How many strategic bombers could Germany realistically field?

[stona]

The aircraft industry was severely hampered by a number of bad choices .

I don't disagree with that. It's not the point. The point is that the idea that there was some long term plan for aircraft production that bore any resemblance to the sort of numbers actually needed not only to cover losses but to compete with allied production is simply not supported by the facts.
The German aircraft industry, for a variety of reasons, never came close to producing the quantity or quality of aircraft needed by the Luftwaffe. I concede that this became a moot point sometime in 1944 when other factors became more important, notably a lack of qualified pilots to fly whatever was produced.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

I don't disagree with that. It's not the point. The point is that the idea that there was some long term plan for aircraft production that bore any resemblance to the sort of numbers actually needed not only to cover losses but to compete with allied production is simply not supported by the facts.
The German aircraft industry, for a variety of reasons, never came close to producing the quantity or quality of aircraft needed by the Luftwaffe. I concede that this became a moot point sometime in 1944 when other factors became more important, notably a lack of qualified pilots to fly whatever was produced.
Cheers
Steve

The point of the thread is whether given an actually functioning strategic bomber rather than the historical He177A that there would be some clarity in terms of production priorities. The He177 was supposed to be ready in early 1942, but wasn't, which jammed up priorities and kept things like the Fw200 in production and put unnecessary things like the Ju290 in production. With a viable long range bomber available priorities and some of the poor choices that historically happened wouldn't here and the wasted resources spent historically would actually be viable. So my point is given the clarity offered by the functional strategic bomber ready to mass produce by January 1942 how many could realistically be fielded given the fuel, production, and logistical constraints? Obviously nowhere near the levels of the US or British given their differing priorities/advantages (for instance the British aircraft production numbers came at the expense of fielding a large army...by 1944 they were disbanding divisions to keep 50 divisions in the field). The Soviets never fielded a heavy bomber, so like the Germans their large production numbers came from using lighter designs, but also mass production that was never bombed and dispersed as a result like the Germans, nor did they have the same resource bottlenecks thanks to supply from their allies.

Even taking the historical 1200 HE177 numbers as a baseline (perhaps added in FW200 and Ju290 production numbers after 1942) how many of these could be in service at once in 1942-44? Fuel was a major consideration in this, which is really what I'm getting at more than production issues.

 

[stona]

I would argue that fuel did not become a critical factor until surprisingly late in the war. Over the winter of 1943/44 the Germans built up reserves of aircraft fuels from 33,786 tons to 119,738 tons (May 1944). It was the devastating attacks of the allied air forces from May onwards that had a serious effect on supplies of aviation fuel. By the end of July 98% of Germany's capacity to produce aviation fuels had been destroyed. Recovery was relatively fast (as covered by Speer). In August 1944 65% of aviation fuel capacity was produced. With the exception of November and December 1944 (65% and 56%) it never rose above 50% again, falling to a mere 5% in February 1945.
I don't see that fuel shortages would have had any effect on a potential strategic bomber force in 1941/42. From May 1944 onwards it was critical.
Cheers
Steve

I've just re-read this and don't want to give the impression that fuel was not a problem earlier. For example, in 1942 the average monthly allotment of aviation fuels for training was reduced to 15,000 tons from a 1941 average of 27,000 tons. I do however believe that had a strategic bomber force been deemed necessary, then fuel could have been marshalled and supplied for it during this period. From early 1944 onwards this was not an option.

 

[GrauGeist]

...The Soviets never fielded a heavy bomber...

Petlyakov Pe-8
Tupolev TB-3

 

[davebender]

German naval Z Plan was approved during January 1939. If you wait that long to cut naval construction ILO more munitions plants it will be too late.

1935 to 1938 was the critical period for building a German military-industrial complex. The nation was at peace and money is available if Germany elects not to recreate the High Seas Fleet.
2 x Scharnhorst class dreadnoughts @ ~RM 144 million each.
2 x Bismarck class dreadnoughts @ ~RM 190 million each.
2 x Graf Zeppelin class CV @ ~RM 92.5 million each.
5 x Hipper class CA @ ~RM 85 million each.

1930s Soviet Union opted to build (or import) munitions factories rather then procure battleships. It's readily apparent they got more bang for the buck then Germany did.

 

[wiking85]

Petlyakov Pe-8
Tupolev TB-3

The TB-3 was retired in 1939 and the Pe-8 was not produced during the war. I should have said did not produce them during the war rather than fielded.

 

[wiking85]

German naval Z Plan was approved during January 1939. If you wait that long to cut naval construction ILO more munitions plants it will be too late.

1935 to 1938 was the critical period for building a German military-industrial complex. The nation was at peace and money is available if Germany elects not to recreate the High Seas Fleet.
2 x Scharnhorst class dreadnoughts @ ~RM 144 million each.
2 x Bismarck class dreadnoughts @ ~RM 190 million each.
2 x Graf Zeppelin class CV @ ~RM 92.5 million each.
5 x Hipper class CA @ ~RM 85 million each.

