Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[parsifal]

I am having a little trouble following the math here. You jump from the German $300 million to an estimated US $400 million and then ASSUME the Navy spent 1/2. The US must have spending an awful lot of the budget on R&D.

The 11% expansion bill which was authorised in April 1940, spent a little over $400m on new ships. It spent about $30m on new facilities. I dont have figures for new or replacement aircraft, but if we assume 1000 we are going to be very generous. Thats not the entire budget for the Navy, in fact the expenditures of the various expansions are over and above budget expenditures I understand.

I can only see where about $500m of that $907m was spent. where did the remainder (about $400m or so) go????
Given that Hap Arnold at the time (or just slioghtly later) was stating German R&D expenditures were being matched, and that we have at least $400m of just one part of Naval expenditures unnaccounted for , why is it unreasonable to suggest $200m on aircraft R&D???

Quoting budget expenditures for expenditures not covered in the budget seems more than a little disingenuous....

From one source: [2-3

TOTAL "DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOLLAR EXPENDITURES" in 1940 = $ 907,160,000

According to your estimate 22% of that money was spent on aeronautical R&D??

From : Budget of the US Navy: 1794 to 2004

1939 = $673,792,000
1940 = $1,137,608,000
1941 = $4,465,684,000
1942 = $21,149,323,000
1943 = $31,043,134,000

You estimate that the US Navy spent 17.58% of their ENTIRE 1940 budget on aeronautical R&D ??

Iam not going to falsely claim that Im am sure, but quoting budegetry estimates here is clearly misleading. The whole purpose of these special enactments, like the Vinson Bill and the 11% expansion bill., were to vote extra funds for military exapansions not covered in the budget. i will look at your source when I can (havent done that yet), but if it is what it says it is, then it is clearly not the whole story for defence funding, because not all defence funding at that time was included in the budget. .

You would have to buy an AWFUL lot of prototypes to spend 200 million dollars in 1940.

Which is deliberatly misrepresenting what ive been saying. im not going through the proess for you again.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. The fact that, as mention before, the Japanese FAILED to improve the Zero and Oscar anywhere near the extent that other nations improved their aircraft for more than THREE years OR provide better replacements in anything approaching significant quantities is not something the US could count on.

Its a risk, but it was far less risk than the one they took by pinching on carrier production. Only by the best of sheer luck were they able to bring the competion dates of 7 carriers forward from 1944-5 some 18months on average. thats a much biger risk than soldiering on with the F4f.

 

[VBF-13]

You poor fool! Can you see how I've duped you into thinking I might know what I'm talking about? (Fade to maniacal laughter...)

Oh my goodness. Well, then. Once bitten, twice shy.

 

[Shortround6]

The 11% expansion bill which was authorised in April 1940, spent a little over $400m on new ships. It spent about $30m on new facilities. I dont have figures for new or replacement aircraft, but if we assume 1000 we are going to be very generous. Thats not the entire budget for the Navy, in fact the expenditures of the various expansions are over and above budget expenditures I understand.

I can only see where about $500m of that $907m was spent. where did the remainder (about $400m or so) go????
Given that Hap Arnold at the time (or just slioghtly later) was stating German R&D expenditures were being matched, and that we have at least $400m of just one part of Naval expenditures unnaccounted for , why is it unreasonable to suggest $200m on aircraft R&D???

Quoting budget expenditures for expenditures not covered in the budget seems more than a little disingenuous....





Iam not going to falsely claim that Im am sure, but quoting budegetry estimates here is clearly misleading. The whole purpose of these special enactments, like the Vinson Bill and the 11% expansion bill., were to vote extra funds for military exapansions not covered in the budget. i will look at your source when I can (havent done that yet), but if it is what it says it is, then it is clearly not the whole story for defence funding, because not all defence funding at that time was included in the budget. .




Which is deliberatly misrepresenting what ive been saying. im not going through the proess for you again.



Its a risk, but it was far less risk than the one they took by pinching on carrier production. Only by the best of sheer luck were they able to bring the competion dates of 7 carriers forward from 1944-5 some 18months on average. thats a much biger risk than soldiering on with the F4f.

