How to prepare Luftwaffe for Barbarossa if accurate intel on Soviet forces?

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In my opinion, any "better" plan of RLM and LW makes sense only if the German economy goes on a total war footing immediately, in Dec 1940.
Otherwise, the Luftwaffe machine will run out of steam in winter 1941/42 as in real life, even with better equipment or smarter tactic.
It would have been a better idea if they did it before invading Poland, but people may have asked questions about reduced living standards.
 
seems no one did use slave labour, they were always used by "someone else" that is why Germany had a "labour shortage".

... Even though slave labour was used from Flossenberg to construct components for Junkers at Dessau, at the Venusberg site, so this must mean Junkers didn't even thought they did. Sounds like Nazi apologism to me.

"Forced labor and quarters
Production of aircraft parts for the Junkers-Werke Dessau. Junkers had relocated component parts manufacturing to the spinning mill of the Gebr. Schüller under the codename of "Venuswerke.""

From here:

Venusberg | KZ-Gedenkstätte Flossenbürg
 
... Even though slave labour was used from Flossenberg to construct components for Junkers at Dessau, at the Venusberg site, so this must mean Junkers didn't even thought they did. Sounds like Nazi apologism to me.

"Forced labor and quarters
Production of aircraft parts for the Junkers-Werke Dessau. Junkers had relocated component parts manufacturing to the spinning mill of the Gebr. Schüller under the codename of "Venuswerke.""

From here:

Venusberg | KZ-Gedenkstätte Flossenbürg
When you start conscription you are well on the way to slave labour. Had a WW1 soldier in a trench a better life than a slave on a plantation? Only if he got out with his body and mind intact and 3 million from UK didn't. Long before Germany went to war it had 1.5 million conscripted soldiers who were paid much less than munitions workers. A similar situation occurred in UK, I have just read John Nichols "Return of the Dambusters" where it details a moral boosting visit of the leader of 617 squadron to the factory where Grand Slam bombs were made, those making the bombs were paid more than those dropping them.
 
What about regular transports? More and earlier Junkers Ju 52, Ju 90, Ju 252, Arado Ar 232, and Messerschmitt Me 323 might have made a difference. In particular, with its aft ramp and greater payload vs. the Ju 52, the Junkers Ju 252 looks useful.

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In the spirit of this thread, and the point of "make more of fewer", which transport plane should have been the One True Transport?
Per <Wiki> I see 10 transport types 1940 and earlier:
1: AGO Ao 192Kurier transport production 6 1935 used by senior officials Capacity <1500Kg
2: Blohm & Voss Ha 139 transport prototype 3 1936 long-range seaplane Capacity <500Kg
3: Blohm & Voss BV 222Wiking transport production 13 1940 six-engined flying-boat Capacity 92 troops
4: Dornier Do 19 transport prototype 3 1936 only 1 flown, built as heavy bomber Cancelled <1600Kg
5: Gotha Go 146 transport prototype 4 1936
6: Heinkel He 70Blitz transport production 324 1932 300Kg
7: Junkers Ju 52Tante Ju transport production 4845 1931 (Spanish Civil War bomber, widely exported) Capacity 17 passengers
8: Junkers Ju 90 transport production 18 1937 Capacity 40 passengers
9: Klemm Kl 36 transport production 12 ca. 1934 (Capacity: 4 seat)
10: Siebel Fh 104Hallore transport production 46 1937 (Capacity 5 passenger)
Two labeled Maritime Patrol/transport
11: Blohm & Voss BV 142 maritime patrol/transport prototype 4 1938 (Capacity 30 fully equipped soldiers)
12: Focke-Wulf Fw 200Condor maritime patrol/transport production 276 1937 originally airliner, some exported (Capacity 30 troops)
And a bomber/transport.
13: Heinkel He 111 bomber/transport production 5656 1935 many exported (Capacity roughly 4400 pounds).

Having glanced over this, I think only 3, 7, 8, 11 & 12 merit a vote. I pick Condor, however realizing that the design was compromised by military requirements creating problems that were never solved.
 
Two major points here. Carrying 1-2 tons of bombs over such distances using 4 engines is rather inefficient ( B-17 is often criticized for only carrying 4-5000lb to Berlin, granted shorter distance) but trying to knock out factories with 1 -2 tons per plane is going to be a long drawn out campaign.
Planning your bomber campaign/missions/procurement on the probability of your ground forces taking thousands of kilometers of enemy territory is pretty iffy planing. US Island hopping in the Pacific is a bit different, also the B-29 was intended to be deployed from China.



The Germans needed too many things to come together at the same time and they often came late. The bomb sights may have been under development for quite some time and bomber procurement planned accordingly. But the good bomb sights and good power turrets come late for the germans, 1942 is too late to START issuing/using such items for the Germans as it takes months if not year to get large numbers in service.




