Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

Well put CobberKane. For short range sir superiority from land has to be the Spitfire.
For carrier ops - has to be the Hellcat.
Simples really!

CobberKane said:

I also think it's a major stretch to suggest the Hellcat could have replicated its Pacific performance in the ETO.

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I don't know about that. The Germans were facing the same kinds of constraints the Japanese were facing at roughly the same time and for much the same reasons, namely, aircraft obsolescence, fuel shortages, and expedited training programs. I don't have anything specific on that experience in my files. Here's pretty much the spot the Japanese Army Air Force was in and how those training programs evolved throughout the War and why and when they eventually collapsed. This is from MILITARY REVIEW, November 1945, Volume XXV, Number 8, Command and General Staff School, Leavenworth KS, pp. 55-56:

"The Present System

Early Japanese successes after 7 December 1941 caused little change in their pilot training system. By 1943, however, the part Allied airpower played in Europe and the Pacific landing operations encouraged the Japanese to regard airpower as the dominating factor in modern warfare. New conscription laws were passed by the Diet and a large-scale call-up of recruits to the Air Forces was made. A new Air Preparatory School was opened in Otsu, similar to the one in existence in Tokyo, and expansion of the flying training units followed in 1944.

At the beginning of 1944, advanced training was conducted at four or five long-established Flight Training Schools (Hiko Gakko) in Japan (which also had the responsibility of forming new units and re-forming old units withdrawn from combat), and by eighteen Flying Training Regiments (Kyoiku Hikoreutai), most of them outside of Japan. Both were responsible for supplying pilot replacements to front-line units, and during their four months of training pilots received intensive instruction in pilotage, air gunnery, bomb and torpedo-bombing, navigation, aircraft maintenance and crew procedure.

On joining the operational flying regiment the pilot was not considered fit for immediate combat operations and received from two to six months' further training within the unit. Because of increased Allied air activity in the combat theaters, however, it was found that operational requirements did not permit the Japanese to carry out to the full this operational training of pilots, and many were sent on an operation with little or no combat training. Cognizance of this deficiency resulted in the formation in overseas areas in 1944 of Advanced Training Units (Reusei Hikotai) and providing operational training for personnel drawn from front-line units and advanced flying training establishments. Meanwhile the Flying Training Regiments (Kyoiku Hikoreutai) had been increased in number and their name changed to Flying Training Units (Kyoiku Hikotai). Advanced flying training schools in Japan were also reorganized and relieved of the responsibility of supplying front-line units with personnel replacements.

Had training plans gone smoothly the Army Air Force would have been in a position to turn out 20,000 pilots per year. Among the factors that upset the training program, it is believed the following are salient:

1) A shortage of training aircraft,

2) Use of inferior quality training aircraft,

3) Interruptions to the training program due to reorganization,

4) Difficulty of transporting training aircraft to operational training areas,

5) Loss of training areas such as Formosa and the Philippines due to allied advances, and the consequent interruption of training programs,

6) Shortage of fuel for training purposes,

7) Strategic bombing of Japanese installations.

A further disruption of training programs would have resulted as the scope of the Allied operations widened. Bomber and fighter strikes against training establishments in the Empire destroyed much of the remaining trainer aircraft, and repair facilities and fuel stocks rapidly decreased. Although the Japanese Army Air Force had a workable system for pilot training, interference with the training program coupled with the dissipation of partially-trained pilots on suicide missions could not but lead to a lower quality of flying opponent for the Allied Air Forces."

Just give a Bearcat and I'll take ya all on.

parsifal said:

So, even though the Navy was planning for a greatly expanded naval program as early as 1938 (something Ive already spoke about) the Essex was not authorised until FY41, and a further three not until FY42. This is reflected in the laying down dates of these ships....Essex was not commenced until April 1941, and the others, not until well into 1942.

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That is simply incorrect. (see Naval Vessel Programs and Legislation) As can be seen CV-9 through CV-19 were funded with FY 41 funds. The dates these ships and CV-20 CV-21 were laid down on are:

CV-9 28-Apr-41
CV-16 15-Jul-41
CV-17 15-Sep-41
CV-10 1-Dec-41
CV-11 1-Dec-41
CV-18 18-Mar-42
CV-12 3-Aug-42
CV-13 7-Dec-42
CV-20 15-Dec-42
CV-19 26-Jan-43
CV-15 10-May-43
CV-14 1-Feb-43
CV-21 13-Sep-43

Most of the the early ships were built on new slipways that were still under construction when they were laid down. CV-9 was built on the same ways as CV-8. IIRC followed by CV-12 then CV-21. CV-10 followed BB-58 and I believe CV-18 followed BB-59.