From Wiki:
"
18 aircraft carriers
2 Iowa-class battleships
5 Montana-class battleships
6 Alaska-class cruisers
27 cruisers
115 destroyers
43 submarines
15,000 aircraft
The conversion of 100,000 tons of auxiliary ships
$50 million for patrol, escort and other vessels
$150 million for essential equipment and facilities
$65 million for the manufacture of ordnance material or munitions
$35 million for the expansion of facilities
The expansion program was scheduled to take five to six years, but a New York Times study of shipbuilding capabilities called it "problematical" unless planned "radical changes in design" are dropped."

In the Spring of 1939 the Army placed first contracts for the P-40. $12,872,898 bought 524 air frames. $24,566.60 averaged out ( no engines, propellers, guns, radios and other GFE). Allison got a contract for 837 engines for $15,000,000.
Granted these are Army planes and engines and are pre 1940 but like the prices for prototypes given earlier are intended to give a frame of reference for aircraft prices at the time.

Even allowing that Navy aircraft are bigger, or more complicated/expensive than army 1937-39 pursuit planes $200 million is an awful lot of money in 1940 for aircraft R&D (research and development), it is even an awful lot of money for production.

Grumman sales (Civil and Military) were;

1938 = $4,905,000
1939 = $4,482,350
1940 = $8,811,295
1941 = $21,858,681
1942 = $143,155,931
1943 = ??????????
1944 = $324 million.

cost of a carrier? from a website, take it for what you think it is worth "The original contract called for Essex class carriers to be constructed at the $40 million mark, but after many improvements and upgrades made during the hectic days of the war the price was closer to $70-78 million per carrier"

Granted not all funds "authorized" by a given bill or act are voted to spent that year and not all "funds voted to be spent" are actual spent (change hands) that same year. But by the same token just because a company gets or signs a contract on a certain does not mean they got ALL the money on that date.

level of funding for the F6F "program" in 1940 is peanuts. There is little more than a few paper studies. until Sept when things pick up a bit, A wooden mock up is inspected on Jan of 1941. Little, if any, money changes hands until the contract for TWO prototypes is signed 30 June 1941 and even then????
I don't know the terms of the THIS contract but Pre-war aircraft contracts usually called for the aircraft (or engine) to be built at company expense and paid for ONLY upon successful completion of acceptance tests or performance trials. Plane crashes before tests are completed? too bad for the company.

I am sorry but unless you can show WHERE portions of the 200 million for NAVY R&D were going it seems a rather far fetched number as it may be larger than total amount spent by the Navy on production planes in 1940/41. Grumman only got about 15.3% of that in total sales in the two years and that includes, for Grumman commercial and foreign sales. Through in Vought, Brewster, Curtiss and Douglas and you still be hard pressed to spend 200 million on Navy planes in 1940 and 41.

 

[parsifal]

The program wiki is referring to (and you are relying on) is the Vinson Bill, sometimes known as the two ocean Navy, sometimes known as the 70% expansion bill. It was eventually pared back for FY42 to seven carriers, because of the delays getting the full plan implemented quickly enough. Even so, with seven carriers (and other similar reductions in other classes) it was still estimated that it would be late '44 before any of those seven would be ready. in the finish, they were ready 12 months before that, but that was not how it looked in 1940.

It does well, incidentally, to look at the full article, since the source you drew this from, also says......

"On June 17, a few days after German troops conquered France, Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark requested four billion dollars from Congress to increase the size of the American combat fleet by 70% by adding 257 ships amounting to 1,325,000 tons. On June 18, after less than an hour of debate, the House of Representatives by a 316–0 vote authorized $8.55 billion for a naval expansion program, giving emphasis to aircraft. Rep. Vinson, who headed the House Naval Affairs Committee, said its emphasis on carriers did not represent any less commitment to battleships, but "The modern development of aircraft has demonstrated conclusively that the backbone of the Navy today is the aircraft carrier".

