Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

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The technology of 1940 was millions of light years away of the technology of 1962
And the situation was also totally different .
The air campaign was started by the Germans for two reasons
1 Air supremacy was ONE (maybe not the most important ) of the needed ,but not sufficient reasons for Sealion .But it had no influence on the possibility of Sealion being successful .
2 Air supremacy could maybe,maybe, become a replacement for Sealion ,if air supremacy would convince the British people that the war was lost .But there was no chance for this .
In the first case (Sealion needed air supremacy ) the air supremacy was needed not in July or August but on the day of the start of Sealion and during the buildup . But here also there was no chance to obtain it,because FC could always retreat to the north where the German fighters could not attack them and could always with full strength intervene on the start of Sealion .
The first week of Sealion,Germany could land only one division which would be destroyed by the Home Forces .
 
Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .
 
As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.
And also 3 other reasons :
8 Bomber Command
9 The Royal Navy
10 The Home Forces
 
Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .
If you wish to learn about air superiority and it's ability to sway a landing, then read about the Dieppe Landings.

The Allies did NOT have air superiority and the Luftwaffe (who DID have air superiority) massacred the Allied troops as they were trying to gain a beach head.
 
In the first case (Sealion needed air supremacy ) the air supremacy was needed not in July or August but on the day of the start of Sealion and during the buildup .

No, no, no and NO. If the DECISION to execute Sea Lion is dependent on air supremacy, then that supremacy must be achieved BEFORE the decision is made. To do otherwise risks the invasion forces embarking without adequate air superiority, which would result in a bloodbath.

Again, I do military operations planning. You don't decide to execute and hope that you'll achieve the preceding required objectives. Prior to ANY decision mid-operation, the HQ staff and decision-makers will perform a conditions check to ensure that the required pre-requisites have been achieved so that the next phase of operations can commence.

You can keep repeating these statements but you are DEAD WRONG. That's not how military operations are planned.



But here also there was no chance to obtain it,because FC could always retreat to the north where the German fighters could not attack them and could always with full strength intervene on the start of Sealion .

So FC retreats, and hence fails to defend the prime target in the UK....London. Just how long do you think ANY political leader would survive under those conditions? It would be a gross abdication of responsibility. And yet you simply dismiss the idea with a wave of the hand.
 
As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER.
And also 3 other reasons :
8 Bomber Command
9 The Royal Navy
10 The Home Forces
As expected, you possess zero clues nd the ability to read.

I stated that the Germans did not have command of the channel's waters.

I stated that the Luftwaffe failed to incapacitate RAF/FAA installations (which would include catching aircraft on the ground)

So, now what?
 
Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .

Bullshit! Every element of air power doctrine existed and was understood during WW1: CAS, OCA, DCA, strategic bombing, SEAD, ISR, counter-ISR, transportation and logistics, air-to-ground and ground-to-air communication. All of it was there...and yet you're claiming that principles of air power don't persist over time. Please show me a doctrinal air power concept that hasn't persisted.


And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .

Correct but not achieving air supremacy beforehand increases overall risk to the operation. It's down to the commander to determine what level of risk he/she is willing to bear. No commander that I've ever met would launch an operation without the preconditions being met.

If the air campaign is being properly led and managed, then air superiority can and should be persisted.
 
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Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .
And an air superiority achieved weeks before the landing is not a guarantee for air superiority the day of the landing .Such air superiority would not last .
The LW didnt need air superiority they needed complete air supremacy look up the difference. That is complete control of the air over southern England and the midlands at least. During the actual battle Bomber Command was given equal credit in radio broadcasts, "wreaking havoc" on assembled landing barges in France and Belgium. The fight as it was would be as nothing compared to an actual landing. Then every plane with a turret or guns and every person with a license to fly would be used. There was no need to retreat because the RAF was not getting weaker, numerically it had more fighters and pilots than at the start throughout the battle, finishing 200 stronger, though pilot quality wasnt so good.
 
The technology of 1940 was millions of light years away of the technology of 1962
And the situation was also totally different .
.
Do you read? Xb02s post that you replied to stated the exact opposite. I guarantee that the British system in 1940 was better than the part that Xb02 worked on in 1962 because one had been worked on for years and the other thrown together in weeks. The Observer Corps in UK was founded in 1925, it became the Royal Observer Corps during the war. During D-Day all US Liberty flak ships had two ROC air observers seconded to them to identify aircraft and call down fire where needed, my uncle was one of them. The job is nowhere near as easy as you think it is. Royal Observer Corps - Wikipedia
 

I think it might be possible to defend London from the north, but it depends on how many fighters FC has, how many CH radars might be maintained or repaired, and whether the populace of the city could withstand it.

You're right that it would be a political nightmare, and Churchill was far too canny to allow such a thing. Any guy saying "We will fight on the beaches ..." is probably not going to countenance 11 Gr retreating to leave civilians to their fate.
 
I gave up when the proposal was for the German army to invade Russia and live off the land. Negating hundreds of years of studies of logistics by general staffs of a number of European armies. Knowledge and practice going back several hundred years.

Scorched-earth tactics were no secret on the Eastern Front. Even without them, 700+ miles is going to be a supply-hog.
 
Just another tidbit on the Chain Home network:

"Direction can be determined by comparing the way in which the returning signal is received by two aerials set at right angles to each other. The Chain Home receiver display uses a calibrated dial. It is turned until the 'blip' in the trace on the screen disappears, and the bearing can then be simply read off the scale."

The 2nd RAF Museum article I linked to upthread "StackPath" used some wording lifted directly out of the WWII "general" section of the Chain Home descriptive manual, just reworded for the past tense.
 
From Eagle in Flames

Which proves that it was the LW who had air superiority over the Channel .
Or it proves the RAF didn't need to have as many sorties over the Channel.
Scorched-earth tactics were no secret on the Eastern Front. Even without them, 700+ miles is going to be a supply-hog.

Stalin certainly knew enough history to notice how well living off the land worked for Napoleon when faced with a scorched earth policy.
 
Hey ljadw,

re "As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER."

Why do you think the weather was the principal reason?

The reason I ask is that I do not see how the weather, be it clear and sunny or dark and stormy, would matter if the Germans do not have air superiority, and control (naval) of the English Channel. If they did not control both there is no way they would survive (intact) the crossing.
 
Why would London be the prime target ?
Besides, the populace of London did withstand the Blitz,thus why could the populace of London not withstand air attacks in the Summer ?
 
Why would London be the prime target ?
Besides, the populace of London did withstand the Blitz,thus why could the populace of London not withstand air attacks in the Summer ?

The people of London withstood the blitz because they knew Fighter Command was between them and the enemy, and that RAF squadrons were going up multiple times each day to try and protect them. Pull those defending fighters north, and the mindset of the Londoners may change markedly, with the greatest concern being the lack of defences. Be careful of applying hindsight and assuming that outcomes will continue as they did even if circumstances change.
 

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