Hood vs. Scharnhorst

[DonL]

Hi Vincenzo,

the first one was the original scheme!
And the other one was a modified or alternative scheme from me with the same armour weight.

 

[Vincenzo]

Hello Vincenzo
The Battle off North Cape showed that even 14in shells, which had a bit less penetration power against decks than 15in, could from long range damage Sch. so badly that loss of speed was result, saying nothing on knocking out main artillery turrets.

Juha

yes a bit pratically we can tell the same, the difference it's more vs the side armour. after i don't told that can't damage only that can't penetrated the armours for hit deposit and engine local. almost this can tell with pen data and armour scheme. but it obvious that a 2nd or 3rf hit on plate give a different result that a first. and the real word it's always different form maths

 

[Vincenzo]

Hi Vincenzo,

the first one was the original scheme!
And the other one was a modified or alternative scheme from me with the same armour weight.

oh i have not understand this i'll rewrite my comment only using the first scheme

 

[parsifal]

Pardon me but this is nonsense, she beated down one of them very badly (IIRC when she popped up the second time)... Sure it reminds me of King Arthur and the Black Knight.. Arthur was certainly incapable of properly dealing with him, only cut off the limbs

.

Scharnhorst only ever got one or two hits on the Norfolk, due entirely to the Norfolk not having flashless powder. The other cruisers were using this new propellant, and were never troubled by Scharnhorsts fire



Any specifics or sources? According the Garzke and Dullin, the captain of Gneisenau (? - too lazy to look up) spoke very highly of the radar sets and their usefullness.


Cant answer right now with specifics, but I will give you the operational details of Scharnhorst versus the British radar fits in a day or two. Basically, there was no comparison in the relative performances of the radar capabilities by 1943. Different story in 1940-41 however.....D



Any specifics?



Disagree... radar IS using radio waves, its easy to detect (the Bismarck fairly easy picked up the HMS PoW's radar signals, even though itself was actually not detected). Scharnhorst was disengaging, switching radar on was equivalent to trying to flee in the dark with a torch in your hand... I would be very surprised if Allied ships would lack such passive sensors.

Scharnhorst was not trying to disengage at all, she was attempting to outflank the cruiser force. Moreover, of the Germans had used radar to keep their forces together, 4th Zerstorer flotilla would not have wandered off lost before the battle. This was the second biggest coup the cruisers achieved against the german dforce....the first was the destruction of the German radar set, effectively blinding the German ship, the second was the determination that 4th flotilla was not present to protect the Scharnhorst close in.....this meant that the RN ships could close to lethal range with impunity, including the destroyres to point blank range, with no threat to them by German torpedoes. Gunfire, even the hevay secondary armament carried by the Sharnhorst is not enough, generally to prevent destroyers and cruisers from closing to lethal range. Firstly, a destroyer or cruiser is a difficult target to hit with guns, and secondly guns might damage a ship, but will not generally disable it, except if hit multiple times.

So, this is the comparison...one force not using radar, starts out concentrated, gets hopelessly lost, ambushed, disabled, and ultimately sunk. The second force, able to co-ordinate and concentrate their forces, with very accurate fire, and able to determine the precise nature, and force disposition of the enemy at the right moment....whose policy and use of technology as well as understanding of basic naval tactics is superior????? It is invalid to argue simply that the Germans were simply outnumbered....they were, but this just didnt happen by chance.....they allowed it to happen to themselves mostly . The Germans could have had at least some parity in their force structure, but as a direct result of their mistaken use of radar, failed to achieve this outcome


Not using radar, as a means of passive defence proved a much more dangerous policy that led directly to the loss of the great ship. If the Germans had been equipped with and using an effective search radar, it would have been very difficult for the British to trap her.

 

[Freebird]

The numbers (from Hazegray) if anyone is interested


Scharnhorst class
Displ: 34,841 tons standard; 38,900 tons full load
Dim: 754 x 98.5 x 27 feet
Prop: Steam turbines, 12 boilers, 3 shafts, 165,000 hp, 32 knots
Crew: 1669-1840
Arm: 3 triple 11/54.5, 4 dual, 4 single 5.9/55, 7 dual 4.1/65, 8 dual
37 mm, 8 single 20 mm.
Armor: 6.7-13.8 inch belt, 2 inch deck, 14.2 inch turrets, 13.8 inch CT
Designed as 'unsinkable' commerce raiders, sometimes classified as
battlecruisers because of small main guns. Really were small
battleships, with smaller guns and armor on the battleship scale.
Designed to allow replacement of triple 11 inch guns with dual 15 inch.
These vessels were a reply to the French Dunkerque class.
Both lengthened to 777.5 feet 1938-39 by addition of a clipper bow.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Hood class battlecruisers
Displ: 42,670 tons load
Dim: 860 x 104 x 28.5 feet
Prop: Steam turbines, 24 boilers, 4 shafts, 144,000 hp, 31 knots
Crew: 1477
Arm: 4 dual 15/42, 12 single 5.5/50, 4 4/45, 6 21 inch TT (2 sub, 4 aw)
Armor: 5-12 inch belt, 1.5-3 inch deck, 5-12 inch barbettes, 15 inch
turrets, 11 inch CT
Originally designed as light battlecruisers, cancelled and
restarted as battlecruisers/fast battleships. Three ships
cancelled after Jutland. Often considered to be the first
modern fast battleship.