However, whilst these ships were authorized in 1940, not all of them received funding in the immediately following funding year. It took time for all of them to be commenced. But then, also there were many subsequent amendments in '41-3 that added may ships, cancelled others, never commenced others. For example, none of the planned Montanas were ever begun, and the Alaskas were also cut back. On the ohter hand, DD and DE construction was greatly expanded


The plan that saw the first Essex Class (literally USS Essex) commenced, along with an extremely modest building program for other ships (Ive previously posted the details, but it was basically 1 carrier, 2 BBs about 7 cruisers and 14 DDs....along with odds and ends). That 11% expansion, which was authorised and funds voted as part of FY'40 but comencing FY'41 (dont ask me to explain that, Im lost too), had a price tag of $907million, however only $400m was spent on ships. Where was the rest of the money spent...not on bases....that came later, or under other fiscal allocations. With regard to carrier production, it was originally envisaged to build repeat yorktowns, but in the finish, someone insisted that the Essex be built. That too was a mistake.....building a new class inevitably slowed down delivery, and greatly increased unit costs. The Essex cost 68million, whilst Hornet cost about 25 million.....


I know you and most here believe that aircraft development was more or less free, and are eager to say that the US were all geniouses able to build world beating aircraft for no cost. I am unable to produce for you the proof you need to show otherwise. I do know what the germans were spending on aircraft development (and that comes from a good source), and it was a LOT of money. And I do know that Hap Arnold assured the British that the US was bettering the German investment (and that also comes from a good source), that statement was about the end of 1940. These are facts that we do know. We also know that big items for development in the USN air inventory were its replacement fighters. Lots of other programs, im sure, and I cant pin down what it actually cost to design, AND develop a given type (but incidentally the contract price for the hellcat was $35000 per copy in 1945....to put you out of your misery) was. But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply dont buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using "pin money". There are simply too many unanswered questions and circumstantial peices of evidence for me to accept such a crass argument. Saying I havent proven my case is one thing, and fair enough. Saying that it cost a few thousand dollars to design develop and organise production is much harder to accept. And still doesnt explain these enormous holes in the fiscal bottom lines ( which I could do for the abovemenetioned Vinson program as well).

 

[DonL]

I will through in some numbers from official german papers.

Development bills of:

Ju 288 from 1938-1944 = 90 million RM
Ju 88 1935-1943 = 32 million RM
Ju 87 1933- 1943 = 17 millon RM

That are the official development bills from Junkers for the timeline and only for development.

Compare to around 80 millions for one Hipper or Deutschland class and 160 million for one Scharnhorst or Gneisenau.
I have my doubts that a/c's were this expensive compare to advanced Navy ships.

 

[Hop]

And while it's been covered in other threads Still really don't get why the Hellcat and Corsair didn't replace the Seafire in the MTO unless, as was suggested, the reasons were economic and political rather than military

I think it was simply that the Seafire was available to the FAA in larger numbers, and earlier, than the Hellcat. According to a December 1942 Ministry of Aircraft Production report from a visit to the US, scheduled Hellcat deliveries were 4 in Jan, 8 in Feb, 10 in March, 15 in April, 20 a month after that.

A summary of FAA operations for August, September and October 1943, dated December 1943, says "Two Hellcat squadrons have formed and two more are in the process of forming."

 

[VBF-13]

I think it was simply that the Seafire was available to the FAA in larger numbers, and earlier, than the Hellcat. According to a December 1942 Ministry of Aircraft Production report from a visit to the US, scheduled Hellcat deliveries were 4 in Jan, 8 in Feb, 10 in March, 15 in April, 20 a month after that.

A summary of FAA operations for August, September and October 1943, dated December 1943, says "Two Hellcat squadrons have formed and two more are in the process of forming."

Yeah. I think maybe too there may have been somewhat of an under-appreciation in the ETO of just what the Hellcat could do. At least, at the start, before there were any workouts. You don't throw the horse in the race right out of the barn.

 

[Njaco]

I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?

 

[VBF-13]

I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?

They weren't finished after the Battle of Britain and the Invasion of Russia but they were up against much the same limitations the Japanese were up against after the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Was their capacity to deal under those limitations better than the capacity of the Japanese? That's a very interesting question.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?

Oh come on! You know he is the most aforementioned authority on the topic.

1. He had a job in the DoD. He could tell you, but he would have to kill you.

2. He heard it from a friend, who heard it from a friend. (To the tune of REO Speedwagon)

Just like he tried to claim the Blackhawk was immune to .50 cal, even when someone who flew it in combat told him otherwise.

