Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

[parsifal]

I will through in some numbers from official german papers.

Development bills of:

Ju 288 from 1938-1944 = 90 million RM
Ju 88 1935-1943 = 32 million RM
Ju 87 1933- 1943 = 17 millon RM

That are the official development bills from Junkers for the timeline and only for development.

Compare to around 80 millions for one Hipper or Deutschland class and 160 million for one Scharnhorst or Gneisenau.
I have my doubts that a/c's were this expensive compare to advanced Navy ships.

Thanks for that information, which suggests these claims by the American members here, of being able to develop a given type for about $250K as sheer fantasy. Its as uncomfortable for me as im sure it will be for you, but whether wittingly, or unwittingly, your figures corroborate, to a degree what Im saying . There is a massive risk in what Im saying.....we al know that comparing cash rates for different countries is dangerous. I have to accept that. But in 1938, the rough exchange rate, dollars to RM was about 2.5, as i understand it. Give or take

If we take the risk and convert the figures you give to US dollars, we get the following indications


Ju 288 from 1938-1944 = $36 million....give or take
Ju 88 1935-1943 = $12.8$....give or take
Ju 87 1933- 1943 = $6.8 million....give or take

That are the official development bills from Junkers for the timeline and only for development.

around $32(USD) millions for one Hipper (compared to $25 million for CA Boston)
$64 million for one Scharnhorst or Gneisenau. (compared to $70million for the Alaskas and $100million for the Iowas)



I dont know much about the Ju288 or Ju88 development programs.....but did they involve massive factory exapansions for more than 20000 workers? I doubt it. But assumning that your figures DO include setting up the production lines, we either have to come to two conclusions.......either the germans were hopelessly inefficient in their aircraft industry, or, these figures for the hellcat are a total crock. Frankly, for once, I am in the camp of the Germans. They were quite efficient designers and builders, and the costs you are giving are far more truthful and to the mark than this figure of "it only costs $50000 to make one the most deadly aircraft in history available for mass production".

As far as your last statement, well maybe, case is unproven for me, but I respect your POV on this

 

[DonL]

Hello Parsifal,

the development program from Junkers for the Ju 88 and the Ju 87 included the Junkers Jumo 211 engine.
The Junkers factory developed 1935 from 9500 workmen to 25000 workmen 1938 and 165000 workmen 1944.
The Ju 88 was the biggest bomber production program of the RLM , so I think Junkers developed 1939 and 1940 around another 20000-30000 workmen.

Junkers produced around 15000 Ju 88 (1939-1945) , 6000 Ju 87 (1937-1944), 900 Ju 86 (1935-1939), 3000 Ju 52 (1932-1945)
Junkers produced also 6500 Jumo 210 engines (1934-1938 ), 68000 Jumo 211 (1937-1945) and 9000 Jumo 213 (1942-1945)

Other productionseries were very smal.

The development program of the Ju 288 included the Jumo 222 engine and the building of the Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark at Wien (1940) with a goal of 1000 engines per month.
Only 22 Ju 288 were ever produced and something about 100 Jumo 222 engines.
It was the most expencive RLM program from 1934 to 1945 and the most expencive mistaken investment.

Edit: Expansion of the Ju 88 production:

69 (1939); 2208 (1940), 2780 (1941); 3094 (1942); 3260 (1943); 3234 (1944); 355 (1945)

Note: Next to the Bf 109 (around 30000) and the FW 190 (20000) the Ju 88 (15000) is ranking far away from other productions (He 111, Ju87 and Me 110 all around 6000) at place 3 of all produced a/c's for the LW.

At 1940 and 1941 it was the most numeric produced a/c of the LW, even more then the Bf 109, 1693 (1940); 2764 (1941)

I dont know much about the Ju288 or Ju88 development programs.....but did they involve massive factory exapansions for more than 20000 workers? I doubt it.

I think you will correct this sentence after my numbers for the Ju88.

 

[Shortround6]

"it only costs $50000 to make one the most deadly aircraft in history available for mass production".

Please tell me it what post I wrote the quoted part?

You are the one who keeps talking about a few thousand dollars. There is a large difference between a few thousand dollars or even 50,000 dollars and 25-40 million dollars.

You are also ignoring the differences between basic R D, design of ONE aircraft and building new factories and lumping the three together.