Hood
Built by John Brown. Laid down 31 May 1916, cancelled and scrapped.
Laid down again 1 Sept 1916, launched 22 Aug 1918, completed 5/1920.
Refitted 1929-1931. Reconstruction authorized 3/1939, cancelled due
to war. Final armament was 4 dual 15 inch, 7 dual 4 inch, 3 8 barrel
AA, 5 AA rocket launchers; displacement had reached 48,360 tons full
load. Was very badly in need of refit or replacement by 1941. Sunk by
Prinz Eugen and Bismarck 24 May 1941 off Iceland.

 

[Juha]

Hello Vincenzo
DoY didn't necessary need numerous hits near each otherto penetrate inside Sch protection, look what happened to A turret of Scharnhorst. But Scharnhorst armour protection was able to keep out from vitals vast majority of 14in hits, but most were not fired at optimum distance but nearer in order to get more hits.

Juha

 

[Kurfürst]

Pardon me but this is nonsense, she beated down one of them very badly (IIRC when she popped up the second time)... Sure it reminds me of King Arthur and the Black Knight.. Arthur was certainly incapable of properly dealing with him, only cut off the limbs

.

Scharnhorst only ever got one or two hits on the Norfolk, due entirely to the Norfolk not having flashless powder. The other cruisers were using this new propellant, and were never troubled by Scharnhorsts fire

Riiight, Norfolk was 'only hit by once or twice', but afaik this 'slight damage' in December 1943 meant she needed such level of repairs which took so long the ship was not ready even for D-Day six months later.. As for the others not troubled, of course, the forward FC set was knocked out with an early lucky hit, so they could aim at the gun flashes only. And...? I don't see where you are going with this...
Any specifics or sources? According the Garzke and Dullin, the captain of Gneisenau (? - too lazy to look up) spoke very highly of the radar sets and their usefullness.

Cant answer right now with specifics, but I will give you the operational details of Scharnhorst versus the British radar fits in a day or two. Basically, there was no comparison in the relative performances of the radar capabilities by 1943. Different story in 1940-41 however.....D

I have looked up thespecification of the FuMo 26/27 that Scharnhorst had at that time. The specs are impressive, but I'll give you possibility to look up the specs of the respective rather sets and finally present us something that is beyond the current, as it seems, wishful arguement based on absolute ignorance of the actual capabilities of the sets used on these ships.

Based on the capabilities of the Fumo 27, especially its accuracy in both range and bearing, I strongly believe that there could be no practical tactical advantage for Allied radar.

Scharnhorst was disengaging, switching radar on was equivalent to trying to flee in the dark with a torch in your hand... I would be very surprised if Allied ships would lack such passive sensors[/I].

Scharnhorst was not trying to disengage at all, she was attempting to outflank the cruiser force.

For which she needed to disengage first of course, cease contact and become invisible of course... I really do not see what are arguing here on semantics..

Moreover, of the Germans had used radar to keep their forces together, 4th Zerstorer flotilla would not have wandered off lost before the battle.

Utter nonsense, the 4th Zerstorer flotilla was sent out by Bey on a wider search pattern for the convoy, not 'wandered off lost' as you try to suggest... and again having absolutely nothing to do with radar at all.

This was the second biggest coup the cruisers achieved against the german dforce....the first was the destruction of the German radar set, effectively blinding the German ship, the second was the determination that 4th flotilla was not present to protect the Scharnhorst close in.....this meant that the RN ships could close to lethal range with impunity, including the destroyres to point blank range, with no threat to them by German torpedoes. Gunfire, even the hevay secondary armament carried by the Sharnhorst is not enough, generally to prevent destroyers and cruisers from closing to lethal range. Firstly, a destroyer or cruiser is a difficult target to hit with guns, and secondly guns might damage a ship, but will not generally disable it, except if hit multiple times.

The destroyers did not close in until the matter was sealed and Scharnhorst was slowed down effectively from battle damage sustained from the DoY. The cruisers did not close in for torp runs until Scharnhorst guns were effectively silenced by gunfire...

So, this is the comparison...one force not using radar, starts out concentrated, gets hopelessly lost, ambushed, disabled, and ultimately sunk. The second force, able to co-ordinate and concentrate their forces, with very accurate fire, and able to determine the precise nature, and force disposition of the enemy at the right moment....whose policy and use of technology as well as understanding of basic naval tactics is superior?????

Its your comparison only though, and as pointed out, it is based on heavy colouring of the events (see 'lost' destroyers, 'due to' radar..) and driven by nationalistic bravado... as such it is rather meaningless IMHo, it just fits to your usual stance on this and just about any other subject.

It is invalid to argue simply that the Germans were simply outnumbered....they were, but this just didnt happen by chance.....they allowed it to happen to themselves mostly . The Germans could have had at least some parity in their force structure, but as a direct result of their mistaken use of radar, failed to achieve this outcome.

The German side had a light Battleship with 11" guns, escorted by 5 destroyers.
The British side 1 battleship with 14" guns, 1 heavy and 3 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers.

You are arguing nonsense. Even with the German force concentrated, they would massively outnumbered all the same.

If the Germans had been equipped with and using an effective search radar, it would have been very difficult for the British to trap her.

They had an effective search radar, and effective passive sets. Again your facts on this are simply wrong.

