How many strategic bombers could Germany realistically field?

[wiking85]

German night bomber losses averaged less then 1% of sorties during 1940 to 1941.

The key to German success in BoB is tactics. Massive British air defense system was almost useless at night prior to 1942.

Very true, but the Germans would find it very hard to get a strategic bomber in service prior to 1942, so operating at night over Britain by then is rough, especially as the Mosquito is in service along with decent AI radar.

 

[GrauGeist]

The bigger bombers had a lot more guns and armor, not to mention a less dangerous enemy in the East

This is actually not the case. Even the B-17 had difficulties in defending itself. German bombers were nowhere near as heavily armed as Allied bombers.

Germany had the best air defense system in the world from 1941-1944 (when Britain took that title), so comparing that to the Soviets for example is not exactly a fair comparison; the Soviets lacked an integrated air defense network, so couldn't organize big wing fighter attacks on German bombers like the Brits could. They also lacked heavy enough cannons to drop them until the P39 showed up in 1943.

And yet the Soviets were able to put up effective air defenses against Axis fighter sweeps and bomber missions.

Of all the Soviet aircraft, the IL-2 was considered the scourge of the Luftwaffe bomber and transport staffels. It accounted for a great deal of damage and losses.

The Yak-1 was equipped with a 20mm ShVAK and so was the Yak-7. The Pe-3 was used in a similiar role as the Mosquito, so there is a good chance it would have been used for heavy bomber interception and it was equipped with two 20mm ShVAK cannon.

By the spring of 1942, the La-5 was proving itself in the skies over the Eastern front and it was known to do terrible damage to Luftwaffe transports and bombers. It was armed with two 20mm ShVAK cannon.

And the Soviet Union had P-39s in service by 1942...

 

[Garyt]

The trouble with strategic bombers is that they are not a quick fix, they are a weapon for the long term, and that is the one thing that Nazi Germany couldn't afford to do, was get into a long term conflict with either the Western powers or the Soviet Union, their greater resources would eventually doom Nazi Germany.

Germany could have handled the Soviet Union if not fighting the West. Could it have handled the West if not fighting the Soviets? Not sure, maybe, but the problem is a lack of a shared land border. So Germany has to cross the channel, or wait to be hit by the western powers when and where they wanted to.

But not losing about 60% of their total production of AFV's on the Eastern Front would have been a great help.

 

[Shortround6]

Germans don't need to (and shouldn't) mimic American and British heavy bomber programs. They could build something similar to Do-317 powered by DB606 engines and have it in mass production during fall of 1940. Better suited to their needs then B-17s and B-24s.

And this is part of what I mean when I say some people want 1943-44 technology in 1940.

Lets look at this. "build something similar to Do-317 powered by DB606 engines and have it in mass production during fall of 1940"

A DB 606 in mass production in the fall of 1940 would NOT be based off of DB 601E/F engines with 1350hp but off of DB 601A-1 or Aa engines giving either 2200 or 2350hp for take-off and not 2700hp and down 400-600hp per engine at altitude (altitude being 3700-4200 meters) compared to the real DB 606. Compared to the DO 317A powered by DB 603 engines the performance might not be that far off. The 603A engine offering 1620hp at 5670 meters or so compared to 2040 hp or ps ( I know there is a difference) at 4,500 meters. Of course the DB 603 was around 1300lb lighter dry per engine/power unit and needed smaller radiators and oil coolers. Using engines that peaked at 3700-4500 meters means there is no need for a pressure cabin though. It does mean that the plane will be flying through denser air so it's speed will be less for the same power.
NONE of the guns listed for the Do 317 for defensive armament were in production in 1940 so defensive armament becomes 7.9mm MG 15s with 75 round drums.
Bomb load for the Do 317A was six 1102lb bombs.

 

[davebender]

Not in large numbers. Nor did anyone else including Britain and USA.

Personally I consider the entire idea almost as pointless as building battleships. 1935 Germany needs to build munitions plants, not expensive and ineffective white elephants.

 

[merlin]

I think the Lw had in the region of 270 Do-17s in mid-1940, if the production was of Do-19s instead I reckon that gives at least 100 four-engine bombers. Some may be used for Maritime recon., but with no need for the Fw-200c - maybe that equals more than 100 !!
Now, granted its defensive armament wouldn't be as good as the B-17/24 or Lancaster, but then it's facing 0.303" machine guns not 20mm cannon. They were many BoB tales of German bombers getting back to France riddled with bullet holes, so a four-engine bomber is going to be more survivable.
With a 'four-engine' aircraft in service - seems less likely the He-177 will be a twin, but will be built as a 'four' hence less teething problems, leading to the He-111 being phased out.

Not saying production could be on a scale to rival the US or UK, just that it could have been different.