CV 16 (USS Lexington ex USS Cabot) was part of the "70% expansion", which eventually included seven carriers.

These additional carriers were authorised under the Vinson Bill of June 1940. As such this ship, and all the other carriers mentioned were part of the expansion programs authorised after FY40 (my mistake....Essex was planned FY40, but did not commence construction until FY41). FY40 had its last expansion added April 1940, and only authorised one carrier, the Essex.

The ships authorised under the Vinson Bill were for the following year, but were brought forward 3 months on orders of the president.

A good source for this material is found here....I have a hard copy and its my main resource in this debate


US Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History - Norman Friedman - Google Books


The USN had originally estimated that these ships authorised under the Vinson Plan would not be ready before 1944, it was only by good fortune and extraordinary construction efforts that they could be commissioned roughly 18 months ahead of schedule. Which only serves to reinforce the case that the US had its priorities wrong when it started to look for a new replacement carrier fighter in 1940. It shouold have soldiered on with the types available, built carriers in FY 40-41, and only thenn, sought funding for a new fighter. It was only by the best of sheer dumb luck that they came out of this mess as well as they did.

VBF the information in your posting is very interesting. If Japan had increased training in 1941 when war was declared the battle would have been much harder. To start in 1943 was too late

Glider said:

VBF the information in your posting is very interesting. If Japan had increased training in 1941 when war was declared the battle would have been much harder. To start in 1943 was too late

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Not only that. They needed to rotate their front line pilots to give them a break. Many of their best pilots flew till they died. That was a major mistake.

parsifal said:

Which only serves to reinforce the case that the US had its priorities wrong when it started to look for a new replacement carrier fighter in 1940. It shouold have soldiered on with the types available, built carriers in FY 40-41, and only thenn, sought funding for a new fighter. It was only by the best of sheer dumb luck that they came out of this mess as well as they did.

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You have yet to show that the funding SPENT on the F6F in 1940-41 actually impacted the carrier program in any significant way.

Grumman production capability could not have filled the carrier decks without being expanded over pre-war size/capability no matter which fighter they were building.

Grumman doesn't a production contract for the F6F until Jan 7 1942 and then it is for the -1 model with Wright R-2600 engine, contract is amended later, A contract for the -3 with R-2800 is placed in March of 1942.

These contracts are way too late to affect carrier funding in 1940. And if not placed for the F6F they would have been placed for additional F4Fs over and above what was already on order, savings would be?????

BTW in Jan 1941 Grumman F4F-3 (fixed wing) replace Grumman F3F-1 Biplanes with squadron VF-7. Several other US Navy Squadrons are still flying biplanes.

Guys, there's another part that comes before this. As I had to hand-type this, I couldn't cut and paste it, I didn't bother with that part. As early as 1933, the Japanese Navy and Army Air Corps pilots were recruited at as early as fifteen years of age into their Reserves. You wonder why their training programs took so long? There's your answer. This part is just the part from the start of the War, upwards and onwards. Their training had to ramp-up as they could no longer cut it with their Reserves program.

The problems in the japanese training system are complex,and cant be explained by a single factor. It starts with a relatively narrow and limited education base/Basically the better educated the society as a whole, the greater choices available to the military for technical jobs like engineers and aircrew. narrow that base down and you have a problem. The Japanese attempted to remedy that by taking young men and training them......educating them that means, from a young age.

But having got to that point, the Japanese training regime was also hampered by a lack of experienced instructors and training aircraft. They could opnly train pilots in relatively small groups, an in relatively small numbers. In situations like the China war, where losses were low, this really didnt matter....pilots entered combat units and had plenty of leasd time to learn the trqade so to speak.

Finally, in the months leading up to Pearl Harbour, Japan was being hit by an acute fuel shortage. Thats why they went to war, after all. Deceisions were made in the lead up to war, from July I think, to curtail training as a fuel saving measure. It was hoped that the Americans would throw in the towel and make terms, the Japanese never envisaged a long war. After their initial onslaught was unsuccessful (I wont say defeated, since they managed to conquer about 30% of the worlds land mass), they realized they had to replace and expand their air arm, but by then, 1943, things were even worse for them. Many of the pilots with experience were dead, the Japanese were locked into a vicious attrition batle that they could not step back from, the fuel shortages were even more acute, and this forced them to send out inadequately trained pilots to the front "to learn the hard way". That was a receipe for disaster.....so many died "learning" that the quality just fell through the floor. By the time the Hellcat arrived it was all but over.

You have yet to show that the funding SPENT on the F6F in 1940-41 actually impacted the carrier program in any significant way.