 

[Glider]

The German side had a light Battleship with 11" guns, escorted by 5 destroyers.
The British side 1 battleship with 14" guns, 1 heavy and 3 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers..

Tue but it tends to ignore the fact that the BB and her escort were out of the fight for hours and in that time the Scharnhorst was up against cruisers that could not penetrate her armour. She had plenty of time to inflict serious damage.

You are arguing nonsense. Even with the German force concentrated, they would massively outnumbered all the same..

Not against the convoy and its close escort.

They had an effective search radar, and effective passive sets. Again your facts on this are simply wrong.

Clearly the passive sets were not effective or they would have seen the DOY, plus the Germans relied on a few radar sets the 80cm Seetakt being on the forward and aft fire control posts. Therefore one hit made her blind forward. RN ships had Type 284 (main Armament) and Type 273Q surface search so there was back up. The surface search radar would not have helped with fire control but would have warned of danger ahead.
The German destroyers didn't have any radar so as soon as they left the Scharhorst no matter what the reason they were out of the fight. Trying to find a convoy at night in rough seas and without radar is almost a lost cause.

 

[hartmann]

Clearly the passive sets were not effective or they would have seen the DOY,

In fact, They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed, but there are evidences of traces of signals picked up by the "Scharnhorst" from the "Jamaica" or the "DoY" some 15 minutes before the final battle thanks to a "Naxos" set given by the Luftwaffe. But this set couldn´t track properly the range nor the true size of the enemy.

plus the Germans relied on a few radar sets the 80cm Seetakt being on the forward and aft fire control posts.

That is not correct. The "Scharnhorst" had a "Hohentwiel" set plus the two "Seetakt" sets.

The surface search radar would not have helped with fire control but would have warned of danger ahead.

Only If It is turned on, but the main problem was that when the "Scharnhorst" firstly engaged the British Heavy crusiers, activated the "Funkmesstile" ("silent active radar" more or less) protocol, turning off all the radar sets and leaving only the passive sets which were still working to escape from them.

The German destroyers didn't have any radar

That is nonsense, all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set instaled from 1942, and from mid to finish 1943, also a "Hohentwiel" surface search set also, among the passive radar sets.

Hope this can help.

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
As I wrote earlier, the were 3 combats, firstly Scharnhorst vs one CA and 2 CLs 09:24-09:40, then 12:24-12:41 Sch vs. the cruisers and 4 DDs, after that Sch. began its high speed withdrawal towards Norway while the 3 cruisers and 4DDs shadowed it, then final battle began when DoY opened fire at 16:50.

Hello Hartmann
Quote:" all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set instaled from 1942…"

That is also my understanding. Did they use their radars? After all they past fairly close some of the escorts of the convoy?

Quote:" They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed…"

Interesting, but why didn't they pick up the radars of the cruisers before the first clash, the cruisers have had Sch. in their screens c. 54 minutes before they opened fire?

Juha

 

[Glider]

In fact, They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed, but there are evidences of traces of signals picked up by the "Scharnhorst" from the "Jamaica" or the "DoY" some 15 minutes before the final battle thanks to a "Naxos" set given by the Luftwaffe. But this set couldn´t track properly the range nor the true size of the enemy.

That is not correct. The "Scharnhorst" had a "Hohentwiel" set plus the two "Seetakt" sets.

Only If It is turned on, but the main problem was that when the "Scharnhorst" firstly engaged the British Heavy crusiers, activated the "Funkmesstile" ("silent active radar" more or less) protocol, turning off all the radar sets and leaving only the passive sets which were still working to escape from them.

That is nonsense, all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set instaled from 1942, and from mid to finish 1943, also a "Hohentwiel" surface search set also, among the passive radar sets.

Hope this can help.

Thanks for the information its appreciated. The only question mark I have is the fitting of the Hohentweil on the destroyers, my understanding is that this happened during 1944 not1943. The rest I accept without question.
It must be said though you have to wonder why the radars were not turned on once combat had been initiated. I doubt if passive sets were able to allow blind firing and at night that is pretty critical.

Thanks again

 

[parsifal]

There is a pretty good account of the battle by Mike Kemble, a well known author, at the following site

The Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst

A few things that have been raisede that need to be responded to

Myth-1
"The German Destroyers were detached on a separate search arc, deliberately by Adm Bey"

Not so according to Kemble, as the following extract shows

The German Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst was now on her way to her destiny, heading north at 25 knots, into worsening weather. Seas were washing completely over the destroyer escorts battling along with her. At 0300 hrs 26th December, Bey received a signal confirming the operation was to proceed. By 0700 hrs the Scharnhorst's navigator reckoned that they were now within 30 miles of the convoy, and ahead of it, another 40 minutes and the convoy should be in view. At 0820 hrs, for some unknown reason, Admiral Bey turned the Scharnhorst to the north. However, Bey neglected to inform the 4th Flotilla who sailed blindly on at 90 degrees to the Scharnhorst, contact soon being lost, never to be regained.

It should be obvious to anyone with any inkling of the nature of naval operations that this losing of contact would not have occurred if the the Germans had adopted a more up to date operational policy with their radar

Myth 2

"Using Radar was more dangerous than not using it".

