How good was the soviet air force? (2 Viewers)

[NevadaK]

1. The RAF could night bombing, so they are good AF. All AF, and the USAAC, suffered losses, but did not have this capability. Better AF, which has more possibilities of application. Return to logic from fairy tales about justice. Then and today, the ability to night boming belongs only to good AF. Otherwise, as we know, they missed the city, or the country.

2. The Battle of Midway was fought by two sides. Both sides made mistakes. One of them suffered heavy losses and did not carry out the plan. The rest is demagogy. Fighters, for example, should not increase the number of shot down, but perform the task. In this case, fighters protected aircraft carriers, and attack aircraft sought out and destroyed aircraft carriers. The result is clear to those who rely on analysis, and not on the drama of heroes.

3. Why is the lack of order to special aircraft not a disadvantage of VVS? In the USSR before the war and after 1942, a lot of aircraft were built. Gift the training aircraft to the USSR not refuse.
No, the logical conclusion: the VVS leaders presented combat operations in a special way. Didn't prefer pilot training and artillery support, for example.
We all know that infantry losses depend on VVS. And Soviet losses are an order of magnitude greater than in other countries. And they were also shot by their own.
Only a few pilots with good training showed success. So Kozhedub was a piloting instructor until 1943. He began fighting and achieved something (cannot be verified). Bad leadership of VVS does not make them better, as well as difficulties. I answer the question of the topic.
No, I avoid doing only the most obvious in difficult situations. But this is not about me. VVS is the largest on Earth. At any moment they were doing strange things, which are difficult to write clearly in a squabble. There are many planes, many pilots, even the speed, let's say, is good according to measurements, full cooperation of advanced countries, including France until the fall of 1939 and the US until 1940, Germany, where samples of combat aircraft and technologies were purchased until 1940, the UK and US since the summer of 1941. But even the expertise has not been established. Before the war, I repeat, in one year alone they built about 30 different new projects of single-seat fighters. Five only P-38 analogs in the USSR in 1940.

And design bureaus with the beginning of the war continued to design. You are in vain asserting that this is impossible. In the US they took a break for the whole of 1942, not in the USSR. The lack of time is explained not by the evil of Nazism, but by the fact, in particular, that in 1937 Stalin imprisoned and shot successful designers, figures of the VVS, army and industry. However, not for the first time. They demanded from the planes only what Stalin, who personally began to lead it, is able to understand. That is, without details, as in this forum: speed, sometimes range. In industry, there is another disaster - falsifications (pripiski). Directors of military factories are fired and shot systematically. Because the plans are not justified, but their implementation is the law. Where would quality and real success come from? When success were, it was in spite of the country's leadership and VVS.

And I know that the actions of the UK Air Ministry, the US President, RLM and Hitler can be criticized. But first, show me at least the executions of designers.

4. There are losses and Soviet losses. Not everyone has them, as you write for some reason. Perhaps the point is that it is difficult to fit such a thing into the mind. They rarely flew, had no experience, there was no communication between the branches of the armed forces. This is how the Germans acted against the Red Army until 1945. Not everyone.

5. I wrote that the RAF acted with tiny forces against LW and Italy at once. VVS on the contrary. RAF won, VVS disappeared. RAF and USAAC helped VVS recovery and conducted air offensive against Germany, Italy, France, Japan, but not vice versa. And perfection of Soviet aircraft - pripiski. Moreover, after the war the situation remained: over many poorly trained pilots who do not form useful VVS. They taught this to communist satellites too.

***
You have no criterion of AF quality. You are about fairness and difficulties. The work of the best looks easy from the outside.

Greetings Ernest, I think my points are being lost in translation.

1. The RAF adopted night bombing to avoid the losses that came with long range daylight bombing. In the early part of the war, the RAF did not possess the types of aircraft that could effectively carry out a strategic bombing campaign. Results were mixed until the large four engine bombers began to be available in numbers in 1943. The RAF did develop technologies to better bomb at night and were leaders in this, however, other air forces demonstrated the ability to bomb urban centers at night. The RAF did not always hit its intended targets either.

2. The point I was making about the Battle of Midway was that the US suffered terrible casualties to its air forces due to lesser equipment and questionable (in hindsight) tactics. The same argument that you make about the VVS. These men flew with great courage and conviction just as the pilots of the VVS must have. The point I am making is that it was not only the VVS that suffered high casualty rates. The same is true for the 8th Air Force in 1943 and the RAF Bomber Command.

