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As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won't argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.This issue is dealt with in some detail in Flying Guns – World War 2: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations 1933-45. Here is an extract:
On combat operations, the American bombers in the ETO expended 26.3 million rounds of .50" ammunition in 1943, and 36.2 million in 1944; the wartime total was 72.3 million rounds. (In October 1943, the ammunition consumption reached a peak of 632,773 rounds per operational day.) That corresponds to nearly 12,000 rounds for every enemy aircraft claimed shot down by the bombers. Because, as we have seen above, these claims were often far higher than the actual German losses, a more realistic average would probably exceed 40,000 rounds for every destroyed German fighter.
In comparison, the American fighters expended 26.6 million .50" rounds and 262,189 20 mm rounds, and claimed the destruction of 5222 enemy aircraft in the air and 4250 on the ground. That corresponds to 2810 rounds per enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed. Because the fighter claims were usually much closer to reality, a very rough but reasonable estimate would be that a fighter was ten times more efficient as a gunnery platform than a bomber.
Some commanders were quite sceptical about the effectiveness of this form of defensive armament. In April 1943 Colonel Claude E. Putnam, commander of the 306th BG, gave as his opinion that four gunners needed to fire simultaneously at an enemy fighter to have a 50% probability to bring it down. Worse, he estimated that to only one in ten of the gunners who theoretically had a firing opportunity actually opened fire. His colleague of the 308th BG, T.R. Milton, shared his doubts, and feared that the defensive guns were often more a hazard than a protection, because the danger of "friendly fire" in a dense formation was high.
Col. Raper was correct in his analysis and they moved in that direction near the end of the war.First off, to Mr. Runnels, it is a great pleasure to find out you flew with my, now using his Wings in Heaven, neighbor, then Col. William Raper. He took Command of the 303rd B/G in October 1944 after being in the 306th B/G from its' start in 1942 after he was rescued from being shot down in the Battle of Midway. A very small world indeed!
On to the topic, my neighbor told me more than once that, in his experience, the waist gunners and all related equipment should have been removed to save weight for other purposes and with more ammunition going to other gunners who, to him, seemed more effective. The Radio operator was going to be their no matter what, but what a crummy field of fire he had.
As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won't argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.
I remember reading an account by a Spitfire pilot assisting with withdrawal over France, passing the bomber formation at a safe distance to escort a "straggler" he was very, very happy that he was assisting it rather than attacking it. The psychological effect of several thousand guns pointed at you must have been overwhelming, almost impossible to believe you wouldn't be hit.As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won't argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.
Can you imagine a defenseless bomber under attack by a fighter?
I question the 50 mph gain also.Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).
A Failure of Intelligence
This part relates to current topic:
"Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets,
with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew from seven to five.
The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown
50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses
confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters
that killed them. But our proposal to rip out the turrets went against the official mythology of the gallant gunners defending
their crewmates. Dickins never had the courage to push the issue seriously in his conversations with Harris.
If he had, Harris might even have listened, and thousands of crewmen might have been saved."
Please note that the article is about Bomber Command so above conclusion relates to night bombers only.
And I'm not sure about 50 mph gain...
Given the Bomber Command record the operational planners would have probably shouted hooray and immediately further loaded up the bombers to use up the weight and fuel saved and leave the crews flying at the same heights and speeds as before. That is what happens when you measure results by tonnage dropped.Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).
A Failure of Intelligence
This part relates to current topic:
"Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets,
with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew from seven to five.
The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown
50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses
confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters
that killed them. But our proposal to rip out the turrets went against the official mythology of the gallant gunners defending
their crewmates. Dickins never had the courage to push the issue seriously in his conversations with Harris.
If he had, Harris might even have listened, and thousands of crewmen might have been saved."
Please note that the article is about Bomber Command so above conclusion relates to night bombers only.
And I'm not sure about 50 mph gain...
It sounds callous but the operational planners had a point. There was a limit to the bombs that could be carried in a bomb bay and a reduction in weight and drag of crew and turrets automatically means a reduction in weight of fuel. There are many ways to present statistics, on very long range missions the Halifax cost four times more in planes and crew than a Lancaster per ton of bombs dropped. The bomber stream was for mutual protection, and all had to fly at the same speed. Travelling faster reduces the losses both to AA and fighters.Given the Bomber Command record the operational planners would have probably shouted hooray and immediately further loaded up the bombers to use up the weight and fuel saved and leave the crews flying at the same heights and speeds as before. That is what happens when you measure results by tonnage dropped.
I have read the same, of course all theory. But what was the total weight of the mid upper turret and its operator and ammunition? They were routinely not used because no one saw anything and taken off for Lancasters carrying the upkeep and grand slam bombs. The front turret was taken off the Halifax just to increase speed. When 50% of losses are due to ground fire it is an obvious calculation that the less time you take covering that ground means lower losses.I don't know how true it is but somebody suggested that BC could have reduced losses by instructing crew to fly at max lean mixture instead most economical. Yes this would shorten range a bit but many missions were not flown at max distances. Difference might only be 15-20mph but every bit should help and was something that could be explored without ripping out turrets and such.