Hellcat and Corsair vs. Messerschmidt 109 and FockWulf 190

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The Fw 190 had 4 20mm before any 8th air force bomber ever saw european skies. The MG 151 was designed as an allrounder aircraft cannon, never as a anti-heavy-bomber gun.
 
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Also, if the main opponent of the Luftwaffe were fighters and not 4-engined bombers, may pilots may have wished for 6 heavy MGs rather than a single 30mm cannon and 2 15mm.
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Out of curiosity: what fighter carried one 30mm and 2 x 15mm (simultaneusly, of course)?
 
I don't think anyone is underestimating the .50cal machinegun. But the fact remains they don't have nearly the destructive effect of 4 x 20mm cannon or a 30mm cannon. That makes a difference in boom zoom combat where you may only land 1 or 2 hits during a high speed pass.
 
Fighter vs bomber, the cannon is better. Bigger, slower targets, much more likely to get slower firing rounds onto target. And they cause more damage, which is needed on the bombers.

Fighter vs fighter, the large caliber machine gun is better. A much smaller, more agile, harder to hit target. Volume of fire is more important. Multiple rounds from a .50 will certainly do damage. Even if you don't "kill" the enemy plane, he will likely try to disengage and go home to lick his wounds. (if the plane makes it home) But the plane is put out of that battle, so the weapon was affective.

I think the old handgun saying " I'd rather hit with a .22, than miss with a .45" comes to mind.
 
Disagree strongly. No evidence that 4x20mm was in any way inferior to 6x .50cal in the dogfighting role.
 
Fighter vs bomber, the cannon is better. Bigger, slower targets, much more likely to get slower firing rounds onto target. And they cause more damage, which is needed on the bombers.

Fighter vs fighter, the large caliber machine gun is better. A much smaller, more agile, harder to hit target. Volume of fire is more important. Multiple rounds from a .50 will certainly do damage. Even if you don't "kill" the enemy plane, he will likely try to disengage and go home to lick his wounds. (if the plane makes it home) But the plane is put out of that battle, so the weapon was affective.

I think the old handgun saying " I'd rather hit with a .22, than miss with a .45" comes to mind.

also some 20 mm have high volume of fire and a (limited) multiple hits from a 20 was sure destroyed fighter
 
Quite a few Hellcats were armed with mixed cannon and mgs and a number of Corsairs were all cannon armed. Apparently the six 50 mgs was more suitable. However the F4U5 which was roughly contemperaneous with the Sea Fury was all cannon armed. The F8F was originally armed with four MGs but later was switched to cannon.

The fact that late war or post war US types such as the F8F and F4U5 adopted the same 4x20mm cannon armament layout as the British Hawkers (Temepest, Typhoon, Fury, etc) helps show that 4x20 cannon is probably the most versatile all-round fighter armament - and even the USN came around to this way of thinking. Sufficient RoF and number of barrels for effective dogfighting, yet packing the punch needed to damage key aircraft structures.
 
The Fw 190 had 4 20mm before any 8th air force bomber ever saw european skies. The MG 151 was designed as an allrounder aircraft cannon, never as a anti-heavy-bomber gun.

True, but the Fw-190 was designed with potential European theatre fighters in mind (self-sealing fuel tanks, armor, strongly built, etc - as well as large multiengined British bombers). Further evidence, in fact, that the early decision to upgun the Fw-190 to a four-cannon standard (plus the two MGs) created a very versatile fighter, excellent in fighter vs fighter combat and mid-altitude bomber interception.

The four and six .50's mounted on most USN and USAAF types were indeed powerful enough to damage and destroy fighters, but I remain convinced that this standard was in part kept because the Americans never had to face a determined or effective bombing campaign, because they could easily take down most poorly protected Japanese fighters and bombers, and because they proved to be acceptable (although probably not ideal) against the well protected Fw-190, Bf-110 and Me-410 heavy zestorers they encountered in Europe in conditions of general US air superiority. I'd argue that only with the P-47 D, with its eight .50 cals, did the USAAF have a fighter that equalled the hitting power of the Fw-190.
 
I'd argue that only with the P-47 D, with its eight .50 cals, did the USAAF have a fighter that equalled the hitting power of the Fw-190.

Sorry but the firepower of a P47 was about equal to a Spit with the E wing. The 190 had another couple of cannon.

Most people agree that the 151 was equal to the Hispano II used by the RAF so in short, the P47 was well behind the FW 190 in its firepower.
 
The points which I think are ignored by the cannon advocates are: The US fighters with 50 cals were mostly more long ranged than the other combatant's fighters and thus were more exposed to combat for a longer time. They could carry more ammo and had longer firing times. An escort fighter with no ammo is almost useless. The 50 cals were adequate in use against the EAs that were encountered in both the the ETO and PTO and their faster rate of fire, higher down range velocity and longer firing time made it easier to get hits. If a pilot has twice the firing time in his guns, he is more likely to hold the trigger down longer and make hits more likely.

