How would the Allies have dealt with large numbers of ME 262s?

Ignore the fighters, go for the bombers. Goring's big blunder in regards to the P-51. Not allowing his pilots the free hunt. Another blunder in regards to the BoB.

altsym said:

Ignore the fighters, go for the bombers. Goring's big blunder in regards to the P-51. Not allowing his pilots the free hunt. Another blunder in regards to the BoB.

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I don't have ready references, but it is my understanding that operations analysis applied to the BoB indicate there was no way the Luftwaffe could have won. The RAF had options to consider or implement in the worst possible case (different LW command decisions). For example, moving northward out of the limited range of its adversaries. Just saying what I've read in the past and unfortunately can't cite. Seems to me the ability of the 109 to mimic P-51 fighter sweep ops is extremely limited.

If decisions were left to the pilots, the RAF would have been decimated.

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If only it were that simple

Ignore the fighters, go for the bombers. Goring's big blunder in regards to the P-51. Not allowing his pilots the free hunt. Another blunder in regards to the BoB.

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He can correct me if Im wrong, but as i recall, DG has previously stated that was the policy of the Reich Defences in '44, and it cost them dearly

Ialso found this online source, which has good discussion of the Me 262 from page 344 onward

Germany and the Second World War: Volume VII: The Strategic Air War in ... - Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, Detlef Vogel - Google Books

Is this written from German sources? it appears so judging by the authors names

altsym said:

Ignore the fighters, go for the bombers. Goring's big blunder in regards to the P-51. Not allowing his pilots the free hunt. Another blunder in regards to the BoB.

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I don't recall that Goering or anyone else required that the LW pilots shoot down fighters. In fact, I believe the only times they were specifically instructed to attack fighters was in protection of the twin engine Zerstoyers, to give them a crack at the bombers. Either way, the bombers were always the priority targets. As for ignoring the fighters, it's very hard to ignore someone camped on your tail squirting .50s while you try to get at the bombers. Practically speaking, the LW pilots could ignore the fighters only when they knew the fighters would eventually have to turn back and leave the bombers unprotected, which stopped happening with the arrival of the P-51, or by flying 100mph faster than anything else in the air, which only happened for the lucky few who got the 262.
Free ranging 109s in the BoB? The RAF might have lost some more fighters, but how much free ranging can you do when you have only twenty minutes of flying time in the combat zone?

[QUOTEBear in mind here that while the 262s vertical velocity might not have been as great as the P-51s][/QUOTE]
I think you meant to say Spitfire XIV, nothing special about p51d climb with 180 gallons of standard fual (not 260 gallon long range load out) its climb rate is about 3400 fpm, compared to the me 262s 3800 fpm with its well over 600 gallons of fuel...which is why you hear stories of the me 262 out climbing spitfires 14s and 9s, it depends on how much fuel the me 262 has burned off, the spits had hundreds of pounds to burn off the me 262 had thousands, combined with its higher speed climb, awesome zoom climb, highest tact mach number, fantastic high speedhandling, firepower, its energy retention, to its speed of 514 at sea level, 542 at 20000, 510 at 33000, it was far faster than anything at any altitude. having said all that, the allies could have delt with the jet any time they wanted by targeting their basses causing the jets to attack and having their own prop fighters attacking at all altitudes, the germans only hope was to introduce the me 262 a lot earlier and that was not possible.

Young late war LW pilots only heard ignore the fighters. Which most took literally even when fired upon.
Galland Mullers were big advocates of the free hunt during the BoB. They felt babysitting bombers or
Carrying bombs was a waste of what there 109's were capable of. I tend to agree.

How was the German fuel situation by late 1943? Also, could the jets have prevented the Soviets from occupy Romania and it's oil fields?

They felt babysitting bombers or carrying bombs was a waste of what there 109s were capable of. I tend to agree.

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They might have been right, but their theories were not going to win them the Battle of Britain, or for that matter, 'decimate' the RAF, as you put it. Your simplistic and inaccurate view doesn't take into account the actions of the British themselves to prevent the Germans from defeating the RAF, nor does it accept that the German bomber force tactics were a part of the LW's defeat. The British came the closest to losing when their 11 Group airfields were being systematically attacked by the bombers - the fact that there wasn't sufficient reconnaissance to determine exactly how much (or little) damage was being done was also a weakness of the LW. The German fighters were important, yes, but it was the bombers that held the key to a successful outcome for the LW. The Germans had the most accurate bombing force in the world during the BoB and they squandered the opportunity to use the technology they had to great advantage, that is, before the British came up with countermeasures to that technology.