 

[fastmongrel]

The RAF and the USAAF took till at least 1944 before they could hit anything hard enough and consistently enough to knock it out for more than a few hours. Somehow in 1941 or 42 the LW is going to get a load of shiny new 1944 technology bombers with fully trained crews, all the lessons the Allies learnt in about 3 years will be learnt seemingly instantly. Then they are going to roam over the SU a lot of which is featureless and hit targets with pinpoint precision. The Soviets will obligingly stand back and do nothing to stop the raids or do anything to repair the damage.

All sounds a bit like the magic Nazi Wish Fairy is going to be needed more than available production.

 

[wiking85]

The RAF and the USAAF took till at least 1944 before they could hit anything hard enough and consistently enough to knock it out for more than a few hours. Somehow in 1941 or 42 the LW is going to get a load of shiny new 1944 technology bombers with fully trained crews, all the lessons the Allies learnt in about 3 years will be learnt seemingly instantly.

The Germans had one of the most rational strategic bombing doctrines pre-war. They would be prepping for a strategic air war via training and practice probably before the first production models of the Ural bomber were ready.

As to RAF BC efficacy, the raid on the Rheinland dams was much more permanent, as was their area bombing of cities prior to 1944. True in 1944 they finally targeted the right things effectively, such as the Danube river mining campaign and oil targets (which were also a function of getting closer bases by 1944, rather than faulty doctrine). Strategic bombing is a complex topic, especially with regard to what the Allies were able to achieve historically. They had a lot of success pre-1944, but much of it was mitigated by German pre-war dispersal plans, redundancy, faulty targeting of critical areas, lack of bases close enough to targets, lack of escorts, etc.

The oil campaign couldn't get close enough without escorts to oil targets until 1944 both due to the P-51 and having bases in Italy and soon in France.

As to the Germans in the East, there were enormous target within a few hundred miles of bases in Smolensk and were covered with terrain features like rivers to navigate from, but also radio beacon guidance was an option due to the targets being so close to German bases. Historically Germany found Gorki quite easily and successfully bombed it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111_operational_history

The He 111 operated in the same capacity as in previous campaigns on the Eastern Front. The bomber was asked to perform strategic bombing functions. Targeting Soviet industry had not been high on the OKL's agenda in 1941-42, but prior to the Battle of Kursk several attempts were made to destroy Soviet military production. The tank factory at Gorkovskiy Avtomobilniy Zavod (GAZ) was subjected to a series of heavy attacks throughout June 1943. On the night of 4/5 June, He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 1, KG 3, KG 4, KG 55 and KG 100 dropped 161 tonnes (179 tons) of bombs, causing massive destruction to buildings and production lines. All of GAZ No. 1 plant's 50 buildings, 9,000 m (29,500 ft) of conveyers, 5,900 pieces of equipment and 8,000 tank engines were destroyed.[56]

The He 111 also formed the core of the strategic bombing offensive later in the year. During the Soviet Lower Dnieper Offensive He 111 Geschwader performed strike missions. Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring issued an order to General Rudolf Meister's IV. Fliegerkorps on 14 October 1943:

I intend to initiate systematic attacks against the Russian arms industry by deploying the bulk of the heavy bomber units [mostly equipped with medium bombers] - reinforced by special units - which will be brought together under the command of IV. Fliegerkorps. The task will be to deal destructive strikes against the Russian arms industry in order to wipe out masses of Russian tanks, artillery pieces and aircraft before they reach the front, thus providing the hard-pressed Ostheer [East Army] with relief which will be much greater than if these bombers were deployed on the battlefield.[57]

Soviet fighter opposition had made strategic bombing in daylight too costly and so German bombers crews were retrained in the winter of 1943/44 to fly night operations. The offensive began on the night of the 27/28 March 1944, with some 180 to 190 He 111s taking part and dropping an average of 200 tons of bombs. On the night of 30 April/1 May 1944, 252 so

Soviet fighter opposition was not so much of an issue in 1941-43, but by 1944 it was not able to be overcome given the issues affecting the Germans. Using night raids on Gorki, as historically happened, would have ben very feasible due to the closeness of it to German air bases with AG-Center and the ability to use radio navigation systems like EGON, which was like the RAF OBOE system. Germany also had a pathfinder force in KG100 that could set the fires to home in bomber forces.

Part of the issue historically was that the army kept requesting air support, so instead of being able to form specialist strategic units, the multipurpose bomber units that existed were sucked into tactical bombing. Had there were be specialist strategic unit operational in 1942 (which should have been the He177), then they could have only used it in the role of hitting Soviet industry, which meant places like Gorki would be attacked by night (as learned in the BoB and Blitz), but also electrical infrastructure such as through operation eisenhammer.

