How effective were gunners in planes?

[Hoosier Hot Shot]

This issue is dealt with in some detail in Flying Guns – World War 2: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations 1933-45. Here is an extract:

On combat operations, the American bombers in the ETO expended 26.3 million rounds of .50" ammunition in 1943, and 36.2 million in 1944; the wartime total was 72.3 million rounds. (In October 1943, the ammunition consumption reached a peak of 632,773 rounds per operational day.) That corresponds to nearly 12,000 rounds for every enemy aircraft claimed shot down by the bombers. Because, as we have seen above, these claims were often far higher than the actual German losses, a more realistic average would probably exceed 40,000 rounds for every destroyed German fighter.

In comparison, the American fighters expended 26.6 million .50" rounds and 262,189 20 mm rounds, and claimed the destruction of 5222 enemy aircraft in the air and 4250 on the ground. That corresponds to 2810 rounds per enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed. Because the fighter claims were usually much closer to reality, a very rough but reasonable estimate would be that a fighter was ten times more efficient as a gunnery platform than a bomber.

Some commanders were quite sceptical about the effectiveness of this form of defensive armament. In April 1943 Colonel Claude E. Putnam, commander of the 306th BG, gave as his opinion that four gunners needed to fire simultaneously at an enemy fighter to have a 50% probability to bring it down. Worse, he estimated that to only one in ten of the gunners who theoretically had a firing opportunity actually opened fire. His colleague of the 308th BG, T.R. Milton, shared his doubts, and feared that the defensive guns were often more a hazard than a protection, because the danger of "friendly fire" in a dense formation was high.​

As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won't argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.
Can you imagine a defenseless bomber under attack by a fighter?

 

[YF12A]

First off, to Mr. Runnels, it is a great pleasure to find out you flew with my, now using his Wings in Heaven, neighbor, then Col. William Raper. He took Command of the 303rd B/G in October 1944 after being in the 306th B/G from its' start in 1942 after he was rescued from being shot down in the Battle of Midway. A very small world indeed!

On to the topic, my neighbor told me more than once that, in his experience, the waist gunners and all related equipment should have been removed to save weight for other purposes and with more ammunition going to other gunners who, to him, seemed more effective. The Radio operator was going to be their no matter what, but what a crummy field of fire he had.

 

[billrunnels]

First off, to Mr. Runnels, it is a great pleasure to find out you flew with my, now using his Wings in Heaven, neighbor, then Col. William Raper. He took Command of the 303rd B/G in October 1944 after being in the 306th B/G from its' start in 1942 after he was rescued from being shot down in the Battle of Midway. A very small world indeed!

On to the topic, my neighbor told me more than once that, in his experience, the waist gunners and all related equipment should have been removed to save weight for other purposes and with more ammunition going to other gunners who, to him, seemed more effective. The Radio operator was going to be their no matter what, but what a crummy field of fire he had.

Col. Raper was correct in his analysis and they moved in that direction near the end of the war.

 

[stona]

As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won't argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.

Everything I've seen and read from the German side confirms that. Defensive fire caused less experienced attackers to make half hearted attacks, often engaging and breaking off at very long range. They also forced difficult tactics on the attackers. Head on attacks could be devastating, but were very difficult to make successfully and were generally beyond the ability of the barely trained pilots coming into the Luftwaffe late in the war.

All this is reflected in the Luftwaffe claims. A relative few claimed a lot of the bombers shot down. These were the men who had survived long enough to gain the experience to make successful attacks. Their's is the gun camera footage shown at the fighter schools (and now on the internet). The rest rarely, if ever, hit a bomber, never mind shot one down.

It was the defensive capability of the bombers that led to the very heavy armouring of the attacking fighters. The Fw 190 A-8/R2 carried nearly 200 Kg of extra armour, over that of the standard fighter version, making it heavy and vulnerable to US escort fighters. The Germans found themselves having to escort their own heavy fighters in order to protect them, a use of resources they could ill afford.

Defensive fire from bombers was effective in these ways, not necessarily by shooting down dozens of fighters.

Then there is the morale issue. You cannot reasonably to ask men to fly aircraft into hostile air space at speeds and altitudes at which the enemy's air defence system is perfectly capable of making interceptions with its fighters with no means to protect themselves. This was an argument acknowledged by the British, operating at night, when the vast majority of air gunners never fired their weapons in anger. The majority never saw the fighter that shot them down, but they still had their guns.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won't argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.
Can you imagine a defenseless bomber under attack by a fighter?

I remember reading an account by a Spitfire pilot assisting with withdrawal over France, passing the bomber formation at a safe distance to escort a "straggler" he was very, very happy that he was assisting it rather than attacking it. The psychological effect of several thousand guns pointed at you must have been overwhelming, almost impossible to believe you wouldn't be hit.