The Germans used a passive bistatic system during World War II. This system, called the Kleine Heidelberg device, was deployed at seven sites (Limmen, Oostvoorne, Ostend, Boulogne, Abbeville, Cap d'Antifer and Cherbourg) and operated as bistatic receivers, using the British Chain Home radars as non-cooperative illuminators, to detect aircraft over the southern part of the North Sea. none were instaleed into warships that I know of

There were a number of passive detection systems that could be in use with the KM that I know of, including Metox
Naxos, Samos and Timor. There were others, but as far as I am aware they were incapable of detecting the HF radars below the 10cnm wavelengths such as the Type 274. Afaik, effective passive detection of this radar was not developed until the mid-50s

According to wiki "The FuG 350 Naxos radar detector was a World War II German counter measure to SHF band centimetric wavelength radar produced by a cavity magnetron.

Telefunken built a simple detector named "Naxos" that could pick up 10 cm / 3 GHz H2S radar transmissions, and a more sophisticated detector named "Korfu" with greater range and accuracy.

Korfu saw little use, but Naxos saw widespread service. There were two different types of Naxos. "Naxos Z" was developed for night fighters and mounted in a blister on top of the fighter's canopy. It could detect an RAF bomber from much longer range than FuG 227 Flensburg. Another version, the S-band (2500-3700MHz, 12-9 cm wavelength)[1] FuMB7[2] Naxos U, was provided to U-boats to allow them to detect 10 cm / 3 GHz ASV, though by that time the U-boats were entirely on the defensive and it did them only a little good. By one of those weird coincidences which occur in wartime, the U-Boats received their Naxos 10 cm detectors on the same day that RAF Coastal Command deployed its first 3 cm ASV radar sets. Naxos was further hobbled by the fact that it proved very fragile in field conditions, and working out the bugs ended up being a difficult task."

As will be seen below, Naxos was unable to detect either the Type 284M or the Type 274 gunnery radars in use by the RN in the battle

Metox was a similar device, able to detect radars above the 10 cm bandwidth. Since the surface radars installed in the RN surface ships after 1942 were all well below this wavelength, there was no hope of the device being effective after 1942, even against its intended target ASV radars, which by then were also operating below the specified band width.

Passive detection could not assist in gunnery direction finding, or fire control, though they might give a general warning of the proximity of enemies. Since this was already known to the Germans at the time of the battle, I dont see a great deal of benefit arising from them

The basic question that has to be asked is this, was using radar actively more dangerous than not using it. The Germans could hardly have done worse, and handled their forces worse with a strong policy of not using radar actively, so there should be little doubt about which policy was the more successful.

Postwar, no Navy adopted as operational policy the general "radar silence" policy adopted by the KM during the war, until well into the 70's with the adoption of radar seeking weaponary. This did lead to the use of radar silence, but for reasons that simply did not exist during the war.

no question in my mind, the Germans were mistaken in their operational policies during the war


Myth 3

"German radar was comparable in performance to the late war British radars"

German radfar was in fact comparable to British radar in 1940-41, but lagged very badly as the war progressed, especially those sets actually employed in an operational capacity

I have provided figures on the essential characteristics for the following radars

Type 284/284M/274/Fumo 27

in that order. Note that DoY was fitted with Type 284M and Type 274, and Scharnhorst with Fumo 27 at the time of the battle


Frequency: 600/600/3296/368. Frequency is important because it is a major determinant in the definition the set will achieve an its overall accuracy. As can be seen, the German set operated at about half that of the Type 284s, and about 10% as high as the Type 274

Power: 25/150/400/60 (FUMO 34)

Pulse (microseconds): 2/1/0.5/5.0

Range/error: 21950+/- 110/ 27430+/- 25/ 36650 +/-20 / 22000 +/- 75 m

Bearing Error: +/-30/5/3/300

By 1945, my sources tell me that the new sets fitted to the Prinz Eugen had reduced the PP to 4 microseconds, and the accuracy to +/-50m

At no point however were German naval radars at all compaparable to Allied radars, refelected in the fact that by early 1943, the principal fire control mechanisms in RN ships were all radar controlled, whereas they remained conteolled by optical means in the KM

Myth 4

HMS was out of action until after D-Day

Not true. According to this site..... HMS Norfolk, British heavy cruiser, WW2


Engaged German battleship SCHARNHORST after radar contact by HM Cruiser SHEFFIELD

and joined by Home Fleet destroyers. Twice hit by enemy fire which damaged "X" turret and

radar equipment. Seven of ships' company were killed and five wounded.

Took part in the subsequent surface gun action against SCHARNHORST with HM Battleship

DUKE OF YORK, HM Cruisers BELFAST and SHEFFIELD –

For details see THE KOLA RUN by D. Campbell and D. Maclnryre, ENGAGE THE ENEMY

MORE CLOSELY and Naval Staff History).



1 9 4 4



January Deployed with Home Fleet.



February Under major refit in Tyne shipyard.

to "X" turret removed. Gunnery fire control radars fitted (Type 274,282,283 and 285.)

November New Surface Warning radars Type 277 and 293 fitted.

(See RADAR AT SEA by D. Howse).

The ship rejoined the Home Fleet in January 1944. It was taken in hand for refit in February, which lasted until November. This cannot be seen as being put out of action as a result of damage received. If it had it would have been decommissioned immediately after the battle

 

[DonL]

What I don't understand is this discussion about Nordkap!

