How good was Japanese aviation?

[vanir]

What the hell was all that about?

Oops, my bad.

The Nakajima Ki 84 was the best fighter in ww2.

Not when compared to the Spit, P-47, and Fw-190.

The 190 had better armament, more armour, great performance and was quite maneuverble. Where as the Zero had speed and maneuverable. Id go with the 190 also over a Zero.

There was also no model of Zero that was an equal to the Hellcat. Especially when it comes to the ability to sustain damage. The Zero did have the manueverability edge below 275 MPH, but above that, the zero does not have the capability to manuever.

Actualy already Zeros met Spitfires over Singapore ...and shot them down imediately (as was wroten by Australian pilot there)

Yes but what kind of Spits were they.

It's something I'll continually say after a lifetime love affair with combat aircraft. So long as they're contemporary comparisons, there's really no such thing as better so much as different in engineering specification. Better here, worse there.
Aside from that "better" combat aircraft usually means poorly suited comparisons.

Zeros held their own for a bit, nothing spectacular but doing okay. But trying to hold on to a Zero is like trying to hold on to a 109 and Zeros didn't get anywhere near the development they did. The war changed significantly in its own lifetime. Jets, ICBMs and atomic bombs happened.
Hellcats and Corsairs come from a totally different planet to Zero's I think.
And I agree the development potential of the Ki-84 as their comparison was compromised.

I'm sure entire books could be written about it. But the question should really be which aircraft do you prefer, not which is better.
Here's why:

Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union cared little about the lives of their own people, it was fight to the death or until you win. They were flying massive sortie numbers and they would often willingly ram other aircraft!
U.S infantry weren't the best, German infantry was and there was a very good reason for that.
German soldiers were on speed. They handed out amphetimies like candy.
The German troops were superior to the Japanese in combat.

I mean come on. Why don't you just put a pointy hat on and hang some niggers. And supertroopers on amphetamines? Well I suppose US troops seem to prefer morphine and heroin so that's fair enough.

I think any man who puts his all in, and gives it for his country honestly, with a gun in his hand and his every fibre switched on, deserves the title "the best." Japanese, US or anybody else.
When people talk about "Japanese" or "US" or anybody else's failures, they're invariably talking about strategic command. Battlefield tactics, everybody recognises comes down to individual military leaders.
I really don't think we can classify entire cultures through this doctrine without adopting a blatantly bigoted intellectual environment.

I mean no offense in this, just that I do not morally agree with the complacency that approach.

 

[plan_D]

China and Burma. Although it has been said they could have mistaken Oscars for them but the Reisen did fight over China when the AVG were there, so I reckon they did meet Zero at some point since Chennault produced a report on them.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Never seen it stated as the 'Thatch and Weave' before.

No, it's the "Thatch Weave" named after Cmdr. James Thatch (VF-3)
http://www.fearsquadron.com/2 Tactics.htm

When did the AVG meet Zeros?

They actually became operational immediately after Pearl Harbor (not intentionally)

 

[KraziKanuK]

FLYBOY, that is why I asked since I have only seen 'Thatch Weave'.

The American Volunteer Group first fought the Japanese on December 20, 1941, and was deactivation on July 4, 1942.


Naturally pD Chennault knew of the Zero/Zeke since it had been in action since Aug 1941.

Do you have a list of the IJN units that fought in China and Burma after Dec 20 1941? This was a IJA theatre and the A6M was a IJN a/c.

 

[plan_D]

It was but the IJN did attack from the Indian ocean. I don't have the order of battle but I know of a few attacks the IJN did against Burma and India, I'll just find it.

 

[plan_D]

Vice-Admiral Nagumo Chuichi arrived in the Bay of Bengal on the 2nd April, 1942 with five aircraft carriers to attack Trincomalee in Ceylon. Vice-Admiral Ozawa Jisabura attacked Cocanda and Vizagapatam on the 5th April. On the 9th Trincomalee was attacked by Nagumo and the RAF attacked Nagumo's flagship, the Akagi.

I'm finding the proper information but that's what I can remember. So, naturally, the Zero would have been met by the RAF.