3. Designing and manufacturing new aircraft is challenging in even the best of circumstances. One has to look at how few new aircraft actually made it into production during the war vs how many attempts were made. New designs can fail for any number of reasons, poor aerodynamics, unforeseen control issues, poor propellor performance, lack of critical materials, power plant performance issues, and on and on. The iterative process for a new design takes two or three cycles to be successful. Sometimes longer. Then you need to build a factory network which also takes time to build machine tools and iron out the production process. New technologies are even longer.

Yes, a good number of the USSR's challenges were self inflicted by Stalin's purges. But, we can't overlook the challenges from 1941 onward to produce new aircraft simply due to the fact that the Soviet Union was an occupied country at war. The effort to bring one new manufacturing network online in these conditions is massive, let alone the effort to bring multiple networks online.

4. Friendly fire happened on all sides and is an unfortunate aspect of war. The USAAF bombed its own troops in Operation Cobra for example. Friendly Fire happened in both Gulf Wars. It is unfortunate but not necessarily a sign of incompetence.

 

[bf109xxl]

I will try to avoid personal attacks in my reply, but it it is for the last time if you won't follow the same way.

The choice of aircraft by French pilots, you supported this thesis

That's not true. I argued that the French could choose the airplanes, but not the pilots themselves.

but you could have honestly refuted it, since you read the book.

I explained the situation with the selection in detail.

In the huge VVS, not all ordinary regiments are the same. Nothing interesting.

OK, give me another example of a front-line four-squadron fighter regiment that kept this structure for more than half a year.

Pilots are obliged to love their weapons. These ones are engaged, not accidental. The Franco-Soviet special friendship based on anti-Americanism continued until the early 1970s, when it suddenly turned into hostility.

The Franco-Soviet friendship dates back to the 1930s, when in France the Communists had considerable support in society.

What kind of nonsense did I write about NN?

Ok, I can cite it again: "In fact, the French in the USSR had no choice. They are ordinary officers of a Soviet regiment...But, perhaps, Yak is the closest to France, and not by chance at all." All these statements are nonsense: the Yak-1 was chosen by the French, but not by the N-N pilots, namely by General Petit and Captain Mirlesse, They had choice options - the French were offered any Lend-Lease aircraft, but they immediately requested "the best Soviet fighter", which at that time was undoubtedly the Yak. Apart from the desire to please the Soviets, the French had quite rational motives - retraining could be organized in the shortest possible time, there was no need to wait. At the very beginning of the training in Ivanovo, Major Tulasne was invited to compare the Yak with the Hurricane and the Airacobra. I think that if Tulasne had strongly opposed the Yak, the French could have gotten the Cobra, but Tulasne was delighted with the Yak. This whole story tells that no one forced the French to choose the Yak, and they had the option until the last moment - no romantic motives like "closest to France" are required to explain it. And they were never "ordinary officers of a Soviet regiment". They could, for example, request the replacement of food products simply because they were too unfamiliar.

If you do not want to answer here, then write something on the topic that will not contradict your own statements. Show me an example. I expected this from an old-timer.

It is very difficult for me to understand your claims, because unlike you I always operate with verifiable information and cite sources. Moreover, you are often agree with my posts - the discussion may be more substantive if you cite sources as well.

You have not yet shown me the best knowledge of the subject.

So you think that citing sources is a sign of lack of knowledge?

Therefore, leave the assessments of my person until the time when I myself consider you an expert.

I'll leave it without comment so you'll be ashamed later.

I do not deal with combat examples. My interest is in designers and industry.

Then why did you mention N-N at all?

The NN example not be indicative of anything.

That's not true. Even in the history of this squadron/regiment, there are examples that can be used to assess the quality of Soviet aviation industry production. Several crashes in N-N happened due to manufacturing defects - just in a single squadron/regiment!!! And you would have known that if you had read the book.

I do not understand why they need to be discussed. The experience on aircraft of different countries in the USSR is not at all unique. You are feeding me irrelevant nonsense.

If you don't like something - don't reply, don't participate in discussions, no one is forcing you. But if you participate in a discussion, you are obliged to support your statements with references to sources - unless, of course, you are the author of books based on archival materials. In that case your opinion will have value by default.

 

[bf109xxl]

Yes, a good number of the USSR's challenges were self inflicted by Stalin's purges. But, we can't overlook the challenges from 1941 onward to produce new aircraft simply due to the fact that the Soviet Union was an occupied country at war.