If he did not read it somewhere on the internet (and a Video game manual I suspect), then it is not worth researching.

I will stop now, before I start doing the stuff that I warn others about.

 

[drgondog]

Yeah. I think maybe too there may have been somewhat of an under-appreciation in the ETO of just what the Hellcat could do. At least, at the start, before there were any workouts. You don't throw the horse in the race right out of the barn.

Actually - it's an under appreciation by the forum members, the AAF never remotely considered either the F4U or the F6F, nor would numbers of either really be more than the Mustang, given the USMC and USN had very high priorities for both.

So what it boils down to is 'pro-forma' performance against the adversary with the escort mission in mind, or the CAS mission in mind. It really boils down to the P-47 vs the F6F as the range is reasonably close, the engine is close, the load carrying ability is close. The P-47D-25 and above should be compared to the F6F-5, but the F6F-5 also falls into operational window of P-47M and N... where the F6F can out turn the P-47 but that is about all there is.

Based on wing loading the F6F could probably out turn the Fw 190, Bf 109 but probably not the Spit IX but all three were faster and could climb better - matching comparative models of each.

All three could out dive the F6F, were faster and roll better - even the 109 through most of the range of speeds and stick forces. All three had better power loading so acceleration was better than F6F.

I haven't looked at all the charts so there could be distinctions based on altitude and power settings - but the key performance profiles should be 25,000 feet and 15,000 feet if F6F was relegated to heavy bomber and medium bomber escorts - or SL for CAS.

So, F6F has range and load carrying ability over Spit IX - but is at a disadvantage compared to Spit in air combat, and for most altitudes at a disadvantage to the P-51B/D at WEP in everything but turn. Why 'buy' F6F in Europe?

 

[VBF-13]

Actually - it's an under appreciation by the forum members, the AAF never remotely considered either the F4U or the F6F, nor would numbers of either really be more than the Mustang, given the USMC and USN had very high priorities for both.

So what it boils down to is 'pro-forma' performance against the adversary with the escort mission in mind, or the CAS mission in mind. [...]

We had the right fighter in our corner in the ETO in those P51s. For what it's worth, I knew one of those boys.*

[...] It really boils down to the P-47 vs the F6F as the range is reasonably close, the engine is close, the load carrying ability is close. The P-47D-25 and above should be compared to the F6F-5, but the F6F-5 also falls into operational window of P-47M and N... where the F6F can out turn the P-47 but that is about all there is.

Now there's the weight-class we're looking for. Not to take anything away from the F6Fs, the P47s packed the bigger punch. Not to take anything away from the P47s, leave the bombing-fighting to the F6Fs.

Based on wing loading the F6F could probably out turn the Fw 190, Bf 109 but probably not the Spit IX but all three were faster and could climb better - matching comparative models of each.

All three could out dive the F6F, were faster and roll better - even the 109 through most of the range of speeds and stick forces. All three had better power loading so acceleration was better than F6F.

I haven't looked at all the charts so there could be distinctions based on altitude and power settings - but the key performance profiles should be 25,000 feet and 15,000 feet if F6F was relegated to heavy bomber and medium bomber escorts - or SL for CAS.

So, F6F has range and load carrying ability over Spit IX - but is at a disadvantage compared to Spit in air combat, and for most altitudes at a disadvantage to the P-51B/D at WEP in everything but turn. Why 'buy' F6F in Europe?

I can't go there. I just don't know enough. I'll point this out, though. Every fighter Mike Tyson KO'ed had charts exceeding his reach and height.

*I love that. They're all in their 70's and 80's, and they're still calling themselves "boys." Those ones I knew are all gone, now. RIP, boys.

 

[zjtins]

I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?

If you are so curious why not re-read what I wrote and not take it out of context? Today we know the Germans had no ability to win the war in late 43 due to material shortages. We could have simply not used the P51 and kept the bombing closer and used more low level twin engine and fighter bombers. Once we had a foot hold in Europe the range became less important. The US could have built more P-47s and P-38 with more internal fuel and drop tanks. The big losses in late 43 were from twin engine destroyers (read the P-38 page and if you really want to get) The Defeat of the German Air Force Which the P38 could easily handle.