Most, if not all of these come too late, again, starting to equip the air transport units in 1942 is too late. It doesn't matter how wonderful a design is in 1943 if you needed large numbers in 1941 and 1942.
Any plane using BMW 801 engines in 1941 to be a viable transport was in deep trouble.

Given the time line (Barbarossa 22 June 1941) there are few options for transports other than the Ju 52 and Fw 200.

The Ju 252's first flight is 1 Aug 1942. Production of Ju 290 begins mid 1942. The Ju 252 and Ju 290 could probably easily be accelerated since the Ju 252 had been suspended for a while and the Ju 290 moved at a slow pace but not by a year. The Ar 232 flies in June 1941 so is also too late for Barbarossa.

1 So the Fw 200 needs to go into a higher level of production so that there are hundreds available for use as transports.
2 He 177 has to be made functional about the same time as the British heavies as it can provide some bombing of Ural factories, even if only with a 1-2 ton bomb load.

3 Alternatively the Ju 89 or Do 19 have to be developed simultaneously as a transport and bomber with an action radius of about 3000km (1800 miles)

4 The Me 261 Adolophine is an interesting possibility:
-Range 11,000km (6820 miles, ie Berlin Tokyo) potentially capable of 20,000km
-Speed 390mph is too fast to intercept.
-Power plant of 2 x DB606 was well engineered compared to the He 177 and its said gave no problems.
-Its fast enough to avoid interception.
-Large enough to carry a decent bomb load.
-Even if it looses 33% of range due to armour it is still adequate.

5 The P-40B I believe was able to take in 156 US gallons (about 570L) which is 50% more fuel than an Me 109F. That proves it could be done and I suspect a P40B equivalent with a DB601E engine would have had fairly good performance. The Luftwaffe need to specify a long range fighter.
*****************

So after this the Luftwaffe can:
1 Can strike Ural factories with maybe a 2 ton bomb load though based in forward areas. The Me 261 Adolophine could strike from anywhere.
2 Escort To the Depth of about 350 miles (550km)
3 Fly a heavy cargo on a Fw 200 to a radius of about 500 miles and return without refuelling. This distance is out of range of Soviet fighters and the load is at least twice as much as the Ju 52. A lighter cargo could be flown with a radius of 1000 miles without refuelling.

Of course all of these are also needed to prosecute a maritime and industrial war against Britain as well as fight the campaign in North Africa.
 
In the spirit of this thread, and the point of "make more of fewer", which transport plane should have been the One True Transport?
Per <Wiki> I see 10 transport types 1940 and earlier:
3: Blohm & Voss BV 222Wiking transport production 13 1940 six-engined flying-boat Capacity 92 troops
Why pick 3, the BV222? What role would this huge flying boat have in Barbarossa? No Me. 323?
 
The first flight date of the Ju 252 seems to have been in October 1941 according to sites such as Junkers Ju 252, Luftwaffe Resource Center - Transports & Utility Aircraft - A Warbirds Resource Group Site and Junkers Ju 252 V1 or the book "The Junkers Ju 52 Story" by Jan Forsgren The Junkers Ju 52 Story.
Although the August 1942 date is certified by Wikipedia, it may relate to the military transport version as the v1, v2 and v3 were built as airliners without armament.

As prototype construction started in July 1940, it might be just possible to order the Ju 252 into production off the drawing board following the success of that method for the Me 210. However, I suggested earlier that the Ju 90 might be a lower risk option.
 
me323 would need a time machine to get it into production in time to help Barbarossa in 1941.
BV222 only needs wheels.
We needn't isolate the Luftwaffe to pre-Barbarossa. When I started this thread my intent was to discuss how the Luftwaffe can better prepare for Barbarossa if they have good intel in Dec 1940. This would enable the RLM and Luftwaffe to make different decisions and plans from Dec 1940 onwards, resulting in different or earlier aircraft arriving well into 1942.

For example, the Messerschmitt Me 321 glider first flies in Feb 1941. By now the RLM, OKW and OKH have the intel that a more protracted war over a vast geography may be at hand, and thus may recognize the need for powered Luftwaffe heavy transport aircraft. Someone calls up Messerschmitt in Jan 1941 and asks if a powered version of their soon to fly Me 321 is possible. By autumn 1941 the first Me 323s enter service.
 
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We needn't isolate the Luftwaffe to pre-Barbarossa. When I started this thread my intent was to discuss how the Luftwaffe can better prepare for Barbarossa if they have good intel in Dec 1940. This would enable the RLM and Luftwaffe to make different decisions and plans from Dec 1940 onwards, resulting in different or earlier aircraft arriving well into 1942.
IF The RLM had perfect knowledge of VVS and PVO on 25 Dec 1940, what would they do differently?

1: Build more of fewer types (strengthened Condor)

2: Hasten development of good prototypes, but who knew which were which?

3: Shoot Hitler so we can fight a war, not indulge his megalomaniacal fantasies (RECRUIT Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops).
 