The Soviet Union was only partially occupied. A large number of factories were evacuated, and many of them were relocated to sites already under construction for planned new factories. And without lend-lease supplies, the USSR could hardly have held out in 1942. Yes, everyone knows that the main deliveries took place in 1944, but in 1942 the value of supplies was extremely high.

The effort to bring one new manufacturing network online in these conditions is massive, let alone the effort to bring multiple networks online.

In many cases the networks were either already in place or their construction had already begun. Even before the war, the Soviets wanted to reduce the concentration of industrial facilities in the "old" industrial regions in favor of the "new" ones - the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. The plan was to build there "duplicates" of the factories from the "old" industrial areas along with "non-duplicates". This is one of the reasons why the evacuation was successful.

Don't forget that the Soviets managed to evacuate ~25 million (in total for 1941/1942) citizens before the occupation.

 

[Luft.4]

With the end of the war, it becomes easier to compare projects and aircraft. Not by the writen opinions of individuals, but by the decisions of experts from different countries.
For example: they praise the La and Me 262, but immediately after the end of the war they were written off everywhere (Me 262 in Czechoslovakia only).
If you read more widely, you can find the reasons for these important decisions, but it is clear that it is difficult to separate the decisive ones from the secondary ones and from random opinions.
After 1946, only the La-9 and -11, whose projects were completely revised. And the FW 190D and Me 109G flew for a long time, much longer than the Me 262, but less than the Meteor, of course. Do you prefer to read one major who felt that he could not cope? The Yaks were not scrapped so quickly.

What are you trying to say here (possibly your translation is muddling things if you are translating from X-> English)? That it is easier to compare fighter performance later in the war or something?

If so here is a little about comparisons:

What I wrote about Harder and his stance on the Soviet aircraft he fought agaisnt in late 1944 was countered with ~"if he had flown against early La-5 his opinion would have changed".
Harder is credited with over 50 claims, most of which were against Western Allied aircraft (fighters include P-38, P-40, P-47, and Spitfires). That was his personal experience, that was his bar. Not only was he successful, he was a unit leader. Now for him to make the complaint to the highest level of Luftwaffe authority regarding Soviet fighters in late 1944 should alert readers that this was not a petty complaint or nonsensical opinion. Harder's first hand combat experience makes him a ideal for such a comparison.

"one major who felt he could not cope" Hmm, ever wonder why he felt like that?

There is this one major, then the other 4+ JGs who felt the same way by late war as I previously pointed out who put into writing just how potent the Soviets had become by war's end (post #594). If you 'read more widely' this trend becomes apparent in late 1944/1945.

Evidently the Soviet Airforce was potent enough to win the air war in the east.

 

[Frog]

I will try to avoid personal attacks in my reply, but it it is for the last time if you won't follow the same way.

That's not true. I argued that the French could choose the airplanes, but not the pilots themselves.

I explained the situation with the selection in detail.

OK, give me another example of a front-line four-squadron fighter regiment that kept this structure for more than half a year.

The Franco-Soviet friendship dates back to the 1930s, when in France the Communists had considerable support in society.

Ok, I can cite it again: "In fact, the French in the USSR had no choice. They are ordinary officers of a Soviet regiment...But, perhaps, Yak is the closest to France, and not by chance at all." All these statements are nonsense: the Yak-1 was chosen by the French, but not by the N-N pilots, namely by General Petit and Captain Mirlesse, They had choice options - the French were offered any Lend-Lease aircraft, but they immediately requested "the best Soviet fighter", which at that time was undoubtedly the Yak. Apart from the desire to please the Soviets, the French had quite rational motives - retraining could be organized in the shortest possible time, there was no need to wait. At the very beginning of the training in Ivanovo, Major Tulasne was invited to compare the Yak with the Hurricane and the Airacobra. I think that if Tulasne had strongly opposed the Yak, the French could have gotten the Cobra, but Tulasne was delighted with the Yak. This whole story tells that no one forced the French to choose the Yak, and they had the option until the last moment - no romantic motives like "closest to France" are required to explain it. And they were never "ordinary officers of a Soviet regiment". They could, for example, request the replacement of food products simply because they were too unfamiliar.

It is very difficult for me to understand your claims, because unlike you I always operate with verifiable information and cite sources. Moreover, you are often agree with my posts - the discussion may be more substantive if you cite sources as well.

So you think that citing sources is a sign of lack of knowledge?

I'll leave it without comment so you'll be ashamed later.

Then why did you mention N-N at all?

