But that's what I do. Machine translation and pasting it into the forum. Why is there a reverse translation here?
Ok. I did something wrong.
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But that's what I do. Machine translation and pasting it into the forum. Why is there a reverse translation here?
But that's what I do. Machine translation and pasting it into the forum. Why is there a reverse translation here?
Ok. I did something wrong.
Wikipedia shows this (credited to Yefim Gordon Soviet combat aircraft of the Second World War):how does the Pe-2 fare?
| I messed up the formatting lol, but interestingly it appears that the Su-2 actually did the best. We should keep in mind though that we don't know what year this was for, or what other metric was being used. |
As a teenager, I talked to a Soviet pilot who fought on a Boston. I didn't ask about the technical details, but I remember well that the pilot spoke only enthusiastically about his aircraft. He said he was very lucky - the Boston was reliable, could withstand significant damage, and was very comfortable for the crew. In general, the figures seem somewhat strange to me, perhaps because the Bostons were mainly involved in the fiercest battles - in this particular case, the interpretation of the statistics is far from obvious.Compared to the Pe-2, the B-3 [Boston III in the Soviet Air Force] daytime bomber has a shorter combat service life, which is a consequence of the B-3's low survivability, since its large fuel capacity, complex hydraulic system, electrical wiring, and a large number of various pipes that are unprotected from machine gun fire and shell fragments greatly increase its vulnerability.
On average, one B-3 aircraft loss accounts for 39 sorties and 60 hours of combat flight time, while one Pe-2 loss accounts for 57 sorties and 70 hours of flight time.
The combat flight time per fighter loss varies widely depending on the type of aircraft. The Kittyhawk aircraft have the longest flight time, with 183 sorties and 165 hours. The longer duration of their combat service is explained by their powerful armament (six large-caliber machine guns), which gave them an advantage in air combat when firing at relatively long ranges, good horizontal maneuverability, and better pilot armor (armored windshield, armor plate in front of the instrument panel) compared to home-made aircraft.
These figures do not allow us to draw any general conclusions about the quality of the aircraft. The variability in losses was enormous - much depended on the experience of the pilots and the strength of the enemy, so the small number of Su-2s with experienced crews could well have suffered fewer losses. I repeat, the number of sorties per loss varied greatly during the war, and it is only possible to compare figures from the same section of the front during the same period. But even with a correct comparison within the same aviation division, losses in the Su-2 regiments were lower than in the Pe-2 regiments - I explained the reason for this above. Overall, the Su-2 was perhaps underestimated, while I consider the Pe-2 to be another major mistake by the Soviet leadership - it was an extremely difficult aircraft for pilots to master and even to fly - especially on landing. Moreover, it had a relatively small bomb load.Wikipedia shows this (credited to Yefim Gordon Soviet combat aircraft of the Second World War):
I messed up the formatting lol, but interestingly it appears that the Su-2 actually did the best. We should keep in mind though that we don't know what year this was for, or what other metric was being used.
I am curious from which source you obtained this information. The distribution by type for 1941 is only available for naval aviation fighters, where most of the I-16s were indeed equipped with M-62/-63 engines (215 versus 129). I have not seen such data for the Air Force I-16s. Most of the I-16s produced were equipped with M-25 engines, and the most common type was the UTI-4 (type 15) trainer.Most of the WW II planes had the M-62 or M-63 engines.
715 built. Not that little.Only a few of these had 20mm cannon.
That's right, but even with its limited effectiveness as a ground attack aircraft, the I-16 could perform many more missions than the Il-2. The I-16 could not replace a proper ground attack aircraft, but there are many examples of successful attacks on ground targets using the RS.The I-16s lacked firepower for ground attack so you needed more missions/sorties to cause the same amount of damage.
I used some reasoning.I am curious from which source you obtained this information. The distribution by type for 1941 is only available for naval aviation fighters, where most of the I-16s were indeed equipped with M-62/-63 engines (215 versus 129). I have not seen such data for the Air Force I-16s. Most of the I-16s produced were equipped with M-25 engines, and the most common type was the UTI-4 (type 15) trainer.
In this particular case, I fully admit that your assumption is reasonable. But when studying the history of Soviet aviation, you constantly encounter situations where extrapolations and reasonable assumptions do not work due to the absurd features of the Soviet system. Therefore, knowledge of exact figures is preferable. For example, I cannot say from general considerations whether the distribution by type was the same or similar for the I-16 in the naval and army aviation.I used some reasoning.
The Soviets switched from the M-25s to the M-62 series in 1939, roughly 2 years before the Germans invaded.
I will only note that the I-16 type 5 was often encountered in 1942, and pilots claimed that they were not afraid to engage the 109s in combat with this type. At the same time, they were instructed to attack bombers preferably on a head-on course.There is no doubt that there were still M-25 powered planes in inventory but how many of the older ones were in front line service?
How many of the older ones were still on the books but awaiting new or repaired engines or other parts?
They could be used as a source of spare parts when repairing I-16s with M-25s.Using UTI-4 (type 15) trainers in combat was not going to end well and they are not a good indicator of the I-16s actual combat capabilities.
