It would have been a better idea if they did it before invading Poland, but people may have asked questions about reduced living standards.
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It would have been a better idea if they did it before invading Poland, but people may have asked questions about reduced living standards.In my opinion, any "better" plan of RLM and LW makes sense only if the German economy goes on a total war footing immediately, in Dec 1940.
Otherwise, the Luftwaffe machine will run out of steam in winter 1941/42 as in real life, even with better equipment or smarter tactic.
seems no one did use slave labour, they were always used by "someone else" that is why Germany had a "labour shortage".
When you start conscription you are well on the way to slave labour. Had a WW1 soldier in a trench a better life than a slave on a plantation? Only if he got out with his body and mind intact and 3 million from UK didn't. Long before Germany went to war it had 1.5 million conscripted soldiers who were paid much less than munitions workers. A similar situation occurred in UK, I have just read John Nichols "Return of the Dambusters" where it details a moral boosting visit of the leader of 617 squadron to the factory where Grand Slam bombs were made, those making the bombs were paid more than those dropping them.... Even though slave labour was used from Flossenberg to construct components for Junkers at Dessau, at the Venusberg site, so this must mean Junkers didn't even thought they did. Sounds like Nazi apologism to me.
"Forced labor and quarters
Production of aircraft parts for the Junkers-Werke Dessau. Junkers had relocated component parts manufacturing to the spinning mill of the Gebr. Schüller under the codename of "Venuswerke.""
From here:
Venusberg | KZ-Gedenkstätte Flossenbürg
In the spirit of this thread, and the point of "make more of fewer", which transport plane should have been the One True Transport?What about regular transports? More and earlier Junkers Ju 52, Ju 90, Ju 252, Arado Ar 232, and Messerschmitt Me 323 might have made a difference. In particular, with its aft ramp and greater payload vs. the Ju 52, the Junkers Ju 252 looks useful.
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Two major points here. Carrying 1-2 tons of bombs over such distances using 4 engines is rather inefficient ( B-17 is often criticized for only carrying 4-5000lb to Berlin, granted shorter distance) but trying to knock out factories with 1 -2 tons per plane is going to be a long drawn out campaign.
Planning your bomber campaign/missions/procurement on the probability of your ground forces taking thousands of kilometers of enemy territory is pretty iffy planing. US Island hopping in the Pacific is a bit different, also the B-29 was intended to be deployed from China.
The Germans needed too many things to come together at the same time and they often came late. The bomb sights may have been under development for quite some time and bomber procurement planned accordingly. But the good bomb sights and good power turrets come late for the germans, 1942 is too late to START issuing/using such items for the Germans as it takes months if not year to get large numbers in service.
Most, if not all of these come too late, again, starting to equip the air transport units in 1942 is too late. It doesn't matter how wonderful a design is in 1943 if you needed large numbers in 1941 and 1942.
Any plane using BMW 801 engines in 1941 to be a viable transport was in deep trouble.
Why pick 3, the BV222? What role would this huge flying boat have in Barbarossa? No Me. 323?In the spirit of this thread, and the point of "make more of fewer", which transport plane should have been the One True Transport?
Per <Wiki> I see 10 transport types 1940 and earlier:
3: Blohm & Voss BV 222Wiking transport production 13 1940 six-engined flying-boat Capacity 92 troops
me323 would need a time machine to get it into production in time to help Barbarossa in 1941.Why pick 3, the BV222? What role would this huge flying boat have in Barbarossa? No Me. 323?
We needn't isolate the Luftwaffe to pre-Barbarossa. When I started this thread my intent was to discuss how the Luftwaffe can better prepare for Barbarossa if they have good intel in Dec 1940. This would enable the RLM and Luftwaffe to make different decisions and plans from Dec 1940 onwards, resulting in different or earlier aircraft arriving well into 1942.me323 would need a time machine to get it into production in time to help Barbarossa in 1941.
BV222 only needs wheels.
IF The RLM had perfect knowledge of VVS and PVO on 25 Dec 1940, what would they do differently?We needn't isolate the Luftwaffe to pre-Barbarossa. When I started this thread my intent was to discuss how the Luftwaffe can better prepare for Barbarossa if they have good intel in Dec 1940. This would enable the RLM and Luftwaffe to make different decisions and plans from Dec 1940 onwards, resulting in different or earlier aircraft arriving well into 1942.
IF The RLM had perfect knowledge of VVS and PVO on 25 Dec 1940, what would they do differently?
1: Build more of fewer types (strengthened Condor)
2: Hasten development of good prototypes, but who knew which were which?
3: Shoot Hitler so we can fight a war, not indulge his megalomaniacal fantasies (RECRUIT Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops).
Excluding the Jews, they did. Two of my great uncles in law served with Ukrainian units in the German army. They had the tattoos to prove it.RECRUIT Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops).
How many Ukrainians did the Nazi Reich inspire to serve for Stalin for each one recruited to serve against Stalin? My point is that the behavior of the Reich increased the size of the Red Army. I indulge in fantasy to imagine that the Reich could be bleached of its spots by the death of Hitler, so that the eradication of the Poles and Jews was no longer part of the war. As of 3 Sept 1939 there was no saving the Reich.Excluding the Jews, they did. Two of my great uncles in law served with Ukrainian units in the German army. They had the tattoos to prove it.
IDK, you could probably find that yourself on Google.How many Ukrainians did the Nazi Reich inspire to serve for Stalin for each one recruited to serve against Stalin?
Are you actually suggesting that the Luftwaffe and RLM recruit Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians? In what role? Pilots, mechanics?IF The RLM had perfect knowledge of VVS and PVO..RECRUIT Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops).
Indeed what is good intel for Adolf? Intel on the French military at the beginning of 1940 would not expect it to be defeated in weeks. Intel on the UK during the Battle of Britain was routinely ignored if it didn't fit with the Goering inspired group think. From L/W losses it was perfectly obvious that the RAF that they were not down to their last 50 fighters but that became the official line, when it was proved not to be true the whole organisation military and political pretended it didn't happen, and nothing to see here.Did they get bad intel ?
Or did they good intel and ignore what they didn't want to believe ?
Did they get bad intel ?
Or did they good intel and ignore what they didn't want to believe ?
I suggest we keep it simply. The RLM, high command and Hitler are informed and convinced of the accurate size and replacement capabilities of the Soviet forces.Did they get bad intel ?
Or did they good intel and ignore what they didn't want to believe ?
The Soviets did collapse, losing thousands of aircraft, tanks and artillery, and millions of men as they collapsed and fled backward. The fatal flaw IMO was the belief that the Soviets did not have the reserves or industrial capacity to replace those forces lost in the first months of collapse.Agreed. The fatal flaw of Barbarossa was not equipment, necessarily, but the mindset in German leadership that foresaw rapid Soviet collapse.
The Soviets did collapse, losing thousands of aircraft, tanks and artillery, and millions of men as they collapsed and fled backward. The fatal flaw IMO was the belief that the Soviets did not have the reserves or industrial capacity to replace those forces lost in the first months of collapse.