That's not true. Even in the history of this squadron/regiment, there are examples that can be used to assess the quality of Soviet aviation industry production. Several crashes in N-N happened due to manufacturing defects - just in a single squadron/regiment!!! And you would have known that if you had read the book.

If you don't like something - don't reply, don't participate in discussions, no one is forcing you. But if you participate in a discussion, you are obliged to support your statements with references to sources - unless, of course, you are the author of books based on archival materials. In that case your opinion will have value by default.

Just my 2c : because of the Soviet / german pact and defeatist activities, by decree dated september 26, 1939, the communist party and related organizations in France were disbanded. Its leader, Maurice Thorez deserted and fled to Moscow. Between october 6 and 8 1939, 34 communists MP were arrested and condemned in 1940 to 5 years in jail.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Evidently the Soviet Airforce was potent enough to win the air war in the east.

Well, I don't agree with that.

The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east. The LW was capable of doing some CAS in the eastern front that was unthinkable in the west: Ju-87s flying in daylight was a fact in 1944 in the east without LW air superiority when already in 1943 in the MTO was nearly a death sentence for their crew.

The 1944 attack to Poltava airbase was a great success while any of the earlier attacks to Britain in Operation Steinbock would struggle to meet that definition.

 

[bf109xxl]

Just my 2c : because of the Soviet / german pact and defeatist activities, by decree dated september 26, 1939, the communist party and related organizations in France were disbanded. Its leader, Maurice Thorez deserted and fled to Moscow. Between october 6 and 8 1939, 34 communists MP were arrested and condemned in 1940 to 5 years in jail.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet-German Pact meant the end of friendly relations between the USSR and France, but these relations began in the early 1930s, when the French offered the USSR to conclude a Treaty of Mutual Assistance. It was signed in 1935. Obviously, the main reason for its conclusion was not the sympathies of the French society at all, but the desire to protect themselves from the growing German threat. Nevertheless, I think that the presence of a strong French Communist Party was of some importance.

 

[bf109xxl]

The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east.

Undoubtedly.

The LW was capable of doing some CAS in the eastern front that was unthinkable in the west: Ju-87s flying in daylight was a fact in 1944 in the east without LW air superiority when already in 1943 in the MTO was nearly a death sentence for their crew.

The war in the East was won by Soviet artillery, tanks and infantry. The role of Soviet aviation, even when taking into account the weakening of the Luftwaffe, was not decisive. If the Soviet Air Force had to confront the entire Luftwaffe, its losses would have been not just great but terrible, though of course it would have played some role.

The 1944 attack to Poltava airbase was a great success while any of the earlier attacks to Britain in Operation Steinbock would struggle to meet that definition.

This is just an episode that demonstrated the weakness of Soviet air defense. But the front aviation was also in fact only numerous, but by no means effective.
In my reply to Luft.4 I will try to contribute the topic "Why Soviet airplanes were superior or equal to German ones mainly on paper?", and also explain why attempts to consider the manufacturing quality of German and Soviet airplanes as comparable in the last months of the war cause me only sad bewilderment.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I will try to avoid personal attacks in my reply, but it it is for the last time if you won't follow the same way.

No, let the moderators deal with it.

 

[Luft.4]

Well, I don't agree with that.

The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east. The LW was capable of doing some CAS in the eastern front that was unthinkable in the west: Ju-87s flying in daylight was a fact in 1944 in the east without LW air superiority when already in 1943 in the MTO was nearly a death sentence for their crew.

The 1944 attack to Poltava airbase was a great success while any of the earlier attacks to Britain in Operation Steinbock would struggle to meet that definition.

One is welcome to agree/disagree.

To the notion that some bad VVS performances negate the Soviets from taking ownership of the win in the east, how many times did USAAF bomber formations get wiped out on missions, or the outrageous losses suffered by RAF bomber command in 1943? Or pause bomber operations temporarily owing to high losses? They still won the war in the West.

How many times did the western allies fly supportive missions for the eastern front throughout the war, a few dozen times? A few dozen times over the course of a few months vs the years and tens of thousands of missions posted by the Soviets. Would you really think those few dozen missions are what enabled the Soviets to win the air war over the east?

By late war the presence of the big three (VVS, USAAF, RAF) also brought with it a much greater occurrence of blue-on-blue (March 18, 1945 being a prime example).

