Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[ljadw]

You seem to have no clue how an integrated air defense system really works. When the Cuban missile crisis began in 1962, Civil Air Patrol cadet squadrons all across the state were inducted into the Air Observer Corps. We had to learn aircraft identification, reporting format and proper phraseology, altitude estimation, and rudimentary weather observation, and we stood assigned watches, mostly relief periods for adult observers for breaks and meals. We were students and had homework to do, so we weren't expected to stand full shifts except on weekends. We called in every aircraft we saw with type, altitude and direction of flight, which was kind of a joke most ot the time, as there wasn't much air traffic out here in the sticks. Mostly Pipers and Cessnas, but there was a nearby SAC low level navigation route and we got treated to the occasional B47, BUFF, or tanker.
Our calls went to a filter center that plotted the tracks and compared them with tracks on the repeaters that they had from air defense radars. Suspicious tracks were investigated by the Air National Guard's F89s. Woe betide any flock of bears that chose to trespass; those Scorpions toted nuclear tipped Genie missiles. Between the radar, the observer corps, and the Scorpions, our section of the northern border was locked down pretty tight.
Our effort was thrown together pretty quickly, so we barely got it figured out when Khrushchev blinked and the crisis was over. The Brits, OTOH, had plenty of time and plenty of practice and got really good at it.
One other point. In the Navy I maintained and ran a radar interception and tactics trainer for the F4, so I have a bit of an idea what it's about. If you wait til you know the target before you send your fighters up, you've already lost the battle. You meet them beyond the edge of your airspace and you peck away at them all the way to the target and back. If you're flying especially short ranged point defense interceptors you send them up in relays and you land them as transients at the nearest airstrip to refuel and rearm, then launch them again to tackle the bad guys as they're egressing after the raid. If their escorts are toting drop tanks, tackle them as far out as you can and make them drop their extra fuel. Now you may soon have unescorted bombers to pick on. Don't worry, you won't lose track of them after they've come past the radar; there'll be so much commotion going on overhead, people on the ground will keep you informed. That, my friend is how it was done.

The technology of 1940 was millions of light years away of the technology of 1962
And the situation was also totally different .
The air campaign was started by the Germans for two reasons
1 Air supremacy was ONE (maybe not the most important ) of the needed ,but not sufficient reasons for Sealion .But it had no influence on the possibility of Sealion being successful .
2 Air supremacy could maybe,maybe, become a replacement for Sealion ,if air supremacy would convince the British people that the war was lost .But there was no chance for this .
In the first case (Sealion needed air supremacy ) the air supremacy was needed not in July or August but on the day of the start of Sealion and during the buildup . But here also there was no chance to obtain it,because FC could always retreat to the north where the German fighters could not attack them and could always with full strength intervene on the start of Sealion .
The first week of Sealion,Germany could land only one division which would be destroyed by the Home Forces .

 

[ljadw]

But the principles of air power persist through time. You don't wave a magic wand and suddenly declare air superiority. It is a campaign-level effort to progressively degrade an adversary's ability to defend within the air domain. It takes time, it takes planning, and it must be integrated with other domains (land, sea, etc) to ensure the air campaign adapts to changing requirements.

Your assertion that German air superiority over Britain wasn't needed prior to Sea Lion is nonsense. If the decision to launch Sea Lion was at all dependent on German air superiority, then that superiority MUST be achieved BEFORE the decision is made to execute Sea Lion.

Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .

 

[ljadw]

Desert Storm was real, Sealion was proposed.

Sealion failed for several reasons:
1) Germany failed to gain air superiority over England.
2) Germany failed to destroy (or cripple) Britain's ability to manufacture aircraft.
3) Germany failed to destroy or incapacitate RAF/FAA fields.
4) Germany failed to destroy/incapacitate English infrastructure.
5) Germany did not have control of the English channel's waters.
6) Germany did not have adequate surface vessels suitable for transporting and landing troops "en masse" along with the needed material and vehicles.

Real history's a bitch, isn't it?

As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.
And also 3 other reasons :
8 Bomber Command
9 The Royal Navy
10 The Home Forces

 

[GrauGeist]

Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .

If you wish to learn about air superiority and it's ability to sway a landing, then read about the Dieppe Landings.

The Allies did NOT have air superiority and the Luftwaffe (who DID have air superiority) massacred the Allied troops as they were trying to gain a beach head.

 

[buffnut453]

In the first case (Sealion needed air supremacy ) the air supremacy was needed not in July or August but on the day of the start of Sealion and during the buildup .

No, no, no and NO. If the DECISION to execute Sea Lion is dependent on air supremacy, then that supremacy must be achieved BEFORE the decision is made. To do otherwise risks the invasion forces embarking without adequate air superiority, which would result in a bloodbath.

Again, I do military operations planning. You don't decide to execute and hope that you'll achieve the preceding required objectives. Prior to ANY decision mid-operation, the HQ staff and decision-makers will perform a conditions check to ensure that the required pre-requisites have been achieved so that the next phase of operations can commence.

You can keep repeating these statements but you are DEAD WRONG. That's not how military operations are planned.

But here also there was no chance to obtain it,because FC could always retreat to the north where the German fighters could not attack them and could always with full strength intervene on the start of Sealion .

So FC retreats, and hence fails to defend the prime target in the UK....London. Just how long do you think ANY political leader would survive under those conditions? It would be a gross abdication of responsibility. And yet you simply dismiss the idea with a wave of the hand.

 

[pbehn]

As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.

I wish you told us that 81 years ago, we have always had lots of weather, loads of it, what type do you want?

 

[GrauGeist]

As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.
And also 3 other reasons :
8 Bomber Command
9 The Royal Navy
10 The Home Forces

As expected, you possess zero clues nd the ability to read.