 

[R Leonard]

Umm, if I could jump in . . .

The Thach Weave (note only one T) was developed by Lt Cdr John S Thach, USN (note Cdr James Thach was John Thach's older brother, but he was a black shoe. John was four years behind his older brother James at USNA; the nickname "Jimmy" was bestowed upon John by upperclassmen who remembered his brother) during the summer of 1941 in response to the reports that Chennault had forwarded to Washington on the performance of the A6M Zero. Chennault's report (albeit somewhat inflating the Zero's abilities) was base on observations made during the Zero's combat debut in the spring of 1941. Thach managed to get a copy of the report and realized his aircraft (his squadron, VF-3, was flying the F4F-3 and Thach had no illusions about the eventualities of a war with Japan) would be at a serious disadvantage. The tactic he developed he called the "beam defense." In naval terms, when a ship is "abeam" to another ship is directly to the side, broadside to broadside. And so the "Beam Defense" Simply, with a four-plane division, divided into 2 two-plane sections fly directly abeam of each other, at a distance just outside the turn radius. Each section was to keep an overwatch of the other. Let's call them sections 1 and 2. In the event that section 1 is about to be attacked and section 2 sees the attack coming in, section 2 would immediately execute a turn towards section 1. This move starts a chain of events to counter the attack on section 1. The turn alerts section 1 that they are about to be on the receiving end of an attack. Section 1 now executes a turn towards section 2. This means that the attacking aircraft are faced with the problem of dealing with a full deflection shot (the most difficult to make and virtually impossible without considerable practice) or following section 1 through its turn. Odds are the attack will be aborted because there's no decent shot available. If the attacker really screws up and follows section 1 through the turn, he'll find himself facing the guns of section 2 coming at him from dead ahead and slightly below, a perfect set up, zero deflection, solution for section 2. His chances of survival at that point are pretty slim.

Thach worked out the details that summer in tests flying against Lt Edward "Butch" O'Hare. The test was for Thach to take a division at half throttle and fend off O'Hare's division which was at full throttle. Thach's division was able to counter any attack that O'Hare' division made. O'Hare told Thach that no matter the type off attack, the attacker could not complete the maneuver without facing the guns of the airplane on the opposite weave.

All worked out before the US entered the war. The name "Thach Weave" was coined by Lt Cdr James Flatley. Flatley commanded VF-10, the first of the "new" squadrons to enter combat. Flatley's squadron drilled the tactic under the tutelage of Lt Cdr O'Hare, who by then commanded VF-3, during it's work up time at NAS Maui in the late summer of 1942.

Flatley went on to be CAG 5 in a tour aboard USS Yorktown (CV-10). Upon his return from that tour, Flatley and Lt William Leonard (back from a tour with VF-11 out of Guadalcanal and who had been Thach's XO at Midway) while working at ComFairWest in the fall and winter of 1943 wrote the Beam Defense into the USF-74 standard combat tactics manual for fighters.

As far as the AVG was concerned, their standard tactic when attacked was to dive away, to use the P-40's superior diving speed to escape and then zoom climb back to altitude. Their opponents in VF vs VF combat were usually Nates and Oscars of the IJAAF. The IJN had long left the China operational areas; the AVG did not fight Zeros.

Rich

 

[plan_D]

"The IJN had long left the China operational areas; the AVG did not fight Zeros."

1st Squadron, AVG, were in Burma though. The IJN attacked Burma and India when they moved into the Bay of Bengal.

 

[R Leonard]

Mere proximity doesn't count. Suggest you avail yourself of a copy of Dan Ford's "Flying Tigers," pretty much the definitive work on the subject. Ford identifies each and every Japanese unit involved in each and every AVG action, using actual Japanese records. All are IJA. The AVG did not ever fight against the A6M.

The problem is that in the early days of the war any Japanese fighter with a greenhouse canopy was referred to as a Zero. It wasn't until late 1942 when Allied intelligence became a little more practiced that other types were identified. As a result many of the early reports by speak to encounters with Zeros when they were actually up against Nates and Oscars. This was especially true with the AVG.

I really don't think you'll be able to find a single reputable source that documents an encounter between the Kido Butai and the AVG.

