Clay_Allison
Staff Sergeant
- 1,154
- Dec 24, 2008
what, are we budgeting out cannon shells for the first time ever? Of course they were worth it.
Heavy AAA: was it worth it
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- #22
Another point I heard raised somewhere was the reassurance the general populace felt (especially in BoB) when they heard the sound of the big AA guns open up at enemy planes. They felt they had some protection and could fight back against the enemy. The people didn't feel so helpless and vulnerable when they heard the guns open up!
Another point to consider perhaps!
Another point to consider perhaps!
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- #24
I've digged out that 25 000 of all 88mm Flaks were produced (according to German Flak 88mm 37 L/56 Antitank Gun Photos - Walkaround Gallery. If we subtract that number for 5000 guns (for ships and anti-ground-purposes), thats 20K AA guns.
The L56 guns weighted some 7 tons in marching order. So, each gun weighted as 3 Bf-109 fighters.
Then we count in some 10 000 prime movers for guns (or more), each costing half a price of a Panther tank.
Then we add 20000 X 4000 shells (=80 000 000) that got to be produced if we want to make the AD guns worthwhile (one kill per gun, that 4000 number is the 1942 value; it is worse before and after).
Now we multiply that 80 milions with 10kg per shell, we now have 0,8 billion kg of material thrown through the barrels.
Of course, we must add some 8 (give or take) men per gun to man it, so 160 000 men.
Perhaps the Germans would be better off with some 50 000 new single engine fighters*, 5000 Panthers** (requiring 25 000 men of those 160 000; the rest to the Jagdgeschvadern) and 800 million tons of shells for the artillery arm, instead of their 88 fleet?
*instead of guns; I know that 1kg per 1kg exchange wouldn't be possible.
** so, 11 000 instead of 6000 produced
The L56 guns weighted some 7 tons in marching order. So, each gun weighted as 3 Bf-109 fighters.
Then we count in some 10 000 prime movers for guns (or more), each costing half a price of a Panther tank.
Then we add 20000 X 4000 shells (=80 000 000) that got to be produced if we want to make the AD guns worthwhile (one kill per gun, that 4000 number is the 1942 value; it is worse before and after).
Now we multiply that 80 milions with 10kg per shell, we now have 0,8 billion kg of material thrown through the barrels.
Of course, we must add some 8 (give or take) men per gun to man it, so 160 000 men.
Perhaps the Germans would be better off with some 50 000 new single engine fighters*, 5000 Panthers** (requiring 25 000 men of those 160 000; the rest to the Jagdgeschvadern) and 800 million tons of shells for the artillery arm, instead of their 88 fleet?
*instead of guns; I know that 1kg per 1kg exchange wouldn't be possible.
** so, 11 000 instead of 6000 produced
parsifal
Colonel
The trpouble with this argument is that it assumes the heavy flak was doing nothing and achieving nothing, and therefore every reichsmark not spent on AA could be diverted to other hardware. Problem is, without the AA, the bomber become deadly accurate, so most of the production "saved" is in fact lost to additional bomb damage and losses. There would be a very real danger of a collapse in Morale, as city after city goers up in massive firestorms, and the casualty bill approaches the millions, instead of the tens of thousands
Your argument is akin to saying that ASW defence gets in the way of surface combat capabilities, so lets not build any more depth charges........
Your argument is akin to saying that ASW defence gets in the way of surface combat capabilities, so lets not build any more depth charges........
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- #26
I'm not following you, parsifal.
The 1st thing suggested im my 'what-if' is to build a huge mass of fighter aircraft instead of heavy AA guns. Since those two do the same thing, namely take it on enemy aircraft, your argument is not valid IMO.
BombTaxi
Tech Sergeant
Tomo,
The raw statistics you have produced neglect the fact that heavy flak was an integral part of a combined-arms air defence network. 5000 extra Panthers and millions of tons of HE shell are no good if the enemy has air superiority and attacks them at will. And even if thousands more fighters were built, they would be at greater risk of destruction on the ground without AAA defence for thier bases.
Your argument also ignores completely the associated costs involved in fielding these extra weapons. Swarms of new fighters need trained pilots - which need instructors to train them. They than need new bases to house them. These bases require men to build them and then men to man them. How much does that cost? Likewise, 5000 Panthers equates to something like 25 new armoured divisions. These have to be manned, then artillery, small arms, transport and a plethora of other things added. Is this truly cost effective in the long run?
