Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIB vs. Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat

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Doodard said:
Hurricanes were more forgiving and when equipped with cannons were deadly. But useless for Arctic service. Wildcats - radial engines and better rate of climb for interceptions made from carriers. Large cockpits and not as responsive.
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Why usless for Arctic Service? We few them on escort for Russian Convoys and the Russians used thousands with a fair degree of success.

Granted they were not in the same league as the 109 F/G or the 190, but neither is a Wildcat.
 


Read my post on the previous page....
 
F4F, and if possible, the F4F-3, because I'd need that extra ammo in case things got hairy and I had to "plow a path" to get back to a squad member or group. Sounds stupid, probably, but this is coming from someone who has no flight experience other than airliners and the air show I saw the other......something.
 
And vol 2, and on into vol 3 (the continutation of Shambles, titled "Air War for Burma") . And compare to "The First Team" in 2 volumes by John Lundstrom, and "Guadalcanal" by Richard Frank for F4F actions told from both sides. Thestatement that Hurricane fared better in 1942 is quite the wrong way around almost no matter how you define or qualify it.

Wildcats weren't encountering enemy fighter much in Jan-April '42 when Hurricanes were being consistently beaten, mainly by Japanese Army Type 1's (Oscar) and Type 97's (Nate), planes at least slightly and considerably, respectively, inferior to the Zero. There were only a few outright Hurricane v Zero air combats, all those documented on both sides in Shambles were disasters for the Hurricanes (I counted 33 Hurricanes and 6 other Brit types lost v 5-6 Zeroes in three combats involving Hurricanes, one over Singapore in January and two over Ceylon in April, one over Surabaya isn't documented on the Japanese side in that book and neither side's claims were reliable enough to conclude anything based on one sided accounting). But again the number of Hurricane v Type 1 combats was considerably more, and results also consistently against the Hurricanes, if not quite as badly.

By the time F4F's and Zeroes encountered one another May, action for the RAF in Far East had died down: the Japanese had conquered everything they immediately planned to, and it was just a relatively quiet Burma-India front, again JAAF facing Hurricanes. But the F4F fought the Zero to an almost exact standsill from the get go. Lundstrom found 10 F4F's downed by Zeroes and 14 Zeroes by F4F's at Coral Sea and Midway. Frank's numbers for G'canal campaign to November 15 are more complete though don't absolutely separate pure F4F v Zero combat. But Zero air combat losses in that period were 115, F4F 101, and the great majority of each was at the hands of the other, so again closely matched, a very different story from the Hurricane's 1942 Pacific career v the Type 1 and to a lesser extent the Zero.

Joe
 
There is little doubt that the Wildcat had a better record against the Japenese but the tactics used had a major impact on the results, the British being woeful in the early years.
It should be remembered that the Hurricane held its own until late in 1944 against the Japanese in its IIc version so I wouldn't get to hung up on the first combat results bad as they were.
 
The all purpose explanation, tactics. Operational results make no difference. Any that don't jibe with what we think or want to think about a plane based on its paper stats or its legendary reputation (often based on overstated wartime claims) just disappear, poof! it was all tactics.

F4F units in 1942 were demonstrably much more effective against the Japanese than Hurricane units. Anything beyond that which tries to bucket it by 'plane' v 'tactics' tends to be unbacked assertion, or more legend. The F4F units didn't generally use specialized anti-Zero tactics in 1942, and as far as 'boom and zoom' that's what the Zeroes tried to do too, especially by later in 1942. Everybody wanted the altitude/energy advantage in a fight.

Later on in Burma Hurricanes fought alongside more effective Allied types; the Allies had overwhelming numbers (which the Japanese didn't have, strategically speaking, in 1942, they did tend to concentrate their numbers more effectively than the Allies did early in the war); it was strictly the JAAF never actual Zeroes, and the Hurricane results per two sided accounts, not their own claims, were still not very impressive anyway. I wouldn't get too hung up on that period. Read "Air War for Burma".

And in any case then we'd have to consider the FM-2's air combat record in 1944-45 which was phenomenal; it can't be comprehensively calculated in terms of actual results, but hardly any FM's were lost in fighter combat while being credited with dozens of enemy fighters; and there's a two side documented case of FM's routing a force of Type 4's (Frank) and Type 3's (Tony) without loss, types never faced by Hurricanes. But we're changing the subject in two directions really. 1942 combats were very important, because that was when the Allies had any real chance of losing or negotiating a peace with Japan, and the Hurricane was a much less effective fighter than the F4F then, for whatever combination of reasons, the relative importance of each factor would never be proven.

