parsifal
Colonel
Sorry that you feel that way.
Correct me if I have misunderstood you, but just one of the issues you raised was that the Duke Of York was not fitted with Type 279 Radar.
So how do you explain this???? The Photo, incidentally was taken prior to 1944 according to the internet source that I found the image..... The captions are not mine
I think that Internet sources in a forum such as this have the advantage of being verifiable.
One article from the Nav Weapons site which includes input by such venerable experts as Nathan Okun had this say regarding the application of radar on ships of the KM
Although German radar development was very promising in its early stages it was quickly overtaken by allied technology. One major reason for this was that the German Navy, which was the most conservative of the three services, did not realize the full potential of active radar, leaving the Allies in a favorable position to force the pace of the microwave war. The German Navy had decided that radar transmissions would provide a source from which an enemy could obtain a 'fix' on a ship's position, in the same way that direction-finders could be used to obtain a 'fix' on the source of a radio transmission. Extensive use of radar was therefore discouraged, a decision reinforced by the German belief in the superiority of their optical equipment. It is significant that young officers were taught absolutely nothing about radar and had to learn from scratch about the complex microwave war while on active service, in conditions where any fault could be fatal. It was not until March 1945 that German Naval Command issued Tactical order No 10 entitled Instruction for use of radar aboard surface units.
Thus the story of German naval radar in surface units is one of 'too lates'. The other services, especially the Luftwaffe, the Flak (AA) troops and even coast defense artillery, employed radar skillfully and extensively, while the Navy was tardy in proving information and training in new technology.
Knowledge of high-frequency radio emissions was therefore limited and the quality of the radar aboard German ships depended substantially on the personnel interest of the responsible radio officer. Only a few of these were electronic experts, by virtue of being enthusiastic, and even fewer had good contacts in the electronic industry, thus reducing their chances of improving sets in service. It is not surprising therefore that, under the rough conditions aboard a ship, the sensitive electronic equipment soon deteriorated and became faulty. Many surface units did not have their radar equipment recalibrated during the long periods of their careers! Thus sets became so unreliable that the commander refused to use them - an easy decision, when asked to hold strict radar silence whenever possible.
To counter the superior Allied radar technology, German surface vessels were fitted with more and more passive sets, the field becoming so extended that description of the German passive radar-sets, the Funkmess-Beobachtungsgeräte or FuMBs has been reserved for a separate article.
The article was written by E. Sieche. His bibliograhy was
Bibliography:
Beaver, Paul: U-Boats in the Atlantic, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge 1979;
German Capital Ships, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge, 1981;
German Destroyers and Escorts, Cambridge, 1982
Bekker, Cajus: Die versunkene Flotte, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1969
Das große Bildbuch der Kriegsmarine, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1972
Bekker, Cajus: Augen durch Nacht und Nebel, die Radar-Story, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1962
Breyer, Siegfried/Koop, Gerhard: Von der Emden zur Tirpitz, 2 volumes, Wehr&Wissen, Bonn 1981
Brown, David: Tirpitz, the floating Fortress, Arms Armour Press, London 1977
Friedmann, Norman: Naval Radar, Conway Maritime Press, London 1981
Giessler, Helmut. Der Marine-Nachrichten und -Ortungsdienst, Lehmann, Munich 1971
Harnack, Wolfgang: Zerstörer unter deutscher Flagge, Koehlers, Herford 1978
Herzog, Bodo: Die deutsche Kriegsmarine im Kampf, eine Dokumentation in Bildern, Podzun, Dorheim 1975
Herzog, Bodo/Elfrath, Ulrich: Schlachtschiff Bismarck, ein Bericht in Bildern und Dokumenten, Podzun, Dorheim 1975
Humble, Richard: Hitler's High Seas Fleet, Pan/Ballantine, 1971
Jones, R V: Most Secret War, Hamish Hamilton, London 1978
Mallman-Showel, Jak P: The German Navy in World War Two, Arms Armour, London 1979
Niehaus, Werner: Die Radar-Schlacht, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1977
Prager, Hans-Georg: Panzerschiff Deutschland, Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow, Koehlers, Herford 1981
Price, Alfred: Instruments of Darkness, W Kimber Co, London 1967
Thomas, Egbert: Torpedoboote und Zerstörer, Gerhard Stalling, Oldbenburg 1970
Schmalenbach, Paul: Kreuzer Prinz Eugen, Koehlers, Herford 1978
Edwin Sieche lives in Vienna and wrote "German Naval Radar to 1945" and published in "Warship" volumes 21 and 22 in 1982
I hardly think these are sources that should not be given some credence. Unfortunately they dont align at all with what you are telling...like the photo
He received assistance from Dipl.-Ing. Heinz-Gerhard Schöck
Correct me if I have misunderstood you, but just one of the issues you raised was that the Duke Of York was not fitted with Type 279 Radar.