From Joe Baugher's website on the B-19 "the aircraft was formally accepted by the Army in June of 1942. The Army paid Douglas $1,400,064 for the XB-19. However, the company had spent almost 4 million dollars of its own funds on the project, so Douglas managed to lose money on the XB-19. " Unless Douglas was lying to it's stock holders about what it really lost.

I would also note that the German planes quoted went through Multiple engine changes, Multiple models over 6-10 years and in some cases dozens of prototype aircraft vs TWO initial prototypes for the F6F.

Is one entitled to wonder if ANY of the Jumo engine programs got charged to the aircraft development mentioned?

And even if it doesn't, 12.8 million US ( 1/2 to 1/3 what you need for a carrier) for the JU-88 covered what? the A series with two wing sizes? 5 variants? Any of the B series or Ju 188? the C series fighters (9-10 variants)? the D series photo recon variants 4-5 variants? and so on for the G, H, P, R, S and T series aircraft.

I would say there was a considerable difference between the Ju-88 program and the F6F program. The F6F program branched out a bit later (but by no means the number of variations as the JU-88 ) but by then it is too late for your idea.

Additional information: from : http://www.uboat.net/technical/ju88.htm

"including a staggering 104 prototypes for its 60 different versions"

Now maybe a some of those were post 1943 and don't count for the 12.8 million total but I think it really puts the two programs in perspective considering you are comparing a twin engine plane of almost twice the size and weight to a single engine fighter.

 

[Aozora]

Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.

Actually the USAAF discovered it had a more effective, less expensive fighter and decided use it to cut the losses before things got worse. The P-38 was better used elsewhere, such as in the Med or Pacific.

But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.
The bombing was not as effective as though during WWII. So had an alternate approach could have been taken (low level twin engine bombers and fighter bombers, In much larger numbers numbers and they may have done worse, the same or better but the results would still be the same, the Allies were going to win regardless. They simply were building faster than they were losing planes and crew (as can be said for tank, ships too). The Germans were running out of material and had no place left to get them.

Read this and tell us what you see; look under "European Theatre of Operations" - sorry, it contains factual material so it might be hard to read

Losses: Army Air Forces in World War II

Now, would the casualty rate have gone up or down in 1944 if the Luftwaffe was in the desperate straits you imagine?

Then again, because the Luftwaffe was so spent, the USAAF could have sent over swarms of computer gamers in Harvards and Stearmans, thus starving Germany out like a plague of locusts and who cares about casualty rates amongst the crews?

 

[DonL]

I would say there was a considerable difference between the Ju-88 program and the F6F program. The F6F program branched out a bit later (but by no means the number of variations as the JU-88 ) but by then it is too late for your idea.

Additional information: from : Junkers Ju-88 - Technical pages - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net

"including a staggering 104 prototypes for its 60 different versions"

Now maybe a some of those were post 1943 and don't count for the 12.8 million total but I think it really puts the two programs in perspective considering you are comparing a twin engine plane of almost twice the size and weight to a single engine fighter.

At the end you can say (simplified) the whole Ju 88 program with all prototypes and tasks is a Douglas A-20, Douglas A-26; North American B-25; Martin B-26 and Northrop P-61 and this all in one aircraft.

This is exaggerated but hits to my opinion the nail.

 

[VBF-13]

Confucius say, "Young man not know much."

A little codicil to that signature line of mine, Matt. For what it may be worth around here...

You'd scarce expect one of my age 

To speak in public on the stage, 

And if I chance to fall below

Demosthenes or Cicero, 

Don't view me with a critic's eye,

But pass my imperfections by. 

Large streams from little fountains flow,

Tall oaks from little acorns grow;

And though now I am small and young,

Of judgment weak and feeble tongue, 

Yet all great, learned men, like me

Once learned to read their ABC.

 

[altsym]

@ zjtins. Well the Luftwaffe certainly wasn't finished by 1943, or 44, or 45. I think combined they had around 2500 claims in 1945.
I mean they were nowhere near the force they started as, but the Luftwaffe was still very dangerous even near the end.

Cheers.

 

[parsifal]

Please tell me it what post I wrote the quoted part?

You didnt. Check back though. at one point claims were being made that R&D could cost as litle as $12000 per model. Thats what this is in response to

You are the one who keeps talking about a few thousand dollars. There is a large difference between a few thousand dollars or even 50,000 dollars and 25-40 million dollars.