 

[Dimlee]

Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).

A Failure of Intelligence

This part relates to current topic:
"Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets,
with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew from seven to five.
The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown
50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses
confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters
that killed them. But our proposal to rip out the turrets went against the official mythology of the gallant gunners defending
their crewmates. Dickins never had the courage to push the issue seriously in his conversations with Harris.
If he had, Harris might even have listened, and thousands of crewmen might have been saved."

Please note that the article is about Bomber Command so above conclusion relates to night bombers only.
And I'm not sure about 50 mph gain...

 

[billrunnels]

Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).

A Failure of Intelligence

This part relates to current topic:
"Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets,
with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew from seven to five.
The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown
50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses
confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters
that killed them. But our proposal to rip out the turrets went against the official mythology of the gallant gunners defending
their crewmates. Dickins never had the courage to push the issue seriously in his conversations with Harris.
If he had, Harris might even have listened, and thousands of crewmen might have been saved."

Please note that the article is about Bomber Command so above conclusion relates to night bombers only.
And I'm not sure about 50 mph gain...

I question the 50 mph gain also.

 

[Shortround6]

It can be fact checked by comparing speeds of the fully equipped bombers with the speeds of converted bombers used as transports after the war.
However be careful to compare speeds at similar power settings and weights as you fly very far at full power.

 

[yulzari]

Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).

A Failure of Intelligence

This part relates to current topic:
"Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets,
with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew from seven to five.
The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown
50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses
confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters
that killed them. But our proposal to rip out the turrets went against the official mythology of the gallant gunners defending
their crewmates. Dickins never had the courage to push the issue seriously in his conversations with Harris.
If he had, Harris might even have listened, and thousands of crewmen might have been saved."

Please note that the article is about Bomber Command so above conclusion relates to night bombers only.
And I'm not sure about 50 mph gain...

Given the Bomber Command record the operational planners would have probably shouted hooray and immediately further loaded up the bombers to use up the weight and fuel saved and leave the crews flying at the same heights and speeds as before. That is what happens when you measure results by tonnage dropped.

 

[pbehn]

Given the Bomber Command record the operational planners would have probably shouted hooray and immediately further loaded up the bombers to use up the weight and fuel saved and leave the crews flying at the same heights and speeds as before. That is what happens when you measure results by tonnage dropped.

It sounds callous but the operational planners had a point. There was a limit to the bombs that could be carried in a bomb bay and a reduction in weight and drag of crew and turrets automatically means a reduction in weight of fuel. There are many ways to present statistics, on very long range missions the Halifax cost four times more in planes and crew than a Lancaster per ton of bombs dropped. The bomber stream was for mutual protection, and all had to fly at the same speed. Travelling faster reduces the losses both to AA and fighters.

 

[swampyankee]

The questions "would casualties drop?" and "would casualty rates drop?" don't necessarily have the same answer: removing a turret, the gunner, and the ammunition could increase bomb load by anything from 20 to 100%, and reducing the number of sorties required in proportion, increase the casualty rate, but reduce total casualties, directly, by fewer sorties, and indirectly by smaller flight crews.

Overall, I think history shows that the best place to put guns for day bombers is on the escorting fighters.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't know how true it is but somebody suggested that BC could have reduced losses by instructing crew to fly at max lean mixture instead most economical. Yes this would shorten range a bit but many missions were not flown at max distances. Difference might only be 15-20mph but every bit should help and was something that could be explored without ripping out turrets and such.

 

[pbehn]

I don't know how true it is but somebody suggested that BC could have reduced losses by instructing crew to fly at max lean mixture instead most economical. Yes this would shorten range a bit but many missions were not flown at max distances. Difference might only be 15-20mph but every bit should help and was something that could be explored without ripping out turrets and such.

I have read the same, of course all theory. But what was the total weight of the mid upper turret and its operator and ammunition? They were routinely not used because no one saw anything and taken off for Lancasters carrying the upkeep and grand slam bombs. The front turret was taken off the Halifax just to increase speed. When 50% of losses are due to ground fire it is an obvious calculation that the less time you take covering that ground means lower losses.

 

[stona]

The contention is from Freeman Dyson, who, to put it mildly, had an axe to grind with Basil Dickins who ran Bomber Command's ORS, Harris, The RAF, the Air Ministry and just about anyone else who refused to listen to his histrionic outbursts during the war.
He does make some valid points, but everything he wrote was coloured by his own preconceptions.
Just saying.
Cheers
Steve

 

[J.A.W.]

AFAIR - USN PB4Y Liberators were particularly aggressive in combat, esp' towards their enemy counterparts,
- even when ranging well out into the oceanic wastes - with little prospect of rescue, if things went badly..

Hard-as - those guys certainly were, real - 'we take no quarter, & offer none' - types, in both Atlantic, & Pacific..