One thing, how did we get from the Me 262 to Bf 109s in the Battle of Britain?

According to Hayworth ("Stopped At Stalingrad"), the Germans went through a bit of as fuel crisis in '42, and then staged a bit of a recovery in '43 as offensive movement started to thin out. The real nose dive occurred in the first six months of 44. However, having said all that ther was never anything like enough fuel to maintain a proper training regime, and this limited both the quantity and the quality of pilots. it also accounts for the massive fleet decommissionings and limited training times for the surface fleet as well which so affected the KM as the latter part of the war drew in.

Hayworth goes into considerable detail on this, but i havent got him her with me at the moment. i think also Murray does a similar analysis. i also have a commercialized version of the USSBS at home that might help in this issue

Don't know about "fantastic high speed handling." The Me 262. while it flew smoothly, was NOT a dogfighter and anythinhg could out-roll, and out-turn it. The climb was nothing spectacular, but WAS done at high forward speed, making it difficult to catch when climbing ... unless you were higher. The only hope the Me 262 had was boom and zoom tactics. If it ever tried to stay and fight, it was doomed.

No doubt it handled very well compared to other jets, but not the propeller fighters, which could turn and out-accelerate it. There are tales of a Meteor turning with a Tempest, but the Me 262 wasn't ever mentioned as a good turner in the war by anybody. It had two strengths only ... high speed and heavy armament. Everything else was 1st-generation jet ... which means not so good.

The Me 262 did OK against bombers flying at less than 200 mph, but with 509 to 542 claimed victories against 100 or so combat losses and some unknown number to operational casues, it isn't anything spectacular. We had piston fighters that did almost 4 times as well for the war. I don't know the real number (and don't know anyone else who does), but I feel safe in saying the Bf 109 did better, too, by a large margin.

So I'm thinking that large numbers of Me 262's would not have accomplished much except to focus attention on Allied jet development while the late pistons were handling the Me 262's, particularly as they landed or took off.

altsym said:

Again it wasn't the BF 109's fault. Command decisions hampered the 109 pilots efforts. If decisions were left to the pilots, the RAF would have been decimated.

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I think Stephen Bungay's Book "most Dangerous Enemy' has put that myth to rest.

No matter what the Luftwaffe did, the best it could have achieved was to lose more slowly.

Plus he debunked that myth about Goering's orders. Goering didn't say that at all. He left tactics up to the individual commanders wot work out, though he did gave them a kick for the Stuka and bomber losses. h also suspected, probably correctly, that some of the fighter pilots were more interested in their 'throat ache' than protecting bombers.

The correct way, which Galland followed (and innovated to a large extent) was for a layered defence of the bombers. Close (ish) escort, high cover and forward sweep. Plus fighters to rendezvous for return.
Exactly as the USAAF worked out later.

Problem was the Luftwaffe didn't have the number of fighters to be able to force enough attrition on the RAF to win. And their fighter production was too low and not enough pilots were being trained.
Park perfectly played to their weaknesses his performance, in all the many times in all the places that have war gamed the BoB, has never been beaten.

Realistically they needed twice or even three times as many fighters to begin with, to have a chance.

As for basic tactics, kill the bombers, then the fighters are irrelevant. Plus in terms of attrition, a bomber is far harder to replace (materially and crew wise) than a fighter.

If, at worst, you only kill one bomber per fighter lost (and the production and training levels are similar) then you win.

If more realistically each fighters takes out 2-5 bombers, then you thump them.

Take '43 for example, the Luftwaffe simultaneously beat the USAAF and RAF Bomber Command. But it's victory depended on a fragile factor, it's twins (Me-110s, Ju-88s and 410s), once the USAAF had a LR fighter, they were slaughtered and their SE engined fighters were too few, too poorly armed and/or too poor a performance to take up the load. Never again did they inflict the sort of kill/loss ratios needed that they managed before.

Note also, unlike (say) the BoB, their kill/loss ratios against bombers had to go up as the air battle over Germany went on, as the USAAF brought on stream more and more bombers and of course more and more escorts, meant that they were suffering greater fighter losses from the US fighters, while having to kill even more bombers.

