Hartmann victories almost exclusively fighters. Why?

[BiffF15]

I can't wrap my head around being in air combat down low and simultaneously being right on the ragged edge of stall.

1) They were on a fighter sweep / patrol. Not cruising at 120 knots.
2) They saw an enemy down lower and McGuire broke for the shot. Even if he were attacking a trainer, he wouldn't be at stall plus a few knots, he'd just make a firing pass and reposition.
3) He was a veteran. He KNEW how much speed firing the gun would lose. If he were at stall plus a few knots, he would have disengaged and repositioned. All the items I have read indicate the primary reason was not dropping tanks. That lends credence to the incident being early in the mission, while the tanks were mostly full.
4) If you have a plane that makes 350 mph down low, 400 mph up high, and stalls at 105 mph, you don't generally enter combat at 115 mph, even if you are a veteran and the theater's second leading ace.

It is very much more likely he stalled while pulling too hard for the configuration than stalled while shooting his guns.

Greg,

Good points regarding airspeed, stalls and proximity to the ground. What I will add is your stall speed with heavy external tanks goes up over empty tanks, and clean stall with tanks is higher than without. If you are going to attack someone with the gun the longer you have in its WEZ or weapons employment zone, the higher your odds are of success. Or the closer you are to your opponents speed the better your odds of success are (less closure rate to deal with). Now you have a nimble Japanese SE fighter being bounced by a heavy P38, who comes in on what the offender assumes is an unobserved entry, too slow for abrupt or advanced maneuvering. Just prior to hammering him the defender comes alive and turns hard into the offender causing an overshoot. The offenders response will be to roll towards wings level and give a fairly abrupt pull to slow down and preserve the 3/9 advantage (IE not go defensive or do what's called a roll swap). That maneuver in a heavy configuration could easily stall the aircraft, and if not in a coordinated stall a spin could or will develop. I read that McGuires plane snapped over onto its back and hit the ground inverted. The above explanation is my interpretation of what I know overlaid with what I have read.

Also a fighter isn't a normal airplane performance wise. Your performance envelope is much larger not only in speed and maneuverability, but also in weight. Remember the ETO Mustangs with a full fuselage tank and two 165 gallon external tanks will fly very different than one with half that fuel and no draggy external tanks (and that is excluding the CG issue). Along with this "abnormal performance " comes an attitude. I've heard it said, and believe this, that some guys strap in while others strap on the jet. Slight difference in words and a world of difference in how they fly. You eventually get to a point where you feel damn near invincible. And that stems from repeated success in dealing with all sorts of tactical problems. It's not a bad thing. Do you want to go on a hairy mission with guys who have low or high confidence in themselves and their planes?

Basic weight of an Eagle is 35k, and max takeoff was around 61k. Big swing in weight and performance from one end of the spectrum to the other.

Food for thought.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[Dimlee]

VVS, like the Red Army, held the whip hand on the eastern front from March 1943

March 1943 was not successful for Red Army. Third Battle of Kharkov.

 

[parsifal]

A setback for sure, but small potatoes compared to the bigger picture at that time. by that stage, the red army had destroyed 6th army, the equivalent of a Rumanian Army, the Hungarians and Italian armies. Each of these Axis satellites had had German units embedded with them, and all had been more or less obliterated along with the armies they were attached to.

Significant portions of 4th panzer army had been mauled, others had been lost. 17th Army had retreated from the Caucasus, but with great difficulty and losses that reflected those difficulties.

Everywhere along the AGS frontage, the Germans were in deep trouble. it is to his credit that Manstein was able to put together a viable counterattack force , strengthened by the arrival of II SS pz corps. in the counterattack Manstein had ordered the SS Corps to encircle to the north of Kharkov, whilst 4pz army pushed from the South. The SS disobeyed orders and attacked the city directly which did two things. it unnecessarily cost the SS 11500 casualties, and led to the failure of mansteins pincer movement, allowing all but 40000 of the Soviet defenders (amounting to some 345000 men) to escape the cauldron.