Rich

 

[plan_D]

Alright but weren't the Oscars similar to the Zero in characteristics?

I know you're a genius on the USN information but do you know anything about the IJAAF and AVG/RAF actions over Burma. If you do I have some questions about losses and kills.

 

[Glider]

Oscarrs and Zero's were very different. The Oscar was slower, more lightly armed (2 x HMG in most cases, lighter in others), more manoeverable and had less strength.
Why they built them until the end of the war is beyond me.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Alright but weren't the Oscars similar to the Zero in characteristics?

The Oscar was slower than the Zero and carried less armament, only 2 12.7 mgs with 250 rounds each. The unique fear the Oscar was a "butterfly flap" which enable the Oscar to do some incredibly tight turns. The Oscar could do immelmans, slow rolls and loops at air speeds under 165 mph! It was more maneuvable than the Zero! But even more so than the Zero, the Oscar was was built like an aluminum coke can and could not absorb any damage. Additionally its airframe design allowed no room for improvement so it changed very little from the first models.

One more note on the Oscar - I believe it was one of the only Japanese aircraft (if not the only Japanese aircraft) to be used by another nation. Some of the puppet states set up by Japan operated the Oscar as well as the French over Viet Nam in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

 

[plan_D]

Surely then, at the start of the war the Allies would just be as fearful of the Oscar as they were of the Zero. The reputation of the Zero was agile and quick climb but if the Oscar was more agile then...

I don't much about the general Japanese aviation, only the Zero. It would be interesting to learn more about the Japanese main types, especially those used over Burma.

 

[KraziKanuK]

Rich,

can you comment on this text?

According to revisionists, the weave was first used during the battle of Midway, giving credit to Commander Thatch for inventing it, and referred to it as the "Thach Weave."

An article in the Smithsonian magazine, Air Space, said that Lt. Commander Thach had developed the weave which he said contributed in a large part, "...To the success of the Battle of Midway...." However, Commander Thatch admits he had heard it was used in China. Incidently this weave was used, during our training at Toungoo, and was part of a combat report when the AVG first encounter the Japanese on December 20, 1941.

 

[Nonskimmer]

I'm certainly no expert on Japanese military aviation, but I think the Zero enjoyed much more infamy than the Oscar due mainly to the fact that it was encountered much more frequently, didn't it? The fighter strength of the Japanese Navy was far greater than that of the Army, wasn't it? Oscars wouldn't have been encountered nearly as frequently. Plus the fact that the Army continued to field newer fighters while the Navy basically put all of it's money on the Zero.

 

[Glider]

The Ki43 I had a top speed of 308mph and the Ki43II 320 but both only had 2 x HMG and it should be remembered that the IJA HMG was probably the worst of all the fighting nations so it was heavily under gunned. Some early versions only had 2 x LMG or 1xHMG and 1 x LMG

Also I believe that it couldn't dive much as its controls almost locked solid at 350mph and it was standard practice to reduce the engine power before going into a dive as it was clean design and accelerated quickly to 350. With this in mind it was fairly easy for most allied aircraft to evade it asuming they saw it plus of course they had a fair chance of surviving the first burst unless it was particually accurate.

Interesting Quote follows which would mean that although the K143 was fragile it did at least have some armour.

'We were encountering a serious problem by this time. Recent Spitfires seem to have adopted even more powerful engines and and their climb and speed had improved considerably. Chasing and shooting down these enemy fighters with our Hayabusa MkIIs became increasingly difficult. Even if we succeeded in luring them into a close-in dogfight, the skill of the RAF pilots was not bad at all. In clear contrast to the USAAF pilots, the RAF pilots were seasoned veterans. They often seemed to intentionally try to dogfight us rather than using hit-and-run tactics.

So we made our best efforts to improve the rate of climb and maneuvrability of our mounts; stripping down our planes was the primary method. We removed our back armor, head armor (this was also to imrove rear vision), and reducedthe number of oxygen bottles.

