Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[ljadw]

Hey ljadw,

re "As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER."

Why do you think the weather was the principal reason?

The reason I ask is that I do not see how the weather, be it clear and sunny or dark and stormy, would matter if the Germans do not have air superiority, and control (naval) of the English Channel. If they did not control both there is no way they would survive (intact) the crossing.

Because there are 2 meanings of Sealion :
the traditional , in reality wrong meaning : an invasion of Britain
and the real one , the only one which was possible = the occupation of Britain .
After 15 September an invasion of Britain was impossible because of the weather .The barges transporting men and supplies would not survive the Autumn storms .
It is even probable that an invasion would not be possible in August, as an invasion would require a long buildup .It would take months to occupy Britain by fighting and months of transports that had to cross the Channel .
A fighting Sealion was impossible without air supremacy and impossible with air supremacy .The same for naval supremacy .
Goering hoped that an early victory in the Battle of Britain would force the UK government to negotiate ( which means : capitulate )WITHOUT ANY NEED FOR AN INVASION . (my emphasis ) . Source :Stephen Bungay . But the hope of Goering was self-deceit.
No one proposed to execute Overlord in the Autumn,thus why would Sealion (with a weak Germany ) be possible in the Autumn ?
General time was Germany's biggest enemy ,and Germany could do nothing against general time .
The only way an occupation of Britain could be possible was if,when, after Britain was giving up .
A successful invasion of Britain in 1940 had the same chance of success as a successful invasion of Japan in 1942 .
Britain did not capitulate during the Blitz ,when every night countless civilians were killed/wounded , thus what Goering hoped was an illusion .
Occupation after invasion was impossible .
Occupation without invasion : idem ,with the exception of the US declaring publicly that they would not help Britain. But since August 1940 (GOP convention ) this was excluded .

 

[pbehn]

Hey ljadw,

re "As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER."

Why do you think the weather was the principal reason?

The reason I ask is that I do not see how the weather, be it clear and sunny or dark and stormy, would matter if the Germans do not have air superiority, and control (naval) of the English Channel. If they did not control both there is no way they would survive (intact) the crossing.

Since weather was the principle reason, why not hold this game at a different venue, like Malta?

 

[pbehn]

Because there are 2 meanings of Sealion :
the traditional , in reality wrong meaning : an invasion of Britain
and the real one , the only one which was possible = the occupation of Britain .
After 15 September an invasion of Britain was impossible because of the weather .The barges transporting men and supplies would not survive the Autumn storms .
It is even probable that an invasion would not be possible in August, as an invasion would require a long buildup .It would take months to occupy Britain by fighting and months of transports that had to cross the Channel .
A fighting Sealion was impossible without air supremacy and impossible with air supremacy .The same for naval supremacy .
Goering hoped that an early victory in the Battle of Britain would force the UK government to negotiate ( which means : capitulate )WITHOUT ANY NEED FOR AN INVASION . (my emphasis ) . Source :Stephen Bungay . But the hope of Goering was self-deceit.
No one proposed to execute Overlord in the Autumn,thus why would Sealion (with a weak Germany ) be possible in the Autumn ?
General time was Germany's biggest enemy ,and Germany could do nothing against general time .
The only way an occupation of Britain could be possible was if,when, after Britain was giving up .
A successful invasion of Britain in 1940 had the same chance of success as a successful invasion of Japan in 1942 .
Britain did not capitulate during the Blitz ,when every night countless civilians were killed/wounded , thus what Goering hoped was an illusion .
Occupation after invasion was impossible .
Occupation without invasion : idem ,with the exception of the US declaring publicly that they would not help Britain. But since August 1940 (GOP convention ) this was excluded .

Why would Germany believe they had to occupy a whole country to win? They hadnt with France Poland or the Netherlands? The daft lad in charge considered the Channel to just be a wide river crossing.

 

[buffnut453]