Yet the Soviet won the air war over the East despite all of that. Apparently, and evidently, despite their shortcomings they were still able to win.
Hence why I underlined the word enough, because it was enough to do the job. The Soviets turned westward long before Operation Frantic began. If anything western allied assisted to speed up the existing process of the Soviet westward push, just like how the Soviet ground forces (and to be fair the air forces, ample documented evidence they cleaned-house here too) absorbed and dealt with the German Panzer forces in the half of the war, clearing up opposition for the western advance for western allied forces.

Ps. on the subject of Ju 87s in the east in 1944, a quick check in my database shows 502 aircraft with damage over 60% (482 aircraft damaged 100%). In the German system, damage over 60% was considered unusable (Prien, IV. JG 3, Vol.4, p.332). There are an additional 234 Ju 87s with damage reported (% not specified). Data for 1944 is not complete, meaning there probably are even more Ju 87 losses. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung and C-Amt for 1944 (Jan-Dec inclusive) show only 904 Ju 87s were built. The rate of Ju 87 losses in 1944 (in the east alone!) is completely not sustainable compared to its production.
Pss. there was a reason why Ju 87s were being hurriedly replaced by Fw 190s over the east in 1944.

 

[NevadaK]

Well, I don't agree with that.

The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east. The LW was capable of doing some CAS in the eastern front that was unthinkable in the west: Ju-87s flying in daylight was a fact in 1944 in the east without LW air superiority when already in 1943 in the MTO was nearly a death sentence for their crew.

The 1944 attack to Poltava airbase was a great success while any of the earlier attacks to Britain in Operation Steinbock would struggle to meet that definition.

With all due respect, the allies needed each other. Let's not forget that something like 70% of Germany's war effort was committed to the east.

 

[NevadaK]

The Soviet Union was only partially occupied. A large number of factories were evacuated, and many of them were relocated to sites already under construction for planned new factories. And without lend-lease supplies, the USSR could hardly have held out in 1942. Yes, everyone knows that the main deliveries took place in 1944, but in 1942 the value of supplies was extremely high.

In many cases the networks were either already in place or their construction had already begun. Even before the war, the Soviets wanted to reduce the concentration of industrial facilities in the "old" industrial regions in favor of the "new" ones - the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. The plan was to build there "duplicates" of the factories from the "old" industrial areas along with "non-duplicates". This is one of the reasons why the evacuation was successful.

Don't forget that the Soviets managed to evacuate ~25 million (in total for 1941/1942) citizens before the occupation.

Thank you for the added context bf109xxl,

I wasn't trying to imply that all Soviet industry was lost in Barbarossa. I do sometimes oversimplify when trying to make a point without getting lost in less important details. Agreed, the Soviet Union did a heroic effort in relocating its industrial base east. I think wikipedia gives a reasonable overview of what was achieved:

Soviet industry in World War II - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

One thing that stands out to me is the drop in the labor pool. One of the points I have been trying to make is that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, would have had a very difficult time bringing new highly capable aircraft into service. Every new higher performing aircraft that is developed requires available manpower, research, and production capacity. My contention is that much of the discussion in this forum has been about the quality of Soviet aircraft, refinement, and production qualities. These are symptoms of a lack of development and production resources. These are challenges are not limited to the USSR. We can see the same issues in Germany's inability to adequately develop new power plants for next generation aircraft and the failed development of a wide range of aircraft. Japan, similarly suffered with power plant development and next generation fighters. The UK and the US in particular on the other hand had a surplus of resources for developing new aircraft. This does not mean that every aircraft was a success. Look at the number of failed designs due to failed power plants in the west. In the west's case it was not forced to accept underdeveloped designs due to the crisis of the war.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

How many times did the western allies fly supportive missions for the eastern front throughout the war, a few dozen times? A few dozen times over the course of a few months vs the years and tens of thousands of missions posted by the Soviets. Would you really think those few dozen missions are what enabled the Soviets to win the air war over the east?

The few Frantic missions were not the only (not even the main) support for the air war by the western allies. The air war in the Med and North África sucked a good part of the fighter, bomber and CAS forces of the LW in 1942 and 1943. The transport force was also in great demand at the same time that the Stalingrad airlift (demanding many fighter resources for escort duties also needed for escort to the Volga city).

The night bombing offense demanded twin engined fighters (and crews) that could had been employed as CAS (Bf.110) or bombers (Ju.88) and the daylight bombing absorbed more of those and stretched the single engined fighters more. Not to mention the vast amount of AA guns, munitions and personel devoted to home defense (up to a million men at it's height) that could be used as AT weapons when the soviet armour started to kick off and to give more hell to the soviet airmen.