Yes SH was only an average design and yes there was no radar control fire equipment on german vessels during the WWII. But that's not the fault of the vessel if radar control or not. And this Thread should be discussing Hood versus SH 1939 till 1941 so no radar is in this match.

I have described my opinion so what is your opinions guys? Long range; short range, guns especially at which range can SH hit through the main belt of Hood; speed advantage.............?

I think there are some very interesting points so what's going on without Nordcap!

 

[renrich]

The threads on this site do seem to wander from time to time. It is all interesting though.

 

[parsifal]

The main characteristics of the Hoods defensive scheme were as follows (from wiki)

Hood's protection accounted for 33% of her displacement; a high proportion by British standards, although less than was usual in contemporary German designs (for example, 36% for the battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg).

The armoured belt consisted of face-hardened armour (Krupp cemented or KC), arranged as follows:

Main belt: 12 in (305 mm) between A and Y barbettes; forward extension 5 to 6 in (127 to 152 mm); aft extension 6 in (152 mm);
Middle belt: 7 in (178 mm) between A and Y barbettes; forward extension 5 in (127 mm);
Upper belt: 5 in (127 mm) amidships, extending forward to A barbette, with a short 4 in (102 mm) extension aft.
All sections of the belt were angled outwards by 10 degrees, increasing the effective armour thickness by causing incoming shells to strike at a less favourable angle for penetration.
The deck protection was constructed from high tensile (HT) steel, arranged as follows:
Forecastle deck: 1.75 to 2 in (44 to 51 mm);
Upper deck: 2 in (51 mm) over magazines; 0.75 in (19 mm) elsewhere;
Main deck: 3 in (76 mm) over magazines; 1 in (25 mm) elsewhere; plus 2 in (51 mm) slope meeting bottom of main belt;
Lower deck (forward and aft): 3 in (76 mm) over propeller shafts; 2 in (51 mm) magazine crowns; 1 in (25 mm) elsewhere.
The 3 in (76 mm) plating on the main deck was added at a very late stage of construction, after live firing trials with the new 15 in APC (armour-piercing, capped) shell in the autumn of 1919 showed that this shell could penetrate the ship's vitals via the 7 in (178 mm) middle belt and the 2 in (51 mm) slope of the main deck. Further trials showed that the additional plating was just adequate to defeat this threat. It was apparently proposed to extend the new plating to the whole of the upper deck, removing the conning tower, torpedo tubes and four 5.5 in guns as weight compensation; in the event, only the areas above the magazines were reinforced. As completed, Hood remained susceptible to plunging (high-trajectory) fire and bombs, and had no margin of protection against the next generation of heavy guns.
The armament turrets had a frontal armour thickness of 15 in (381 mm), side-armour of 11 to 12 in (280 to 305 mm) and a roof of 5 in (127 mm). For protection against torpedoes she was given an "anti-torpedo bulge", an air-filled space backed by an inner reinforced wall. It was a new and effective solution for WW I ships.

The weak link in the Hood was of course its level of deck protection . It appears to be faulty in concept to me, though my opinion is that her rapid demise in 1941 was still somewhat the result of very bad luck

On the assumption that her armouring scheme was designed to withstand the British 15" shell, one therefore needs to compare this venerable gun to the performance of the SKC/34 28cm fitted to the Scharnhorst to determine if the latter weapon was of sufficient power to deal with the Hoods defensive scheme adequately.

Using the Nav weapons site, I found the following characteristics for each gun.
Elevation With 727.5 lbs. (330 kg) APC L4,4 Striking Velocity Angle of Fall
2.0 degrees 5,470 yards (5,000 m) 2,513 fps (766 mps) 2.5
4.3 degrees 10,940 yards (10,000 m) 2,139 fps (652 mps) 5.7
7.4 degrees 16,400 yards (15,000 m) 1,824 fps (556 mps) 10.3
11.3 degrees 21,870 yards (20,000 m) 1,578 fps (481 mps) 17.2
16.2 degrees 27,340 yards (25,000 m) 1,430 fps (436 mps) 25.7
22.0 degrees 32,810 yards (30,000 m) 1,371 fps (418 mps) 35.3
29.2 degrees 38,280 yards (35,000 m) 1,404 fps (428 mps) 44.0
38.2 degrees 43,740 yards (40,000 m) 1,509 fps (460 mps) 52.0
40.0 degrees 44,760 yards (40,930m) ---

At maximum recorded range for any hit on a warsgip, the 28cm weapon is going to strike its target at sbout 20-25 degrees. Because of its flat trajectory, it gained a reputation as an accurate gun, but this also means it has a lesser chance of achieving a plunging fire solution compared to its 38cm cousin

This means that it will have to defeat the side armouring scheme of the Hood. We therefore need to check the AP characteristics of the gun:

Range : Side Armor/ Deck Armor
0 yards (0 m): 23.79" (604 mm)/ ---
8,640 yards (7,900 m): 18.09" (460 mm)/ 0.76" (19 mm)
16,514 yards (15,100 m): 13.18" (335 mm)/ 1.63" (41 mm)
20,013 yards (18,288 m): 11.47" (291 mm)/ 1.87" (48 mm)
30,000 yards (27,432 m): 8.08" (205 mm)/ 2.99" (76 mm)
Note: The above information is from "Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War Two" for a muzzle velocity of 2,920 fps (890 mps) and is based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration. I copied this and the next dataset from the Nav weapons site

Range: Side Armor
10,936 yards (10,000 m): 13.70" (348 mm)
16,404 yards (15,000 m): 11.02" (280 mm)
21,872 yards (20,000 m): 8.86" (225 mm)
27,340 yards (25,000 m): 7.64" (194 mm)
Note: The above information is from "German Capital Ships of World War Two." The data is based upon the pre-war Krupp test shoots on their range in Meppen with L/4,4 APC projectiles using RPC/32 propellant against KC-type armor at an impact angle of 70 degrees.