If you are prepred to agree to 25-$40 million dollars for Hellcat development, I would be a very happy man

You are also ignoring the differences between basic R D, design of ONE aircraft and building new factories and lumping the three together.

nope. im saying R &D is two separate things, but the cost of getting a new design onto the carrier decks is that combied cost.

From Joe Baugher's website on the B-19 "the aircraft was formally accepted by the Army in June of 1942. The Army paid Douglas $1,400,064 for the XB-19. However, the company had spent almost 4 million dollars of its own funds on the project, so Douglas managed to lose money on the XB-19. " Unless Douglas was lying to it's stock holders about what it really lost.

That would mean the B-19 cost less to "R&D" than a Ju87. Im not buying that either. The Ju87 was a smaller, simpler earlier design relying on off the shelf technologies. Can you say the same for the B-19. Youve just finished lecturing me about how far behind the US aircraft industry was in 1938-40. That would suggest a need for much greater injections of capital into the system. Yet here we still are, trying to argue that a four engined (the largest to date at that time) with new engine techs, new armamenent and lord knows what else, still cost less than the lowly Stuka. you have gotta be kidding either me or yourself, or both.

I would also note that the German planes quoted went through Multiple engine changes, Multiple models over 6-10 years and in some cases dozens of prototype aircraft vs TWO initial prototypes for the F6F.

We dont exactly know what DoNLs figures are for. he says development, which I assume means exclusinve of productiopn and delivery costs (I hope he is not trying to say the entire production run of Ju88s cost just $12.8 million dollars.....thats roughly $800 per airframe if is saying that. I further assume it includes production setup, design and development of the prototypes. all good

Saying that the F6F involved just two proprypes is not correct. One has to look at the whole package. There, were, to begin with the F4F-2 designs, then there was the Xf5F proptypes. there were from some sources at least three F6F-1 proportypes, I forget how many F6F-2 and from memory 3 F6F-3 propotypes. This is typical American hyperbole. Saying there were just two prototypes is correct....so long as you ignore all the duds they tried and discarded along the way....And in the end....so what, weve already well established that the building of propotypes is your "pin money" scenario.

Is one entitled to wonder if ANY of the Jumo engine programs got charged to the aircraft development mentioned?

Of course....questions allover the place. But small change compared to the claims made that it didnt cost much to get the Hellcat up and running....Raising all these red herrings looks like the mark of desperate men to me...desperate for people like me to stop asking embarrassing questions about what is obviously a sacred cow in US aeronautical folklore

And even if it doesn't, 12.8 million US ( 1/2 to 1/3 what you need for a carrier) for the JU-88 covered what? the A series with two wing sizes? 5 variants? Any of the B series or Ju 188? the C series fighters (9-10 variants)? the D series photo recon variants 4-5 variants? and so on for the G, H, P, R, S and T series aircraft.

I would say there was a considerable difference between the Ju-88 program and the F6F program. The F6F program branched out a bit later (but by no means the number of variations as the JU-88 ) but by then it is too late for your idea.

Id agree that there is not much comparability between what was done with the Ju88 and the F6F. But the F6F was not all beer and skittles. It was part of the overall USN replacement fighter program, which spanned four different aircraft types, and at least three different engines. Not in the same league as the Junkers, but then, hardly the "50000" claimed by some either....

 

[DonL]

From Joe Baugher's website on the B-19 "the aircraft was formally accepted by the Army in June of 1942. The Army paid Douglas $1,400,064 for the XB-19. However, the company had spent almost 4 million dollars of its own funds on the project, so Douglas managed to lose money on the XB-19. " Unless Douglas was lying to it's stock holders about what it really lost.

That would mean the B-19 cost less to "R&D" than a Ju87. Im not buying that either. The Ju87 was a smaller, simpler earlier design relying on off the shelf technologies. Can you say the same for the B-19. Youve just finished lecturing me about how far behind the US aircraft industry was in 1938-40. That would suggest a need for much greater injections of capital into the system. Yet here we still are, trying to argue that a four engined (the largest to date at that time) with new engine techs, new armamenent and lord knows what else, still cost less than the lowly Stuka. you have gotta be kidding either me or yourself, or both.