1930s Soviet Union opted to build (or import) munitions factories rather then procure battleships. It's readily apparent they got more bang for the buck then Germany did.

I would agree with the carriers and two of the hipper class.

 

[vikingBerserker]

The TB-3 was retired in 1939 and the Pe-8 was not produced during the war. I should have said did not produce them during the war rather than fielded.

I do not believe you are correct as the Soviets used the TB-3 during combat several times early on during the war as bombers. Also Pe-8 (aka TB-7s) were also produced during 1942 when they were equipped with the AM-35-A engines and the M-85 engineered model was produced during 1944. Soviet Air Power in World War 2 by Yefim Gordon (pg 390-398 )

 

[GrauGeist]

The TB-3 also continued through the war as a night bomber because of it's vulnerability to interceptors. Both Soviet types were used for the duration of the war in various capacities and in limited numbers.

The Soviet Heavy bomber program can be compared to Germany's in the fact that the Soviet Union relied more on Medium bombers much like Germany. Neither country pursued a dedicated heavy bomber program and what few heavy bombers they had were used more for propaganda and harassment missions.

 

[stona]

Of course producing strategic bombers and procuring the fuel for them is one thing. Having anyone to fly them is another.

From 'Technical Training within the German Luftwaffe'.

The Allies had the benefit of effectively unlimited fuel supplies and clear and peaceful skies for training. The US had large manpower reserves and Britain was able to draw on a pool of men in with secondary or higher education across the entire Commonwealth to crew its strategic bomber force. Those men shared a common language and to a very large extent a common education (Canada would be the most divergent on the final point). No such luxuries were afforded the Germans.

Steve

 

[redcoat]

The trouble with strategic bombers is that they are not a quick fix, they are a weapon for the long term, and that is the one thing that Nazi Germany couldn't afford to do, was get into a long term conflict with either the Western powers or the Soviet Union, their greater resources would eventually doom Nazi Germany.
So if Germany was to build a powerful heavy bomber force, it would be preparing for a war that it knew that it would lose.

 

[wiking85]

Of course producing strategic bombers and procuring the fuel for them is one thing. Having anyone to fly them is another.

From 'Technical Training within the German Luftwaffe'.


The Allies had the benefit of effectively unlimited fuel supplies and clear and peaceful skies for training. The US had large manpower reserves and Britain was able to draw on a pool of men in with secondary or higher education across the entire Commonwealth to crew its strategic bomber force. Those men shared a common language and to a very large extent a common education (Canada would be the most divergent on the final point). No such luxuries were afforded the Germans.

Steve

That's why I was confused with your statement about fuel not being an issue. The LW did field significant numbers of large aircraft (four engine and He177s) with pilots, ground crew, and fuel enough for substantial numbers of missions. However given the constraints that you note here I'm convinced that an air corps is all that will be viable for strategic bombing, with several Kampfgruppen of 40 aircraft for maritime and recon missions. Its doable, but not in the numbers the Allies could due to the lack of sufficient fuel.

That said there is certainly a place for such an air corps on the Eastern Front given the large size and high density of Soviet factories and power facilities that were within the full 6 ton payload range of the He177 in the Moscow-Upper Volga area. With the Fritz-X bomb it can conduct very accurate bombing even deeper within the USSR, as it could maximize the reduced payload for long range missions (IIRC accuracy against large facilities was around 50% at 5km with the Fritz-X).

 

[davebender]

if Germany was to build a powerful heavy bomber force, it would be preparing for a war that it knew that it would lose.

I agree. However heavy bombers are a lot more useful then battleships. So it's a marginally better solution then what 1930s Germany did historically.

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans could not have fielded enough 4 engine bombers to really do much of anything. Before people go back to counting the Ju -290 (65 built)and other odds and sods consider how many B-17s were built (12,700+) and how many Halifax's (almost 6200) and they were the US and British #2 bombers in production.
Now people want to 'trade' a number of the twin engine bombers for 4 engine bombers but the only two twins made in really large numbers were the He 111 ( around 6500) and JU 88 (15,000). Problem is that most of those were powered by 1000-1300hp engines.
Many proponents of the large 4 engine bomber force want 1943/44 tech level bombers in 1940-41.
The Germans could have built several thousand 4 engine bombers in 1939-41 but they would have used the Jumo 211 1000-1300hp engines depending on year, been armed with hand held 7.9 mm single machine guns (and/or a few 20mm FF cannon with small drums and no power mountings) and not really offered a whole lot over the He 111s and JU 88s that were used ( 200 He 111s attack Belfast or 100 4 engine bombers?)
Please remember that the B-17 and B-24s with their turbo charged engines offered a lot more power at 20,000ft and above than the German engines of similar take-off power and the British 4 engine bombers went to 1300-1600hp engines pretty quick, they also don't show up in numbers until 1942 and beyond.

