Hunter crashes at shoreham airshow (2 Viewers)

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Looks like the 'knock on effect' has started.
Got an e-mail from Little Gransden Air Show, asking me to sign a petition against CAA changes to airshows in the UK.
Apart from some restrictions on displays (which I haven't fully read yet), charges for displays are set to increase, and this has already lead to show cancellations, one of which is the Sywell air show.
Could be bad news, particularly for organisers of smaller air displays.
 
I'm puzzled; how does increasing airshow operator's fees increase safety at the venue on the day? Increased CAA presence at flying displays is understandable; I worked at an airshow in the UK the week after the Biggin Hill crashes a number of years ago and we had a CAA guy in the tower keeping an eye on things; he grounded the Utterly Butterly Barnstormers for flying over the crowd line, but increasing fees by 100 percent? It would be better for event organisers if they could use that money to implement better safety at ground level on the day, not sending it to the CAA. Perhaps the CAA could send a rep to investigate each venue and make recommendations, which would be infinitely more useful to organisers and pilots, rather than making it more difficult for airshows to be held. Or is that the point?
 
Grant, I have a feeling your last sentence might be very close to the truth !
It's some years now since I was involved directly with General Aviation, and air show participation, but even back then, it seemed that CAA stood for 'Civil Aviation Abolishment', as they appeared to make things more and more difficult for private operators, airshow organisers and participants, and made even the simplest pamphlet (CAP) as complicated as possible.
 
Perhaps the CAA could send a rep to investigate each venue and make recommendations, which would be infinitely more useful to organisers and pilots, rather than making it more difficult for airshows to be held. Or is that the point?
That is likely to be even more expensive, unfortunately - CAAUK have people working for them that have no idea about aviation.

Much better to get the regulator completely out of the airshow picture, like we can do here. The more I read/hear stories like this, the more I appreciate our regulator (not that they don't have their own issues).
 
Much better to get the regulator completely out of the airshow picture, like we can do here. The more I read/hear stories like this, the more I appreciate our regulator (not that they don't have their own issues).

Yes indeed. I feel that (like a lot of things in this country) we don't really appreciate how fortunate we are by comparison to other countries. That's not going to happen in the UK though; the sheer scale of air events precludes it; we have nothing like the number of organisations wishing to hold airshows and fly-ins.
 
Compared to Aus the UKCAA are positively helpful and intelligent and the UK closely follow ICAO recommendations. Then again UKCAA do not believe in fairy tales like "Qantas has never had an accident"

OF MORE IMPORTANCE the first regulatory outcome caused the Shoreham accident is now available at
Proposed MPD 16-01 R1: Turbine Engines -Rolls-Royce Avon, Viper, Orpheus, Derwent and Nene series, de Havilland Goblin and Ghost series, Motorlet M701 series and Ivchenko AI-25 series: Engine Fuel System – Ageing Effects.
Due to its short life (ends on 29 Feb) I have attached it

For this particular item they do say "While not being considered a factor in the accident, the deterioration observed has been attributed by the manufacturer to ageing, chemical attack and air exposure."
 

Attachments

  • ProposedMPD1601R1.pdf
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Compared to Aus the UKCAA are positively helpful and intelligent and the UK closely follow ICAO recommendations. Then again UKCAA do not believe in fairy tales like "Qantas has never had an accident"

OF MORE IMPORTANCE the first regulatory outcome caused the Shoreham accident is now available at
Proposed MPD 16-01 R1: Turbine Engines -Rolls-Royce Avon, Viper, Orpheus, Derwent and Nene series, de Havilland Goblin and Ghost series, Motorlet M701 series and Ivchenko AI-25 series: Engine Fuel System – Ageing Effects.
Due to its short life (ends on 29 Feb) I have attached it

For this particular item they do say "While not being considered a factor in the accident, the deterioration observed has been attributed by the manufacturer to ageing, chemical attack and air exposure."
I opened up the document and read this proposal, it makes no sense as all of these engines are different and their fuel control units function differently. I've never seen an M701 fail because of rubber failing in the FCU and I've been working on L29s for about 15 years. Why didn't they list other older turbine engines for that matter?
 
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This is a proposed MPD. The engine types listed are those that the CAA deems potentially liable to degradation of 'rubber' parts in the fuel system/fuel pump. There is no suggestion that any of these engines have failed, yet, due to this issue.
I would imagine that all the types listed are operated in the UK under CAA regulations.
Cheers
Steve
 
This is a proposed MPD. The engine types listed are those that the CAA deems potentially liable to degradation of 'rubber' parts in the fuel system/fuel pump. There is no suggestion that any of these engines have failed, yet, due to this issue.
I would imagine that all the types listed are operated in the UK under CAA regulations.
Cheers
Steve
I understand that but without examining the FCU and the type of rubber used (if any), this is pretty baseless. Some Eastern European manufacturers do not provide a life limit on rubber based components and many times you would change a rubber seal "on condition."
 
It appears that the UKCAA is clutching at straws to reach a solution in this accident. The first report centered on Ejection seats and requiring more rigid inspection/documentation on cartridge life. This latest report proposes inspection/ life limiting FCUs and increased inspections for turbojet engines that have been preserved or in storage.
None of these requirements have any connection to, nor determined to be a cause of the accident. Is the UKCAA going back to the anti aviation mindset that killed the British aviation industry. Next thing we will see is the UKCAA requiring such requirements for piston powered aircraft that have FCUs and ejection seats. What will their requirement be for a person wanting to operate a T37 (pop up extraction seat) in the UK or an aircraft that has a pneumatic ejection system. Personally i feel they need to take a step back and return to the accident and look more in depth for the reason and make recommendations based on those facts.
 