Because there are 2 meanings of Sealion :
the traditional , in reality wrong meaning : an invasion of Britain
and the real one , the only one which was possible = the occupation of Britain .
After 15 September an invasion of Britain was impossible because of the weather .The barges transporting men and supplies would not survive the Autumn storms .
It is even probable that an invasion would not be possible in August, as an invasion would require a long buildup .It would take months to occupy Britain by fighting and months of transports that had to cross the Channel .
A fighting Sealion was impossible without air supremacy and impossible with air supremacy .The same for naval supremacy .
Goering hoped that an early victory in the Battle of Britain would force the UK government to negotiate ( which means : capitulate )WITHOUT ANY NEED FOR AN INVASION . (my emphasis ) . Source :Stephen Bungay . But the hope of Goering was self-deceit.
No one proposed to execute Overlord in the Autumn,thus why would Sealion (with a weak Germany ) be possible in the Autumn ?
General time was Germany's biggest enemy ,and Germany could do nothing against general time .
The only way an occupation of Britain could be possible was if,when, after Britain was giving up .
A successful invasion of Britain in 1940 had the same chance of success as a successful invasion of Japan in 1942 .
Britain did not capitulate during the Blitz ,when every night countless civilians were killed/wounded , thus what Goering hoped was an illusion .
Occupation after invasion was impossible .
Occupation without invasion : idem ,with the exception of the US declaring publicly that they would not help Britain. But since August 1940 (GOP convention ) this was excluded .

You're very big on making direct correlations where they don't exist. Negotiation does NOT equal capitulation. Also, just because the UK secured a negotiated peace does not mean that Germany had to invade in the summer of 1940.

Now, it's entirely plausible that Nazi influence over the UK would increase over time. In the short term, and assuming a more pliable British Government than Churchill's cabinet, some combination of trade, Anglo-German military coordination committees, and perhaps a force of German observers in the UK, could suffice to assuage German fears that the UK may change its mind in the future. The more ties established between the 2 countries, the less chance there was of the UK reneging.

 

[ljadw]

I gave up when the proposal was for the German army to invade Russia and live off the land. Negating hundreds of years of studies of logistics by general staffs of a number of European armies. Knowledge and practice going back several hundred years.

Never let minor details get in the way of a new/improved concept.

Bullshit! Every element of air power doctrine existed and was understood during WW1: CAS, OCA, DCA, strategic bombing, SEAD, ISR, counter-ISR, transportation and logistics, air-to-ground and ground-to-air communication. All of it was there...and yet you're claiming that principles of air power don't persist over time. Please show me a doctrinal air power concept that hasn't persisted.




Correct but not achieving air supremacy beforehand increases overall risk to the operation. It's down to the commander to determine what level of risk he/she is willing to bear. No commander that I've ever met would launch an operation without the preconditions being met.

If the air campaign is being properly led and managed, then air superiority can and should be persisted.

''should '' = handwaving .
And air supremacy on 1 September does not mean that there will be air supremacy on 15 September, because you make the traditional mistake of thinking that air supremacy is gained,is done by the winner only and that it will last .You forget the role of the other party (here FC ) . It was very well possible for Dowding to retreat to the North on 1 September to spare FC for the deciding day of 15 September and against this decision,the LW could do nothing .
Achieving air supremacy depends as much, or some times more , on what the opponent would do
And,what is air supremacy ? Is it to prevent the opponent during a certain time to interfere ,or to eliminate him totally, or to prevent him to interfere on the D Day ?
What would be more important for Britain : to withhold FC for the day of invasion or to use/wast FC to defend the civilians of London before the invasion ?
This would be a decision on which the Germans had no influence .
During the Battle of the Atlantic, U Boats targeted merchant vessels, hoping that an escort would come to save the survivors and that they could thus attack the escort .But it was very well possible for the convoy commander to order to abandon the survivors.
To have and conserve air supremacy it is needed to find, fight and defeat the opponent, but if the opponent refuses to fight ?

 

[pbehn]

Why are you discussing Fighter command retreating, Park didnt even abandon Manston which is so close to the sea and to France it is easier to attack than defend. If Dowding and park withdrew forces they would lose Radar so the position of defending London becomes more difficult not easier.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

Thanks for the answer re weather, makes more sense now.

 

[ljadw]

You're very big on making direct correlations where they don't exist. Negotiation does NOT equal capitulation. Also, just because the UK secured a negotiated peace does not mean that Germany had to invade in the summer of 1940.

Now, it's entirely plausible that Nazi influence over the UK would increase over time. In the short term, and assuming a more pliable British Government than Churchill's cabinet, some combination of trade, Anglo-German military coordination committees, and perhaps a force of German observers in the UK, could suffice to assuage German fears that the UK may change its mind in the future. The more ties established between the 2 countries, the less chance there was of the UK reneging.

NO : to negotiate from a weaker position always result in capitulation .
The German ''negotiations '' in November 1918 resulted in the German capitulation of June 1919 .
You only negotiate if you are losing .
In June 1940 the Germans told the French : these are our demands . Accept them or war will continue .
It was the same for the Allies in November 1918 and June 1919 .
UK would not renege only if it was occupied .

