How did the I-16 Really Perform in WWII?

The Polikarpov I-16 was a part of that early generation of modern fighters with retractable landing gear. In the Spanish Civil War and in China it was a strong performer. However, like most of these aircraft (save for those with colossal development potential like the base BF-109) it was generally outdated come the start of WWII. That being said, I'm curious to see how it truly did in the early period of WWII and especially on the Eastern Front.

The I-16 was used by the USSR as we know:


It was also used by China (some were modified with US engines and called the "Chung 28"):


Finland captured quite a few of them, though unlike with the I-153 I am not sure if they were used operationally:


Both "versions" of Spain used the I-16 either through supply or being captured which translated to WWII usage:


Other operators included Germany, Romania, Japan, etc. for flight testing after being captured. Wikipedia claims Mongolia used one for training. Poland apparently had one though I'm not sure exactly how.

Advantages:
Very manueverable
Strong roll rate at low speeds
Small target

Middle:
Unstable - I'm putting this in the middle solely because this actually had some benefits alongside the obvious downsides. The aircraft was hard for new pilots because it could enter a spin easily, however it had arguably some of the best "exiting a spin" characteristics of any aircraft of WWII. This meant that, once the pilot learned the plane well enough, they could trigger snap rolls (and related maneuvers) very easily when doing air combat.

Disadvantages:
Light construction
Slow
Variants with cannons were rare, so most had weak armaments
Bad handling on takeoff and landing

Here is a video from an airshow demonstration in 2011:

View: https://youtu.be/DahBnByHi54?si=NoyYYDMQUlfuoAuvYou can see how it is a small target and is pretty maneuverable, but also how it isn't very fast and its ground handling on takeoff and landing leaves a lot to be desired.

One thing I've read in some comments on social media (I would like it if anyone on here could provide verification for some of these) is that a lot of Soviet Spanish Civil War veterans actually did not want to switch to more modern fighters in 1941 due to their own positive views of the aircraft. So what is the truth? Was the I-16 just an outdated fighter by WWII, or was it still a capable aircraft during The Second World War in the right conditions?

In 1941, all of the "new" Soviet fighters (MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1) had a huge number of design and manufacturing flaws that seriously complicated their mastering and use. The MiG-3 was no easier to master than the I-16 (in fact, it was even more difficult), and its armament was not significantly superior to that of the latter. Only the Yak-1 was significantly easier to master than the I-16. As a result, in 1941, an experienced pilot flying a well-mastered I-16 of acceptable build quality could achieve better results in combat with fighters. However, it was more difficult to chase down a bomber on the I-16 - even the versions equipped with M-62/M-63 engines never reached speeds of 500 km/h. Therefore, it is true that the I-16 was already obsolete for performing all fighter tasks, but it was still sufficient for maneuvering combat with fighters if the pilot was well trained. There were not many veterans of the Spanish Civil War, so I would simply refer to them as well-trained pilots. One of the last units that fought on the I-16 before the beginning of 1943 was the 13th (4th Guards) Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Arm. The pilots of this air regiment even had the opportunity to engage in combat with the FW 190, at the same time, they rated the Hurricane's capabilities in air combat with fighters lower than those of the I-16.

bf109xxl said:

In 1941, all of the "new" Soviet fighters (MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1) had a huge number of design and manufacturing flaws that seriously complicated their mastering and use. The MiG-3 was no easier to master than the I-16 (in fact, it was even more difficult), and its armament was not significantly superior to that of the latter. Only the Yak-1 was significantly easier to master than the I-16. As a result, in 1941, an experienced pilot flying a well-mastered I-16 of acceptable build quality could achieve better results in combat with fighters. However, it was more difficult to chase down a bomber on the I-16 - even the versions equipped with M-62/M-63 engines never reached speeds of 500 km/h. Therefore, it is true that the I-16 was already obsolete for performing all fighter tasks, but it was still sufficient for maneuvering combat with fighters if the pilot was well trained. There were not many veterans of the Spanish Civil War, so I would simply refer to them as well-trained pilots. One of the last units that fought on the I-16 before the beginning of 1943 was the 13th (4th Guards) Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Arm. The pilots of this air regiment even had the opportunity to engage in combat with the FW 190, at the same time, they rated the Hurricane's capabilities in air combat with fighters lower than those of the I-16.

