A careful examination of the first year in the PTO shows that when facing its usual, early opposition (most commonly, the P-40E and Buffalo) the A6M dominated the skies. The one aircraft that might have salvaged some success from the debacle was the Hurricane mark IIB which arrived late in the campaign (~Late January) and was subsequently, due to a variety of limitations, committed piecemeal and in such small numbers that nowhere could its impact be felt through the fall of Java. The P-40Es were overwhelmed in the PI by the initial A6M onslaught and then, like the Commonwealth Hurricanes, deployed to Java late and in relatively small numbers. The next stage of IJ activity in the PTO were the many raids on Darwin through the Spring into early summer of 1942. These long range attacks from Koepang in Timor, foreshadowed those made on Henderson Field at very long range on fairly well defended airfields. The Darwin raids were not countered with any consistency and rarely effectively by the well supplied three squadrons of USAAF P-40s that were defending the city and surrounding airstrips. (Over New Guinea, the Australians fought their own air battles with the P-40 as their domestically employed air force slowly built up. (I am sure others here can describe this process with far more accuracy and detail than I). Then comes the Guadalcanal campaign, primarily defended by the relatively mediocre-performing Marine F4F-4s and for the first time, the IJ air assault is blunted effectively. What's going on here? Is it just improved tactics that induced Lt. Col. Joe Bauer to tell his pilots, "When you see Zeros, dogfight 'em!" Was his exhortation marine moral boosting bluster, or was his comment an astute recognition of a significant change in a fundamental parameter? In August and September, the F4F-4 had arrived on the scene in significant numbers providing air defense of henderson Field. Its p*ss-poor climb rate is compensated by RADAR and the extraordinary coastwatcher network throughout the Solomons. For the first time, the IJN A6M escorts and bombers are facing an aircraft that can reach an equal or higher altitude than that flown by the A6M escorts and in numbers sufficient to counter the attacks. The IJ tactics hadn't changed since their basically successful attacks on the PI, Darwin and Java, and perhaps to a lesser extent Malaya which was more the domain of the Ki-43 Oscar. I believe if you replace the F4F with an equal number of Hurricanes (assuming they were as rugged), you get essentially the same result. But it was the F4F-4 with the two stage supercharged P&W engine that made the difference. That's why, I believe, if the F4F isn't the most underrated fighter of the 2nd WW, it may be the most under-appreciated. JMHO