All those things contributed to gap between the VVS and the LW and my assessment that VVS was not enough.

Ps. on the subject of Ju 87s in the east in 1944, a quick check in my database shows 502 aircraft with damage over 60% (482 aircraft damaged 100%). In the German system, damage over 60% was considered unusable (Prien, IV. JG 3, Vol.4, p.332). There are an additional 234 Ju 87s with damage reported (% not specified). Data for 1944 is not complete, meaning there probably are even more Ju 87 losses. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung and C-Amt for 1944 (Jan-Dec inclusive) show only 904 Ju 87s were built. The rate of Ju 87 losses in 1944 (in the east alone!) is completely not sustainable compared to its production.
Pss. there was a reason why Ju 87s were being hurriedly replaced by Fw 190s over the east in 1944.

Since Ju.87 production ended in august 1944, any losses thereafter was unsustainable by definition, but the opposite seems to be true by your numbers: if 502 were unusable or destroyed in the whole 1944, production of 904 aircraft in 8 months seems good enough for the replacement. A linear proyection give some 113 built a month for 42 destroyed (with all the caveats that losses weren't lineal and building rate neither most probably). Also, the mere fact it was in production till that date and was stopped when all bomber production was stopped indicated that the LW felt that it had some usage left until the Fw.190 jabos production could cope with the demand.

With all due respect, the allies needed each other. Let's not forget that something like 70% of Germany's war effort was committed to the east.

That was my point. It took the combines efforts of all three to win

 

[Luft.4]

Since Ju.87 production ended in august 1944

Wrong, 21 Ju 87 D5 were produced and delivered in September 1944. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung for September.
Your numbers for lost aircraft are likewise wrong: see my post above for losses (w/ and w/o %s), plus the fact that 1944 losses remain incomplete. There was alot more than 502. This is only for the eastern front.
Your understanding that the rate of loss was sustainable/linear is also wrong. Numbers I posted for losses were only for the eastern front. You must add to that western front / other front losses. As such the statement:

production of 904 aircraft in 8 months seems good enough for the replacement.

is not accurate at all because 1) its 9 months in 1944, 2) there were alot more Ju 87 losses than 502, and 3) with the high rate of 100% losses and crew deaths you are forced to fly the remaining aircraft with less experienced crews which increases the probability of future losses.

the LW felt that it had some usage left

Yes: beyond its dwindling role it was delegated while units awaited the Fw 190s, it was used mainly for towing gliders into pockets, training aircraft for schools, nachtschlacht duties, and to build up reserves for other units when taken out of front line duty (as found ordered in HW-5). Bf 109 Es were used till the very end because they could still fly, the LW was desperate to use what they could.

the mere fact it was in production till that date

The Bf 109 G6 was still being produced in Feb 1945 (!) because they had the parts and needed the aircraft. Bf 109 G14s were put ahead of K4 production in early 1945 because they needed to satisfy contracts for the former. One should consider that the plants had contracts agreed to many months prior that they needed to fulfill despite the realities at the front, and how bureaucracy plays a part in military production.

Ok next.

Twin engine aircraft in the east by wars end were now spplit between teir intended roles and for troop transport and supply dropping. If more twin engine aircraft were to be sent over, more would be used to supply trapped garrisions.
ADD/18VA activites did not require anywhere the same attention as the RAF, no need to send over additional NJGs.
The majority of transports were in the east and Balkans by war's end.
What would more bombers on the eastern front have contributed? As already stated ground attack and dive bombing aircraft like the Ju 87 were being retired and Fw 190s were given that role. KG units were being converted to fighter units KG(J), while those that werent (KG4 as an example) were preoccupied with supply dropping or glider towing, not bombing. Furthermore, spare twin engined bombers were used up for Mistels, not for bombing. The bomber itself became the bomb.

All those things contributed to gap between the VVS and the LW and my assessment that VVS was not enough.

Fair. You have yours, I have mine.
In a full-on continental war one should not be surprised that multiple factors overlapped, but to flat out state the Soviets needed the USAAF and RAF to win the war in the East is too big of an unsubstantiated stretch for me given the available documentary evidence. Med and Western Europe air activity certainly assisted in speeding things up, but that this won the war over the east, no. Fighting in the east won the air war over the east.
Are you under the bizarre impression Africa and the Med won the war in the east? I hope not.

Please list the USAAF and RAF fighting contribution in the east. Otherwise cursory activities such as the Med/Africa can easily be countered with how the overwhelming majority of the second world war's European conflict occurred in the east.