Now if a He 111 can carry 4400lb of bombs what does the 4 engine bomber (using the same engines) really offer unless it can carry over 8800lbs of bomb? a bit more range?

You can't save production from one year to another. Workers sitting on hands for a year don't produce twice as much the next year.

AS far as gutting the German Navy, this has been gone over many times before. The savings just help the British/French/Americans save money/men/production. No Scharnhort and twin? perhaps fewer KG Vs built. No need to Run the old "R" class as convoy escorts saving thousands of men and tens of thousands of tons of fuel oil. Fewer bomb raids diverted to targeting them and on and on. Smaller German Navy means Norway invasion is either much more risky or impossible.

 

[davebender]

B-17 and B-24s with their turbo charged engines offered a lot more power at 20,000ft and above than the German engines of similar take-off power and the British 4 engine bombers went to 1300-1600hp engines pretty quick, they also don't show up in numbers until 1942 and beyond.

Germans don't need to (and shouldn't) mimic American and British heavy bomber programs. They could build something similar to Do-317 powered by DB606 engines and have it in mass production during fall of 1940. Better suited to their needs then B-17s and B-24s.

 

[GrauGeist]

Honestly...how many medium bombers did the Luftwaffe lose in the Battle of Britain?

If the fighters couldn't establish a protective zone around their bombers at that point in time, how would they have been able to protect the larger (and most likely slower) heavy bombers?

We've already seen what can happen to heavy bombers without adequate protection in the form of the early 8th AF and RAF BC missions...it was a massacre...

If you want to build up a strategic heavy bomber program, you better start with a better fighter program that will protect those bombers...

 

[wiking85]

Well the He177 offered up to 6 tons at a 950 mile combat radius and could take 2 tons of bombs about 2800 miles. IIRC 1 ton could go over 3000 miles. At shorter ranges using external overload they could handle 7.2 tons of bombs, much more than the He111 with external load. The main advantage would be range and payload, plus armor and defensive guns. Keep in mind that the numbers you quote for Allied bombers was in the context of fighting Greater Germany+Bohemia, Japan, Italy, Romania, Hungary, parts of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, etc. Germany would have targets in Britain or parts of the USSR, so would have a more focused target list. In Axis Europe production and logistics targets were much more decentralized and dispersed than in Russia, which had American style massive facilities which were insanely vulnerable to bombing and a way that Germany never was. Using the limited He111 raid in 1943 on a Russian tank factory in Gorky as an example, the Germans managed to destroy huge amounts of equipment that was simply not possible when hitting German factories. Germany would have to pick targets that were concentrated and focus their limited bomber strength on that target to achieve results, which brings us back to the power stations around Moscow region and the Upper Volga. 11 targets cuts out 50% of the remaining electricity available to the USSR, which collapses production; the repair facilities only exist in Leningrad and they were destroyed in the bombing in 1941. The US can only replace them with a 12 month lead time.

Even using the 1941 Jumo 211F (with 1350hp for take off) is sufficient for 1941, but by January 1942 there are BMW 801s with 1700hp or DB603s with 1750hp, even if the later needs to be overhauled every 50 hours of use. That's sufficient to use in the East against limited targets until they get reliable or there are enough BMW 801s.

 

[wiking85]

Germans don't need to (and shouldn't) mimic American and British heavy bomber programs. They could build something similar to Do-317 powered by DB606 engines and have it in mass production during fall of 1940. Better suited to their needs then B-17s and B-24s.

The DB606 wasn't ready in 1940 are arguably never was ready; it was only the DB610 in 1943 that offered better service and really it wasn't even until the coupled DB603 version that things became acceptable. The Bomber B program is a non-starter.

 

[wiking85]

Honestly...how many medium bombers did the Luftwaffe lose in the Battle of Britain?

Over 700.

If the fighters couldn't establish a protective zone around their bombers at that point in time, how would they have been able to protect the larger (and most likely slower) heavy bombers?

The bigger bombers had a lot more guns and armor, not to mention a less dangerous enemy in the East

We've already seen what can happen to heavy bombers without adequate protection in the form of the early 8th AF and RAF BC missions...it was a massacre...

If you want to build up a strategic heavy bomber program, you better start with a better fighter program that will protect those bombers...

Germany had the best air defense system in the world from 1941-1944 (when Britain took that title), so comparing that to the Soviets for example is not exactly a fair comparison; the Soviets lacked an integrated air defense network, so couldn't organize big wing fighter attacks on German bombers like the Brits could. They also lacked heavy enough cannons to drop them until the P39 showed up in 1943.

 

[davebender]

German night bomber losses averaged less then 1% of sorties during 1940 to 1941.

The key to German success in BoB is tactics. Massive British air defense system was almost useless at night prior to 1942.