How good was the soviet air force? (3 Viewers)

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The summer of 1993 I had the opportunity to spend a couple of weeks in Berlin visiting a college friend. Since it was during the 50th anniversary of WW2 there was a lot of documentary presentations and discussions on TV. What struck out to me then was that German television held tight to the narrative that the Eastern front was the most important theater in the entire war. The portrayal of the ferocity of the fighting and magnitude was eye opening. The Western Allies were definitely considered secondary. I found the discussion of about Allied bombing illuminating especially in the context of city bombing by the RAF constituting a war crime.

yes ... I definitely agree with all of that. Watch that David Glantz lecture I linked up thread, it is eye opening and he presents it very well - the increcdible scale of the Soviet German war is mind boggling and he gets it across very effectively. And the Russian war was turning into a nightmare much earlier for the Germans. Stalingrad was at the end of 1942, from that point on, it was a hellscape for them. The Allies were winning big battles in North Africa and in the Altantic, but that felt further away. After Stalingrad the Germans knew the Soviets were coming for their throat. And they were.

And as for the Allied bombing, that is another one I often bring up in here (and get shot down in flames over and over... haha). I think it was a mistake, personally. I am not on "team Bomber Mafia" or a fan of Arthur Harris.

Not just from the German perspective but many of the Western allies too - the Dutch, the French, the Belgians, have a very different perspective in their own national stories of the war than we would assume in the Anglophone world. We bombed occupied cities, sometimes causing more mayhem there than the Germans had in the early war. Our aircraft flew over occupied countryside and pretty much annihilated anything that moved. Trains, cars, trucks, horse carts, houses, piles of stuff. Anything that looked like it might be alive. It was war, so it's understandable (certainly, rules of engagement would be almost impossible to implement) but if you are a French farmer and your daughter gets blasted off of a horse cart by .50 caliber machine guns, or you are a Belgian or a Dutch citizen of some port town that get's hammered into oblivion by heavy bombers, and you are limping around with burn scars and a missing leg, you may not perceive it as a blessing.

Rather than "good guys / bad guys", I'd say in terms of the States involved, it's very, very, very bad, defeated by much less bad. But also ruthless killers, lets be real. I mean for those of us who recognize that the Soviet Union was an extremely bad state, and Stalin was pretty similar to Hitler, we can see that we had to make a devil's bargain to defeat the Nazis through the Russians, by and large. So that alone shows where we were at. We incinerated cities like Hamburg and Dresden, and almost every city in Japan. We also bombed the crap out of occupied cities in Asia as well, like Hanoi or Taipei.

And just as not every German or Japanese or Italian pilot or soldier was 100% evil or 100% on board with their ideology, not every Allied pilot or soldier (or general) was gentle or kind or 100% on board with our stated ideology. War has a lot more gray areas than we like to think about, and that isn't necessarily something we have to explore in here.

But I would also say, again, that the strategic bombing campaign was largely a waste, and a mistake. Certain industries - i.e. oil - proved to be highly vulnerable to heavy bombers. Airfields also proved very vulnerable, in many theaters, I've been learning. But smashing and burning down all those cities, and at such huge cost in life for our own air crews (bomber command lost nearly 50% of their crews!) I just think it was a mistake, and a tragedy.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

For those who wonder as to the relevance of the Teutonic Knights to the 20th or 21st Century, look into the history and current strategic relevance of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

 

[tomo pauk]

For those who wonder as to the relevance of the Teutonic Knights to the 20th or 21st Century, look into the history and current strategic relevance of the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Relevance of Teutonic knights in 20th and 21st century??
smh

 

[SaparotRob]

The summer of 1993 I had the opportunity to spend a couple of weeks in Berlin visiting a college friend. Since it was during the 50th anniversary of WW2 there was a lot of documentary presentations and discussions on TV. What struck out to me then was that German television held tight to the narrative that the Eastern front was the most important theater in the entire war. The portrayal of the ferocity of the fighting and magnitude was eye opening. The Western Allies were definitely considered secondary. I found the discussion of about Allied bombing illuminating especially in the context of city bombing by the RAF constituting a war crime.

I imagine the eastern threat was more existential.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Relevance of Teutonic knights in 20th and 21st century??
smh

Well, it's relevant in two ways - the persistent, nasty legend or dark fantasy of that particular type (of racial superiority, especially toward Slavic and Baltic people), and that fact that it's ultimately the reason the Soviets took over that odd (and currently I'd say, pretty dangerous) little piece of land on the coast between Poland and Lithuania.