I also said they were not aware of it at the time.

 

[Njaco]

I'll stick to my books and primary resources and not what flickers across a screen.

Not taken out of context? What context? You have maintained across several threads that the LW was done by 1943, there was no need for long range fighters and that the 8th AF bombing campaign was useless. I'm sorry, but actual history disputes every claim you've made. Or maybe now its just your opinion and we all know about opinions.....

 

[drgondog]

If you are so curious why not re-read what I wrote and not take it out of context? Today we know the Germans had no ability to win the war in late 43 due to material shortages. We could have simply not used the P51 and kept the bombing closer and used more low level twin engine and fighter bombers. Once we had a foot hold in Europe the range became less important.

You should be aware that Allied High Command were seriously concerned that a strong LW would contribute to a failure of the Invasion? So, they drafted ARGUMENT as a goal to destroy the LW via Daylight operations? That daylight operations were halted over Germany with the disastrous Oct 14, 1943 attck on Scweinfurt? Your lack of knowledge is appalling.

The US could have built more P-47s and P-38 with more internal fuel and drop tanks.

We did. But they were not available (late P-38J and P-47D-25) until after D-Day.. a little late to begin the systematic dismantling of the LW PRIOR to the Invasion, don't you think?

The big losses in late 43 were from twin engine destroyers (read the P-38 page and if you really want to get) The Defeat of the German Air Force Which the P38 could easily handle.

Out of idle curiosity, how many Me 110, 210, 410, Ju 88 do you suppose the P-38 destroyed in ETO (compared to P-47 and Mustang)

Set yourself free and research the toll taken by Mustangs on the Luftwaffe Day and Night Fighter T/e in March - and you will find why ZG 26 and 76 withdrew from southern and mid eastern Germany to Ne of Berlin and Dresden... which still didn't work through April, May and June.

Extracting the Strategic Bombing Survey Chart you will note that they cite
Q1 LW Losses West (including RAF, 8th and 9th AF) Total = 2130 a/c destroyed in the air
Q2 LW Losses West (including RAF, 8th and 9th AF) Total = 3057 " " " "
Q1 P-38 Contribution (8/9 AF) = 88/2130 = 4.1% --- Q2 = 90/3057 = 2.9%
Q1 P-47 Contribution (8/9 AF) =560/2130 = 26.3% -- Q2 = 409/3057 = 13.4%
Q1 P-51 Contribution (8/9 AF) =399/2130 = 18.7% -- Q2 = 972/3057 = 31.8%

It looks like the P-38 was really hammering the LW doesn't it?

Research - become better informed

 

[zjtins]

Not taken out of context? What context? You have maintained across several threads that the LW was done by 1943, there was no need for long range fighters and that the 8th AF bombing campaign was useless. I'm sorry, but actual history disputes every claim you've made. Or maybe now its just your opinion and we all know about opinions.....

Logistically true, but you implied the fighting was over something I never implied or stated.

 

[zjtins]

It looks like the P-38 was really hammering the LW doesn't it?

Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.

But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.
The bombing was not as effective as though during WWII. So had an alternate approach could have been taken (low level twin engine bombers and fighter bombers, In much larger numbers numbers and they may have done worse, the same or better but the results would still be the same, the Allies were going to win regardless. They simply were building faster than they were losing planes and crew (as can be said for tank, ships too). The Germans were running out of material and had no place left to get them.

 

[drgondog]

Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.

Ahhh not exactly, the 8th AF gave them to the 9th and 15th AF. The 9th used them as Ground support and the 15th as mix of escort and CAS... they replaced the P-38 with a better aircraft for long range escort, cheaper to buy, cheaper to fly, cheaper to maintain - and far more effective at cutting the LW than all the P-38s used in ETO and MTO since Nov 1942.

But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.
The bombing was not as effective as though during WWII.

So, in your opinion the bombing and strafing did nothing to disrupt production and deployment?

So had an alternate approach could have been taken (low level twin engine bombers and fighter bombers, In much larger numbers numbers and they may have done worse, the same or better but the results would still be the same, the Allies were going to win regardless. They simply were building faster than they were losing planes and crew (as can be said for tank, ships too). The Germans were running out of material and had no place left to get them.