Attritional warfare again, only in the opposite way to the BoB. The attackers, finally, won.

In this case, unlike the RAF in the BoB which was actually getting stronger as the battle went on (relative to the Luftwaffe), the Luftwaffe basically had the same amount of SE fighters in 44 as they had in 40 .. with mostly poorer pilots.

OldSkeptic said:

the Luftwaffe basically had the same amount of SE fighters in 44 as they had in 40 .. with mostly poorer pilots.

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Which is a very important point. In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1369 fighter (SE and TE) ready for the Battles of France and Britain. In May 1944 it had 1650.

Production had soared and yet numbers in service did not. In simple terms the more fighters the Luftwaffe put up, and you can include the Me 262 in this, the more the allies, particularly the USAAF shot down.
In the six months from January to June 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 2855 fighters in combat and a further 1345 to other causes. That's 4200 fighters, over two and a half times it's entire fighter establishment in six months.

Frankly the introduction of a few hundred Me 262s would have made very little difference to these figures, except to boost the "other causes" number.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Which is a very important point. In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1369 fighter (SE and TE) ready for the Battles of France and Britain. In May 1944 it had 1650.

Production had soared and yet numbers in service did not. In simple terms the more fighters the Luftwaffe put up, and you can include the Me 262 in this, the more the allies, particularly the USAAF shot down.
In the six months from January to June 1944 the Luftwaffe lost 2855 fighters in combat and a further 1345 to other causes. That's 4200 fighters, over two and a half times it's entire fighter establishment in six months.

Frankly the introduction of a few hundred Me 262s would have made very little difference to these figures, except to boost the "other causes" number.

Cheers

Steve

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And in terms of pilot/crew and machine quality they were at their best. The 109 outnumbered the Spits (it's only match at that time) very significantly and it was markedly superior to the Hurricane.
Their fighter pilots were significantly better trained and experienced than RAF ones.
Their fighter (and bomber) tactics were far better (took FC another year and BC tactics and technology took to late 42 to even get close).

At the BoB it was the Luftwaffe at it's absolute height. Blooded and hardened from the Spanish, Polish, French (etc) campaigns. With superb (and overall superior) equipment, incredibly well trained and experienced pilots and crews.

stona said:

Which is a very important point. In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1369 fighter (SE and TE) ready for the Battles of France and Britain. In May 1944 it had 1650.


Cheers

Steve

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This numbers may be true but you should also show the numbers at the opposite side in those years.
cimmex

cimmex said:

This numbers may be true but you should also show the numbers at the opposite side in those years.
cimmex

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According to Overy, on 19th June 1940 Fighter Command had 768 fighters in operational squadrons of which 520 were serviceable.

According to the USSBS in May 1944 the RAF and USAAF had 7706 and 5716 fighters in the ETO respectively. That's a total of 13,422. That's a grand total in the entire ETO and no indication of how many were operational. In any case it is vastly more than the Luftwaffe had available. Then there was the Soviets.

The total of allied aircraft in the ETO at this time was 25416, roughly ten times the total Luftwaffe establishment. Another reason why the Me 262 would not have had a significant impact.

You'll notice that whilst the number of fighters available to the Luftwaffe has remained roughly the same the RAF strength in the ETO alone has increased ten fold.

Cheers

Steve

Jenisch said:

How was the German fuel situation by late 1943? Also, could the jets have prevented the Soviets from occupy Romania and it's oil fields?

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www.conservapedia.com/Luftwaffe

Annual LW av-gas stores on hand

Which reflects the tonnage of bombs dropped on oil targets by the British and Americans, look at the jump in November '44. According to some this was pointless



Cheers

Steve

GregP said:

Don't know about "fantastic high speed handling." The Me 262. while it flew smoothly, was NOT a dogfighter and anythinhg could out-roll, and out-turn it. The climb was nothing spectacular, but WAS done at high forward speed, making it difficult to catch when climbing ... unless you were higher. The only hope the Me 262 had was boom and zoom tactics. If it ever tried to stay and fight, it was doomed.

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Utter nonsense. What you are saying goes for all jet fighters !
Pretty much every piston fighter could outmanoeuvre a jet, from the F-86 to an F-22.
And WW2 was all about boom and zoom attacks! How else do you think the P-38, P-47 and P-51 achieved air superiority over Germany and Japan? Speed and power, that is what WW2 brought to aerial combat.

Kris