Joe
 

Obviously the British were badly outnumbered and were using outdated equipment in early '42, so it would be hard to see how they could "win" air battles, when outnumbered. The point was not to "win" air battle by kill ratio, it was the effect that it had on the war. The main Zero vs. Hurricane engagement in early '42 were the engagements over Ceylon. The Japanese were trying to destroy the port other infrastructure. The two engagements over Ceylon were not strictly Zero vs. Hurri, because the Hurri's were trying to down Jap bombers, not only the Zero's. From what I can tell were about 40 - 50 Hurri's in Colombo, Ceylon (some taken from the Hermes, with disasterous results for the unprotected carrier) and it was attacked on April 5 '42 by about 80 (carrier) dive-bombers with about 60 fighters escorting. There were 21 Japanese planes shot down, vs. 19 Hurricanes. (6 Swordfish TB's were also destroyed) The second attack on the 6th by 54 bombers, with approx equal # of fighter escort. 15 japanese planes were shot down, vs. 11 Hurricanes.
Partly because of this battle, (40 Japanese aircraft shot down + many damaged) and with the Allied resistance stiffening, the Japanese decided to withdraw from the Indian Ocean, the carriers went back to Japan to replace losses. If however, they had managed to wipe out most of the RAF FAA fighters on the ground (as happened in Pearl, Phillipines, Poland, Russia etc.) or if they had destroyed all the defending fighters with minimal losses, they might have made further inroads in the Indian Ocean.

Quoted from W. Churchill "The Turn of the Tide"
"The Japanese were making a raid and a demonstration. If, of course they had found Ceylon unprepared and devoid of air defence they might have converted their reconnaissance in force into a major operation. They might have encountered the British fleet and inflicted a severe defeat on it. If this had happened, no one could set limits on their potential action. The stubborn resistance encountered at Colombo (Ceylon) convinced the Japanese that further prizes would be dearly bought. The losses that they had suffered in aircraft convinced them that they had come in contact with bone"
 
You may want to read what I wrote before sounding off. Let me take you through it a bit at a time
There is little doubt that the Wildcat had a better record against the Japenese
I dont think you can disagree with this
but the tactics used had a major impact on the results, the British being woeful in the early years.
There is no doubt that the Britsh tactics were dreadful in the early war years and there is no doubt that this had a lot to do with their losses. Trying to dogfight a Jap plane was suicide, not using what speed advantage you had, was stupidity itself and sticking to flights of three totally obsolete.
However lessons were learnt, leading to my next part.
It should be remembered that the Hurricane held its own until late in 1944 against the Japanese in its IIc version
Notice, held its own, not more than or better than, just held its own against the Japanese, no more, no less.
Now the last part of my posting
so I wouldn't get to hung up on the first combat results bad as they were
A simple reminder that the plane was better than the first results would indicate.

Nowhere did I say or mention or claim that the Hurricane was better than the Japanese it faced or was more effective than the F4.
 
Again, read "Bloody Shambles". The Japanese losses you quote are what the British claimed at the time, not what the Japanese lost.
In the Apr 5 raid the British also lost 4 Fulmars (fighters, albeit very weak ones) and 19 Hurricanes, besides the 6 Swordfish, a PBY and an Albacore. The Japanese actually lost 1 Zero and 6 Type 99 Carrier Bombers ('Val'), latter not all necessarily downed by British fighters, AA made claims too.

On April 9 (not 6th), 8 Hurricanes were downed (3 others damaged) v 3 Zeroes, plus 2 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes ('Kate'), but one of the Zeroes was apparently hit by AA while strafing, suicide crashing into a Royal Marines AA emplacement.

One of the other two known combats between Zeroes and Hurricanes is recorded from both sides: 9 Zeroes from the 22nd Air Flotilla were escorting bombers over Singapore Jan 22 when engaged by a slightly superior number of Hurricanes. The Hurricanes downed 1 Type 96 Land Attack Bomber ('Nell) and 2 Zeroes for 5 losses; Buffaloes then attacked and lost 2 for no result.

But you're ignoring the fact that Hurricanes engaged Japanese Army Type 1's and Type 97's, planes inferior to the Zero, in a fairly large number of combats from January to April 1942 with also consistently poor results. That seriously undercuts any argument that the Zero engagements were a fluke.

In these details we've added non-fighter targets; the F4F's ratio was far above 1:1 if including non-fighters. But fighter forces that couldn't cope with enemy fighters were attrited down to nothing pretty quickly, after which they couldn't accomplish anything against any other target. So fighter-fighter ratio was in fact an important indicator of fighter effectiveness.

Also before the subject gets further diffused or changed, I think you should take a line in next post to just admit your original categorical statement was wrong.

Joe
 
Problem with the Ceylon accounting is that IJN records admit to a much smaller number of losses. Less than half of the forty claimed by the British were actually lost.

On April 5th JNAF losses were only one Zero-sen and 6 Type 99 Kanbaku (Vals), not the 18 or 21 claimed.

During the April 9th strike on Tricomalee, JNAF losses were 3 Zero-sen, 4 Type 99 Kanbaku (Vals) and 2 Type 97 Kanko (Kates).

This is what Joe referred to earlier as the unreliability of "one-sided accounting". Both sides overclaim and only the admitted losses can be relied upon to be closer to the truth. (Even then, crashed on landing and aircraft written off due to damage are sometimes left off the "losses" column).