There is no question that a hit from a cannon can be more lethal than a hit from a 50 cal but neither weapon's projectile is infallible. There are plenty of examples where US fighters received multiple hits from cannon and came home. I think an analogy that shows how a lighter caliber weapon is superior because of ROF and velocity is the Mig 15 which was armed with two 20 mms and one 30 mm. I have read that the 30 mm in the Mig was largely ineffective against the F86 and in Viet Nam, whereas the faster firing and higher velocity 20 mms did most of the damage.

The fact is that the AAF continued to use the 50 cal BMG in it's jets until well after WW2. The USN used 20 mms in Corsairs and Hellcats that were dedicated night fighters where the target was probably a slow flying bomber or recon plane, not a fighter.

An example of how the lower ammo supply of a cannon armed AC limited the usefulness of a fighter is the early war A6M with only 60 rounds for each of it's 20mms. At Midway, the effectiveness of the CAP of the Kido Butai was heavily influenced by the need of the Zeros to land and rearm.

To me, another analogy to the 50 BMG versus cannon discussion is the choice of shotgun shells when hunting geese and doves. Most hunters hunting doves, a small and fast moving target, use 7.5s or 8s because the density of the pattern makes it easier to get hits and those small shot are adequate to bring down a dove. Hunting geese you go to number 2s because the number 2 is adequate to bring down the goose. That number two is more than adequate to bring down doves but the pattern is much less dense and that pattern would make it much harder to obtain a hit. I believe that we all tend to think of aircraft weapons in WW2 creating a very small impact point at the point of convergence at the optimum range but the fact is that there are many factors which cause the projectiles to spread into something more like a shotgun pattern. The denser the pattern the more likely to get a lethal hit.
 
The argument that US fighters with 0.5 were longer ranged than fighters with 20mm, is with the exception of the P38, is a fallacy.
The guns were synchronised to a certain distance, it varied and to a degree was a personal choice but for the sake of the example lets say it was 300 yards.
At 300 yards the guns are synchronised to a point, it goes without saying that at 600 yards the shells will be the same distance apart as the guns are on the firing aircraft. At much over that, you can blaze away all day and not hit a thing as the shells are getting further apart and you would be lucky to hit a wingtip. Some shells will hit because of the scatter and forces on the wing causing it to flex but there is no concentration of fire. Indeed in this situation the 20mm is better as a couple of random 50 bullets will probably do little if any damage but one 20mm is likely to damage whatever it hits.
For obvious reasons the P38 with its centerline guns is a different thing altogether.

To this should be added the well known fact that the vast majority of all pilots of all nations had to be close to hit anything in the first place.

I understood that USN Night fighters sometimes had the 20mm, because they had to get a first time kill and the firepower needed to be upped. If for whatever reason the target bomber escapes the first shot it was very difficult to get it in your sights a second time as it will evade. The workload in a WW2 single seat night fighter cockpit against a target that is evading you, was such that it was likely to get away.

Where I do totally agree with Renrich is on:-
a) For long ranged escort missions you need a decent firing time as you don't want to hundreds of miles behind the lines and no ammunition. Generally speaking the .50 had the advantage, there were a few fighters that could match the firing time of the Mustang and P47 but they were few and far between
b) The .50 was more than sufficient against the targets they had to face.

Because of these two reasons the 50 M2 was an excellent weapon for the task it was asked to do.
 
US Air Force found in Korea that keeping the .50 had been a mistake, even at the higher rate of fire of the M-3 guns. The Air Force had also given up on the .50 as bomber destroying armament as shown by the SIX 20mm cannon armament of early F-89s

Many early FW 190s carried 2 different types of 20mm cannon. The MG FFs had a lower rate of fire, a lower MV and a much lower ammo capacity. Using guns with 3 different MV and trajectories in the same plane may sound impressive but does little for actual results.
 
The fast moving agile hard to hit fighter plane target is a myth. In actuality over 90% of fighter vs fighter kills were on completely unsuspecting targets flying straight and level, ie 'bounce' situations. The 109 shot down more fighters than any other plane, and did it primarily with one cannon and two machine guns.

The argument that the .50 was adequate is no more relavent in this discussion than the argument that the .303 was adequate in BoB. Sure they both got the job done, but there is no doubt that a more powerful weapon would have done it better. Both weapons might have been adequate, but they were not optimum.

The fact that the .50 was retained by the US air forces when other nations were switching to cannon is not a convincing argument. The US is not immune to making less than optimum choices in weaponry. The 7.62 and 5.56 for example, both used by NATO at US insistence when other countries were looking at 'intermediate' 6mm rounds and which people who know are once again advocating.

The .50 was still in use in Korea, where it proved to be barely adequate and was subsequently dropped from use in air to air combat. (as previously posted)

For another hunting analogy (the other end of the spectrum from doves), consider W.D.M.' Karamojo' Bell, who shot 300 elephants with a 6.5 Mannlicher. It was adequate to the task, but it was not optimum.
 
The fast moving agile hard to hit fighter plane target is a myth. In actuality over 90% of fighter vs fighter kills were on completely unsuspecting targets flying straight and level, ie 'bounce' situations. The 109 shot down more fighters than any other plane, and did it primarily with one cannon and two machine guns.