You have criticised AAA precisely because of it's high secondary costs, then completely ignored secondary cost's in proposing alternative use of resources. The stats you provide have shock value, granted, but they give no real consideration to the actual usefulness of 5000 tanks, etc, IMHO.
The raw statistics you have produced neglect the fact that heavy flak was an integral part of a combined-arms air defence network. 5000 extra Panthers and millions of tons of HE shell are no good if the enemy has air superiority and attacks them at will. And even if thousands more fighters were built, they would be at greater risk of destruction on the ground without AAA defence for thier bases.
Your argument also ignores completely the associated costs involved in fielding these extra weapons. Swarms of new fighters need trained pilots - which need instructors to train them. They than need new bases to house them. These bases require men to build them and then men to man them. How much does that cost? Likewise, 5000 Panthers equates to something like 25 new armoured divisions. These have to be manned, then artillery, small arms, transport and a plethora of other things added. Is this truly cost effective in the long run?
You have criticised AAA precisely because of it's high secondary costs, then completely ignored secondary cost's in proposing alternative use of resources. The stats you provide have shock value, granted, but they give no real consideration to the actual usefulness of 5000 tanks, etc, IMHO.
- Thread starter
- #28
I like the discussion very much 
My comments are in bold:
My comments are in bold:
Tomo,
The raw statistics you have produced neglect the fact that heavy flak was an integral part of a combined-arms air defence network. 5000 extra Panthers and millions of tons of HE shell are no good if the enemy has air superiority and attacks them at will. And even if thousands more fighters were built, they would be at greater risk of destruction on the ground without AAA defence for thier bases.
Since we now have double as many fighters, I fail to see just how enemy would achieve air superiority.
I haven't say a word against light AAA, so those air bases would have decent defence. I very much doubt that heavy AA would do any harm to the attackers flying tree top. For the high flying attackers, well, we've just built heaps of fighters
Now, the AAA can be supressed (flak supression anyone?; think that RAF was pretty good at it).
Your argument also ignores completely the associated costs involved in fielding these extra weapons. Swarms of new fighters need trained pilots - which need instructors to train them.
One need to train the AAA gunners their instructors as well, so no downside for that part too.
They than need new bases to house them. These bases require men to build them and then men to man them. How much does that cost?
Any military (or civilian) structure is a subject for that.
Likewise, 5000 Panthers equates to something like 25 new armoured divisions. These have to be manned, then artillery, small arms, transport and a plethora of other things added. Is this truly cost effective in the long run?
Soldiers need to be trained, be it the longbowmen or tankers. Instead of train them to load the AAA, they will be trained to load 7,5cm.
You have criticised AAA precisely because of it's high secondary costs, then completely ignored secondary cost's in proposing alternative use of resources.
I've criticised the heavy AAA because of primary cost (guns, prime movers, shells produced).
The stats you provide have shock value, granted, but they give no real consideration to the actual usefulness of 5000 tanks, etc, IMHO.
One or two persons in WWII german army might find extra 5000 tanks pretty useful
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
1. You've neglected a point that has already been made, in the absence of heavy flak emplacements, the strategic bomber will become significantly more accurate and you're having alot more difficulty producing these 'heaps of fighters'; light flak is very good at defending your airfield against marauding tactical fighter-bombers but will have little effect against streams of strategic bombers
2. Presumably you think the RAF (or USAAF, or even the Luftwaffe itself) enjoyed flak suppression as a mere formality? It was difficult, nerve-jangling and suicidally dangerous.
3. Why do you need to train their instructors? Flak crews need to be trained but it doesn't take as long (nor is it as expensive) as training a fighter pilot
4. You do at last have a point; the RLM did a good job of distributing aircraft production into the forests and the Luftwaffe did an equally good job of following them with their fighter strength
5. I'm not sure what your point is there
6. Have you considered platform turnover as a function of primary cost? How many flak emplacements are lost in battle compared to the number of fighters lost? I'm sure some are but do you think it's any where near the number of fighters? Fighters are more expensive to manufacture and they don't generally last as long.
7. I'm sure they would - provided they were also supplied with the fuel and oil necessary to maintain them as an effective asset. As the war progressed, the Germans had trouble doing this for their existing infrastructure, never mind an additional 5,000 tanks and swarms of fighters.
parsifal
Colonel
The only "other" way to counter the air defence problem was to buld more fighters with the money saved from not building AA. I believe this is essentially TPs case. Milch was certainly critical of the performance of AA. By the end of the war, some analysts say that the cost to bring down a bomber by AA was almost the same as the cost of the bomber itself.