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While I suspected it, I never knew that the I-16 did actually face the Fw-190. You are pretty much right about everything you said though. The MiG-3 was a high altitude fighter that was not for the faint of heart, and the LaGG-3 was an overly complex aircraft made by a new company with little mass production experience. The Yak-1 was the "best" just because it went the simpler fighter route (like the Hurricane and P-40), and Yakovlev was also a politician who knew how to get on Stalins good side. Polikarpov was the opposite, which is (part of) why his advanced designs (I-180, I-185, etc.) never entered mass-production.

Does anyone on here have any data/accounts of air combats? The only major one I know of is from China in 1940 when the A6M was first field tested, and the I-16s were largely dominated in the fight.

Airborne2001 said:

While I suspected it, I never knew that the I-16 did actually face the Fw-190.

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Moreover, Vasily Golubev claimed he had shot down two FW 190s on the I-16 in January 1943! However I never heard, that they were not confirmed by German loss records, nevertheless even the fact that the I-16 fought the FW 190 and at least did not lose is surprising.

Airborne2001 said:

The MiG-3 was a high altitude fighter

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The MiG-3 was designed as a high-speed front-line fighter, and its altitude characteristics were rather a consequence of the choice of engine - Polikarpov simply chose the most powerful engine available. At that time, there was a crisis with engines in the USSR - Klimov failed with the M-106, Nazarov with the M-87, and Mikulin with the AM-37. As a result, it was necessary to choose between the M-105 and the AM-35A, the latter being considered too heavy for a fighter, but Polikarpov took the risk. As a result, his fighter became a "high-altitude" aircraft, but I strongly doubt that Polikarpov had originally planned this.

Airborne2001 said:

Yakovlev was also a politician who knew how to get on Stalins good side. Polikarpov was the opposite, which is (part of) why his advanced designs (I-180, I-185, etc.) never entered mass-production.

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Stalin listened not only to Yakovlev, and the intrigues of the latter were not the only thing that prevented the mass production of the I-185. The situation was much more complicated, involving at least the directors of aircraft factories with whom Polikarpov did not have a good relationship. There is still no final clarity on the possibility of serial production of the I-185, and the debate continues.

bf109xxl said:

Moreover, Vasily Golubev claimed he had shot down two FW 190s on the I-16 in January 1943! However I never heard, that they were not confirmed by German loss records, nevertheless even the fact that the I-16 fought the FW 190 and at least did not lose is surprising.

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Yeah, an I-16 facing an Fw-190 and coming out alive is something for sure. I will say that I am not too surprised though given the records of aircraft like the F2A, P-36, I-153, IAR-81C, etc.

bf109xxl said:

The MiG-3 was designed as a high-speed front-line fighter, and its altitude characteristics were rather a consequence of the choice of engine - Polikarpov simply chose the most powerful engine available. At that time, there was a crisis with engines in the USSR - Klimov failed with the M-106, Nazarov with the M-87, and Mikulin with the AM-37. As a result, it was necessary to choose between the M-105 and the AM-35A, the latter being considered too heavy for a fighter, but Polikarpov took the risk. As a result, his fighter became a "high-altitude" aircraft, but I strongly doubt that Polikarpov had originally planned this.

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Well this is new info to me! I suppose it makes sense though given the issues with Soviet engines at the time. I still wonder what a MiG would've been like in the Blitz or over the Meditteranean...

bf109xxl said:

Stalin listened not only to Yakovlev, and the intrigues of the latter were not the only thing that prevented the mass production of the I-185. The situation was much more complicated, involving at least the directors of aircraft factories with whom Polikarpov did not have a good relationship. There is still no final clarity on the possibility of serial production of the I-185, and the debate continues.