So how do you explain this???? The Photo, incidentally was taken prior to 1944 according to the internet source that I found the image..... The captions are not mine
I think that Internet sources in a forum such as this have the advantage of being verifiable.
One article from the Nav Weapons site which includes input by such venerable experts as Nathan Okun had this say regarding the application of radar on ships of the KM
Although German radar development was very promising in its early stages it was quickly overtaken by allied technology. One major reason for this was that the German Navy, which was the most conservative of the three services, did not realize the full potential of active radar, leaving the Allies in a favorable position to force the pace of the microwave war. The German Navy had decided that radar transmissions would provide a source from which an enemy could obtain a 'fix' on a ship's position, in the same way that direction-finders could be used to obtain a 'fix' on the source of a radio transmission. Extensive use of radar was therefore discouraged, a decision reinforced by the German belief in the superiority of their optical equipment. It is significant that young officers were taught absolutely nothing about radar and had to learn from scratch about the complex microwave war while on active service, in conditions where any fault could be fatal. It was not until March 1945 that German Naval Command issued Tactical order No 10 entitled Instruction for use of radar aboard surface units.
Thus the story of German naval radar in surface units is one of 'too lates'. The other services, especially the Luftwaffe, the Flak (AA) troops and even coast defense artillery, employed radar skillfully and extensively, while the Navy was tardy in proving information and training in new technology.
Knowledge of high-frequency radio emissions was therefore limited and the quality of the radar aboard German ships depended substantially on the personnel interest of the responsible radio officer. Only a few of these were electronic experts, by virtue of being enthusiastic, and even fewer had good contacts in the electronic industry, thus reducing their chances of improving sets in service. It is not surprising therefore that, under the rough conditions aboard a ship, the sensitive electronic equipment soon deteriorated and became faulty. Many surface units did not have their radar equipment recalibrated during the long periods of their careers! Thus sets became so unreliable that the commander refused to use them - an easy decision, when asked to hold strict radar silence whenever possible.
To counter the superior Allied radar technology, German surface vessels were fitted with more and more passive sets, the field becoming so extended that description of the German passive radar-sets, the Funkmess-Beobachtungsgeräte or FuMBs has been reserved for a separate article.
The article was written by E. Sieche. His bibliograhy was
Bibliography:
Beaver, Paul: U-Boats in the Atlantic, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge 1979;
German Capital Ships, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge, 1981;
German Destroyers and Escorts, Cambridge, 1982
Bekker, Cajus: Die versunkene Flotte, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1969
Das große Bildbuch der Kriegsmarine, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1972
Bekker, Cajus: Augen durch Nacht und Nebel, die Radar-Story, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1962
Breyer, Siegfried/Koop, Gerhard: Von der Emden zur Tirpitz, 2 volumes, Wehr&Wissen, Bonn 1981
Brown, David: Tirpitz, the floating Fortress, Arms Armour Press, London 1977
Friedmann, Norman: Naval Radar, Conway Maritime Press, London 1981
Giessler, Helmut. Der Marine-Nachrichten und -Ortungsdienst, Lehmann, Munich 1971
Harnack, Wolfgang: Zerstörer unter deutscher Flagge, Koehlers, Herford 1978
Herzog, Bodo: Die deutsche Kriegsmarine im Kampf, eine Dokumentation in Bildern, Podzun, Dorheim 1975
Herzog, Bodo/Elfrath, Ulrich: Schlachtschiff Bismarck, ein Bericht in Bildern und Dokumenten, Podzun, Dorheim 1975
Humble, Richard: Hitler's High Seas Fleet, Pan/Ballantine, 1971
Jones, R V: Most Secret War, Hamish Hamilton, London 1978
Mallman-Showel, Jak P: The German Navy in World War Two, Arms Armour, London 1979
Niehaus, Werner: Die Radar-Schlacht, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1977
Prager, Hans-Georg: Panzerschiff Deutschland, Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow, Koehlers, Herford 1981
Price, Alfred: Instruments of Darkness, W Kimber Co, London 1967
Thomas, Egbert: Torpedoboote und Zerstörer, Gerhard Stalling, Oldbenburg 1970
Schmalenbach, Paul: Kreuzer Prinz Eugen, Koehlers, Herford 1978
Edwin Sieche lives in Vienna and wrote "German Naval Radar to 1945" and published in "Warship" volumes 21 and 22 in 1982
I hardly think these are sources that should not be given some credence. Unfortunately they dont align at all with what you are telling...like the photo
He received assistance from Dipl.-Ing. Heinz-Gerhard Schöck
(faster than me aswering 