Just glancing at these figures, it becomes apparent that the 28cm gun could not penetreate the main belt of the Hood outside of 16000 yards (ignoring any interanl bulkheads after the main belt. I estimete the middle belt was protection against projectiles fired at greater than 21000 yards. The deck plating of the main deck could not be penetrated by plunging fire.

These are not good figures forthe SKC 34

Now, the Scharnhorst armouring scheme was:
main belt: 6-13.75
Deck: 2in
armoured deck (below): 3in
Turrets: 6-14 (face)

The 15in Mk II had the following characteristics

Range
Elevation(see Note 2) With 1,920 lbs. (871 kg) 4crh AP Shell
1.0 degree 1,920 yards (1,756 m) --- 1.0
2.6 degrees 5,000 yards (4,570 m) 2,074 fps (632 mps) 3.0
5.0 degrees 8,629 yards (7,980 m) --- 6.0
5.9 degrees 10,000 yards (9,140 m) 1,776 fps (541 mps) 7.3
10.0 degrees 14,853 yards (13,582 m) --- 13.0
10.1 degrees 15,000 yards (13,720 m) 1,537 fps (468 mps) 13.6
15.0 degrees 19,707 yards (18,020 m) --- 21.0
15.6 degrees 20,000 yards (18,290 m) 1,377 fps (420 mps) 22.3
20.0 degrees
(see Note 3) 23,734 yards (21,702 m) --- 29.0
20.0 degrees
(see Note 3) 23,387 yards (21,385 m) --- ---
22.5 degrees 25,000 yards (22,860 m) 1,317 fps (401 mps) 32.7
30.1 degrees 29,000 yards (26,520 m) 1,326 fps (404 mps) 42.0


In summary, it has a steeper angle of descent than the 28cm weapon, making a plunging fire shot more likely, roughly 50% more likely in fact.

Now, the AP characteristics of this gun:

Armor Penetration with 1,938 lbs. (879 kg) APC Shell
.
Range Side Armor Deck Armor
17,200 yards (15,730 m) 14.0" (356 mm) ---
18,000 yards (16,460 m) --- 2.0" (51 mm)
19,400 yards (17,740 m) 13.0" (330 mm) ---
21,700 yards (19,840 m) 12.0" (305 mm) ---
24,000 yards (21,950 m) --- 3.0" (76 mm)
24,500 yards (22,400 m) 11.0" (279 mm) ---
28,000 yards (25,600 m) 10.0" (254 mm) 4.0" (102 mm)
29,500 yards (26,970 m) --- 5.0" (127 mm)
32,500 yards (29,720 m) --- 6.0" (152 mm)
Notes:
This data is from "British Battleships of World War Two." This table assumes 90 degree inclination and is based upon theoretical calculations performed in 1935, not actual firing trials.

Armor Penetration with 1,938 lbs. (879 kg) APC Shell
.
Range Side Armor Deck Armor
0 yards (0 m) 27.1" (687 mm) ---
10,000 yards (9,144 m) 16.5" (422 mm) 1.25" (32 mm)
15,000 yards (13,716 m) 13.9" (353 mm) 1.95" (50 mm)
20,000 yards (18,288 m) 11.7" (297 mm) 3.10" (72 mm)
25,000 yards (22,860 m) 10.2" (259 mm) 4.30" (121 mm)
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 9.0" (229 mm) 5.70" (145 mm)
Note: This data is from "Battleships: Allied Battleships in World War II" for a muzzle velocity of 2,400 fps (732 mps) and is partly based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration and partly based upon official data.

In 1921 the British conducted a series of gunnery trials using the last battleship completed by the Germans during World War I, the surrendered Baden. These trials were conducted as a part of the design process for the next generation of capital ships, which were later cancelled as a result of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty. During these gunnery trials, the monitors Erebus and Terror fired a total of 31 shells using reduced charges in order to obtain striking velocities equivalent to the expected battle ranges. Two primary striking velocities were used, 1,550 fps (472 mps) simulating a range of 15,500 yards (14,170 m) and 1,380 fps (421 mps) simulating a range of 21,800 yards (19,930 m).
Tests at 1,550 fps (472 mps) with 4crh "Greenboy" APC showed that these projectiles could penetrate turret face armor of 35 cm (13.8 in) when struck at an angle of 18.5 degrees and penetrate barbette armor of 35 cm (13.8 in) when struck at an angle of 11 degrees, but that this same armor thickness on the conning tower successfully defeated an APC striking at an angle of 30 degrees. Another test at this velocity saw an APC striking at an angle of 14.5 degrees penetrating the upper armor belt of 25 cm (10 in) and this shell then traveling some 38 feet (11.6 m) before bursting on the funnel casing and damaging two boilers, having first penetrated a 3 cm (1.2 in) splinter bulkhead and the 1.2 cm (0.5 in) main deck

 

[hartmann]

all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set installed from 1942…"

That is also my understanding. Did they use their radars?