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It makes sense that it was complicated given Polikarpov was not heavily supportive of Soviet politics in the way everyone else had to be to survive basically. Also, Polikarpov spoke his mind freely, which certainly must've upset more than just Stalin. I agree that the I-185 debate is up in the air, but I still think that the root problem goes back to the I-180 in 1940.

The I-16 performed about as well as could be expected in WWII. It may have done better had the USSR been more prepared for Hitler's invasion, but Stalin seemed to put more trust in the racist, antisemitic, slavophobic, rabidly anti-bolshevik Hitler than his own people. Maybe he should have had somebody give him a summary of Mein Kampf

Airborne2001 said:

Also, Polikarpov spoke his mind freely, which certainly must've upset more than just Stalin.

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Polikarpov was arrested in 1929 and remained in prison until 1931, where he continued to design aircraft in the prison design bureau (TsKB-39). Therefore, if he expressed his opinion, he did so rather quietly and cautiously. Polikarpov was simply terribly unlucky - the I-180 crashes, which were actually caused either by test pilots' mistakes or manufacturing defects, undermined Stalin's trust in him.

Airborne2001 said:

I agree that the I-185 debate is up in the air, but I still think that the root problem goes back to the I-180 in 1940.

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The problem was that the large "fighter" aircraft factory in Gorky (No. 21) had been reoriented to produce the LaGG instead of the I-16. While the I-180 was a further development of the I-16, and the technologies were still very similar despite all the differences, the LaGG manufacturing technology was radically different, which required a complete change of all tooling in production. After the war outbreak - by the time the I-185 was ready for mass production - any slowdown in production was considered unacceptable, unfortunately it was inevitable due to the need to replace all the tooling. It was a serious mistake to start production of the wooden LaGG. The result was a very mediocre aircraft with a huge number of serious shortcomings, which required two years of improvement to achieve acceptable quality. It was necessary to preserve the technology and produce the I-180 of mixed construction despite all the problems with the engine, which had achieved acceptable characteristics by the end of 1939. This would have allowed a smooth transition to the I-185, which, in general, continued the line of the I-16 and I-180, and the production deployment would not require a radical change in technology. Unfortunately, this is obvious now in hindsight, but at that time decisions were made under conditions of insufficient information.

swampyankee said:

The I-16 performed about as well as could be expected in WWII. It may have done better had the USSR been more prepared for Hitler's invasion, but Stalin seemed to put more trust in the racist, antisemitic, slavophobic, rabidly anti-bolshevik Hitler than his own people. Maybe he should have had somebody give him a summary of Mein Kampf

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I am absolutely convinced that Stalin was familiar with the translation of Mein Kampf. He simply mistakenly believed himself to be smarter than everyone else, including Hitler, and hoped to outsmart the latter. This resulted in the deaths of millions of Soviet citizens.
However, Stalin's voluntarism was not the only cause of problems for Soviet aviation. At that time, the directors of aircraft factories had a serious influence on certain decisions in aviation, and Polikarpov did not have a good relationship with them. The factory director had the power to slow down the production of a "foreign" experimental design and, on the contrary, to speed up the production of a design created by the factory's own design bureau, as was the case with Polikarpov. The Soviet system was somewhat more complex than it is often portrayed in the West.

bf109xxl said:

Polikarpov was arrested in 1929 and remained in prison until 1931, where he continued to design aircraft in the prison design bureau (TsKB-39). Therefore, if he expressed his opinion, he did so rather quietly and cautiously. Polikarpov was simply terribly unlucky - the I-180 crashes, which were actually caused either by test pilots' mistakes or manufacturing defects, undermined Stalin's trust in him.