So there is an argument there to support this notion, however, im not buying it. For starters, AA fulfilled a role that fighters could never do, they downgraded the performance and accuracy of EVERY bomber that came into their range. It is wrong to gauge the effectiveness of flak solely by the numbers of AC they shot down. For a number of reasons (already tabled by others) it had other functions going beyond the mere kill rate.
That is not to say that the flak arm was inneffective in bringing aircraft down. From the beginning of 1944 on, the ratio of a/c brought down by flak compared to aircraft brought down by fighters rose as a proportion of the total. most scholars believe that by about Septmeber, losses to flak was exceeding losses inflicted by German fighters. This may or may not be correct, but it still demonstrates the importance of the flak arm to the Germans defences.
Moreover, the losses the fighters were taking to bring down each bomber were rising sharply, as 1944 progressed. By late 1944, the Germans were losing something like 6 aircraft for every one they were bringing down. At that exchange rate, I do not believe that the fighter arm was, by that stage a cost effective means of air defence for the germans. True, they had lost the war anyway by that stage, but this is just a question of which arm was the more cost effective
So there is an argument there to support this notion, however, im not buying it. For starters, AA fulfilled a role that fighters could never do, they downgraded the performance and accuracy of EVERY bomber that came into their range. It is wrong to gauge the effectiveness of flak solely by the numbers of AC they shot down. For a number of reasons (already tabled by others) it had other functions going beyond the mere kill rate.
That is not to say that the flak arm was inneffective in bringing aircraft down. From the beginning of 1944 on, the ratio of a/c brought down by flak compared to aircraft brought down by fighters rose as a proportion of the total. most scholars believe that by about Septmeber, losses to flak was exceeding losses inflicted by German fighters. This may or may not be correct, but it still demonstrates the importance of the flak arm to the Germans defences.
Moreover, the losses the fighters were taking to bring down each bomber were rising sharply, as 1944 progressed. By late 1944, the Germans were losing something like 6 aircraft for every one they were bringing down. At that exchange rate, I do not believe that the fighter arm was, by that stage a cost effective means of air defence for the germans. True, they had lost the war anyway by that stage, but this is just a question of which arm was the more cost effective
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- #31
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
If the bomber is destroyed, he will never gonna get accurate. 'My' fighters would take care of it.
That's based on the pretty hefty premise that the fighters will destroy all of the bombers; the problem with your theory is that intercepting fighters can be engaged by escorting fighters and to a lesser extent, by the bombers' own defensive armament. What neither the escorting fighters or the bombers can do is engage the flak.
No, I don't think that anyone enjoyed it. However, it proved feasible many times.
It was always feasible to suppress flak but it almost invariably came at a price
Sure thing pilots are more expensive to train then gunners. Again, germans failed to train the gunners properly from 1942 on
And how does that change the fact that pilots are more expensive to train than gunners?
The planes and tanks would continue to function until there is fuel. Since we now have the fighters to KILL the bombers, Ploesti and synthetic fuel factories will be free from bombing.
Back to your hefty premise. You haven't really presented a good case as to why fighters could supplant flak in defending the industrial base, your argument is that they could have done because... they could have done, you've simply reset the debate back to zero; so WHY do you think oil and synthetic fuel would be free from bombing?
That's based on the pretty hefty premise that the fighters will destroy all of the bombers; the problem with your theory is that intercepting fighters can be engaged by escorting fighters and to a lesser extent, by the bombers' own defensive armament. What neither the escorting fighters or the bombers can do is engage the flak.
No, I don't think that anyone enjoyed it. However, it proved feasible many times.
It was always feasible to suppress flak but it almost invariably came at a price
Sure thing pilots are more expensive to train then gunners. Again, germans failed to train the gunners properly from 1942 on
And how does that change the fact that pilots are more expensive to train than gunners?
The planes and tanks would continue to function until there is fuel. Since we now have the fighters to KILL the bombers, Ploesti and synthetic fuel factories will be free from bombing.
Back to your hefty premise. You haven't really presented a good case as to why fighters could supplant flak in defending the industrial base, your argument is that they could have done because... they could have done, you've simply reset the debate back to zero; so WHY do you think oil and synthetic fuel would be free from bombing?
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- #33
Hi, parsifal
When we talk about AAA, fighters, bombers and all of that, we talk about 1943-45.