It is undeniable that 3rd Kharkov was a defeat for the Red Army, but it is a very big stretch to claim it showed the continued or restored supremacy of the heer, or that march "was a bad month for the Red Army'. Hardly. If anything it showed in spades the deep seated weaknesses facing the germans at that time. after the runaway successes of the preceding three months, Soviet sources claim that Central Front (the army sized equivalent tasked mostly with the defence of the city) was down to 2000 combat effectives....hardly the stuff of resounding runaway victories for germany.

 

[Dimlee]

Parcifal, I agree with the most of your comment.
But I see no evidence of "holding the whip hand" (I assume it means certain level of dominance) of VVS and/or Red Army neither in March, nor in following months - not until the aftermath of the Kursk.

 

[parsifal]

It depends on the measure you want to apply. Certainly VVS was not able to deny airspace activity to the Axis at this time, but otoh the Luftwaffe sortie rates were in freefall at this time. For VVS along the three fronts opposite the AGS groups an average of about 1000 sorties per day was pretty typical , By comparison, the Axis were reduced to fewer than 200, with the best single day being 270 and the usual somewhere below 150. This includes a certain number flown by the minor axis partners. now, no matter how good the LW, if it is flying such a disproportionately low sortie rate, they cannot possibly be controlling the battlefield. Either the sortie rates as reported are rubbish, or the popular narrative that we so like to read about hundreds of VVS aircraft being flamed at no cost to the LW is just sheer bunkum. I tend to think the latter.

Kursk, for a brief moment allowed the LW to re-establish air superiority but the usual culprits of attrition and losses to enemy (Soviet) advances into german held territory quickly sank that advantage after Kursk.

 

[dedalos]

As usual parsifal you are manipulating the events and the datas. The number of sorties of the Lw fall not because of the vvs. Already by late 1942 several fighter and bomber units left the eastern front for the North Africa. In 1943 home defense also required units from the east.
The second factor was fuel . Already before kursk fuel situation imposed limitations on number of sorties. In several autobiographies of german pilots from both bomber and fighter units, report that they were taken "days off" because of lack of fuel. He177s were bombing on the eastern front,in early 1944 ,almost with no losses to fighters and stopped simply there was not enough fuel for them. VVS was unable even in 1945 to stop the schlachtgruppen from their missions.
Also comments like " they were advised not to engage the soviet fighters below 5000m" , or "they were ordered not to engage yak fighters lacking an oil cooler under the nose" are stupid myths. In the fall of 1943 it was the fighter gruppen that allowed the army to retreat. In 1944-45 , 2 gruppen of Jg 54 kept the Kurland ports open ,facing 5000 soviet aircraft. The main advantage of the vvs in late 1943 and 1944 was that there were just 3 german fighter wings on the eastern front. Of them Jg52 had also,occasionally, to face the american 15th air force. Also the units of the eastern front were the last to receive up graded models.

 

[parsifal]

The number of sorties of the Lw fall not because of the vvs. Already by late 1942 several fighter and bomber units left the eastern front for the North Africa. In 1943 home defense also required units from the east.

I don't disagree that redeployments forced on the LW diminished the strength they could deploy to the east. I thought I was at pains on several occasions in my discourse to say, in effect to say that it was beyond the capacity of the VVS to achieve outright air superiority over the axis, but for much of the middle part of the war they actually did not make that one of their central goals.

However it is a greater piece of misinformation to claim that the LW sortie rates dropped solely because of falling numbers and redeployments. In actual numbers from July 1942 to May 1943, the numbers of Axis a/c deployed in the east dropped slightly. According to Hardesty it fell from 2900 to about 2500 (including the satellite axis) with the greatest losses occurring in LW fighter deployments (dropping from 859 to 615, including their fighter recon units), which is important, but does not explain the drop in sortie rates. You need to take into account the readiness rates, which fell from a high of just over 70% in June 1942 falling to under 31% by the following April. There was a partial recovery from late April through to Kursk, climbing to averages of over 50% for that battle, before falling away to a more or less constant of about 45% for units deployed to the front for most of the following year.