I'm not privy to the internal workings of this investigation, but as far as I know no causal problem with the Hunter involved has been found. Obviously some concerns have been raised about fuel pump components and out of date cartridges in the ejection system, none of which seems unreasonable to me, though neither caused this accident. It is not the CAA's fault that the ejector seat manufacturer has decided not to support some older systems anymore. The requirement for such systems to be operational on certain types of aircraft is not new, nor is it related to this accident.
The CAA's responsibility is the regulation of flying in the UK to prevent further accidents and, as in this case, tragic deaths, not to apportion blame.
Cheers
Steve
 
Sometimes during the course of an investigation you uncover things unrelated to the incident under investigation that, none-the-less require attention. Doesn't mean that they caused the crash (in fact they specifically point out that it didn't contribute), just that there is an issue that the CAA believes needs resolving.

The ejection seat issue is, IMO really a non-event - just disable the system, as we have done to aircraft here in NZ. The only increased risk in this is to the pilot, and they have enough knowledge to accept the risk. As for the rubber seals - I don't really know enough to comment.
 
The ejection seat issue is, IMO really a non-event - just disable the system, as we have done to aircraft here in NZ. The only increased risk in this is to the pilot, and they have enough knowledge to accept the risk. As for the rubber seals - I don't really know enough to comment.

Agree. The thing about seals and O rings is that there are modern synthetic alternatives available within the aviation industry that could negate any potential issues. We carry out inspections on components based on schedules of maintenance that cover such things. The biggest limitation for the operators in that case would be cost and whether manufacturer or representative support for the installation of alternative o rings in fuel and hydraulic lines, but it's doable. Every manufacturer defers to operator experience when continuing to support aircraft and operators can make recommendations to manufacturers to implement alternative practices to what's stated in the manuals if the correct amount of evidence and support can be provided for it. Happens all the time in the airline industry.
 
All cases are different, but the CAA seems to consider that the ejection system, as fitted in the original design of a swept wing aircraft, is the only safe way of abandoning such an aircraft in flight. If it can be shown that the aircraft can safely be abandoned by other means then the CAA would be obliged to examine such evidence.

The fact that other authorities are prepared to allow such aircraft types to fly with non operational safety systems would be (and should be) irrelevant to the UK CAA.

Here the CAA refused to issue an ex RAF E.E. Lightning with a permit to fly to fly. The UK CAA considered that "in service accident data of the English Electric Lightning type of aircraft demonstrated a safety record which is considerably worse than other similar ex-military aircraft issued with a permit to fly in the UK'.
The UK CAA was also aware that the same owner had previously registered two Hawker Hunters, a Blackburn Buccaneer and an English Electric Canberra, all imported to South Africa and that all three types had subsequently been involved in accidents.

The Lightning was eventually shipped to South Africa and allowed to fly there, operated by Thunder City (SA registration ZU-BEX) with fatal consequences for the pilot. The SA CAA report into the accident makes for very uncomfortable reading.

Cheers

Steve
 
All cases are different, but the CAA seems to consider that the ejection system, as fitted in the original design of a swept wing aircraft, is the only safe way of abandoning such an aircraft in flight. If it can be shown that the aircraft can safely be abandoned by other means then the CAA would be obliged to examine such evidence.
The fact that an aircraft has swept wings is irrelevant and I think that people think that the swept wings carry some ejection seat mandate. It's all about speed and altitude. I flown in L29s, 39s Fougas, T-33s and F-4s and the only one of the bunch I would ever think of punching out of was the F-4 as all the carts were current and the seat was maintained by trained personnel, beside the thing landed at 175 knots!
The fact that other authorities are prepared to allow such aircraft types to fly with non operational safety systems would be (and should be) irrelevant to the UK CAA.
Agree, but one should look where and how the aircraft is being operated. I worked for a company that had operational F-4s. We has operational pylons that could drop expendable fuel tanks as well as bombs. We had to disable the system when operating within 30 miles of Los Angeles airspace. Up in the desert and around Mojave we just about did as we wanted within the parameters of our "operation limitations," a document issued by the FAA.
Here the CAA refused to issue an ex RAF E.E. Lightning with a permit to fly to fly. The UK CAA considered that "in service accident data of the English Electric Lightning type of aircraft demonstrated a safety record which is considerably worse than other similar ex-military aircraft issued with a permit to fly in the UK'.
The UK CAA was also aware that the same owner had previously registered two Hawker Hunters, a Blackburn Buccaneer and an English Electric Canberra, all imported to South Africa and that all three types had subsequently been involved in accidents.

The Lightning was eventually shipped to South Africa and allowed to fly there, operated by Thunder City (SA registration ZU-BEX) with fatal consequences for the pilot. The SA CAA report into the accident makes for very uncomfortable reading.

Cheers

Steve


Here's the accident report from that crash - there were a number of flags that should have alerted the pilot not to fly the aircraft. Air regulatory agencies can do their part to protect the aviation and general public, but they can't regulate common sense and poor decision making.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwi-5qKp4pXLAhUS4mMKHXo6BxQQFggcMAA&url=http://www.caa.co.za/Accidents%20and%20Incidents%20Reports/8706.pdf&usg=AFQjCNElGgf6snorjTOBt2ZBVD0_qp7dbg&bvm=bv.115339255,d.cGc
 
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