However, what was the task for all of those 88s from 1939 to 1943?
Those guns haven't brought down any significant number of enemy planes simply because there was no major bombing offensive aginst germany in 1st half of war. Now I know about RAF night bombers, yet their offensives weren't halted by heavy AAA at the peak of it's efficiency.
In the meantime, fighter planes were flying as much sorties as they could muster. The heavy AAA couldn't help them much to gain air superiority over enemy territory, nor escort bombers, nor attack ground forces. So, while fighters could do the job of the heavy AAA and more, it wasn't possible the other way around. All of that during the 6 year war.
And as we may conclude, the very moment Luftwaffe fighters lost the upper hand, allied bombers roamed free despite the AAA. Not only above german factories, but also against frontline troops.
When we talk about AAA, fighters, bombers and all of that, we talk about 1943-45.
However, what was the task for all of those 88s from 1939 to 1943?
Those guns haven't brought down any significant number of enemy planes simply because there was no major bombing offensive aginst germany in 1st half of war. Now I know about RAF night bombers, yet their offensives weren't halted by heavy AAA at the peak of it's efficiency.
In the meantime, fighter planes were flying as much sorties as they could muster. The heavy AAA couldn't help them much to gain air superiority over enemy territory, nor escort bombers, nor attack ground forces. So, while fighters could do the job of the heavy AAA and more, it wasn't possible the other way around. All of that during the 6 year war.
And as we may conclude, the very moment Luftwaffe fighters lost the upper hand, allied bombers roamed free despite the AAA. Not only above german factories, but also against frontline troops.
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
1. No, but they would be driven to higher altitudes where their accuracy would have suffered
2. That's a bit silly; flak is neither an air superiority or an escort platform; you might just as well argue that panzers weren't able to help much during the Channel Dash. Technically, they could/did use 88s to attack ground forces.
3. You've stated the bleedin' obvious and presented it as your case for the defence. Nobody is going to argue that a flak emplacement can't do what a fighter can do because we know that flak emplacements can't fly. You've once again ignored the fact that they will drive the bombers higher and present the incoming bomber crews with both a psychological and physiological threat ie the fear of being hit and actually being hit. Once driven higher and less accurate, the interceptors can do their part and engage them. This is largely why I think the flak + fighters were two parts of the same defence mechanism, rather than two separate entities that just happened to be fighting the same threat.
4. Allied bombing certainly knocked the stuffing out of Germany's core industrial base but is it true to say they 'roamed free' even in the closing stages of the war? Frontline troops would have been engaged at a tactical level, rather than by bomber streams and guess what they would have been protected by - flak. Flak that moves with them when they move, instead of waiting for hard-pressed fighters to turn up (if they did) to see off the Allied fighters.
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- #35
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- #36
1. What escort fighters? Not in 1939, nor in 1940, nothing up to 1944.
2. Flak supression comes with the price indeed. Are other things, not only in war, free?
3. It doesn't.
Does the training (or absence of it from 1943) make the heavy AAA to stop bomber offensive? It doesn't.
4. The bombers would be shot down since the defender has double the number of fighters perhaps?
Colin1
Senior Master Sergeant
Could we agree that Lancaster bombing Hamburg was as accurate at 15K feet, as it was at 5K or 25K? The city would burn either way. In the same time no flak saved river dams from the Dambusters.
Both one-offs
Hamburg was well-defended but it wasn't the industrial heartland of Germany, it was an historical city with a correspondingly large number of wooden buildings. It had been an exceptionally dry summer. The Allies used something in the region of 350,000 incendiaries combined with conventional HE; you could have bombed Hamburg from the moon and hit it.
The Dams were a strategic target hit tactically, there was no 'bomber stream' and with the exception of the Mohne, no correspondingly heavy concentrations of flak. 53 out of 133 men didn't make it back (40%), 8 Lancasters and two were so badly damaged they had to abort their mission - statistics sound roughly familiar? You can bet it wasn't down to enemy fighters.
My point: fighters can do what heavy flak can, but not vice versa. Panzers are not suposed to kill planes, you should know that.
My point: heavy flak can do what fighters can't, they can engage the enemy at practically minimal risk of being engaged themselves; anyone foolish enough to go down and take them on likely won't be coming back up again.
Nobody mentioned panzers. The 88, accurate at targetting heavy bombers, was murderously accurate when targetting ground forces, you could make some concession for the wrong type of ammo but you're still shooting at them with the minimum of turn-around time.