Did the Brits/Americans win in Greece and Italy because the Soviets ADD dropped supplies to the Balkan partisans and with their long range Yak-9DD escorts they helped downed allied crews get back to Italy? Of course not. Although these activities did take place, they are cursory to the actual fighting. Once again, please list the actual USAAF and RAF fighting in the east and how those limited mission won the VVS the air war over the east.

How many times did the western allies fight over the east? ~100 times and this won the war there? Come on...

 

[tomo pauk]

In a full-on continental war one should not be surprised that multiple factors overlapped, but to flat out state the Soviets needed the USAAF and RAF to win the war in the East is too big of an unsubstantiated stretch for me given the available documentary evidence. Med and Western Europe air activity certainly assisted in speeding things up, but that this won the war over the east, no. Fighting in the east won the air war over the east.
Are you under the bizarre impression Africa and the Med won the war in the east? I hope not.
Please list the USAAF and RAF fighting contribution in the east. Otherwise cursory activities such as the Med/Africa can easily be countered with how the overwhelming majority of the second world war's European conflict occurred in the east.
Did the Brits/Americans win in Greece and Italy because the Soviets ADD dropped supplies to the Balkan partisans and with their long range Yak-9DD escorts they helped downed allied crews get back to Italy? Of course not. Although these activities did take place, they are cursory to the actual fighting. Once again, please list the actual USAAF and RAF fighting in the east and how those limited mission won the VVS the air war over the east.
How many times did the western allies fight over the east? ~100 times and this won the war there? Come on...

It would've been fair to list the indirect stuff that the 'West' did that allowed for the Soviets to have a much easier war. Like, the German production of Flak and ammo for them, that was predominantly located and use in the West. It was about 20000 (20 thousand) of just the 88L56 AA guns, while the ammo just for the heavy Flak (75mm and up) was 1.5 millions of shells monthly for many months of the war. Or, the trashing of LW fighter force in the 1st 6 months of 1944, where a good deal of the mean and aircraft lost fought in the East in 1942-43.
No major air in the West = lower production of Flak and it's ammo, greater production of field and AT guns and their ammo = Soviets have it worse.

Major and earlier supplier to the partisans anywhere were the Western countries, not the SU.

 

[bf109xxl]

Please list the USAAF and RAF fighting contribution in the east. Otherwise cursory activities such as the Med/Africa can easily be countered with how the overwhelming majority of the second world war's European conflict occurred in the east.

It is very curious to read that the systematic destruction of the Reich's industrial potential had no effect on the situation on the Eastern Front. I.e., the dramatic drop in synthetic fuel production, the many times more complicated logistics, the reduction or cessation of growth in military output, the diversion of large resources to the production of anti-aircraft artillery, and most of the Luftwaffe's fighters for the Reich's air defense, were all factors of little significance. This is a fresh and somewhat unusual thought.
The air war on the Eastern Front was therefore not a decisive factor because the Soviets were able to utilize numerical superiority. But if more than twice as many Luftwaffe fighters appeared in the East, I doubt that this superiority would have helped the VVS any longer. However, the best Soviet fighter would surely have been a decisive factor here too - I mean "a T-34 tank on an enemy airfield". Of course, with gigantic losses. Can this be considered a win of the air war? I think not. The Soviets probably would not have had air supremacy in this case. They would just have achieved victory on the ground without it.

PS. A detailed response to the previous posting addressed to me takes time.

 

[Dimlee]

How many times did the western allies fly supportive missions for the eastern front throughout the war, a few dozen times? A few dozen times over the course of a few months vs the years and tens of thousands of missions posted by the Soviets. Would you really think those few dozen missions are what enabled the Soviets to win the air war over the east?

I think the point here is not the few dozen Allied missions for the benefits of the Eastern Front but the whole Allied contribution to the air war in Europe. Lend-lease provided VVS with equipment and materials (fuel included), Allied bombing weakened the industrial base, changed German priorities and didn't allow LW to increase its fighter and AAA force in the East, Allies degraded the logistic network, etc. There were other influences, such as operations in the Mediterranean that forced LW to redeploy forces. Or the Battle of the Atlantic, which is not often mentioned in this context. Each new submarine (as a replacement to yet another U-boat sunk by Allied aircraft) required resources that could be used for tanks and artillery for the Eastern Front.
For the credit of VVS, its massive expansion turned the force into a steamroller which was, with all efficiency issues and non-flexibility, a serious factor in the Soviet advances in the last 2 years.