In the eyes of Nagumo and his pilots, there was no effective opposition. Somerville was high-tailing it to Mombasa and everything worth attacking had been sunk or destroyed. THAT was the reason the First Carrier Striking Force left. I'm afraid the "stubborn resistance encountered at Ceylon" was only in the mind of Winnie and not Chuichi.

Hate to say it, but the Senior Service and, for that matter, the "crab blue cladded bunch" didn't exactly wrapped themselves in glory during this campaign.

Have to hand it to Somerville, he did the right thing to avoid certain destruction of the two carriers. HMS Indomitable and Formidable lived to fight another day when they could be equipped with "proper" carrier aircraft like .... eh .... the ones made by Grumman.

Ironic, isn't it that the FAA 880 Sq Sea Hurricanes on HMS Indomitable were replaced in April 1942 by the 806 Sq equipped with ... Grumman Martlets (Wildcats in RN parlance).
 
 
Perhaps you are right about that.
I don't really know enough about the early Wildcat battles, so how well did they fare in combat prior to Midway?

Well as for the Hurri I was going by the numbers of losses, if the actual # was closer to what you claimed then it does not look nearly as good (to put it mildly).

As fer-de-lance points out there were inaccurate accounts both + -, so if the planes were badly damaged in combat but crashed on landing it was not always counted. How many planes made it back but were written off I wonder?
 

Yes, any Canso driver who can keep the Hiryu's CAP at bay for seven minutes so that the radioman can get out a contact report deserves his One Boiled Egg ...

Well, out of the 300 JNAF aircraft, there would be about a third in a raid with 30-odd Zero-sen escorting. All the rest are Vals and Kates ... That's a "target-rich environment ... not bad odds.

As for Wildcats, sure they played against similar odds (proportionately) .. VMF-211 at Wake Island ... VMF-212 at Henderson vs 25th Kokutai Sentai at Rabaul.
 
Wake Island would be comparable to the Glads in Malta, but did not the F4F usually have the advantage of height in Guadaulcanal when facing the Zeros as opposed to the Hurricanes which were surprised to find the Japanese over Ceylon and were attacking from below.
Quote from my source on previous post which indicates the Brits had totally undermestitated the range at which IJN aircraft could operate something the Wildcats in Guadualcanal were aware of 4 months later
" Instead of the tactical advantage of having the
defending fighters awaiting the Japanese from above, it
was now the Japanese who held the advantage of height.
And the defenders suffered accordingly. Almost half
the defending force – four Fulmars and 15 Hurricanes – was
shot down, as were six Fairey Swordfish torpedo aircraft
of 788 Squadron, which arrived on the scene from
Trincomalee. In fact, the Swordfish, certain that any
fighters over Colombo must be friendly, flashed recognition
signals to identify themselves as British as the Zeros
approached."
 
Again let's not focus entirely on Ceylon for Hurricanes, because there are a fair number of other examples. In Jan-April '42, when fighting greatly died down on British fronts v Japanese, the Hurricane results, as given in Bloody Shambles combat by combat as I count, fighter to fighter:
Zeroes: 2 combats over Ceylon, 27 Hurricanes lost for 3 Zeroes
Zeroes: 3 other combats with both sides known: 8 Hurricanes 3 Zeroes
Type 1's: 12 combats, 20 Hurricanes, 4 Type 1's
Type 97's: 9 combats, 8 Hurricanes, 5-6 Type 97's
1 Hurricane was lost in a combat with either Type 1's or Zeroes w/ no J loss, and 7 in combats where the Japanese side is not given. A few were Dutch Hurricanes, and a few combats were along with the AVG but only one has a real claim overlap, that's 5 v 6 Type 97's.

So the Hurricane combat effectiveness problem v the Japanese in the early campaigns was not a fluke of one situation. The Hurricanes were not outnumbered and surprised in every one of the 26 two-side documented combats, not nearly, but came out on the short end of all of them, except 2 combats v. Type 97's.

In the set piece interceptions over G'canal by F4F's, of Type 1 Land Attack Planes ('Betty') escorted by Zeroes, F4F's often had altitude advantage, but sometimes didn't. Plus, not all combats over G'canal involving land based planes in 1942 were those set pieces. Some were battles over convoys or carrier based planes of one side v landbased ones of the other, which occured at lower altitude. And a significant % were carrier fighters on both sides. At Coral Sea and Midway as already mentioned Lundstrom found the score between carrier based fighters was 14 (Zeroes, plus 2 Type 96's) v 10 carrier based F4F's. The numbers for Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz are included above in Frank's numbers for all G'canal thru Nov 15 1942, but the carrier Zeroes did a bit better in the second two carrier battles. But overall the exchange in actions between carrier fighters was also around 1:1, where there was no tendency for altitude advantage on either side, and a general numerical advantage for the Japanese.

I suggest reading the references given above, count up and consider in their totality all the combats, and then see if a plausible case can be made that the Hurricane v F4F effectiveness difference can easily be explained by one factor like tactical situation. I don't see how.

Joe
 
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