When more 109s are made than any other fighter (by far) that means that they are going to engage in more combats (again, pretty much by far) which should result in more planes shot down in total numbers. The statistic that the 109 shot down more planes doesn't really tell us much. Even a statistic of planes shot down per 1000 planes manufactured doesn't tell us a whole lot considering all the other variables.:)
 
But along with the concept of optimum v adequate goes, how far from optimum? Our friend Tony Williams (a true expert on a/c guns) has really influenced a lot of people with the paper on his site about comparative aramament effectiveness. But I'm quite convinced the issue is blown *MASSIVELY* out of proportion by now, when the question is F6F v Fw190 and the discussion ends up 'but what about that terrible .50's armament'.

Korea is a good comparison to make for two reasons:
1. in the situation (near Mach combat) and targets (jets tougher than props) there was a lot of opinion among USAF combat pilots that .50 had become suboptimal (though it was still not unanimous, and also the eventual alternative was a very high performing 20mm by WWII standards). In WWII there was almost no opinion against .50. Why were WWII USAAF pilots so much more naive or 'NIH' minded than USAF ones in Korea on this issue? or a simpler explanation is that .50 was only pretty slightlly less than from optimum for the circumstnances and mission in WWII time, maybe not clearly objectively away from optimum at all, when all the subtleties are taken into account, with all due respect to Tony W.

2. The re-examination of armament in Korea came in context of a fighter-fighter kill ratio of around 6-7:1 in favor of the .50 armed a/c according to each side's loss records, perceived to be around 10:1 from the US side at the time. Both those numbers, but especially the first, are quite high by WWII standards (the difference between real and claimed ratio is narrow by WWII standards, also). An actual 6+ ratio, with top of line enemy fighter as the overwhelmingly most common target, was not common in WWII and rarer still to have been maintained over such a long period (of course it varied back and forth in Korea but wasn't less than 3 over any sustained period). This doesn't mean the .50 was really optimum by the early 1950's, but it's again context, v blowing the issue out of all proportion.

I think spending much time on armament when predicting F6F/F4U results in ETO is ridiculous frankly, because not only blowing out of proportion but other US a/c with the same armament fared well in ETO, and in many cases no better in PTO than the naval fighters.

Joe
 
In understand that in Korea, it was common for Migs to return to base with lots of .50 holes. During WWII, the USN determined that a 20mm AP had 2-1/2 to 3 times the destructive result as a .50 API, round for round, depending on range.

In Korea, with the more robust airframes and skins, the 20mm may have exceeded the WWII margin of superiority.
 
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But along with the concept of optimum v adequate goes, how far from optimum? Our friend Tony Williams (a true expert on a/c guns) has really influenced a lot of people with the paper on his site about comparative aramament effectiveness. But I'm quite convinced the issue is blown *MASSIVELY* out of proportion by now, when the question is F6F v Fw190 and the discussion ends up 'but what about that terrible .50's armament'...

People skip the conclusion of one of mr. Tony Williams' articles, and that conclusion is roughly "while US fighters could've used some 'better' weapon, their .50 cals were up for their task".
 
In understand that in Korea, it was common for Migs to return to base with lots of .50 holes.
One issue there though is often really? Even at the time US pilots were often under impression this had occurred (they'd hit MiG's a lot but didn't appear to go down), and seems confirmed by Soviet accounts, publicized much later, giving examples of lots of hits but MiG survived. But, one of the Russian language works on air war in Korea is pretty much just a transcription of the combat summaries of the Soviet MiG units (unfortunately only covering the first several months, subseqent volumes by this author never appeared :( ) and there aren't actually many cases mentioned of a/c with lots of holes coming back, though often the number of hits to a/c is mentioned. And some involved a fair number of hits to returning a/c, but not a lot relative to the several dozen air combat losses in the period (as mentioned in the book, which track pretty well though of course not perfectly with US claims in the same period). And none of those a/c were hit dozens of times as mentioned in some memoirs which in turn have appeared in MiG-15 books in English in recent years. I guess the numbers of hits might have grown in the imagination over time :). And in other cases in the transcribed combat reports, for example, a MiG deadstcked hit just 3 times, engine ko'd.

Of course fast firing (6*1200rpm M3 .50 cal) light caliber armament would be expected to wing but not knock down more a/c than a slower firing heavier caliber armament even if it was equally effective. The question would be how many. I don't view the descriptions in the book I mentioned as the end of this story but rather IMO the .50 cal v MiG issue really needs more data to nail it down.

Joe
 
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Glider, I hope you did not misunderstand my post when I said the US fighters were mostly longer ranged. I was not talking about the armament but about the fact that the fighters were able to go longer distances. I fail to understand why the critics of the US fifty cal armed fighters, which shot down many many EA in all theaters of the war, can't admit that the longer firing times, compared to cannon armed AC, were a substantial advantage. The early P51s carried 125 rounds of 20 mm ammo for each gun which gave them a firing time of 12.5 seconds. The P51s with 50 cals carried enough ammo for 20 seconds of firing time. If I am in a bomber I would surely feel better that my escort fighters were carrying ammo for more firing time rather than less, especially when the 50 cals had proven to be very effective against enemy fighters.
 

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