Here we go, that's very interesting, because I have very exact datas about the Ju89 Uralbomber from 1935-1937.

Cost sheet to the RLM:

Ju89 V1:
Dummy building: RM 150 441; Aerodynamic and Structural Calculations: RM 301 388; experiments: RM 6000, construction of the a/c with 4 x DB-600 engines: RM 1,128,000; equipment: RM 1,033,764; Changes: 63,600 RM; production of a second Fuselage front part: RM 18,968; flight tests and flight testing: RM 109 487.

Ju89 V2: 1,558 Millionen RM.

Ju89 V3 Bruchzelle (I think destruction fuselage) 175.824 RM.

In summary 4,545472 Millionen RM.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89

 

[Glider]

If you are so curious why not re-read what I wrote and not take it out of context? Today we know the Germans had no ability to win the war in late 43 due to material shortages.

My understanding is that Germany produced approx 20,600 aircraft in 1943 but had the material, shortages whatever to produce approx 35,000 in 1944.
I also understand that they produced about 13,500 tanks in 1943 and almost 19,000 in 1944 and production of the 105mm FH18 almost doubled between 1943 and 1944

I would further contend that had Germany put its factories onto a full war footing in 1939, they would have easily been able to produce in 1943 what they produced in 1944 and the outcome of the war in Russia could easily have been very different.

So if can you tell us more about your source of information re the shortage of resources it would be appreciated.

 

[zjtins]

@ zjtins. Well the Luftwaffe certainly wasn't finished by 1943, or 44, or 45. I think combined they had around 2500 claims in 1945.
I mean they were nowhere near the force they started as, but the Luftwaffe was still very dangerous even near the end.

One of many quotes of data of what happened. I am not disagreeing with these facts. BUT BDA AFTER THE WAR showed the affect of strategic bombing was far less that what they thought during the war. The USAF changed future tactics based on the post war BDA comparisons. In Vietnam the us went after harbor mining and electrical power stations and relay stations base don WWII post war BDA. They chose not to target Electrical stations as they though to well defend and the Germans coudl easily repair the damage and temporarily accommodate it by the electrical net from other areas. The Brits did it a few times and after the war it turns out the Germans had a hard time dealing with the damage. But AT THE TIME THE ALLIES DID NOT KNOW THIS.
Of course during the war everyone went after what they thought meant the most for the cost.
BUT other choices could have been made that in the end were just as good or better.
Also the P-51 stats are skewed as large numbers of P-51s were brought on the line AND given free reign to attack ground targets at around the time the Germans training was dropping drastically, fuel was rapidly diminishing, experienced pilots in the Luftwaffe were diminishing and even the ammo was becoming suspect due to lack of materials and the use of slave labor.
~1400 ME262'S were built but only ~400 or so saw action.
TODAY with 20/20 hindsight Germany had no cards left in late '43, the tide had irrevocably turned but alot of people had to die first. Germany simply was running out of resources it was a massive war of attrition. Whether it was over 6 months earlier or later due to some technical wonder or some strategic or tactical move it was still over.

 

[zjtins]

I would further contend that had Germany put its factories onto a full war footing in 1939, they would have easily been able to produce in 1943 what they produced in 1944 and the outcome of the war in Russia could easily have been very different.

Open a new thread.

 

[drgondog]

In Vietnam the us went after harbor mining and electrical power stations and relay stations base don WWII post war BDA.

And ignored the single most important targets - the dikes to the rice paddies..due to interference from Johnson and McNamara

Of course during the war everyone went after what they thought meant the most for the cost.

Also the P-51 stats are skewed as large numbers of P-51s were brought on the line AND given free reign to attack ground targets at around the time the Germans training was dropping drastically, fuel was rapidly diminishing, experienced pilots in the Luftwaffe were diminishing and even the ammo was becoming suspect due to lack of materials and the use of slave labor.

The greater damage was done March through May, 1944 when the P-51s and P-38s were still at reasonable parity - and the Mustang FAR outscored the P-38 on aircraft destroyed on the ground - and outnumber combined by the P-47 Groups. The numbers are skewed to reflect the effectiveness of the Mustang - not the quantity.