That was formerly Königsberg, the seat of the Teutonic Order after they lost their original home base of Marienberg / Malbork following the mid-15th Century rebellion of German cities that I mentioned upthread. This persisted across the centuries as a German enclave adjacent to Poland / Lithuania, which, merging with Brandenburg was the origin of the Kingdom of Prussia. The same Prussia that defeated Napoleon etc., and contributed so many officers to the military of the German Empire etc. This chunk of land, still very influenced by the legends and ideology of the Teutonic Knights, was a key factor in the tensions leading up to WW I, after which it became an unstable region of revolutions and strife between Germans, Polish and Russians, right up to WW2.

The Russians, post WW2, and post fall of the Soviet Union, have held on to the epicenter of that Prussian state, which they call Kaliningrad, and it is once again complicating matters between Russia and states to their West (including specifically NATO).

You can assume that anything from that far back has no meaning in the modern world, but ideology, propaganda, and legends from the distant past can still have very real effects today, in many parts of the world.

To paraphrase HP Lovecraft, you don't have to believe in Santa Claus to receive Christmas Presents.

 

[SaparotRob]

Cthulhu saves.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Cthulhu saves.

Only if you truly open your heart to him, and mumble the right insane chants...

 

[NevadaK]

I imagine the eastern threat was more existential.

Yes, my feeling from what was being shared/communicated was that there was real hate in the Eastern Front. Perhaps the most telling thing was how the Soviets commemorated their victory over the Nazis. In Vienna, they built a huge statue to the Soviet victory directly in front of the Russian embassy. In Berlin, on the other hand, the Soviets left the historic core of the city largely in-state as it was in June 1945. When I was there, restoration of the historic core had yet to begin. It was quite moving as a memorial and the message was unmistakeable.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Another historical tie-in.

The most apocalyptic war in Europe prior to WW I and WW II in the 20th Century, was the 30 Years War in the 17th Century. You can see it here as 1 on the map.

It was a religious-sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants, fought largely in what is now Germany and some other Central European states, and known for a kind of new level of ruthlessness, cruelty to civilians, and general apocalyptic destruction, including the massacre of entire cities. After the 30 Years War, wars in general tended to be much more bloody and less restrictive in terms of civilian casualties than they had been previously. You could say that the TYW was the first 'total war'.

The direct precursor, which is this little peak that I put the number 2 next to, was the Livonian War. This was Muscovy under Ivan the Terrible vs. a variety of mostly German polities in the southern Baltic: Several city-states, the remnants of a mostly German Crusading Order, and knights and various militias in a region called Livonia (which is now Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). In this case, the blame goes I think mainly to Ivan and the Muscovites. Ivan had come up through the Mongol system (Muscovy was under Mongol rule until a famous incident during his reign). He was cruel and ruthlesss to a point of insanity, basically a serial killer in charge of a whole state. Very much like Stalin in that sense, maybe worse in some ways.

The dispute though was tinged by religious sectarianism on both sides, like the TYW. No mercy on either side. Atrocities right and left. Within the Catholic or Protestant parts of Europe, at least up to that point, there had been usually some moderation in war. There were rules in war, at least in North Central Europe and Italy. Civilians were (usually) spared, scorched earth was generally avoided (as it was known to lead directly to famine and then outbreaks of plague). Compromise was a thing. Military prisoners were routinely exchanged or released, or if they were rich, ransomed. Across religious boundaries however, it was always much more tricky. The Ottomans, for example, never had a lot of restrictions on how they conducted war.

And in the Livonian War all that kind of thing really went out the window. Civilians were not only massacred, but tortured to death en-masse. Famines got so bad that they led to outbreaks of cannibalism. The Thirty Years War was just more of the same, but on an even larger scale. The Catholics and Protestants had so demonized one another that they no longer considered each other human. And then immediately after the TYW followed another catastrophic religious war in Poland, between Muscovy (Orthodox), Sweden (Lutheran), Poland (Catholic), and the Cossacks (Orthodox) - which the Poles call The Deluge. It was more of the same... 1/3 of the population of Poland ended up being killed.

WW2 was basically the exact same religious-sectarian conflict as the Livonian War, the Thirty Years War, and The Deluge, but instead of religion, it was based on secular ideologies.

You could argue that humanity sometimes learned the wrong lessons on the road to progress.

 

[Just Schmidt]

Cthulhu saves.

Most of the time, my impression is, he just sleeps

 

[z42]

Yes, that and I think the Nazis were very good at propaganda, their propaganda definitely still lingers, and thanks to the uncomfortable fact that (theoretically former) Nazis ended up part of many western defense and intelligence establishments

Yes, I think the post-war situation with the cold war starting is behind much of the whitewashing of many heinous crimes during the war. People have deservedly been put behind bars for much less, but expediency won over morality. Tom Lehrer even made a song about von Braun:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjDEsGZLbio

And how much of the "Rommel myth" was really based on facts, vs., say, Liddel Hart out to polish his own image?