You are a curiously stubborn, ill informed, fella. The most effective Strafer in MTO and ETO was the Mustang by an order of magnitude over the P-38 as far as strafing Axis aircraft was concerned. The Mustang was credited with destroying more German aircraft on the ground than the MTO and ETO P-38s and P-47s combined.. so why would you make the comment

 

[bobbysocks]

Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.

But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.

dispite the fact that they doubled their aircraft output to what it was a year or 2 earlier??? look at the production number for the LW and you will find out this statement is simply not true. i have had discussuions with others who claimed the "big week" bombings of LW factories did them in....it did not. .

The bombing was not as effective as though during WWII. So had an alternate approach could have been taken (low level twin engine bombers and fighter bombers, In much larger numbers numbers and they may have done worse, the same or better but the results would still be the same,

dont know if the outcome would have been the same but do you understand the logistics for the much larger numbers of TE bombers? the number of ground crews, armorers, trainers, etc that would be involved? it would be staggering

the Allies were going to win regardless.

but i doubt the end would have come when it did....without long range bombing and especially escorts to keep the LW groups pinned in central europe you now cast doubt on the date and success of the D-day landings....with out the threat to the interior of germany there is more resources going to the east and western front.......stiffer german resistance to the soviet invasion.

They simply were building faster than they were losing planes and crew (as can be said for tank, ships too). The Germans were running out of material and had no place left to get them.

I will agree that the allies were out building the LW in machines.....but the german problem wasnt in the number of aircraft but more the numbers of vetern pilots. it was easierfor them to make the machines of war than it was to find a trained body to man it.

and of course we know the ending to the story...they didnt in 43.

 

[Shortround6]

. But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply dont buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using "pin money". There are simply too many unanswered questions and circumstantial peices of evidence for me to accept such a crass argument. Saying I havent proven my case is one thing, and fair enough. Saying that it cost a few thousand dollars to design develop and organise production is much harder to accept. And still doesnt explain these enormous holes in the fiscal bottom lines ( which I could do for the abovemenetioned Vinson program as well).

I know you and most here believe that aircraft development was more or less free, and are eager to say that the US were all geniouses able to build world beating aircraft for no cost.

Exaggeration is going to get us nowhere. Neither are veiled (or not so veiled) insults.

" When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, NACA had only 500 employees and a modest budget of a little more than $4 million. The war transformed the NACA. It grew from one research facility--the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton, Va -- to three: Ames Aeronautical Laboratory and the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio. Employment peaked at 6,077 employees in 1945 and the budget that same year was almost $41 million."

https://sites.google.com/site/drwordenbriefingngsrc/1935-1950-naca

There were numerous collage or university research centers. Some manufacturers (even of light planes) had connections with specific collages or universities for things like stress analysis or aerodynamics. This allowed professors and students some real world experience/problems and saved the aircraft company the cost of full time employees that could do that type of work ( some companies only designed one some what simple type of aircraft ever few years in the 30s).

The US went from about 12 wind tunnels at the beginning of the war to around 40 at the end of the war. Only ONE of the wind tunnels were owned by an aircraft company (Curtiss) at the Beginning of the war. A lot more of of them were company owned by the end of the war. Aside from Langley (only wind tunnels over 10ft) and Wright field wind tunnels were at Standford University (1919), University of Michigan (1925), New York University (1925), Cal Tech (1930), MIT (1937).

It wasn't "Free" or "No Cost". But it sure wasn't the result of a 200 million dollar funding dump in one year either.

The US was also different in that the size of both the industry and the size of the market were much larger than other countries and the industry as a whole was much less dependent on government subsidies or contracts. Both Wright and P W had out stripped Bristol and Armstrong Siddeley in sales on new radial engines and were developing new models WITHOUT government money. If the Government wanted to by them (or pay them to work on a project thought up by the government) all well and good but Better R-1820s and R-1830 and the R-2600 and R-2800s were coming even if the government wasn't paying for them.
The US was NOT a controlled economy (in certain ways) during the war and sure wasn't before the war. Workers were free to come and go as they pleased. After the government "fixed" wages after a fashion, companies were still free to offer different health benefits or pensions or climate ( Buffalo New York in the winter or California) to lure away each others workers. The Gov could NOT tell workers "we are shutting down the XXX aircraft project and you will now move to the ZZZ shipyard and work on an aircraft carrier".