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ah no, but we do know that carrier production was at least in part curtailed by money, and that the US, according to Hap Arnold was at least equalling the Germans in 1940 in terms of aeronautical R&D. The LW was spending about $300m per year in 1940 on R&D. If we assume an equal split between Army and Navy, and an anual R&D budget of say $200m for the Navy, thats a lot of ships.

Saying that new aircraft development is cheap, or not likley to affect other budget decisions, is even more innaccurate than me trying to say it directly affected carrier production. R&D for aircraft costs a lot of money if you think about the whole package.

Grumman production capability could not have filled the carrier decks without being expanded over pre-war size/capability no matter which fighter they were building.

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As history does show, it didnt have to be Grumman. Grumman was directed to diversify in 1942, and brought Eastern into the process (and others)....they could just as easily have done that in 1940

Grumman doesn't a production contract for the F6F until Jan 7 1942 and then it is for the -1 model with Wright R-2600 engine, contract is amended later, A contract for the -3 with R-2800 is placed in March of 1942.

These contracts are way too late to affect carrier funding in 1940. And if not placed for the F6F they would have been placed for additional F4Fs over and above what was already on order, savings would be?????

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The decisions about A replacement fighter (which eventually was the F6F) was made in 1939 and 1940. Decisions about expanding grumman production capability were made in 1940. This was the critical moment in history, not in 1942 when it was too late

BTW in Jan 1941 Grumman F4F-3 (fixed wing) replace Grumman F3F-1 Biplanes with squadron VF-7. Several other US Navy Squadrons are still flying biplanes.

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And the Japanese went to war with Nates and Claudes as their main operational types. The Army Type 1 there were about 100 in service, and the Type O navy fighter about 350 or so.

The US would have done fine with the F4F as their main operational type until the midlle of 1944 at least.

One more thing. I don't want to start a riot around here, but if any of you are assuming they ran out of pilots after Midway, assume, again. While they lost aircraft when those carriers went down, pilots weren't in all that aircraft, and some were rescued, as were others on those carriers. Besides that, they didn't go with all their marbles at Midway. They had other carriers and pilots, and still had cushion in their reserves. But, we maybe can have Midway out in another thread. Remember, this is about Spitfires and Hellcats, lol.

parsifal said:

ah no, but we do know that carrier production was at least in part curtailed by money, and that the US, according to Hap Arnold was at least equalling the Germans in 1940 in terms of aeronautical R&D. The LW was spending about $300m per year in 1940 on R&D. If we assume an equal split between Army and Navy, and an anual R&D budget of say $200m for the Navy, thats a lot of ships.

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I am having a little trouble following the math here. You jump from the German $300 million to an estimated US $400 million and then ASSUME the Navy spent 1/2. The US must have spending an awful lot of the budget on R&D.

From one source: [2-3

TOTAL "DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOLLAR EXPENDITURES" in 1940 = $ 907,160,000

According to your estimate 22% of that money was spent on aeronautical R&D??

From : Budget of the US Navy: 1794 to 2004

1939 = $673,792,000
1940 = $1,137,608,000
1941 = $4,465,684,000
1942 = $21,149,323,000
1943 = $31,043,134,000

You estimate that the US Navy spent 17.58% of their ENTIRE 1940 budget on aeronautical R&D ??

parsifal said:

Saying that new aircraft development is cheap, or not likley to affect other budget decisions, is even more innaccurate than me trying to say it directly affected carrier production. R&D for aircraft costs a lot of money if you think about the whole package.

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Planes were a LOT cheaper back then. Bell got $245,000 for XFL-1 Airabonita program of which $125,000 was for the airplane. US contracts were a bit different back then too. Plane was "supposed" to do 339mph. For EVERY ONE MPH over 343mph Bell would get $1500. BUT for EVERY ONE MPH under 335mph Bell would forfeit $1500. Similar clauses for weight.

For the Army 1937 persuit design competition there were 7 bids 2 Bell, 2 Curtiss, 3 Seversky ranging from $201,500 to $246,500. For the price the Army would get ONE prototype aircraft, engineering data, a wind tunnel model and a free-spinning model. 1/5 -1/4 million PER prototype single engine pursuit plane ACTUALLY ordered.

Army R D had spent under 1 million dollars on the Continental O/V-1430 engine TOTAL, not one year and about 1/2 million on the Lycoming O-1230 engine TOTAL, not one year.