Sgt. Masahiro Ikeda, 64th Sentai commenting on the state of battle in Burma , 1944


Nonskimmer is correct when he says that the IJA came up with newer designs such as the KI44, KI61, KI84 and finally the Ki100 which rectified the problems of the Ki43.
The Navy probably stuck with the Zero to long and went to the Raiden which wasn't a success and the Shinden was a lucky development of a floatplane fighter.

 

[cheddar cheese]

The J2M Raiden was a promising fighter design that could have been active in late 1942/early 1943. As such it encountered several design problems (mainly the engines) and didnt start to see service in any numbers until mid/late 1944.

 

[R Leonard]

Rich,

can you comment on this text?

According to revisionists, the weave was first used during the battle of Midway, giving credit to Commander Thatch for inventing it, and referred to it as the "Thach Weave."

An article in the Smithsonian magazine, Air Space, said that Lt. Commander Thach had developed the weave which he said contributed in a large part, "...To the success of the Battle of Midway...." However, Commander Thatch admits he had heard it was used in China. Incidently this weave was used, during our training at Toungoo, and was part of a combat report when the AVG first encounter the Japanese on December 20, 1941.

Yes, I can.

This writing (above) is a case of someone taking words and meanings out of context. And my immediate response is that someone, who likes to throw around words with negative connotations in history circles, such as "revisionists" is apparently either an AVG apologist, at worst, or, at best, an overly enthusiastic AVG booster, or most likely, someone who does not know what a Thach Weave is and is simply keying on the word "Weave". Regretfully, this goes on and on. Neither the historical timeline, nor an actually examination of what defines the tactics described supports the position that the AVG had anything to do with a Thach Weave type tactic, nor did they independently develop any weave type tactic, nor was Thach at all influenced by the activities of the AVG. Further, if one takes the time to read up on the AVG one finds not a single instance of a description of a Thach Weave type tactic being used in combat.

Thach was aware of tactical developments from the reports he was receiving. Important to note was that Thach worked out the details of his Beam Defense in July 1941. The first 29 of the AVG pilots and ground personnel did not arrive in Toungoo until 1 August 1941. A second contingent of 123 arrived on 18 August. By early September they were conducting training flights in their P-40's. Kind of makes it a little tough for the AVG to come up first with a "Thach Weave" tactic some two months after Thach had already worked out the details and tested same, eh? Further, Thach and VF-3 were already off to the Pacific by the time the AVG entered its first combat. If indeed, Thach ever saw an AAR from this AVG action it was certainly long, long, after the fact. Kind of makes me wonder exactly when Thach "heard it was used in China" and exactly what did he hear. A quick look at his oral history doesn't mention weaving in China, nor does Steve Ewing's recent biography "Thach Weave – The Life of Jimmie Thach".

When you read up on this first action of the AVG you find that it is an intercept of about a dozen or so Ki-48 (Lily) twin-engined bombers. Without going into detail of the action itself, two of the P-40's making the intercept, in accordance with the tactics laid out by Chennault, were instructed to remain overhead as a protection against the appearance of Japanese fighters. These two were described as weaving over the action and were referred to as "weavers." This practice, which in the USN would be called a "high CAP" was, in reality, merely milling about over the action waiting for something to happen. It has absolutely nothing to do with the tactic later called a Thach Weave.

There are even cases of USN fighters weaving, but not in a Thach Weave. At Coral Sea the strike escort F4Fs weaved back an forth over their charges as they made their way towards the Shoho on the 7th and Shokaku on the 8th. This weave was intentional as it permitted the fighters to stay with their slower companions without having to throttle back. Another weave, for certain, but not a Thach Weave.

I think it is important to note, and cannot be repeated enough, that when developing his defensive tactic, Thach did not use the word "weave" at all. He called it a "beam defense".

Thach deliberately avoided the word "weave" because he was aware of a tactic used by the RAF. If you note the timing of the quote, reporting use of a "weave" in their first combat on 20 Dec 41, obviously, then, the AVG was using a "weave" as well, but long after, as noted, Thach devised his defense. In actuality, the AVG "weave" or "weaver" was not particularly a pure "tactic", but rather a formation lookout doctrine and was, in fact, the same as noted for the RAF. Oddly enough, the AVG use of weavers in their formations made them somewhat behind the times, doctrinally. For the sake of simplicity, though, I'll go ahead and refer to the use of weavers as a "tactic" as once there is contact with enemy aircraft it no longer becomes a lookout doctrine, but a defensive tactic.