I stated that the Germans did not have command of the channel's waters.

I stated that the Luftwaffe failed to incapacitate RAF/FAA installations (which would include catching aircraft on the ground)

So, now what?

 

[buffnut453]

Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .

Bullshit! Every element of air power doctrine existed and was understood during WW1: CAS, OCA, DCA, strategic bombing, SEAD, ISR, counter-ISR, transportation and logistics, air-to-ground and ground-to-air communication. All of it was there...and yet you're claiming that principles of air power don't persist over time. Please show me a doctrinal air power concept that hasn't persisted.

And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .

Correct but not achieving air supremacy beforehand increases overall risk to the operation. It's down to the commander to determine what level of risk he/she is willing to bear. No commander that I've ever met would launch an operation without the preconditions being met.

If the air campaign is being properly led and managed, then air superiority can and should be persisted.

 

[GrauGeist]

Well, this has been interesting.

Junior seems to lack the ability to even stay focused on their fantastical spin on military events and doctrine.

So I can either wait here for more sci-fi gems to amaze and astound or I can go clean the cat's litter box.

Well, that was a tough decision...to the litterbox we go.

 

[pbehn]

Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .

The LW didnt need air superiority they needed complete air supremacy look up the difference. That is complete control of the air over southern England and the midlands at least. During the actual battle Bomber Command was given equal credit in radio broadcasts, "wreaking havoc" on assembled landing barges in France and Belgium. The fight as it was would be as nothing compared to an actual landing. Then every plane with a turret or guns and every person with a license to fly would be used. There was no need to retreat because the RAF was not getting weaker, numerically it had more fighters and pilots than at the start throughout the battle, finishing 200 stronger, though pilot quality wasnt so good.

 

[pbehn]

The technology of 1940 was millions of light years away of the technology of 1962
And the situation was also totally different .
.

Do you read? Xb02s post that you replied to stated the exact opposite. I guarantee that the British system in 1940 was better than the part that Xb02 worked on in 1962 because one had been worked on for years and the other thrown together in weeks. The Observer Corps in UK was founded in 1925, it became the Royal Observer Corps during the war. During D-Day all US Liberty flak ships had two ROC air observers seconded to them to identify aircraft and call down fire where needed, my uncle was one of them. The job is nowhere near as easy as you think it is. Royal Observer Corps - Wikipedia

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .

Boelcke might have an argument with this statement.

Just as pertinent to this discussion of the BoB, "First look, first shot, first kill" is also something that has stood the test of time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So FC retreats, and hence fails to defend the prime target in the UK....London. Just how long do you think ANY political leader would survive under those conditions? It would be a gross abdication of responsibility. And yet you simply dismiss the idea with a wave of the hand.

I think it might be possible to defend London from the north, but it depends on how many fighters FC has, how many CH radars might be maintained or repaired, and whether the populace of the city could withstand it.

You're right that it would be a political nightmare, and Churchill was far too canny to allow such a thing. Any guy saying "We will fight on the beaches ..." is probably not going to countenance 11 Gr retreating to leave civilians to their fate.

 

[Shortround6]

I gave up when the proposal was for the German army to invade Russia and live off the land. Negating hundreds of years of studies of logistics by general staffs of a number of European armies. Knowledge and practice going back several hundred years.

Never let minor details get in the way of a new/improved concept.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I gave up when the proposal was for the German army to invade Russia and live off the land. Negating hundreds of years of studies of logistics by general staffs of a number of European armies. Knowledge and practice going back several hundred years.

Scorched-earth tactics were no secret on the Eastern Front. Even without them, 700+ miles is going to be a supply-hog.

 

[ThomasP]

Just another tidbit on the Chain Home network:

"Direction can be determined by comparing the way in which the returning signal is received by two aerials set at right angles to each other. The Chain Home receiver display uses a calibrated dial. It is turned until the 'blip' in the trace on the screen disappears, and the bearing can then be simply read off the scale."

The 2nd RAF Museum article I linked to upthread "StackPath" used some wording lifted directly out of the WWII "general" section of the Chain Home descriptive manual, just reworded for the past tense.

 

[swampyankee]

From Eagle in Flames

Which proves that it was the LW who had air superiority over the Channel .

Or it proves the RAF didn't need to have as many sorties over the Channel.

Scorched-earth tactics were no secret on the Eastern Front. Even without them, 700+ miles is going to be a supply-hog.

Stalin certainly knew enough history to notice how well living off the land worked for Napoleon when faced with a scorched earth policy.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey ljadw,

re "As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER."

Why do you think the weather was the principal reason?

The reason I ask is that I do not see how the weather, be it clear and sunny or dark and stormy, would matter if the Germans do not have air superiority, and control (naval) of the English Channel. If they did not control both there is no way they would survive (intact) the crossing.

 

[ljadw]

I think it might be possible to defend London from the north, but it depends on how many fighters FC has, how many CH radars might be maintained or repaired, and whether the populace of the city could withstand it.

You're right that it would be a political nightmare, and Churchill was far too canny to allow such a thing. Any guy saying "We will fight on the beaches ..." is probably not going to countenance 11 Gr retreating to leave civilians to their fate.

Why would London be the prime target ?
Besides, the populace of London did withstand the Blitz,thus why could the populace of London not withstand air attacks in the Summer ?

 

[buffnut453]

Why would London be the prime target ?
Besides, the populace of London did withstand the Blitz,thus why could the populace of London not withstand air attacks in the Summer ?

The people of London withstood the blitz because they knew Fighter Command was between them and the enemy, and that RAF squadrons were going up multiple times each day to try and protect them. Pull those defending fighters north, and the mindset of the Londoners may change markedly, with the greatest concern being the lack of defences. Be careful of applying hindsight and assuming that outcomes will continue as they did even if circumstances change.