You would have to buy an AWFUL lot of prototypes to spend 200 million dollars in 1940.

parsifal said:

As history does show, it didnt have to be Grumman. Grumman was directed to diversify in 1942, and brought Eastern into the process (and others)....they could just as easily have done that in 1940

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And that saves you what? The Eastern plants had to be nearly gutted. Equipment and tools placed in storage(US Navy paid for two warehouses to be built to store car tooling and rented at least one more) , new tools and equipment purchased and installed, workers retrained, air strips built,etc.
Converting car plants was not free.

parsifal said:

The decisions about A replacement fighter (which eventually was the F6F) was made in 1939 and 1940. Decisions about expanding grumman production capability were made in 1940. This was the critical moment in history, not in 1942 when it was too late

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Correct, but since the actual cost or money spent IN 1939-40 was minimal (paper studies, preliminary drawings) the opportunity to SHIFT money doesn't really exist in 1939-40.

parsifal said:

The US would have done fine with the F4F as their main operational type until the midlle of 1944 at least.

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Hindsight is a wonderful thing. The fact that, as mention before, the Japanese FAILED to improve the Zero and Oscar anywhere near the extent that other nations improved their aircraft for more than THREE years OR provide better replacements in anything approaching significant quantities is not something the US could count on.

Edit> some additional costs from a book on the Wright Tornado engine. Cost of the Tornado engine program from start to cancellation was about 6.5 million dollars. Cost of the P W R-2800 program until successful type test or first production model (?) was 8 million dollars. Cost of the P W R-4360 program to same level was 25 million dollars. Cost of the R-4360 was spread over 4 years?

parsifal said:

The US would have done fine with the F4F as their main operational type until the midlle of 1944 at least.

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So essentially you're saying, with the benefit of 70 years of hindsight, that the USN in 1940-42 should have slowed design and development of the F6F, knowing that the Japanese would be unable to develop a successor to the best carrier borne fighter of its generation, confident that the best carrier force in the world would be broken up at Midway, with a complete awareness that there would be an increasingly steep decline in the quality of Japanese pilots and aircrew, starting at Midway and continuing through the battles around the Solomons and New Guinea: all this while determining that the F4F was all that would be needed up until mid-1944? Yeah, right!

I guess what we have here are a couple of ways to interpret the Hellcats great record in the PTO. Firstly, that a 19:1 kill loss ratio (taken as read) demonstrates that the Hellcat was an excellent fighter, and there is no reason to believe it couldn't have done the same over Europe. The second view is that the Hellcat was indeed an excellent fighter, but the fact that contemporaneous fighters like the Spitfire IX/VIV, P-51 and P-47D could not match the Hellcat's record in the ETO, in spite of at least equalling it's performance, suggests that conditions in the Pacific were more conducive to shooting down enemy aircraft than conditions over Europe.
To my mind the first proposition can be dispensed with pretty easily. If the Hellcats stellar record in the PTO was attributable to the characteristics of the aircraft we would be able to identify some feature that made it a more effective fighter (by a factor of two or three times) than the other aircraft mentioned. Quite simply, there is no such feature. In fact, compared to those aircraft, the Hellcat would come a creditable fourth in most parameters of performance.
That leaves us with the second proposition; excellent as it was, Hellcat's great performance in the PTO also rested largely on the tactical situation it found itself in, and the fact that contemporaneous marks of the Spitfire with at least equal performance could not match this record in the ETO indicates that the tactical situation there made shooting enemy aircaft down more difficult.
Personally I'm going for option two, because unlike option one there is no major sticking point. It might be that the Japanese pilots weren't as good, or their aircraft, or the number on highly vulnerable bombers being put up, but there were factors that worked heavily in the Hellcat's favour.
Unless of course, we introduce another possibility: the pilots flying the Hellcats in The Pacific were way better than the pilots flying Spits in the ETO. Anyone want to take that on?

Cobber , this one still going on?? You're points are well made.

To summarise, depends on where you are. In the ETO in late '43 the Luftwaffe had 109Gs and the 190A's with higher revs and boost.
These were formidable planes and though not nearly at the peak it was in the BoB, the Luftwaffe hadn't declined in average pilot ability to the levels seen in late '44 and 45.

So if you were taking off from land airbases and going up against that, you would struggle a lot in a Hellcat, especially since a lot of the combat had again got back to higher altitudes by then (because they were escorting).

It was a heck of a good plane in its environment, but outmatched by the P-51Bs, Spit IXs, P-47s plus the late model 190As and 109Gs of that time.
I'd rather be in a P-47. Yes you struggled under 20,000ft, but you'd at least have excellent performance at 30,000+ft.
Where is the 'safe altitude' of the Hellcat? Nowhere. High up you've got the 109Gs, mid altitude the 190As. All faster

Basically you have roughly the performance of a Spit Mk V, which got hammered in 41... what chance in late 43????

