup of Sealion(which would take months )."

So, per our "expert", the LW needed to achieve air superiority so that Sea Lion could commence....but the timing needed to be so good that the required degree of air superiority was achieved right at the start of the Sea Lion operation. Errrr....so, during Desert Storm, the Coalition was wasting its time achieving air superiority before the land forces went in?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Errrr....so, during Desert Storm, the Coalition was wasting its time achieving air superiority before the land forces went in?

Desert storm? What's that?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Short bus rider?

 

[Glider]

More like he'll grow up to be a proud boy.

Or a Politician

 

[ljadw]

I'm particularly confused by the following rather tangled skein of logic:

"What the Germans need was not air superiority over southern England before Sealion, but air superiority over southern England at the start of Sealion and during the buildup of Sealion(which would take months )."

So, per our "expert", the LW needed to achieve air superiority so that Sea Lion could commence....but the timing needed to be so good that the required degree of air superiority was achieved right at the start of the Sea Lion operation. Errrr....so, during Desert Storm, the Coalition was wasting its time achieving air superiority before the land forces went in?

We are talking about 81 years ago , not about Desert Storm and Desert Storm was not Sealion .

 

[GrauGeist]

We are talking about 81 years ago , not about Desert Storm and Desert Storm was not Sealion .

Desert Storm was real, Sealion was proposed.

Sealion failed for several reasons:
1) Germany failed to gain air superiority over England.
2) Germany failed to destroy (or cripple) Britain's ability to manufacture aircraft.
3) Germany failed to destroy or incapacitate RAF/FAA fields.
4) Germany failed to destroy/incapacitate English infrastructure.
5) Germany did not have control of the English channel's waters.
6) Germany did not have adequate surface vessels suitable for transporting and landing troops "en masse" along with the needed material and vehicles.

Real history's a bitch, isn't it?

 

[buffnut453]

We are talking about 81 years ago , not about Desert Storm and Desert Storm was not Sealion .

But the principles of air power persist through time. You don't wave a magic wand and suddenly declare air superiority. It is a campaign-level effort to progressively degrade an adversary's ability to defend within the air domain. It takes time, it takes planning, and it must be integrated with other domains (land, sea, etc) to ensure the air campaign adapts to changing requirements.

Your assertion that German air superiority over Britain wasn't needed prior to Sea Lion is nonsense. If the decision to launch Sea Lion was at all dependent on German air superiority, then that superiority MUST be achieved BEFORE the decision is made to execute Sea Lion.