The generally abysmal serviceability rates on the eastern front arise primarily from the following factors
1) The weather
2) The poor logistics that bedevilled the Axis forces on the eastern front. Though this improved slightly as the supply lines shortened, it was never fully solved, and certainly in March 1943 was a major problem still . Even as late as march 1943, only 37% of required trains were reaching the eastern front
3) Consistent mismanagement by the Axis leadership as they continued to unneccessarily overuse their available airpower, forcing it to run up and down the front, fire brigade style without proper rest or refit periods and without adequate training programs in place, at the front, so as to bring new recruits up to standard.
4) Finally and probably the least important of all, the massively expanding numbers and capability of the VVS. In June 1942, the VVS strength stood at 3300 a/c, including about 1000 deployed to the far East. By the following May, its strength had risen steadily to about 6700 a/c.

The second factor was fuel . Already before kursk fuel situation imposed limitations on number of sorties. In several autobiographies of german pilots from both bomber and fighter units, report that they were taken "days off" because of lack of fuel. He177s were bombing on the eastern front,in early 1944 ,almost with no losses to fighters and stopped simply there was not enough fuel for them. VVS was unable even in 1945 to stop the schlachtgruppen from their missions..

The fuel shortages arose for two reasons, partly because of strategic shortages, but this was a minor issue for the eastern front. overwhelmingly the dominant reason for fuel shortages at the front was the break down in the supply chain. No enough rolling stock, too few rail lines repaired, plummeting MT numbers, sheer overuse and misuse of LW reserves were all to blame. there were a combination of Soviet and VVS actions that contributed to that....probably most important being the activities of the partisans, but also the interdiction successes of soviet Long Range Aviation (ADD). You mention the inability of PVO to intercept the German attack groups, which I will deal with in a minute, but in saying that fail to mention the equal, and more disastrous failure of the LW to deal with these rear area interdiction efforts against them

Now with regard to the absence of losses amongst the LW bomber groups. perhaps. but neither was this a priority for the VVS. Their primary mission was to protect their own bombers for long enough so that the mission could be completed and the breakthroughs on the ground could be achieved. These are taken directly from Novikov himself. STAVKHA certainly wanted to inflict losses on the LW, but the best way to do this was to achieve breakthroughs with ground forces and then overrun the rear areas like airfields. In 1943-4 the Soviets were immensely successful at this....what was the effect of the LW bombers in this period. virtually nil …..

As far as your final comments, I agree that not too much weight can be given to an "order" not to engage below a certain altitude. There also was no equivalent order for the VVS to go above that height. however, fact remains that VVS fighters, particularly their later types enjoyed their best performance advantages at these lower altitudes . Fact also remains that many VVS fighters were forced or ordered to fight above these altitudes. the premise on which this discussion is based, is that virtually all Hartmanns victories were made against fighters. Since we know that Soviet ground attack a/c heavily favoured attacks at zero altitude, it at least seems reasonable to argue that he tended to fight those fighters of the VVS providing topcover...ie above 5000.

As for your claim that over 5000 VVS fighter were deployed against Courland, I don't think so. In the whole fronts deployed in Bagration, which led to Courland, there were never more than 4000 VVS a/c, stretching from Pripyet to the Baltic Coast. In Lithuania, there were never more than 1000 aircracraft until very late.

 

[Dimlee]

Now with regard to the absence of losses amongst the LW bomber groups. perhaps. but neither was this a priority for the VVS.

It was not the strategic priority since 1942 but still VVS and VNOS/PVO were supposed to provide anti aircraft defence until end of the war. They did well on some occasions and failed miserably in other incidents (Poltava 1944, Rybinsk and Yaroslavl 1942-1943, etc.

 

[Just Schmidt]

It was not the strategic priority since 1942 but still VVS and VNOS/PVO were supposed to provide anti aircraft defence until end of the war. They did well on some occasions and failed miserably in other incidents (Poltava 1944, Rybinsk and Yaroslavl 1942-1943, etc.

If memory serves, the Poltava raid took place at night.

It makes me wonder to what extent die Luftwaffe bombed at day during the later years of the war. Obviously direct ground support works best at day (as opposed to the night harassment attacks), but i am wondering about the deeper penetration raids, even if these were rare. For what i know they could be largely non-existent in 44, again from memory the aircraft used at Poltava were the ones accumulated for the ambitious, and in the event practically aborted, long planned campaign against soviet strategic targets.

I know little about soviet night fighters too.

I'd appreciate any additional information on these topics.