Lots of other programs, im sure, and I cant pin down what it actually cost to design, AND develop a given type (but incidentally the contract price for the hellcat was $35000 per copy in 1945....to put you out of your misery) was. But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply dont buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using "pin money". There are simply too many unanswered questions and circumstantial peices of evidence for me to accept such a crass argument. Saying I havent proven my case is one thing, and fair enough. Saying that it cost a few thousand dollars to design develop and organise production is much harder to accept. And still doesnt explain these enormous holes in the fiscal bottom lines ( which I could do for the abovemenetioned Vinson program as well).

The $35,000 dollar figure may be for a late war contract, early ones may have been more, and would seem to be for a bare air frame, no engine, prop, guns, radio, etc. That or Grumman was WAAAAY better at making aircraft than ANY other US aircraft maker.

But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply don't buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using hundreds of Millions of dollars per design (OK an exaggeration).
Things got real complicated DURING WW II. P W took 3-4 years of PEACE time work, 8 million dollars and 3500 test hours to get the R-2800 into production. It took them from 1940 to 1944, 25 million dollars 15,000 test hours and 23 test engines to get the R-4360 to about the same same level. ANd the R-4360 used R-2800 cylinders (at least to start).

Comparing post war prices and policies to pre war or early war prices and policies is a mistake.

IF it costs $50,000 or so to build a bare airframe and companies were bidding $200-250,000 for a prototype and engineering data, what do you think it was really costing them? Granted they expected to make a bit of money on a production contract but low balling the prototype work TOO much could put the company out of business.

For some "circumstantial pieces of evidence" on the other side, Grumman priced the G-21 Amphibian "Goose" starting at $68,000 in 1937, With engines and accessories although optional interiors could run the price up. I doubt they anticipated sales in thousands so R D of that model has to built into the price. The Lockheed 14 Airliner (turned into the Hudson) started at about $85,000 in 1937. Same thing, anticipated sales in the hundreds, if the R D was in the tens of millions for one design how do they price the plane so low? Lockheed ( the second company) at this point had built fewer than 200 planes combined of the models 10 and 12.

What in the F6F (features) warrants millions of dollars of R&D? A fairly normal wing, the fold has already been used on the Avenger and F4F, Landing gear seems to be a Boeing Patent, Operates like P-36/40 landing gear? The engine was certainly used by other aircraft (except for down draft carb) Early Prop was the dead same one as used on the F4U and Hamilton Standard was pretty much the world standard, they were going to build props for 2000 hp engines with or without the F6F.

Navy was going to have to spend Money to expand production facilities even if they used Buffaloes. Especially if they used Buffaloes? No savings there. And Production expansion is NOT R D.

Your chain of logic seems a bit off.

1.Germans were spending 300 million (on what?).
2. Arnold tells the British we are spending more. (on what?)
3, you claim 400 million. That is more than the German 300 million but did Arnold say 400 million? or 1/3 more? or quantify it?
4, you then split 400 million between the Army and Navy, seems equal but aside from declaring that both got an equal share is there any proof?
5. Army was trying for turbo supercharged multi engine bombers with pressure cabins, remote power turrets, etc. Navy had SOME multi-engine flying boats. equal need for research?
Army PROJECTS include the B-27, B-28, B-30, B-31, B-32 ( and BTW the B-29 was first ordered August 1940), B-33 and B-33A. B-35 Flying wing was ordered in Sept 1941 (1/3 scale flying models were flying earlier. Convair B-36 prototypes were ordered November 1941 (before Pearl Harbor).

Douglas had spent about $4 Million between 1936 and 1942 on the B-19 bomber project. It takes a lot of imagining to figure out spending that much or more on a single engine fighter of no great technical difficulty.

There may very well be hundreds of dollars "missing" from these abbreviated accounts. Doesn't mean the Navy spent it on aeronautical R D or at least enough to pay for a carrier to be in service about the time the first few dozen F6Fs roll out the factory door.

I would say you are very far from proving your case.

I may not have "proved" mine but it seems that circumstantial evidence can be used both ways.