IF The RLM had perfect knowledge of VVS and PVO on 25 Dec 1940, what would they do differently?

1: Build more of fewer types (strengthened Condor)

2: Hasten development of good prototypes, but who knew which were which?

3: Shoot Hitler so we can fight a war, not indulge his megalomaniacal fantasies (RECRUIT Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops).

1. Yes.
2. Me 210 was bad during the tests, no great shakes performance-wise despite investment of two engines and whatnot, so kill it. He 177 - will probably not work with that engine set-up. Ju 288 - shortcomings were engine (BMW needs to debug the 801, until it is so don't use the 3 min rating at all, reduce the take off for just 1 min duration) and undercarriage (Junkers needs to debug it). Do 217 - worked; it used BMW 801A without the most aggresive 3 min rating; make those in greater numbers. Fw 190 - also worked, BMW 801 needed all love it could get - so install the DB 601 in the nose ASAP until the 801 works.
3. Nazis were more than just Hitler. But killing him might've been a good start.
 
Excluding the Jews, they did. Two of my great uncles in law served with Ukrainian units in the German army. They had the tattoos to prove it.
How many Ukrainians did the Nazi Reich inspire to serve for Stalin for each one recruited to serve against Stalin? My point is that the behavior of the Reich increased the size of the Red Army. I indulge in fantasy to imagine that the Reich could be bleached of its spots by the death of Hitler, so that the eradication of the Poles and Jews was no longer part of the war. As of 3 Sept 1939 there was no saving the Reich.
 
How many Ukrainians did the Nazi Reich inspire to serve for Stalin for each one recruited to serve against Stalin?
IDK, you could probably find that yourself on Google.

But I doubt many peoples from the occupied territories joined the Luftwaffe. Nor do I think, having more accurate intel on Soviet military capabilities in Dec 1940 that the RLM or Luftwaffe could have anticipated utilizing the peoples of Eastern Europe. That's the topic we're discussing here.
IF The RLM had perfect knowledge of VVS and PVO..RECRUIT Jewish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops).
Are you actually suggesting that the Luftwaffe and RLM recruit Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians? In what role? Pilots, mechanics?

As for Jews in the Luftwaffe, it was a rare thing, for obvious reasons. The Jewish General Behind the Luftwaffe. More common in the pre-Nazi Luftwaffe of another age.
 
Did they get bad intel ?
Or did they good intel and ignore what they didn't want to believe ?
Indeed what is good intel for Adolf? Intel on the French military at the beginning of 1940 would not expect it to be defeated in weeks. Intel on the UK during the Battle of Britain was routinely ignored if it didn't fit with the Goering inspired group think. From L/W losses it was perfectly obvious that the RAF that they were not down to their last 50 fighters but that became the official line, when it was proved not to be true the whole organisation military and political pretended it didn't happen, and nothing to see here.
 
Did they get bad intel ?
Or did they good intel and ignore what they didn't want to believe ?

Agreed. The fatal flaw of Barbarossa was not equipment, necessarily, but the mindset in German leadership that foresaw rapid Soviet collapse.

Having said that, I think the best bet the LW had was focusing on production of current designs (admittedly tactical) in order to aid the advance of the Heer, with the secondary goal of building the infrastructure for a large fleet of long-range bombers.

I confess skepticism as to their ability to accomplish the latter. One heavy bomber, of five-seven crewmen, implies fifteen-twenty personnel total (counting groundcrew and support) per bomber. 1,000 heavy bombers, say, implies 15-20,000 LW personnel, solely to man the bombers in the field. This says nothing of the man-hours required to build those planes, or the manpower to build the bombs for them, or collect and distribute fuel and munitions over rickety supply-lines.

Absent the Soviet political surrender the Nazis envisioned ("kick in the door and the whole house will collapse"), there's no way Germany can defeat the USSR. And Stalin knew that surrender meant his ass. The Germans seem to have forgotten that part: Stalin could not have survived defeat politically, so would not have entertained the thought.
 
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Agreed. The fatal flaw of Barbarossa was not equipment, necessarily, but the mindset in German leadership that foresaw rapid Soviet collapse.
The Soviets did collapse, losing thousands of aircraft, tanks and artillery, and millions of men as they collapsed and fled backward. The fatal flaw IMO was the belief that the Soviets did not have the reserves or industrial capacity to replace those forces lost in the first months of collapse.
 
The Soviets did collapse, losing thousands of aircraft, tanks and artillery, and millions of men as they collapsed and fled backward. The fatal flaw IMO was the belief that the Soviets did not have the reserves or industrial capacity to replace those forces lost in the first months of collapse.

The collapse I was referring to was political and not military, sorry I didn't make that clear enough.

Of course the Soviet lines collapsed. But the political collapse envisioned by the Germans only got a short bit of consideration before the Soviets determined to play hardball.
 

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