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Having to have a prison design bureau is wild, but not surprising given Stalin. The I-180 issues were really unlucky on his part.

bf109xxl said:

The problem was that the large "fighter" aircraft factory in Gorky (No. 21) had been reoriented to produce the LaGG instead of the I-16. While the I-180 was a further development of the I-16, and the technologies were still very similar despite all the differences, the LaGG manufacturing technology was radically different, which required a complete change of all tooling in production. After the war outbreak - by the time the I-185 was ready for mass production - any slowdown in production was considered unacceptable, unfortunately it was inevitable due to the need to replace all the tooling. It was a serious mistake to start production of the wooden LaGG. The result was a very mediocre aircraft with a huge number of serious shortcomings, which required two years of improvement to achieve acceptable quality. It was necessary to preserve the technology and produce the I-180 of mixed construction despite all the problems with the engine, which had achieved acceptable characteristics by the end of 1939. This would have allowed a smooth transition to the I-185, which, in general, continued the line of the I-16 and I-180, and the production deployment would not require a radical change in technology. Unfortunately, this is obvious now in hindsight, but at that time decisions were made under conditions of insufficient information.

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This is why I said in my earlier post that the I-180 was needed. While it is true that there were political problems, the I-185 was very different from the Lavochkin fighters. The I-185 would've needed the I-180 to be a mass-produced aircraft before it to achieve production of its self.

Airborne2001 said:

Does anyone on here have any data/accounts of air combats? The only major one I know of is from China in 1940 when the A6M was first field tested, and the I-16s were largely dominated in the fight.

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The most comprehensive (and, apparently, of the highest quality) source on Soviet aces that I know is the book "All of Stalin's Aces 1936-1953" by Mikhail Bykov:

The cover is, of course, rather silly, but overall it is a very serious work. The author honestly writes that the lists of victories contain confirmed claims (i.e., when the shoot-down was confirmed by other participants in the air combat or the crash of the enemy aircraft was confirmed by ground units), and that it is unrealistic to verify all claims. But it is possible to establish approximately how many claims were made when the pilot was flying the I-16.
On the other hand, I am not sure that this data can be used to draw conclusions about the qualities of the fighter itself, since, on average, the training of Soviet pilots was insufficient, and the organization of air combats at the beginning of the war was completely inadequate.
By the way, it was a big and very unpleasant surprise for the Soviets that the Japanese Ki.27, with its fixed landing gear and less powerful engine, was not inferior to the I-16 in speed and surpassed the latter in maneuverability. Only thanks to the numerical superiority and the transfer of pilots with experience in aerial combat in Spain from other fighter units the Soviets managed to achieve air superiority over Khalkhin Gol in 1939 (the Nomonhan Incident).

How did the I-16 Really Perform in WWII?

In what regards?
1. Did it kill or not kill a certain percentage of it's own pilots/crew in take-off, landing, spin and engine failure accidents?
2. Did it allow a certain percentage of it's pilots to avoid getting shot down in combat?
3. Did it actually inflict a fair amount of damage to the enemy in proportion to the amount of effort to manufacture and deploy it (and pilots/fuel/ground crew)?

A lot of accounts of a number of aircraft only focus on one or two things. Avoiding getting shot down is sort of important, but if the squadrons, wings, regiments are not causing much damage to the enemy, or allowing same air force bombers to get through to targets then they are not doing the whole job.

A bit like Bf 110s over England. Even if the Bf 110s are not being shot down in large numbers, the fact that the Bombers they were supposed to escorting were being shot down means they were not performing well despite a what ever the kill to loss ratio against British fighters may say.

The inability to catch Axis bombers may be a bit exaggerated. Ju 88 may be hard to catch in an I-16, but an He 111 probably isn't hard for at least a later model I-16, nor I suspect were Do 17s while they were around, and a Ju-87, still important for a long time in the Soviet-German war, definitely isn't going to be hard to catch in an I-16.

Same is true for Italian bombers like the BR.20.