In this battle probably yes, but those sets were of less capability than the installed in heavy cruisers and battleships, so I don't know If really were effective in the so rough sea of these days and, also, They had very limited range (given the reduced height of the aerials) of some 10-12 kms (probably less in those meteorological conditions.)

" They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both them were grouped closely, so it didn't worked only because it was previously destroyed…"

Interesting, but why didn't they pick up the radars of the cruisers before the first clash; the cruisers have had Sch. in their screens c. 54 minutes before they opened fire?

Probably, the cruisers were using a combination of search radar models of Type 273 Q and Type 284, both in decimetric and centimetric wavelengths so it was far more difficult to track them.
Honestly, the battle of North Cape isn't one of the mostly studied by me. I can't tell you more about this at the moment.

Thanks for the information it's appreciated.

Thanks a lot for your words

The only question mark I have is the fitting of the Hohentwiel on the destroyers; my understanding is that this happened during 1944 not 1943.

I have been reading some notes and documents, and probably you are right. I thought firstly in the bigger vessels, which received a set of "Hohentwiel" in mid to finish of 1943. My mistake (I was writing from my memory ).

It must be said though you have to wonder why the radars were not turned on once combat had been initiated.

You have to take in account that those sets were driven by electronic vacuum valves, and not by chips and silicon components, so They needed sometime to warm and properly functioning (the German valves were realtively fast, comparatively, the British sets needed large periods of pre- heating, by this reason the British almost never turned off their sets, because they needed a lot of time to restart them again.

I doubt if passive sets were able to allow blind firing and at night that is pretty critical.

Pretty correct my friend. It was almost impossible to make blind fire with only passive sets in night and gale weather as in Nordkapp.

 

[hartmann]

There is a pretty good account of the battle by Mike Kemble, a well known author, at the following site

The Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst

A few things that have been raisede that need to be responded to

In fact, the writer of the webpage has no idea about the ship, as She was classified ever as a fast battleship by Germany and built as such (Schlachtschiff, not Schlacht Kreuizer).

There were a number of passive detection systems that could be in use with the KM that I know of, including Metox, Naxos, Samos and Timor. There were others, but as far as I am aware they were incapable of detecting the HF radars below the 10cm wavelengths such as the Type 274.

That's not correct.
"Naxos" was tuned to catch emissions in the range of 10-9 cm as direct response to H2S panoramic radar, but It in fact could track at very short ranges, sub-harmonics of this frequency, giving the possibility under certain circumstances of detect also H2X, in the 3,3 cm range. Because It was not a very common success, the much more specialised "Korfu" and "Mücke" were created, which were capable of tracking radar emissions ranging from 1,5 cm to 12 cm. And finally, in very late 1944 entered the FuMB 36 "Athos", capable of tracking wavelengths between 1, 5 cm to only millimetric waves (frequencies up to 40.000 MHz).

Also, the radar set Type 274 was a set tuned to send in 10 to 9 cm so it was perfectly capable of being tracked by a "Naxos" (as in fact happened in the battle).

Afaik, effective passive detection of this radar was not developed until the mid-50s.

Not again. The Germans put in service passive sets (FuMB sets) capable of detecting wavelengths ranging from millimetres to metres. If Naxos wouldn´t have worked, the British bomber crews wouldn´t have suffered so much.

Korfu saw little use,

It saw good use in the Kriegsmarine in the last year of war, mainly in cruisers and destroyers, but also in U Boote.

As will be seen below, Naxos was unable to detect either the Type 284M

Quite obvious, as it operated in 50 cm band.

or the Type 274 gunnery radars in use by the RN in the battle

The Type 274 was not used by DoY in this battle, as it was the centimetric replacement of gun laying radar Type 284 in all its variants (and again once more, If it would have been used, which was not the case, It would have been tracked as It had centimetric wavelength).

May be you refer to surface-search set Type 273Q which was carried in DoY and some of the cruisers.

Metox was a similar device, able to detect radars above the 10 cm bandwidth.

Yes, It was tuned to catch only signals in the 1,5 metres wavelenght, and in the third sub-harmonics, rarely catched sets in the 50 cm band.

Since the surface radars installed in the RN surface ships after 1942 were all well below this wavelengt,

Even the RAF used well until 1944 metric sets in ASW search and interception.

In fact, during the war there was not a single set below the 10 cm band installed in a single RN ship (only a pair of experimental sets as the Type 268U). All ranged from 7,5 metres to 10 cm in wavelength, so, no one surpassed the capability of Naxos, much less the more advanced passive sets.

even against its intended target ASV radars,

Again it is not absolutely correct. As I previously stated, the introduction of centimetric wave sets was a very hard work. By example, the USS Washington battleship used until well late 1944 the MK3/MK4 decimetric sets even when their sisters had the far better MK8 sets.
And this is only one example.