Ceterum censeo: crew killed by fighters is a better bargain then the crew feared by heavy Flak.
Why crews only killed by fighters? Is that better than a crew killed by flak? You still miss the psychological element viz the crews with nerves shot to shreds that jettisoned their bomb loads and made for neutral Sweden or Switzerland; that's a gap in the defensive box, one less set of guns and bomb load to worry about.
What the 'less accurate' bomber got to do with the ability of fighters to shot the bombers down??
Is the answer 'nothing at all'? see below, I left it in
This is largely why I think the flak + fighters were two parts of the same defence mechanism, rather than two separate entities that just happened to be fighting the same threat.
My impression it that prospects of an allied bomber crew was far brighter in 1944 then in 1943, not to mention earlier years
And what do you attribute that to? The fact that the German High Command just weren't listening to you and balanced interceptors with flak instead of just more interceptors, or the fact that the Allies could now escort their charges all the way to the target with something that could take on and cancel out the intercepting fighters?
Swarms of fighters wouldn't have helped your argument, think of Operation Bodenplatte as a case in point; by midday, the Allies had lost roughly 500 aircraft whilst the Luftwaffe lost about half of that, 280'ish.
Despite the disparity in losses, the Allies were flying in replacements by late afternoon of the same day, the Luftwaffe on the other hand only succeeded in hurting themselves; experienced pilots lost, precious aviation fuel expended and it is fair to say that Bodenplatte broke the Luftwaffe in these respects.
So, my point, you fly in a swarm of fighters and the Allies will fly in a bigger one, more quickly.
Please quote my post where I say a word against light flak?
You didn't, but you did a poor job of differentiating between attacking frontline troops and Germany's industrial base; the flak you seem to have so little time for was usually all they had, Axis fighters by that time would have been rare to non-existent over their positions.
Both one-offs
Hamburg was well-defended but it wasn't the industrial heartland of Germany, it was an historical city with a correspondingly large number of wooden buildings. It had been an exceptionally dry summer. The Allies used something in the region of 350,000 incendiaries combined with conventional HE; you could have bombed Hamburg from the moon and hit it.
The Dams were a strategic target hit tactically, there was no 'bomber stream' and with the exception of the Mohne, no correspondingly heavy concentrations of flak. 53 out of 133 men didn't make it back (40%), 8 Lancasters and two were so badly damaged they had to abort their mission - statistics sound roughly familiar? You can bet it wasn't down to enemy fighters.
My point: fighters can do what heavy flak can, but not vice versa. Panzers are not suposed to kill planes, you should know that.
My point: heavy flak can do what fighters can't, they can engage the enemy at practically minimal risk of being engaged themselves; anyone foolish enough to go down and take them on likely won't be coming back up again.
Nobody mentioned panzers. The 88, accurate at targetting heavy bombers, was murderously accurate when targetting ground forces, you could make some concession for the wrong type of ammo but you're still shooting at them with the minimum of turn-around time.
Ceterum censeo: crew killed by fighters is a better bargain then the crew feared by heavy Flak.
Why crews only killed by fighters? Is that better than a crew killed by flak? You still miss the psychological element viz the crews with nerves shot to shreds that jettisoned their bomb loads and made for neutral Sweden or Switzerland; that's a gap in the defensive box, one less set of guns and bomb load to worry about.
What the 'less accurate' bomber got to do with the ability of fighters to shot the bombers down??
Is the answer 'nothing at all'? see below, I left it in
This is largely why I think the flak + fighters were two parts of the same defence mechanism, rather than two separate entities that just happened to be fighting the same threat.
My impression it that prospects of an allied bomber crew was far brighter in 1944 then in 1943, not to mention earlier years
And what do you attribute that to? The fact that the German High Command just weren't listening to you and balanced interceptors with flak instead of just more interceptors, or the fact that the Allies could now escort their charges all the way to the target with something that could take on and cancel out the intercepting fighters?
Swarms of fighters wouldn't have helped your argument, think of Operation Bodenplatte as a case in point; by midday, the Allies had lost roughly 500 aircraft whilst the Luftwaffe lost about half of that, 280'ish.
Despite the disparity in losses, the Allies were flying in replacements by late afternoon of the same day, the Luftwaffe on the other hand only succeeded in hurting themselves; experienced pilots lost, precious aviation fuel expended and it is fair to say that Bodenplatte broke the Luftwaffe in these respects.
So, my point, you fly in a swarm of fighters and the Allies will fly in a bigger one, more quickly.