With all this being said, however, it seems to me Germany is among the few nations that has managed to look back at what they did and be genuinely sorry about it. To the point this is perhaps seen to this day as excessive timidity in foreign policy, e.g. wrt supporting Ukraine.

With regard to aviation, the Germans started with a clear, major advantage. But it does seem like that advantage slipped to almost nothing, as Germans fell behind in every area - tactics, training, and kit. By 1944 I don't see much German superiority on the front line, or over it. In fact at that point, I don't think there was any way they could win.

Both Germany and Japan gambled on a short war. In such a scenario, no need to spend resources on R&D projects that won't result in anything useful in short order. Once the Allies managed to endure the initial onslaught and it turned into an industrial slogging match the superior industrial capacity of the Allies, as well as plentiful access to critical resources such as oil, turned the tide.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yes, I think the post-war situation with the cold war staring is is behind much of the whitewashing of many heinous crimes during the war. People have deservedly been put behind bars for much less, but expediency won over morality. Tom Lehrer even made a song about von Braun:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjDEsGZLbio

yes 100% and he definitely nailed it. That song pretty much explains project paperclip better than I ever could.

And how much of the "Rommel myth" was really based on facts, vs., say, Liddel Hart out to polish his own image?

I think there are a lot of myths like that, sort of solidified on both sides, which bear re-examination.

With all this being said, however, it seems to me Germany is among the few nations that has managed to look back at what they did and be genuinely sorry about it. To the point this is perhaps seen to this day as excessive timidity in foreign policy, e.g. wrt supporting Ukraine.

I agree 100%. They faced up to what their country did, paid the price for it, and have moved on. I'd say Germany also, more than almost any other European or Anglo-American nation, resisted the propaganda of the Nazis post-war, because they knew how much it cost them. They understand the risks of falling into that kind of con better than anybody else.

However, largely due to external pressure of various kinds (political, economic, cultural), including from the US, a lot of this is rapidly eroding at the moment. Germany is shifting toward a something a lot like a war-footing. So is Japan.

Both Germany and Japan gambled on a short war. In such a scenario, no need to spend resources on R&D projects that won't result in anything useful in short order. Once the Allies managed to endure the initial onslaught and it turned into an industrial slogging match the superior industrial capacity of the Allies, as well as plentiful access to critical resources such as oil, turned the tide.

Agreed again, though of course, the story how the Allies found the ability to force the war into a longer conflict, and how they were able to simultaneously catch up with, and draw ahead of the two major Axis powers .. does bear exploring.

 

[tomo pauk]

Both Germany and Japan gambled on a short war. In such a scenario, no need to spend resources on R&D projects that won't result in anything useful in short order. Once the Allies managed to endure the initial onslaught and it turned into an industrial slogging match the superior industrial capacity of the Allies, as well as plentiful access to critical resources such as oil, turned the tide.

When it is about the military aircraft, Germany was stamping out the prototypes of many of those, while also trying to make aero engines and guns of different capabilities and levels of complexity. In any year of the war, including the 1st 24 months of the war when they were still dizzy after series of wins on the battlefield.

 

[Shortround6]

When it is about the military aircraft, Germany was stamping out the prototypes of many of those, while also trying to make aero engines and guns of different capabilities and levels of complexity. In any year of the war, including the 1st 24 months of the war when they were still dizzy after series of wins on the battlefield.

I think I have just found the secret of Germany's downfall.
The German supply officers and non-coms did an excellent job at first integrating and distributing an absolutely bewildering array of captured/commandeered weapons/vehicles/equipment (so beloved by modelers over the 70+ years) but the strain took it's toll and soon even the most hardened quartermasters started resorting to drink deal with the strain. Shortages meant that rarely could anything be gotten rid off (there was always some backwater rear area than needed something/anything) and shortages also meant even more stop gaps or substitute standard weapons and ammo, meaning longer hours, less sleep and more stress for the quartermasters and thus, more beer and wine consumption.
At some point they past the tipping point and the German supply system was being run by career alcoholic's due to the strain and mistakes became more and more numerous until the whole system collapsed.
Allied bombing is just an excuse/coverup

This is all a joke and is not to meant actually belittle any of the men (and women) who were trying their best on both sides.
German procurement was certainly not the well planed picture it is often painted as.

 

[tomo pauk]

German procurement was certainly not the well planed picture it is often painted as.

I don't think that many people that have taken even a cursory look at the matters will believe that German procurement was rainbows and unicorns. Eg. a quick look at IIRC 10 (ten) different 7.5cm artillery calibers (without the captured calibers) in use will give a pause to a warrant officer in logistics department, let alone someone higher up.
OTOH - waging a multi-continent war without the required resources is quite a task, and was pushing Germans into trying to make use of anything and everything they acquired (by legal means or otherwise).