"German radar was comparable in performance to the late war British radars"

German radar was in fact comparable to British radar in 1940-41, but lagged very badly as the war progressed, especially those sets actually employed in an operational capacity

That is the true myth my friend, the German gunlaying sets both in Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were as capable or more than the Allied counterparts. Indeed, a good work in disinformation and dissemination of propaganda. Rather the inverse, the British radar of 1941 was not on par with the late 1941 German radar sets. Not until the Type 271 the British had comparable surface search radar to the basic Seetakt sets of first series¡¡

Type 284/284M/274/Fumo 27

in that order. Note that DoY was fitted with Type 284M and Type 274,

That is nonsense, the DoY only had the decimetric gunlaying Type 284M set, but not the 274. Again it must be the surface search Type 273Q, not the gunlaying Type 274.

and Scharnhorst with FuMO 27 at the time of the battle

Again, it is not the case my friend. The "Scharnhorst" was upgraded to the FuMO 26 (the true German gunlaying beast set) just a couple of moths before the last engagement (probably the radar servants were not well trained with this new set).

 

[hartmann]

The last post of my answer.

Frequency: 600/600/3296/368. Frequency is important because it is a major determinant in the definition the set will achieve and its overall accuracy.

Again not. Taking into account only the frequency (or the equivalent, wavelength) by itself, means nothing about overall accuracy and definition of the set. There are a lot of other parameters far more important than wavelength. If this would be the case, the SCR 268 family of AA gunlaying sets, operating at 1,5 metres would be completely useless, which of course was not the case, as SCR 268 AA gunlaying sets were the most capable of US Army until the entry of SCR 584.

As can be seen, the German set operated at about half that of the Type 284s, and about 10% as high as the Type 274.

I would better put the wavelength, as it is more understandable to the rest of the people:

Type 284 and 284 M = 50-55 cm.
Type 274 = 10-9,8 cm.
FuMO2x = Between 70 to 83 cm.

Power: 25/150/400/60 (FUMO 34)

The transmitted power of the FuMO 26 was only 16 Kilowatts and beat the Type 284 in range and equals to the Type 284M, so, again as the wavelength/frequency, taken alone, is senseless. And aagain, the FuMO 34 had an emitting power of 125 Kwatts, not of 60 Kwatts.

Pulse (microseconds): 2/1/0.5/5.0

What do you refer with this data? Pulse duration (PL) or Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF)?

the Type 284 used a PRF of 500 Hz, the Type 284M maybe was boosted to 600, but again, the FuMO27 and 26, used a PRF of 500 Hz (the first series, aka FuMO21 and 22, between 1000-2000 Hz).

If We talk about Pulse length, It is also wrong, allthe Seetakt radar sets had ever a Pulse Length (PL) of 2-3 microseconds (average 2,5), not 5.

Bearing Error: +/-30/5/3/300

Again, the data is not correct for German set, and misleading (as is commonly given in degrees and mils, not in meters or feets, as you are speaking of angular data when talk about bearing).

By 1945, my sources tell me that the new sets fitted to the Prinz Eugen had reduced the PP to 4 microseconds, and the accuracy to +/-50 m

Again, range accuracies of 100-50 metres with FuMO sets were obtained in late 1941 to mid 1942, not in 1945, and btw, both, the PL and the PRF of German sets remained the same, 2,5 microseconds and 500 Hz, It didn't changed in second and third FuMO series.

At no point however were German naval radars at all comparable to Allied radars,

Which were not? Again, the FuMO26 or the "Renner" series gunlaying coastal artillery sets were equal to the best Allied sets. Concerning surface search radars, the late war "Hohentwiel" model was very comparable to SG and Type 273 sets, so I don't see an abysmal difference (even the early "Hohentwiel" was superior to Type 271).

 

[parsifal]

Well, ther is virtually nothing that we agree on I can see. If you dont mind, I will continue to rely on the sources that I draw from, such as Campbell and the nav weapons, if they are "propaganda sources", then they are pretty good, since they are accepted by all except the most cocketed pro-germans around. We will have to agree to disagree on this issue I am afraid.

Of course, I could be wrong, and in fact the Germans only let us win because they felt sorry for us....or, the accpted texts are correct.

 

[hartmann]

I will continue to rely on the sources that I draw from, such as Campbell and the nav weapons

If You like, I would suggest better the book "GEMA" from Harry von Kroge, original German documents like AGR, or the manual of the FuG 224 (or If You like FuMO 81) "Berlin" series radar sets, books like "Blitz und anker" (both 2 volumes) from Joachim Beckh, some books about radar technology like from Skolnik, in both two and third edition and University courses (like when I studied optics).
Or may be books like "Deckname Würzburg" from Arthur O. Bauer, or may be "A RADAR HISTORY OF WWII" written by Louis Brown and so on, instead on reliying in Internet. But I can say You a lot more (and certainly, I have also campbell book "Naval Weapons").

since they are accepted by all

cocketed pro-germans

Do You think so it really?

Well, then I will forget all that I have learned until now form WWII radar technology and naval technology and I will reconsider the "Bismarck" class as a mere bigger "Baden" ships, or that German radar technology was far behind the allied technology from 1941, as It is the accepted by allmost all writers
(uhmm, I have cited some others which don´t consider this, very extrange , they must be also cocketed pro-germans ).

and in fact the Germans only let us win because they felt sorry for us

What sh*t is this?

Facts are facts.
I have given you enough data to reconsider some things wrtitten by the common wisdom, from new research, completelly correct, and It doesn´t matter If Germany was behind or beyond the Allies in some technology, They lost by their mistakes and because a lot more things. Not by They felt sorry for Us. If the data given doesn´t fit in your agenda, It is not my problem.

By myself, this discussion can be finished. I have not intention to ear insults and discredits.