Please quote my post where I say a word against light flak?
You didn't, but you did a poor job of differentiating between attacking frontline troops and Germany's industrial base; the flak you seem to have so little time for was usually all they had, Axis fighters by that time would have been rare to non-existent over their positions.
Clay_Allison
Staff Sergeant
- 1,154
- Dec 24, 2008
Remember all of those B-17 veterans who said that FLak was a joke and that they never worried about it? Me either.
parsifal
Colonel
Hi, parsifal
When we talk about AAA, fighters, bombers and all of that, we talk about 1943-45.
However, what was the task for all of those 88s from 1939 to 1943?
Those guns haven't brought down any significant number of enemy planes simply because there was no major bombing offensive aginst germany in 1st half of war. Now I know about RAF night bombers, yet their offensives weren't halted by heavy AAA at the peak of it's efficiency.
In the meantime, fighter planes were flying as much sorties as they could muster. The heavy AAA couldn't help them much to gain air superiority over enemy territory, nor escort bombers, nor attack ground forces. So, while fighters could do the job of the heavy AAA and more, it wasn't possible the other way around. All of that during the 6 year war.
And as we may conclude, the very moment Luftwaffe fighters lost the upper hand, allied bombers roamed free despite the AAA. Not only above german factories, but also against frontline troops.
Hi TP
There are a couple of assumptions embedded into your position that are highly questionable to me
My reply has relied on a number of sources, chief among them is "Flak - German AntiAircraft Defences 1914-45"; EB Westermann, University Of Kansas Press, 2001. This is a good source, perhaps the best currently in print, but it is not without its errors.
The Flak arm was responsible for the majority of losses over Germany and western Europe, throughout 1941. Relevantly, Westermann states "In the last six months of the year, flak forces in the Reich and western Europe brought down 607 aircraft (405 at night) whilst the nightfighters brought down 421 aircraft, in all of 1941, and approximately 250 in the six month period specified. Clearly the domionant force for the RAF to deal with at this time was the flak forces. This should come as no surprise....Night fighters were still in the experimental stage in 1941, and nearly all the protagonists relied on flak as their primary defences aginst night bombing.
However, it is wrong to suggest that flak was some sort of adjunct to the Nightfighter forces, at this stage it was an indispensable element to the defensive network. more that 70% of Night Fighter shoot downs were assisted by Searchlights, and Searchlights found it absolutely essential to be protected (heavily) by flak. Without the flak, the searchlights were just too vulnerable, and without the searchlights, the Nightfighters could not really function. So without the ground based defences, none of the elements of the defensive network could operate.
As for the notion that the losses were small and therefore unimportant, well that depends on the perspective you take. From the RAFs POV they were crippling and massive, to the point that by November 1941 the RAF was almost admitting defeat and had scaled back operations drastically. The battles in 1941 were neverthe less critical to the overall bomber offensive. It was in 1941 that the RAF learnt the important lessons that led it to better outcomes in subsequent operations....the need for massed attacks, incendiary bombing, pathfinders, the development of better types and technology but most importantly the build up of expertise in the squadrons that enabled the bomber force to hit targets much more accurately in susbsequent years. Without the flak arm, this expertise and indeed the numbers of bombers itself, would have been built up much more quickly and
5the bomber force would have reached potency much more quickly if the flak was not so potent.
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- #40
Thanks for the source
Is there a really good site about german (or any other) AD guns systems? I'm especially interested about numbers built at disposal for units.
Now, according to that quote from the book, the RAF was loosing, during the night, in the 2nd half of 1943:
-3 and a half per night by Flak only
-4 and 3/4 per night, both by Flak and night fighters.
While I don't know if Bomber command was making bombing runs every night, but the losses under 5 planes per day seem to me hardly a reason to stop those runs.
Does the book have any information about the numbers of heavy AAA available for the Luftwaffe, and about the numbers of night fighters for the same time space?
Is there a really good site about german (or any other) AD guns systems? I'm especially interested about numbers built at disposal for units.
Now, according to that quote from the book, the RAF was loosing, during the night, in the 2nd half of 1943:
-3 and a half per night by Flak only
-4 and 3/4 per night, both by Flak and night fighters.
While I don't know if Bomber command was making bombing runs every night, but the losses under 5 planes per day seem to me hardly a reason to stop those runs.
Does the book have any information about the numbers of heavy AAA available for the Luftwaffe, and about the numbers of night fighters for the same time space?