 

[buffnut453]

''should '' = handwaving .
And air supremacy on 1 September does not mean that there will be air supremacy on 15 September, because you make the traditional mistake of thinking that air supremacy is gained,is done by the winner only and that it will last .You forget the role of the other party (here FC ) . It was very well possible for Dowding to retreat to the North on 1 September to spare FC for the deciding day of 15 September and against this decision,the LW could do nothing .
Achieving air supremacy depends as much, or some times more , on what the opponent would do
And,what is air supremacy ? Is it to prevent the opponent during a certain time to interfere ,or to eliminate him totally, or to prevent him to interfere on the D Day ?
What would be more important for Britain : to withhold FC for the day of invasion or to use/wast FC to defend the civilians of London before the invasion ?
This would be a decision on which the Germans had no influence .
During the Battle of the Atlantic, U Boats targeted merchant vessels, hoping that an escort would come to save the survivors and that they could thus attack the escort .But it was very well possible for the convoy commander to order to abandon the survivors.
To have and conserve air supremacy it is needed to find, fight and defeat the opponent, but if the opponent refuses to fight ?

I'm not assuming anything. Again, remember I'm very familiar with military planning. Based on your pronouncements, I think I understand air superiority and air supremacy better than you.

Yes, an adversary does have a say in how any battle progresses...but the advantage is ALWAYS with an attacking force that can pick the time and place of its operations. Defenders are, by nature, responsive. Removing radar warning and hammering the Sector Stations would leave Fighter Command really struggling to mount any kind of credible defence. The best option available would be to mount standing patrols...but do you know how expensive that is in terms of aircraft?

What would the people of Britain say if Fighter Command refused to fight? Do you think they'd be in favour of that approach? Also, how far north would squadrons have to withdraw to be out of range of the Luftwaffe? There were Luftwaffe bombing raids in 1940 against Coventry, Sheffield, Birmingham, Liverpool, Newcastle etc. Fighter Command would have to pull a VERY long way back to avoid being attacked.

 

[pbehn]

And air supremacy on 1 September does not mean that there will be air supremacy on 15 September, because you make the traditional mistake of thinking that air supremacy is gained,is done by the winner only and that it will last .

I have no idea what your point is, the LW never got close to air superiority let alone supremacy.

 

[pbehn]

NO : to negotiate from a weaker position always result in capitulation .
The German ''negotiations '' in November 1918 resulted in the German capitulation of June 1919 .
You only negotiate if you are losing .
In June 1940 the Germans told the French : these are our demands . Accept them or war will continue .
It was the same for the Allies in November 1918 and June 1919 .
UK would not renege only if it was occupied .

What is a weaker position? Switzerland is always in a weak position, it just lets it be known that the cost of an attack would be huge.

 

[buffnut453]

NO : to negotiate from a weaker position always result in capitulation .
The German ''negotiations '' in November 1918 resulted in the German capitulation of June 1919 .
You only negotiate if you are losing .
In June 1940 the Germans told the French : these are our demands . Accept them or war will continue .
It was the same for the Allies in November 1918 and June 1919 .
UK would not renege only if it was occupied .

Again, you're making a lot of connections and assertions that aren't backed up by facts.

The armistice on 11 November 1918 came after 4+ years of the bloodiest conflict the world had seen. The situation in May/June of 1940 was considerably less developed. Indeed, the desire for peace was often motivated by the memories of the Great War.

In 1940 the French were losing...but only part of France was occupied by German forces. Vichy France continued with self-government so hardly a complete capitulation. Sweden and Switzerland were both militarily much weaker than Germany...and yet neither were invaded during WW2. Why was that?

I think a negotiated peace in May/June 1940 was possible, as did many in senior British Government positions at the time.

 

[pbehn]

I think a negotiated peace in May/June 1940 was possible, as did many in senior British Government positions at the time.

Churchills first job was to get rid of or silence them from wiki "However, Churchill outmanoeuvred Halifax by calling a meeting of his 25-member Outer Cabinet, to whom he delivered a passionate speech, saying, "If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground",[40]​ convincing all who were present that Britain must fight on against Hitler whatever the cost. Churchill also obtained the backing of Neville Chamberlain, who was still Conservative Party leader.[30]​

Churchill told the War Cabinet that there would be no negotiated peace. Halifax had lost. A few weeks later, in July 1940, Halifax rejected German peace offers presented through the Papal Nuncio in Berne and the Portuguese and Finnish prime ministers." Edward Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax - Wikipedia

 

[buffnut453]

