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The technology of 1940 was millions of light years away of the technology of 1962You seem to have no clue how an integrated air defense system really works. When the Cuban missile crisis began in 1962, Civil Air Patrol cadet squadrons all across the state were inducted into the Air Observer Corps. We had to learn aircraft identification, reporting format and proper phraseology, altitude estimation, and rudimentary weather observation, and we stood assigned watches, mostly relief periods for adult observers for breaks and meals. We were students and had homework to do, so we weren't expected to stand full shifts except on weekends. We called in every aircraft we saw with type, altitude and direction of flight, which was kind of a joke most ot the time, as there wasn't much air traffic out here in the sticks. Mostly Pipers and Cessnas, but there was a nearby SAC low level navigation route and we got treated to the occasional B47, BUFF, or tanker.
Our calls went to a filter center that plotted the tracks and compared them with tracks on the repeaters that they had from air defense radars. Suspicious tracks were investigated by the Air National Guard's F89s. Woe betide any flock of bears that chose to trespass; those Scorpions toted nuclear tipped Genie missiles. Between the radar, the observer corps, and the Scorpions, our section of the northern border was locked down pretty tight.
Our effort was thrown together pretty quickly, so we barely got it figured out when Khrushchev blinked and the crisis was over. The Brits, OTOH, had plenty of time and plenty of practice and got really good at it.
One other point. In the Navy I maintained and ran a radar interception and tactics trainer for the F4, so I have a bit of an idea what it's about. If you wait til you know the target before you send your fighters up, you've already lost the battle. You meet them beyond the edge of your airspace and you peck away at them all the way to the target and back. If you're flying especially short ranged point defense interceptors you send them up in relays and you land them as transients at the nearest airstrip to refuel and rearm, then launch them again to tackle the bad guys as they're egressing after the raid. If their escorts are toting drop tanks, tackle them as far out as you can and make them drop their extra fuel. Now you may soon have unescorted bombers to pick on. Don't worry, you won't lose track of them after they've come past the radar; there'll be so much commotion going on overhead, people on the ground will keep you informed. That, my friend is how it was done.
Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .But the principles of air power persist through time. You don't wave a magic wand and suddenly declare air superiority. It is a campaign-level effort to progressively degrade an adversary's ability to defend within the air domain. It takes time, it takes planning, and it must be integrated with other domains (land, sea, etc) to ensure the air campaign adapts to changing requirements.
Your assertion that German air superiority over Britain wasn't needed prior to Sea Lion is nonsense. If the decision to launch Sea Lion was at all dependent on German air superiority, then that superiority MUST be achieved BEFORE the decision is made to execute Sea Lion.
As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.Desert Storm was real, Sealion was proposed.
Sealion failed for several reasons:
1) Germany failed to gain air superiority over England.
2) Germany failed to destroy (or cripple) Britain's ability to manufacture aircraft.
3) Germany failed to destroy or incapacitate RAF/FAA fields.
4) Germany failed to destroy/incapacitate English infrastructure.
5) Germany did not have control of the English channel's waters.
6) Germany did not have adequate surface vessels suitable for transporting and landing troops "en masse" along with the needed material and vehicles.
Real history's a bitch, isn't it?
If you wish to learn about air superiority and it's ability to sway a landing, then read about the Dieppe Landings.Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .
In the first case (Sealion needed air supremacy ) the air supremacy was needed not in July or August but on the day of the start of Sealion and during the buildup .
But here also there was no chance to obtain it,because FC could always retreat to the north where the German fighters could not attack them and could always with full strength intervene on the start of Sealion .
I wish you told us that 81 years ago, we have always had lots of weather, loads of it, what type do you want?As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.
As expected, you possess zero clues nd the ability to read.As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.
And also 3 other reasons :
8 Bomber Command
9 The Royal Navy
10 The Home Forces
Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .
The LW didnt need air superiority they needed complete air supremacy look up the difference. That is complete control of the air over southern England and the midlands at least. During the actual battle Bomber Command was given equal credit in radio broadcasts, "wreaking havoc" on assembled landing barges in France and Belgium. The fight as it was would be as nothing compared to an actual landing. Then every plane with a turret or guns and every person with a license to fly would be used. There was no need to retreat because the RAF was not getting weaker, numerically it had more fighters and pilots than at the start throughout the battle, finishing 200 stronger, though pilot quality wasnt so good.Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .
Do you read? Xb02s post that you replied to stated the exact opposite. I guarantee that the British system in 1940 was better than the part that Xb02 worked on in 1962 because one had been worked on for years and the other thrown together in weeks. The Observer Corps in UK was founded in 1925, it became the Royal Observer Corps during the war. During D-Day all US Liberty flak ships had two ROC air observers seconded to them to identify aircraft and call down fire where needed, my uncle was one of them. The job is nowhere near as easy as you think it is. Royal Observer Corps - WikipediaThe technology of 1940 was millions of light years away of the technology of 1962
And the situation was also totally different .
.
Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
So FC retreats, and hence fails to defend the prime target in the UK....London. Just how long do you think ANY political leader would survive under those conditions? It would be a gross abdication of responsibility. And yet you simply dismiss the idea with a wave of the hand.
I gave up when the proposal was for the German army to invade Russia and live off the land. Negating hundreds of years of studies of logistics by general staffs of a number of European armies. Knowledge and practice going back several hundred years.
Or it proves the RAF didn't need to have as many sorties over the Channel.From Eagle in Flames
Which proves that it was the LW who had air superiority over the Channel .
Scorched-earth tactics were no secret on the Eastern Front. Even without them, 700+ miles is going to be a supply-hog.
Why would London be the prime target ?I think it might be possible to defend London from the north, but it depends on how many fighters FC has, how many CH radars might be maintained or repaired, and whether the populace of the city could withstand it.
You're right that it would be a political nightmare, and Churchill was far too canny to allow such a thing. Any guy saying "We will fight on the beaches ..." is probably not going to countenance 11 Gr retreating to leave civilians to their fate.
Why would London be the prime target ?
Besides, the populace of London did withstand the Blitz,thus why could the populace of London not withstand air attacks in the Summer ?