I-16s and I-153s seemed to have the ability to evade being shot down when flown by very skilled pilots, due to their high agility. Later in the war this helped enable their use as (somewhat marginal) close air support aircraft armed with rockets and small bombs.

2xFAB-250. Successfully used in the summer of 1941.

Steamed_Banana said:

The inability to catch Axis bombers may be a bit exaggerated. Ju 88 may be hard to catch in an I-16, but an He 111 probably isn't hard for at least a later model I-16, nor I suspect were Do 17s while they were around, and a Ju-87, still important for a long time in the Soviet-German war, definitely isn't going to be hard to catch in an I-16.

Same is true for Italian bombers like the BR.20.

I-16s and I-153s seemed to have the ability to evade being shot down when flown by very skilled pilots, due to their high agility. Later in the war this helped enable their use as (somewhat marginal) close air support aircraft armed with rockets and small bombs.

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In fact, a Ju-88 that has an underwing bombload will not be too difficult for a late model (M-62/M-63 engined) I-16 to catch. After dropping the load is a different story though. The ground attack story is true as well since Polikarpov fighters actually had a decent success rate with this, especially I-16s that were in the Zveno combination.

I have a Soviet Air Force internal analytical report prepared by the Operations Directorate of the VVS Headquarters.

Date: 25 August 1943
Authors: Colonel Vasiliev, Engineer-Major Pimenov
Title: "Preliminary Conclusions from the Analysis of Aircraft Losses"

According to this document, the losses of the I-16 amounted to 1 aircraft shot down per 128 combat sorties (15,352 sorties counted).
Interestingly, the report most often lists the I-16 as being used in the ground-attack role. With such a combat load in a low-altitude attack mission, the value of the I-16 is undeniable.

For comparison from the same document:

• Il-2: 1 loss per 26 sorties
• Kittyhawk: 1 loss per 183 sorties (the most survivable)
• Yak-1: 1 loss per 45 sorties (island-based unit)

I can upload the document if anyone is interested.

Serhyi said:

I have an internal analytical report on the Soviet Air Force prepared by the Operations Board of the Air Force Headquarters.

Date: August 25, 1943.
Authors: Colonel Vasilyev, Major Engineer Pimenov
Title: Preliminary conclusions from the analysis of aviation losses

According to this document, the losses of the I-16 amounted to one aircraft shot down per 128 combat sorties (15,352 combat sorties were counted).
It is noteworthy that the I-16 was most often mentioned as an attack aircraft in the report. With such a combat load in low-altitude attack conditions, the value of the I-16 is undeniable.

For comparison, from the same document:

• Il-2: 1 loss per 26 sorties
• Kittyhawk: 1 loss per 183 sorties (the most survivable)
• Yak-1: 1 loss per 45 combat sorties (island-based)

If anyone is interested, I can upload the document.

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These figures varied greatly during the war—for example, for the Il-2, from 8-9 in 1941 to 85-90 in 1944-1945.
I have repeatedly mentioned the lower losses of the I-153, I-16, and even the I-15 when used as ground attack aircraft in discussions on the forum.

Once again, good old Kittyhawk turns out to be a trooper. Are these loss rates just for strike / CAS missions or other types?

This does match what I've read about I-16 and I-153 as well.

how does the Pe-2 fare?

I'd love to see a translation of the whole document. How big is it?

Steamed_Banana said:

Старый добрый «Киттихок» снова оказался штурмовиком. Эти показатели потерь действуют только для ударных/боевых миссий или других типов?

Это также совпадает с тем, что я читал о I-16 и I-153.

как обстоят дела с Пе-2?

Хотелось бы увидеть перевод всего документа. Насколько он большой?

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The Kittyhawk is mentioned not as an attack aircraft, but as a 'modern imported fighter.' There is no translation. Unfortunately, I also have problems with English

S Serhyi , please use the English. The Cyrillic may be a trouble for many of mambers here.