The "Weave" or "Weaver" was a formation defense developed, again, by the RAF. At its simplist, this involved having the tail-end-charlie of a given formation weave back and forth over the rear of the formation to discourage an overhead or rear attack. In other cases, such as the AVG having a couple of planes milling around over an action, there was more than one weaver, but the intent was the same. What the RAF found was that, and typical of most air forces of the time, the tail-end-charlie tended to be the most junior pilot. So, in retrospect, they were putting the least experienced pilot, or pilots, in a position critical to the defense of the formation. They also found that the Germans, no one ever said they were stupid, had a remarkable tendency to pick off these weavers as there was no one to protect them. The RAF lost a lot of FNGs that way. Eventually, in early 1942, the practice was discontinued for exactly that reason.

Thach was very much aware of this tactic/practice, from briefings and reports from liaison officers and observers, and experimented with it in training with VF-3 on the west coast. At the same time, on the east coast, Lt Cdr Oscar Pedersen's VF-42 also experimented with concept of protective weavers, both in the spring of 1941. Both squadron commanders, and, of course, their pilots, quickly realized that the poor slob chosen to be weaver had a zero over two pi life expectancy in combat. By the end of May 1941, neither squadron ever considered the use of weavers as a viable tactic. I am unaware of any other USN VF squadrons that may have experimented with weavers.

So, adopted from the RAF, this also was the weave "tactic used by the AVG. I would posit that their use of the practice put them somewhat behind the curve in terms of formation protection.

The comparison of the RAF/AVG Weaver to the Thach Weave is simply a seizure upon the word "weave". Remember, Thach did not use the word weave for his tactic. The expression Thach Weave did not come into the lexicon until Lt Cdr Jimmy Flatley named it in his after action report for the Battle of Santa Cruz. He recounted how Thach's Beam Defense tactic had allowed him a successful defense in an almost sure destruction situation during the battle. He wrote: ". . . the four plane division is the only thing that will work and, I am calling it the Thach Weave." This written in late October 1942.

The Thach Wave, on the other hand is, as stated, a tactic. Here you have, commonly, a four plane-two section division cruising along, probably in a finger four type mode (though in USN practice probably each section leader and his wing man are little closer together than the sections to each other). When attacked (note: "when attacked") by superior numbers the sections separate farther, to use a naval term "abeam," to where the distance between the sections is marginally greater that the turning radius at military power. It is the duty of each section to provide, to use an army term, an "overwatch" of the other section. When, say, the starboard side section detects an attack setting up on the port side section, the starboard side section initiates the weave with a turn to port as the enemy commits to his run. The port section see this move, realizes somebody's starting a gunnery run on them and turns toward the starboard section. This accomplishes a couple of things . . . the turning to starboard creates a high deflection shot for the enemy airplane(s) that if they not particularly trained to do (and most air forces in those days tended to prefer the straight up the rear or head on zero deflection shot) you have spoiled their shot ... the next thing that usually happens is that the enemy is watching the port section and if he attempts to reacquire a sight picture (and he probably will) he's going to turn to starboard as well, still watching his intended victim. Now the enemy pilot has set himself up for a head on encounter with the approaching starboard section. All he can do is hope for the best, because if he tries to break away he's only opening himself up for a free low deflection shot from the starboard section ... game, set, match. An illustration of this can be found at

http://www.daveswarbirds.com/navalwar/defense.htm

Bottom line is that weaving about over ones charges on escort or boring holes on the sky keeping a lookout for your squadron mates as the execute an attack is not a Thach Weave. The Thach Weave requires a particular positioning of the division or section and the "weave" is not initiated until the attacking enemy has committed to his run-in.


Regards,

Rich

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Excellent!

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I mean come on. Why don't you just put a pointy hat on and hang some niggers.

Alright vanir we dont need talk like that in this forum. This forum contains people from all walks of life and we will not have people being offended by that kind of talk.