~1400 ME262'S were built but only ~400 or so saw action.
TODAY with 20/20 hindsight Germany had no cards left in late '43, the tide had irrevocably turned but alot of people had to die first. Germany simply was running out of resources it was a massive war of attrition. Whether it was over 6 months earlier or later due to some technical wonder or some strategic or tactical move it was still over.

I wish that you could stand in front of an audience of vets of the 8th AF, RAF, Allied infantry and armor - and make that silly statement. You would be able to cut the utter contempt with a wooden spatula.

 

[DonL]

Coming back to some numbers.
From the FW 187 two seater series I have also exact datas, but I think they are only the construction, building and material costs without development (dumys, experiments, aerodynamik caculation etc..).
But what is realy interesting how fast the bill and workours droped even by a preproduction series of 6 a/c's inclusive the first prototype.

FW 187 V4: (first twoseater prototype)
100578,60 workinghours = 105922 RM + 89211,47 RM (material) = 195134 RM for the first prototype
For the next two A0 preproduction aircrafts:
73373,63 workinhours = 77710,29 RM + 75397,77 RM (material) = 153108,06 RM each
For the next/last three A0 preproduction aircrafts:
64489,62 workinhours = 68136.41 RM + 74774,46 RM (material) = 142910,87 RM each

I think here was Focker Wulf pretty efficient.

 

[VBF-13]

Guys, I think the F6Fs were around $50,000, starting, and cut down pretty substantially once Bethpage got rolling with them. Look in Thruelsen, The Grumman Story.

 

[Glider]

Open a new thread.

Fair enough but what about the rest of the posting that dealt with resources and production.

My understanding is that Germany produced approx 20,600 aircraft in 1943 but had the material, shortages whatever to produce approx 35,000 in 1944.
I also understand that they produced about 13,500 tanks in 1943 and almost 19,000 in 1944 and production of the 105mm FH18 almost doubled between 1943 and 1944

So if can you tell us more about your source of information re the shortage of resources it would be appreciated

Or to put it another way. If Germany was out of resources at the end of 1943, where did the resources come from to build all this equipment in 1944?.

 

[DonL]

Guys, I think the F6Fs were around $50,000, starting, and cut down pretty substantially once Bethpage got rolling with them. Look in Thruelsen, The Grumman Story.

I have very serious doubts, that a mass produced Hellcat will be ever at $50000, because a P51 was not at $50000 at 1945 and I think from the weight of the a/c's and the P&R 2800 the Hellcat must be much more expensive. Something about $75ooo looks realistic.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I have very serious doubts, that a mass produced Hellcat will be ever at $50000, because a P51 was not at $50000 at 1945 and I think from the weight of the a/c's and the P&R 2800 the Hellcat must be much more expensive. Something about $75ooo looks realistic.

Unit cost $35,000 in 1945

Ferguson, Robert G. "One Thousand Planes a Day: Ford, Grumman, General Motors and the Arsenal of Democracy." History and Technology, Volume 21, Issue 2, 2005.

pp. 149–175

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grumman_F6F_Hellcat#Bibliography

 

[DonL]

Is this including the engine?
How do you think it is possible after this list:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/interesting-usaaf-costs-37213.html

How can a carrier operated a/c, which was much heavier (so more material) then the presented fighter, also with the P&R 2800 engine being this cheap, compare to the P40 and the P51?
To me it looks unlogic.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Is this including the engine?
How do you think it is possible after this list:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/interesting-usaaf-costs-37213.html

How can an carrier operated a/c, which was much heavier (so more material) then the presented fighter with the P&R engine being this cheap, compare to the P40 and the P51? To me it looks unlogic.

The engines, radios and guns were usually furnished by the government AKA "GFE." They might not haven been included in that price - one would have to read the contract between Grumman and the USN to see what was considered a "deliverable."

It also depends how many were ordered and built - the more built, the unit cost came down. Money wasn't necessarily made on selling the entire aircraft. Most if not all manufacturers make their real profits on post-delivery support, meaning spare parts.

From that site;

"Average cost per airplane is the weighted average on all programs approved during a designated fiscal year and represents the estimated cost of a complete airplane ready for flyaway, including factory installed ordnance and radio equipment. Costs exclude equipment installed at modification centers and airplane spare parts. Unit costs reflect renegotiation of contracts only to the extent of reductions in contract prices for future deliveries but do no reflect reductions in price effected by cash refunds."