 

[pinehilljoe]

I think I have just found the secret of Germany's downfall.
The German supply officers and non-coms did an excellent job at first integrating and distributing an absolutely bewildering array of captured/commandeered weapons/vehicles/equipment (so beloved by modelers over the 70+ years) but the strain took it's toll and soon even the most hardened quartermasters started resorting to drink deal with the strain. Shortages meant that rarely could anything be gotten rid off (there was always some backwater rear area than needed something/anything) and shortages also meant even more stop gaps or substitute standard weapons and ammo, meaning longer hours, less sleep and more stress for the quartermasters and thus, more beer and wine consumption.
At some point they past the tipping point and the German supply system was being run by career alcoholic's due to the strain and mistakes became more and more numerous until the whole system collapsed.
Allied bombing is just an excuse/coverup

This is all a joke and is not to meant actually belittle any of the men (and women) who were trying their best on both sides.
German procurement was certainly not the well planed picture it is often painted as.

Ironically in the summer of '44 German production reached its apex, after this the production plunged. The bombing may have been much more effective than thought.

Germany started the war with slack in its production like the USA, and did not totally mobilize for war production until 1943 and into 1944. The bombing may have placed a ceiling on German War production well below what a skillfully managed economy may have been able to produce. As substantial as 1943 and '44 production was, it might have been even greater without the bombing campaign. It is hard to imagine German production if the industrial planners had the same freedom as in the USA to plan, build and operate the War economy without interruption. Recommend reading the work of British historian economist, Richard Overy.

I'm skeptical of any Soviet accounts on capability and production given it was a closed society. Ten to 15% of the Soviet Air Force was equipped with Lend Lease aircraft. One in five AFVs were Lend Lease if the accounts of 40,000 T-34s being produced plus other Soviet AFVs are accurate, but its uncommon to see photos of M-4s or Valentines with the Red Star.

 

[z42]

When it is about the military aircraft, Germany was stamping out the prototypes of many of those, while also trying to make aero engines and guns of different capabilities and levels of complexity. In any year of the war, including the 1st 24 months of the war when they were still dizzy after series of wins on the battlefield.

They stamped out a lot of prototypes, and even low volume initial production. But did they actually manage to introduce a single new aircraft into service during the war that ended up contributing significantly to their war efforts, beyond the FW 190?

In particular wrt longer term projects. By the time they realized jets would be important, it was essentially too late. Granted the UK committed the same mistake with jets, but they were winning the war by that point, they didn't have a desperate need for a big step up in capability.

 

[tomo pauk]

They stamped out a lot of prototypes, and even low volume initial production. But did they actually manage to introduce a single new aircraft into service during the war that ended up contributing significantly to their war efforts, beyond the FW 190?

You were making talking about Germany (and Japan) having:

no need to spend resources on R&D projects that won't result in anything useful in short order

However, they were spending money on many R&D projects.
That a lot of these projects were flawed (be that slightly or wholly), and thus contributed next to nothing to the German war effort is beyond the point.
Japan was also making a lot of designs, eg. Army was having about one fighter design a year in production, let alone in R&D phase, while Navy was almost trying to have a floatplane equivalent of anything land-based.

 

[z42]

That a lot of these projects were flawed (be that slightly or wholly), and thus contributed next to nothing to the German war effort is beyond the point.

No, that's exactly the point. Perhaps I didn't write clearly enough. They evidently planned to win a short war with what they had at the outset. When that didn't happen, whatever plans they had to switch to improved types waiting in the pipeline where wholly inadequate, and with the exception of the FW 190 largely didn't happen.

A prototype is a long way away from having a new aircraft in volume production with at least the worst of the inevitable issues worked out. The adage about 90% of the effort remaining when you think you're 90% done applies.

 

[tomo pauk]

No, that's exactly the point. Perhaps I didn't write clearly enough. They evidently planned to win a short war with what they had at the outset. When that didn't happen, whatever plans they had to switch to improved types waiting in the pipeline where wholly inadequate, and with the exception of the FW 190 largely didn't happen.

A prototype is a long way away from having a new aircraft in volume production with at least the worst of the inevitable issues worked out. The adage about 90% of the effort remaining when you think you're 90% done applies.

R&D money & effort sunk is most evident in having actual prototypes, no? Note plural 'prototypes' - Germans had no problems in making half a dozen prototypes flying within a year, of a single design.
By the time aircraft are to be produced, it is procurement money that makes that happen (funelled into several manufacturing locations if the design is judged vital and/or promising enough), not R&D money & effort.
How good/bad the aircraft performed in actual combat is the 3rd category, that had a lot to do with quality and quantity of opposition encountered, as well as with logistics (supply of fuel, new pilots, spare parts) that supports units using the new types.