Look at the performance specs, test in Sept 43 (F6F Performance Trials). From the report:

Climb performance
Max. rate of climb in Main supercharger gear = 2260 ft/min at 5400 feet.
Max. rate of climb in Aux. Lowspeed supercharger gear = 1880 ft/min at 20500 feet.
Time to reach 10,000 ft. = 4.65 minutes
Time to reach 20,000 ft. = 10.0 minutes
Change gear height = 9200 feet

Level speed performance
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 315 mph (274 knots) at 2000 ft. in Main supercharger
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 371 mph (322 knots) at 18700 ft. in Aux. Low Speed supercharger.

Now the Bearcat, that was something else... While the Hellcat was ok'ish and great in the PTO, but not competitive in the ETO at the time it was introduced, the Bearcat could have well have held its own. That was an impressive plane by any measure. A choice between that even a late model Spit IX would be a no-brainer. Not so much against against a Spit XIV though, though at mid/low altitudes I'd pick the Bearcat.

Sorry, didn't mean to be going in circles. I agree the Bearcat is a much more reasonable comparison for late war fighters in the ETO. The Hellcat did its job in the PTO in exemplary fashion, and even if, God forbid, an invasion of Japan had been necessary, had the Bearcat not been available I'm sure the Hellcat could have finished the job in similar fashion against what the Japanese had left. It's pretty predicable what would have happened if the Japanese had sent their obsolescent aircraft against, Bearcats, Tigercats, Sea Furies and Sea Hornets.

We might want to recall that one of planes that were brought down by (not only) Hellcats was the Yokosuka D4Y (Judy), and that dive bomber was 10-15 mph faster than F4F. The 'Marianas turkey shooting' not happening with F4F being the only CV interceptor? How well the USN bombers would've fared without F6F shepherding them towards Japanese CVs?

Glad we are sort of back on topic. The off-topic discussion makes interesting reading though.

My vote is for the Spitfire without a doubt. I would probably pick a Mk.XIV given a choice as a pure Air Superiority fighter. If I am equipping a carrier air force, the Hellcat is the easy choice.

As others have mentioned, performance-wise, a Hellcat is similar in performance to the Spitfire Mk.V which was obsolete in the ETO by 1942. Even the USN recognised that the Hellcat was pretty much finished by 1945 and due to be replaced by the Bearcat.

Regarding Bearcat, Yes, in performance numbers, it was a hot aeroplane, but it had its share of problems as commented on by Corky Meyer: The outter wing panels were intended to break off if over-stressed. The problem is that they didn't necessarily break off in pairs, so even a Blue Angel pilot managed to get himself killed when only one outter wing panel came off. My understanding is that the problem was never adequately solved even with the installation of explosive bolts to blow both outter wings off at the same time.

- Ivan.

parsifal said:

The problems in the japanese training system are complex,and cant be explained by a single factor. It starts with a relatively narrow and limited education base/Basically the better educated the society as a whole, the greater choices available to the military for technical jobs like engineers and aircrew. narrow that base down and you have a problem. The Japanese attempted to remedy that by taking young men and training them......educating them that means, from a young age.

But having got to that point, the Japanese training regime was also hampered by a lack of experienced instructors and training aircraft. They could opnly train pilots in relatively small groups, an in relatively small numbers. In situations like the China war, where losses were low, this really didnt matter....pilots entered combat units and had plenty of leasd time to learn the trqade so to speak.

Finally, in the months leading up to Pearl Harbour, Japan was being hit by an acute fuel shortage. Thats why they went to war, after all. Deceisions were made in the lead up to war, from July I think, to curtail training as a fuel saving measure. It was hoped that the Americans would throw in the towel and make terms, the Japanese never envisaged a long war. After their initial onslaught was unsuccessful (I wont say defeated, since they managed to conquer about 30% of the worlds land mass), they realized they had to replace and expand their air arm, but by then, 1943, things were even worse for them. Many of the pilots with experience were dead, the Japanese were locked into a vicious attrition batle that they could not step back from, the fuel shortages were even more acute, and this forced them to send out inadequately trained pilots to the front "to learn the hard way". That was a receipe for disaster.....so many died "learning" that the quality just fell through the floor. By the time the Hellcat arrived it was all but over.

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They trained the same way the Luftwaffe trained, Parsifal. "During the years leading up to the attack upon Pearl Harbor, some lessons for combat training were learned by the Japanese during the conflicts in Manchuria and China in 1931 and 1937, but the study of the German Air Force made by Yamashita, then Inspector General of Aviation, in 1940-41, undoubtedly formed the basis for much of the modern training program." Ibid., p. 54.

PS: The Luftwaffe program was shaken for much the same reasons, too, and at around the same time.