 

[syscom3]

One point about the fuel requirements; don't forget whats needed for training is significant. And you need to put up multiple bombers in the air as part of the training regime for formation practice. The tons of fuel required just for a group training mission is quite impressive. Dont say that this would have no implications for training requirements for the whole LW.

 

[GrauGeist]

If you're also going to start a war, make sure you don't have to stop your bomber/transport training program and send your flight school's instructors and aircraft to airlift supplies to a beseiged army, losing many instructors and training aircraft in the process...

 

[stona]

One point about the fuel requirements; don't forget whats needed for training is significant. And you need to put up multiple bombers in the air as part of the training regime for formation practice. The tons of fuel required just for a group training mission is quite impressive. Dont say that this would have no implications for training requirements for the whole LW.

Absolutely right.

In 1941 27,000 tons per month (of the 120,000 ton grand total) was used by training commands.

Steve

 

[Koopernic]

There is no doubt the Germans couldn't support a strategic bomber fleet anything as large as Britain's let alone the USAAF. There wasn't enough oil on the continent for one, they didn't have someone like the US underwriting their considerable expenses. Missing strategic materials in Europe and the lack of access to global trade meant that the Germans couldn't exploit what territory they controlled. For instance it was up to the German petrochemicals and chemicals industry to supply fertilizer and fuel to all of Europe, something it wasn't big enough to do.

However they clearly felt the need for one, the He 177, which they wanted to produce at a rate of 100/month (for the last produced variant the He 177-A5) for various reasons was too complicated get get truly ready for service till late 1943 (in reality 1944) when it was useless due to the strategic situation anyway. With the benefit of hindsight they might have accepted say 4 x Jumo 211 engines and been operational by early 1942 or even late 1941 but that is too late in my view. In consideration of the realities of project development the Germans would need to bet on either the Ju 89 (flew in 11 April 1937) or the Dornier Do 19.(flew in 28 October 1936)

In other words they have 3 years to get the aircraft tested and into production and still beat the start of WW2. By 1939 the 750hp engines that hobbled these aircraft can be replaced by 1100hp engines in the form of the Jumo 211A or DB601A. By 1942 the Jumo 211J is producing 1470hp.

I would argue that they could have had a 4 engined aircraft with a speed in the 270-295 mph range (as fast as the 2 engined bombers) in service by the outbreak of the war and that it would be heavily armed with tail guns, waist guns, ventral bathtub guns. It's purpose would be maritime reconnaissance and bombing. It would be far more effective than the Fw 200 condor and would stand a good chance against the initial measures employed against the Condor; catapult launched Hurricanes and latter carrier based Fulmars, Martlets due to both speed and armament. It would still be vulnerable to the Mosquito and latter Seafires.

I would suggest that a production rate of 1200 aircraft would mean that 1200 aircraft could be 'on the books' assuming 1200/year was lost to accidents, damage or shot down. Of those on the books maybe 800 would be operational at any one time.

By the end of 1942 they could upgrade to newer engines such as the BMW801, DB603A or Jumo 213A as they did with the Ju 290A (flew in 16 July 1942) and have a very fine aircraft matching the speed of the Ju 188E/Do 217 ie between 320-347mph.

The benefit I see is this:

The Ju 52 transport had a miserable performance. It was good for maybe 3 tons of cargo with a 650 mile range. IE a radius of action of 300 miles. A Fw 200 with the same number of crew could carry at least that cargo 2400 miles at 1.5 times the speed. It's radius of delivery is about 1200 miles. It could fly directly from Berlin to North Africa to resupply Rommel or Paulus in Stalingrad without building rail heads to fuel the aircraft and reload them. That conserves pilots. The big losses of transport/training pilots was Holland, Crete, Damsk Pocket, North Africa and Stalingrad. The major losses at Crete and North Africa could have been avoided if the Luftwaffe enigma machines were secure.

A 1940 Ju 89//Do 19 could've supplied excellent reconnaissance to Adm Lutjens and Capt Lindemann in the Bismark, I would argue it could cope with the Fairy Fulmar fighter British carriers used and might have harassed KGV, Rodney and Nelson long enough for the u-boat protection that was forming around the crippled Bismark. Attacks by Fritz-X and Hs 293 far out to sea also become more of a threat.

During the Baby Blitz the Germans alsmost succeded in shutting down the RAF radars with their own version of Windows "Duppel" which only failed because the twin engined aircraft couldn't carry quite enough of it.

In General the Luftwaffe supported the Kriegsmarine poorly. (the German navy really needed its own air arm, the marineflieger, as they did in WW1 and as they do now)

I would argue that given Milch's track record that if given a choice of a 'promising' He 177 and a working Ju 89 he would not even allow something as dodgy as the He 177 into production. Heinkel would be told to develop something else or get it perfect, which it probably would do early in the absence of production driven design compromises.

There certainly would be raids into the Soviet manufacturing base in the Urals, forcing defense expenditure there.