The fixed landing gear on most of the trainers was going to hurt performance even if they only flew with one pilot and faired over the 2nd cockpit.
If I was standing next to political officer with a loaded pistol in his holster I would be inclined to say things that would keep me alive at least until the next day.In this particular case, I fully admit that your assumption is reasonable. But when studying the history of Soviet aviation, you constantly encounter situations where extrapolations and reasonable assumptions do not work due to the absurd features of the Soviet system. Therefore, knowledge of exact figures is preferable. For example, I cannot say from general considerations whether the distribution by type was the same or similar for the I-16 in the naval and army aviation.
I will only note that the I-16 type 5 was often encountered in 1942, and pilots claimed that they were not afraid to engage the 109s in combat with this type. At the same time, they were instructed to attack bombers preferably on a head-on course.
They could be used as a source of spare parts when repairing I-16s with M-25s.
Types 12, 17, 27, and 28 were cannon armed. Some Chinese modified ones were cannon armed trainers. Soviet ace Boris Safonov in particular used the I-16 type 28 from July - early October 1941. According to airpages.ru he got 13 kills with it.And is there any consensus as to 20mm cannon with the I-16 / 24 etc.?
Have you decided that the discussion lacks silly clichés that have nothing to do with reality? It was about interviews in the 1990s and 2000s.If I was standing next to political officer with a loaded pistol in his holster I would be inclined to say things that would keep me alive at least until the next day.
Firstly, type 10 was produced from February 1938, while type 5 was produced until March 1938. Secondly, the difference between these types in terms of flight characteristics is minimal. Thirdly, some of the Type 5 aircraft were upgraded - about 200 aircraft received additional PV-1 or ShKAS guns. There was a program to upgrade ALL I-16 Type 5 aircraft of the late production series (after the 32nd), but the factory did not have the required capacity.Granted not all factories ended production at the same time but the type 10 started to replace the type 5 in 1937 (?).
It is possible that about half of all I-16s in 1941 were equipped with M-25s, but it is unlikely that anyone can say exactly how many there were in 1942. The difference between types 5 and 10 is minimal, so I don't see any point in distinguishing between them too much.So what is the definition of "often encountered" when discussing 5-6 year old planes in the Soviet Union in 1942?
I suspect that aircraft equipped with the M-25 were even more reliable than those equipped with the M-62/M-63, and it was easier to find spare parts for them.On Mission out of 10 flown? 1 mission out of 20 flown? 1 Mission out of 50 Flown?
Soviet pilots disliked the cannon versions of the I-16, calling them "irons" because of their reduced maneuverability due to increased weight. The increased firepower did not compensate for the deterioration in flight characteristics.Types 12, 17, 27, and 28 were cannon armed. Some Chinese modified ones were cannon armed trainers. Soviet ace Boris Safonov in particular used the I-16 type 28 from July - early October 1941. According to airpages.ru he got 13 kills with it.
This would explain Boris' willingness to switch to the Hurricane the moment it became available to the Soviets.Soviet pilots disliked the cannon versions of the I-16, calling them "irons" because of their reduced maneuverability due to increased weight. The increased firepower did not compensate for the deterioration in flight characteristics.
I've wondered this too. When the A6M was first operationally tested in 1940 (A6M2 Model 11 specifically) it practically mopped the floor with the I-16 and I-15. They both had the same large flaps for good low speed mobility idea so I wonder what the issue was. Maybe the better stability of the A6M combined with the mostly better pilot skills of Japan? (Not that China didn't have good pilots, of course.)One thing I'm curious about, given the apparent agility of the I-16 (high roll rate and tight turning circle, with fairly good power) I wonder why they did not seem to do so well against A5M, Ki-27 and of course, the Ki-43 and A6M in China etc.
The agility seems to be comparable to all of these aircraft, though I assume the Ki-43 and A6M are more powerful.
An extremely rearward center of gravity on the I-16 improves maneuverability, but greatly reduces stability. It is a fundamentally unbalanced aircraft. A pilot needs to be very experienced to take advantage of the I-16's strong points. And the VVS RKKA had a serious shortage of experienced pilotsOne thing I'm curious about, given the apparent agility of the I-16 (high roll rate and tight turning circle, with fairly good power) I wonder why they did not seem to do so well against A5M, Ki-27 and of course, the Ki-43 and A6M in China etc.
The agility seems to be comparable to all of these aircraft, though I assume the Ki-43 and A6M are more powerful.
This would explain Boris' willingness to switch to the Hurricane the moment it became available to the Soviets.
Seemingly with A5M and Ki-27 too, not to mention Ki-43 needless to say.I've wondered this too. When the A6M was first operationally tested in 1940 (A6M2 Model 11 specifically) it practically mopped the floor with the I-16 and I-15. They both had the same large flaps for good low speed mobility idea so I wonder what the issue was. Maybe the better stability of the A6M combined with the mostly better pilot skills of Japan? (Not that China didn't have good pilots, of course.)