 

[Dimlee]

It is very curious to read that the systematic destruction of the Reich's industrial potential had no effect on the situation on the Eastern Front. I.e., the dramatic drop in synthetic fuel production, the many times more complicated logistics, the reduction or cessation of growth in military output, the diversion of large resources to the production of anti-aircraft artillery, and most of the Luftwaffe's fighters for the Reich's air defense, were all factors of little significance. This is a fresh and somewhat unusual thought.

Why, this is a very old thought. I read it in the Soviet books and heard it in the "politinformatsiya" sessions when I was a schoolboy.
Everything old is new again, as they say. And today this "new" thought is supported not with the meagre efforts of Politizdat and APN but with a multi-billion budget and wide and professional networks.

 

[Luft.4]

I think the point here is not the few dozen Allied missions for the benefits of the Eastern Front but the whole Allied contribution to the air war in Europe. Lend-lease provided VVS with equipment and materials (fuel included), Allied bombing weakened the industrial base, changed German priorities and didn't allow LW to increase its fighter and AAA force in the East, Allies degraded the logistic network, etc. There were other influences, such as operations in the Mediterranean that forced LW to redeploy forces. Or the Battle of the Atlantic, which is not often mentioned in this context. Each new submarine (as a replacement to yet another U-boat sunk by Allied aircraft) required resources that could be used for tanks and artillery for the Eastern Front.
For the credit of VVS, its massive expansion turned the force into a steamroller which was, with all efficiency issues and non-flexibility, a serious factor in the Soviet advances in the last 2 years.

Then the poster could delineate what they are saying, because saying stuff like:

The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east.

is bizarre and plain vague.
No, the VVS did not need the western allied air forces to fight successfully in the east, they managed. Allied ~100 missions was a drop in the combat bucket.
Yes, the western allies' cursory involvement assisted in bringing about a quicker victory. No one is questioning that the cursory involvement helped and quickened the victory. And this cursory involvement took shape in many forms. I have posted prior agreeing to this, should you care to read.

It would've been fair to list the indirect stuff that the 'West' did that allowed for the Soviets to have a much easier war.

... and then what the Soviets scarified for the west. You see how this is a spiral which leads nowhere? For that very reason he statement "The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east." is bizarre and plain vague.
The Frantic Missions resulted in more German troops rushing in to assist in the eastern front, easing the western front. It helped the western front.

I think the point here is not the few dozen Allied missions for the benefits of the Eastern Front but the whole Allied contribution to the air war in Europe.

Yes these cursory activities had benefits, but to flat out state the Soviets needed the allies to fight in the east for them to win is not. Delineate thoughts and specify what you want to say.

This is a fresh and somewhat unusual thought.

Nor did I make such a statement. If you take the time to read posts (this is a tall ask as your responses my posts on Harder, La-5, etc have shown otherwise), perhaps you could see that. You could also list which missions in the east fought by western allies were so impactful that without them the VVS could not have won ... because that's what I am trying to draw out from those which state that the VVS needed the help of the USAAF and RAF to fight successfully in the east. The western allied contrition for the soviet's was not in the east.

The air war on the Eastern Front was therefore not a decisive factor because the Soviets were able to utilize numerical superiority.

... and the USAAF didn't over the west??? Western allied air superiority now makes the western air war not a decisive factor? What kind of ill-logic are you working with?

 

[bf109xxl]

Nor did I make such a statement.

It follows logically from your statements

If you take the time to read posts (this is a tall ask as your responses my posts on Harder, La-5, etc have shown otherwise), perhaps you could see that.

I see that you make incorrect statements.

You could also list which missions in the east fought by western allies were so impactful that without them the VVS could not have won ...

If you take the time to read posts perhaps you could see that nobody told about the Allied missions in the east - it was an indirect impact.

because that's what I am trying to draw out from those which state that the VVS needed the help of the USAAF and RAF to fight successfully in the east.

The Soviets do need the help of the Wester Allied. Otherwise they should fight against the entire Luftwaffe.

The western allied contrition for the soviet's was not in the east.

Sure. If you take the time to read posts perhaps you could see that nobody told about the Allied missions in the east - it was an indirect impact.

... and the USAAF didn't over the west??? Western allied air superiority now makes the western air war not a decisive factor?

We are talking about the Soviets. The war in the East and in the West was quite different. Or does that not make sense to you either?

What kind of ill-logic are you working with?

I suppose the most common logic that seems to be incomprehensible to you.