Churchills first job was to get rid of or silence them from wiki "However, Churchill outmanoeuvred Halifax by calling a meeting of his 25-member Outer Cabinet, to whom he delivered a passionate speech, saying, "If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground",[40]​ convincing all who were present that Britain must fight on against Hitler whatever the cost. Churchill also obtained the backing of Neville Chamberlain, who was still Conservative Party leader.[30]​

Churchill told the War Cabinet that there would be no negotiated peace. Halifax had lost. A few weeks later, in July 1940, Halifax rejected German peace offers presented through the Papal Nuncio in Berne and the Portuguese and Finnish prime ministers." Edward Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax - Wikipedia

Exactly...but if 11 Group retreats, causing a no-confidence vote in Churchill's leadership, what then? Would a negotiated peace be back on the table? I suspect the answer is yes.

 

[pbehn]

Exactly...but if 11 Group retreats, causing a no-confidence vote in Churchill's leadership, what then? Would a negotiated peace be back on the table? I suspect the answer is yes.

I dont really know how this part of the discussion came about, if 11 Group pulled back behind London they could still defend London but not really defend the Kent coast or Chain home. As far as I am aware any discussion of it was "worst case scenario" possibilities, the only airfield that was seriously discussed being abandoned was Manston. If the LW forced 11 group out of Kent and landed, an army marching on London may have forced surrender, but that was nowhere near happening.


In a winner takes all fantasy scenario, you could have the RAF withdrawing to invite an invasion, allow a beach head to be established and then attack, forcing Adolf to commit his Navy and Airforce to rescue a stranded army. (it worked for William at Hastings in 1066)

 

[Peter Gunn]

''should '' = handwaving .
And air supremacy on 1 September does not mean that there will be air supremacy on 15 September,

True, air supremacy is something that is fluid unless, like 1944-45 the USAAF and RAF are simply too powerful even separately for the LW to handle.

because you make the traditional mistake of thinking that air supremacy is gained,is done by the winner only and that it will last .You forget the role of the other party (here FC )

I doubt buffnut made any "traditional mistake of thinking" or forgot the role of FC, he's pretty sharp and knows WTF he's talking about. Sometimes it's better to listen than to speak, just sayin'.

It was very well possible for Dowding to retreat to the North on 1 September to spare FC for the deciding day of 15 September and against this decision,the LW could do nothing .

Why would Dowding do this again? In case it escaped you, by September the RAF was holding the line very nicely, bloody but they were wearing down the LW and winning the production battle of airframes produced as well. 11 group was bearing the brunt but were holding up so why move them north again?

Achieving air supremacy depends as much, or some times more , on what the opponent would do
And,what is air supremacy ? Is it to prevent the opponent during a certain time to interfere ,or to eliminate him totally, or to prevent him to interfere on the D Day ?
What would be more important for Britain : to withhold FC for the day of invasion or to use/wast FC to defend the civilians of London before the invasion ?
This would be a decision on which the Germans had no influence .

I think this has already been answered more than once.

During the Battle of the Atlantic, U Boats targeted merchant vessels, hoping that an escort would come to save the survivors and that they could thus attack the escort .But it was very well possible for the convoy commander to order to abandon the survivors.
To have and conserve air supremacy it is needed to find, fight and defeat the opponent, but if the opponent refuses to fight ?

Studied my share of U-Boat history, one of the last things they wanted to do was tangle with a RN or USN destroyer. I can see them taking on a target of opportunity but to actively seek out going mano a mano with a ship designed to kill them? Ludicrous.

 

[Shortround6]

Convoy tactics/operations varied over the years.
U-boats carried a rather limited number of torpedoes.

Sink large freighter or tanker vs sinking a Flower class corvette, trawler, 20 year old destroyer?
Sometimes there were one or two ships designated as "rescue" ships. Usually small (difficult target) and with sufficient speed to catch up to the convoy.
Since even the fast convoys had ships that ran at 9-13 knots it didn't take a lot of speed to catch up. Rescue ship might be able to cut the corners on the zig zag route also.

U-Boat commanders were usually rated on tonnage sunk.

 

[GrauGeist]

It's a shame that D-Day was called off due to bad weather, the war would have been over much sooner.

Oh, wait...

 

[pbehn]

It's a shame that D-Day was called off due to bad weather, the war would have been over much sooner.

Oh, wait...

Those Mulberry harbours were over rated, one blew away in a summer breeze (second internet fact of the day).

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Why would London be the prime target ?
Besides, the populace of London did withstand the Blitz,thus why could the populace of London not withstand air attacks in the Summer ?

Did I say they wouldn't?

It'd be nice if for once you read for comprehension rather than contradiction.